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This book presents experiences and insights gathered by a number 
of academics and policymakers through years of engagement with the 
thematic topic of informal, artisanal and small-scale mining, also known 
as ASM, the unprecedented rush by the global poor for commodities or 
jobs in extractive operations that have been unleashed by an increasingly 
resource-hungry world. My personal interest in the phenomenon began 
with my research into environmental and social changes that took place in 
mining areas during the mid-1990s in India. Those years roughly marked 
the beginning of a ‘mining boom’ in the country as the economy began 
to adopt more liberal economic policies. My early investigations of the 
impacts of mining on local environments and communities brought me 
to examine how—in the face of a degraded local environmental base—the 
communities living around mining areas survive. Around the coal-mining 
belt in eastern India had grown one of the world’s largest continuously 
urbanised tracts into which the cities and towns not only sucked in people 
from all around, but also absorbed the surrounding rural land—the built-
up tract expanding and transforming the rural areas. The undulating hills 
of the area began to be mined for stones and other construction material. 
Not only did the environment degrade but, with the expansion of mining 
and urban centres, the local peasantry began to decay as traditional rural 
farmers moved on to other, non-farm occupations, often working as wage 
labourers for contractors. These contractors were charged with procuring 
stones, and thus removed the overburdens, extracted the material for the 
mining companies, transported them to storage depots, loaded them 
onto the trucks and hauled them across all the sinews of transport—from 
the major arterial highways to local village roads, and narrow tracks that 
wound through the few bits of forests that were still left. This fundamental 
transformation of the social landscape was accomplished within the span 
of less than two decades. 
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This book takes up the much-needed task of investigating and explaining 
similar transformations—triggered by a number of ill-understood 
factors—that are sweeping through the mineral-rich tracts of countries 
in Africa, Latin America and Asia. In particular, the book deals with and 
puts under the microscope the political–economic processes of unleashing 
the extractive giants that have also pushed or lured the local communities 
to join in, leading to an extractivism unfamiliar to the industrialised 
world and hence cannot be explained by the same models of processes 
pertaining to that world. The extractivism of the poor creates an untidy 
and chaotic world that is difficult to explain and accommodate in the 
discourses of mining: of the triple bottom line, win–win solutions, 
unionised labour, corporate social responsibility, social licence to operate, 
sustainability and health and safety. Therefore, to shift the prevalent 
understanding of such mining as destructive to the environment, to make 
sense of the array of theoretical, conceptual and practical issues thrown 
up by it, to place them within the historical context and to relate them to 
the contemporary political economy of resource extraction is an urgent 
priority. The contributions in this book deal with a range of such issues 
pertaining to this little-understood world, attempting to make sense of it 
in different ways. It is also important to ‘get inside the belly of the beast’ 
to understand it, and several contributions from renowned scholars and 
practitioners help us understand a whole range of issues related to this 
kind of mining. Consequent to the immense variety that exists within 
informal, artisanal and small-scale mining, one can only expect the 
diversity of voices, interpretations and explanations that can be detected 
in these contributions.
Personally, it has been a long journey in understanding the social, 
economic and political aspects of the transformations of space and 
territories within which informal, artisanal and small-scale mining takes 
place. In this journey, I have benefited from having the privilege of 
knowing colleagues and receiving support from a number of organisations 
operating at the local, national and global levels. From India, my research 
took me to Indonesia, where a number of colleagues, including my 
dearest former PhD student Nina Lestari, gave me company in my early 
days of visiting remote locations, to Lao PDR, where I was fortunate to 
know Chansouk Invouvanh who exposed me to the fascinating history 
of Phon Tiu mine, and to Mongolia, where Hishgee Dondov took me 
deep into the rangelands of the Middle Gobi to observe how the lives 
of nomadic herders are changing in the face of the onslaught of mining. 
All three helped me to appreciate the vastly different contexts, allowing 
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me to expand my vision and deepen my understanding. Besides the three 
mentioned, I am grateful to a number of individuals at a personal level for 
sharing their insights, which have enriched my intellectual journey. There 
are far too many for me to name each one of them individually within this 
space. I will name only two persons: Dr David Williams, my husband and 
partner in crime, who walked the rough paths with me, and my younger 
son, Ovimanyu Dutt, who made the great sacrifice of spending days and 
nights alone so that his mother could sprint around. I am grateful to both.
Besides individuals, a number of organisations need to be acknowledged. 
In the early years, the Communities and Small-Scale Mining (CASM) 
group (now defunct) offered two lots of development grants to establish 
the ASM Asia-Pacific Learning Network in 2004 and 2005. This allowed 
me to reach out to ordinary people, to build partnerships with them in 
a  context that was characterised by a lack of knowledge at that time. 
The network is still alive at www.asmasiapacific.com. In more recent years, 
in 2013, the Australian Research Council generously provided funding for 
an action research project, titled ‘Beyond the Resource Curse: Charting 
a Path to Sustainable Livelihoods for Mineral-Dependent Communities’ 
(Discovery Project DP130104396). This project examined—jointly 
with civil society partners based in India—micro-level mineral-based 
livelihoods, placing them in context of the local history of agrarian 
transition. As a metal detector manufacturing company came forward to 
invest in the understanding of informal and artisanal gold-mining, with 
them as partners and jointly with my colleague Dr Keith Barney, I received 
funding yet again from the Australian Research Council for a  project 
titled ‘Going for Gold: Safe Livelihoods for Informal Gold Miners in 
South and Southeast Asia’ (Linkage Project LP130100942). Together, 
the projects attempted to shift scholarly attention from viewing informal 
miners only as environment destroyers, to the context of poverty and rural 
political economy within which the mining communities operate. I thank 
the Resources, Environment and Development Group in the Crawford 
School of Public Policy where these projects were based. They culminated 
in a major international conference in 2015 that was held at The Australian 
National University, which also provided additional funding. Selected 
papers from the conference have undergone phases of reviews, revision 
and copy-editing to form a part of this book. Finally, I  thank the Asia 
Research Institute of the National University of Singapore for offering me 





Professor Saleem H. Ali
Saleem H. Ali holds the Blue and Gold Distinguished Professorship 
in Energy and the Environment at the University of Delaware, and is 
also a  Senior Fellow at Columbia University’s Center on Sustainable 
Investment and Georgetown University’s Center for Australia, New 
Zealand and Pacific Studies. Professor Ali has held the Chair in Sustainable 
Resources Development at the University of Queensland’s Sustainable 
Minerals Institute in Brisbane, Australia (where he retains professorial 
affiliation). Previously, he was Professor of Environmental Studies at the 
University of Vermont’s Rubenstein School of Natural Resources, where 
he was founding director of the Institute for Environmental Diplomacy 
and Security. His books include Treasures of the Earth: Need, Greed, 
and a Sustainable Future (2009, Yale University Press); Environmental 
Diplomacy: Negotiating More Effective Global Agreements (with Lawrence 
Susskind; 2015, Oxford University Press); and Mining, the Environment, 
and Indigenous Development Conflicts (2003, University of Arizona Press). 
Corporate and government experience includes employment in General 
Electric’s Technical Leadership Program, a Baker Foundation Fellowship 
at Harvard Business School and a Research Internship at the UK House 
of Commons. He was chosen as a Young Global Leader by the World 
Economic Forum in 2011 and received an Emerging Explorer award from 
the National Geographic Society in 2010 and joined the United Nations 
International Resource Panel in 2017. Saleem received his doctorate in 
environmental planning from MIT, a masters degree in environmental 
studies from Yale University and a bachelor’s degree in chemistry from 
Tufts University (summa cum laude).
BeTWeeN THe PLOUGH AND THe PICK
xiv
Dr Keith Barney
Keith Barney is a Lecturer in Resources, Environment and Development 
Program at the Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian 
National University. He has conducted research on sustainable forestry 
and  land management issues in Southeast Asia for the past 14 years, 
including fieldwork in Lao PDR, Thailand, Malaysia, Cambodia and 
Vietnam. His conceptual interests lie at the intersections between 
political ecology, economic geography and agrarian studies. Keith has also 
conducted policy-based research with a number of international public 
policy organisations, including Forest Trends, the Rights and Resources 
Initiative and the Center for International Forestry Research, on issues 
relating to Asian forest markets and sustainable trade, land tenure and 
resource rights, and the implications of China’s resource demand for local 
communities and ecologies in Southeast Asia.
Dr Sara Beavis
Sara Beavis is a Senior Lecturer at the Fenner School of Environment 
and Society at The Australian National University, where she teaches 
core courses on water science at undergraduate and graduate levels 
and undertakes research on water and sediment interactions and water 
resources management. She has published numerous papers on water and 
sediment geochemistry, and the impacts of natural and anthropogenic 
processes on water quality and water security. Her current research 
includes examining the impacts of climate variability on water security 
in the Pacific, the implications of climate variability and change on water 
and sediment quality in inland and coastal riverine environments, and 
the transport and fluxes of heavy metals associated with artisanal mining 
(in eastern Indonesia).
Dr Carmel Bofinger
Carmel Bofinger holds the position of Associate Professor at the Minerals 
Industry Safety and Health Centre within the Sustainable Minerals 
Institute at the University of Queensland. Carmel has a Masters of 
Environment and Community Health, and her role involves education 
and training, consultancies, project work and research in health and safety 
in the mining and minerals processing industry. She has previously worked 
independently and for mining companies and government agencies as 
a specialist occupational health and safety (OHS) and risk management 
xv
NOTeS ON CONTRIBUTORS
consultant. Carmel also has extensive experience in providing training 
and education in OHS in large- and small-scale mining in many countries 
including Ghana, Mongolia, Zambia and Madagascar.
Professor Deborah Fahy Bryceson
Deborah Bryceson is a Research Associate at the African Studies 
Centre and the International Gender Studies Centre/International 
Development Centre, Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford University. She 
is currently a Reader in the School of Geographical and Earth Sciences 
at the University of Glasgow. She holds bachelor and masters degrees in 
geography from the University of Dar es Salaam, and a DPhil (sociology) 
from Oxford University. Her long-standing interest in rural and urban 
areas has involved extensive research into the interaction of livelihood, 
mobility and settlement in East Africa, and elsewhere on the African 
continent. Her early work spanned the topics of African food security, 
staple food markets, agricultural policy, rural transport and gender 
divisions of labour. During the 1990s, she pioneered the comparative 
study of the deagrarianisation processes in Africa, focusing on rural income 
diversification and associated household and community responses. 
More recently, she has concentrated her research  on urban economies, 
urban growth and mobility patterns. Her current interests embrace the 
comparative study of East Africa’s coastal cities, livelihood frontiers in 
Tanzanian mining and trading settlements, and the economic and social 
impact of HIV/AIDS.
Dr Arnab Roy Chowdhury
Arnab Roy Chowdhury is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Public Policy 
Department in the Higher School of Economics (HSE), Moscow. 
Arnab received his PhD in Sociology from the National University of 
Singapore (NUS) in 2014. Prior to joining HSE, he taught in the 
Indian Institute of Management, Calcutta, and was a Postdoctoral 
Researcher in  the Department of Communications and New Media 
at NUS. He  was  previously a University Grants Commission – Junior 
Research Fellow in Jawaharlal Nehru University and Indian Institute of 
Technology, Delhi. He has published a number of papers in international 
journals such as Progress in Development Studies, Development in Practice, 
and Social Movements Studies. He is also currently working on converting 
his doctoral thesis into a monograph. His research and teaching interests 
BeTWeeN THe PLOUGH AND THe PICK
xvi
include forced migration, extractive industries, social movements, 
state–society relations, environmental sociology and post-colonial and 
subaltern studies.
Professor David Cliff
David Cliff was appointed Professor of Occupational Health and 
Safety in Mining and Director of Minerals Industry Safety and Health 
Centre (MISHC) at the University of Queensland, Australia in 2011. 
His primary role is providing education, applied research and consulting 
in health and safety in the mining and minerals processing industry. 
He has been at MISHC over 15 years. As part of the International Mining 
for Development program at the University of Queensland, funded by 
the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, David gained extensive 
experience in providing training and education in OHS in mining to 
many countries, focusing on developing capacity within governments in 
developing countries. He has also undertaken similar work for the World 
Health Organization. He is currently supervising the PhD research of 
a  number of students from developing countries looking at ways to 
improve the OHS of mining in their countries.
Stacie Constantian
Stacie Constantian, MPH, is a research coordinator at the Harvard 
Humanitarian Initiative. She has eight years of experience working and 
living in developing countries, including two years as a Peace Corps 
Volunteer in Ecuador. She has conducted research evaluations in Uganda, 
Ecuador, Guatemala and Egypt, specialising in health applications 
of mixed-methods research in post-conflict settings.
Dr Marjo de Theije
Marjo de Theije is an Associate Professor at the Department of Social 
and Cultural Anthropology of Vrije Universiteit (VU), Amsterdam, 
and part-time member of the Centro de Estudios y Documentación 
Latinoamericanos (CEDLA) research staff. She received her PhD in social 
sciences at Utrecht University in 1999. Currently, she is also the academic 
director of VU Brasil Academic Program at VU University, and coordinates 
several international research projects. In her current research, she focuses 
on the cultural, social, economic and environmental aspects of small-scale 
gold-mining in the Amazon region (Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Peru and 
Suriname). Uncontrolled polluting activities of small-scale gold-mining 
often threaten the livelihoods of indigenous peoples. Cross-border 
tensions arise when miners from one country invade another, or smuggle 
xvii
NOTeS ON CONTRIBUTORS
gold between countries. With the recent instability in the world economy 
driving up the price of gold, and with mining techniques becoming 
more mechanised, the scale of the impact is increasing. Few national 
governments know how to respond to these developments and evidence-
based policy responses are urgently required. These are what this project 
aims to provide. 
Professor Katherine C. Donahue
Katherine C. Donahue is Professor of Anthropology and Chair of the 
Social Science Department at Plymouth State University, Plymouth, 
New Hampshire, United States. Her research is centred on environmental 
and social justice. She has done fieldwork in France, Tanzania and the 
United States. Her publications include Slave of Allah: Zacarias Moussaoui 
v. The USA (2007, Pluto Press) and, with David C. Switzer, Steaming to 
the North: The First Summer Cruise of the US Revenue Cutter Bear, Alaska 
and Chukotka, Siberia, 1886 (2014, University of Alaska Press).
Dr Nicholas Garrett
Nicholas Garrett is a Director at RCS Global. He  is a leading ASM 
consultant who has directed or led over 50 projects globally for companies, 
development organisations, governments and non-government 
organisations, particularly in complex, conflict-affected and high-risk 
areas. He completed a PhD (cum laude) on ASM and conflict minerals 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo at the Freie Universität Berlin, 
and holds an MSc in International Development Management from the 
London School of Economics.
Dr Maureen Hassall
Maureen Hassall holds a PhD in cognitive systems engineering, an 
MBA, and bachelor’s degrees in engineering and psychology. Her research 
focuses on utilitising leading-edge human factors approaches to improve 
industrial risk management in ways that can help entities achieve better 
health, safety, well-being and business outcomes. Maureen’s work involves 
delivering applied research, training and consulting services direct to 
industry, and to undergraduate and postgraduate students at the University 
of Queensland. Her work is motivated by over 18 years of working in 
industry, addressing various human and system operational challenges 
from a range of roles, including specialist engineering, line management, 
organisational change and business performance improvement roles.
BeTWeeN THe PLOUGH AND THe PICK
xviii
Professor Amalendu Jyotishi
Amalendu Jyotishi is Professor at Amrita School of Business (Bangalore 
Campus), Amrita Vishwa Vidyapeetham and the adjunct faculty of 
University at Buffalo (SUNY). He has a PhD in economics from the 
Institute for Social and Economic Change, Bangalore, where he worked 
on the ecological economic issues of swidden agricultural systems. He 
also received the VKRV Rao Memorial Best PhD Thesis Award from the 
Institute for Social and Economic Change. His research covers issues 
relating to natural resources and institutions, on the one hand, and 
innovation, entrepreneurship in information technology business, on the 
other, both from an institutional economics perspective. Recently, he has 
been working on the issues relating to fish for food security in city regions, 
iron smelting and deforestation, informal gold-mining and climate 
change vulnerability issues, as well as innovation and cultural issues 
relating to small business including information technology business. He 
has published his research in journals, books, edited volumes and working 
papers. He is one of the core research members of Asian Initiative on 
Legal Pluralism and was the coordinator of the group from 2012 to 
2015. Amalendu has collaborated in research projects supported by 
organisations such as the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research 
(NWO), Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), World 
Bank, International Water Management Institute (IWMI), Oxfam (Great 
Britain) Trust, Aga Khan Rural Support Program (India), South Asian 
Network for Development and Environmental Economics (SANDEE), 
Australian Research Council (ARC) and Sir Ratan Tata Trust. 
Joycelyn Kelly
Jocelyn Kelly is the Director of the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative’s 
Women in War program, where she designs and implements projects 
to examine issues related to gender, peace and security in fragile states. 
She has been conducting health-related research using qualitative and 
quantitative research methods for over eight years, both in national 
and international settings. Her international work has focused on 





Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt is a Professor at the Crawford School of Public Policy, 
ANU College of Asia and the Pacific, The Australian National University. 
Kuntala has extensively researched the social and ecological politics and 
gender equity issues related to extractive industries since 1993–94, initially 
in India and later on in other Asian countries such as Indonesia, Lao PDR 
and Mongolia. In particular, she has written on gender and livelihood 
issues in both large, industrial mining and in informal, artisanal and small-
scale mines and quarries on the displacement of peasantry and indigenous 
peoples, and on the transformations of land and livelihoods in mining 
areas. A related field of research comprises the social and gender equity 
issues that are expressed at different geographical scales in water resource 
management. She has published on the livelihoods of poor and immigrants 
living on ecological boundaries of land and water, on chars or river islands 
in her book Dancing with the River: People and Life on the Chars of South 
Asia (2013, Yale University Press; co-authored with Gopa Samanta). Other 
books include In Search of a Homeland: Anglo-Indians and McCluskiegunge 
(1990, Minerva, Kolkata); Women Miners in Developing Countries: 
Pit Women and Others (2006, Ashgate; co-edited with Martha Macintyre); 
Fluid Bonds: Views on Gender and Water (2006, Stree, Kolkata); Water First: 
Issues and Challenges for Nations and Communities in South Asia (2008, Sage; 
co-edited with Robert Wasson); Gendering the Field: Towards Sustainable 
Livelihoods for Mining Communities (2011, ANU E Press); Doing Gender, 
Doing Geography: Emerging Research in India (2011, Routledge; co-edited 
with Saraswati Raju); The Coal Nation: Histories, Ecologies and Politics of 
Coal in India (2014, Ashgate); and Experiencing and Coping with Change: 
Women-Headed Households in the Eastern Gangetic Plains (2014, Australian 
Centre for International Agricultural Research).  
Gernelyn Logrosa
Gernelyn Logrosa is a PhD candidate at the Minerals Industry Safety and 
Health Centre, University of Queensland. She holds bachelor and masters 
degrees in metallurgical engineering at the University of the Philippines. 
Gernelyn has several years of experience working with artisanal and small-
scale miners, operators and ASM cooperatives in the Philippines, through 
fieldwork and forums, as Research Specialist of the Cleaner Mining 
Technologies, Engineering Research, and Development for Technology 
of the Department of Science and Technology. Gernelyn has also worked 
as Chief Metallurgical Engineer for mining projects in the Philippines.  
BeTWeeN THe PLOUGH AND THe PICK
xx
Lynda Lawson
Lynda Lawson is Manager (Knowledge Transfer) at the Centre for 
Social Responsibility in Mining at the University of Queensland, and 
has extensive experience designing and delivering training programs for 
industry and government in Europe, Australia, Asia-Pacific, Africa and 
South America. She speaks fluent French and has a particular interest in 
mining and development in Madagascar and Francophone Africa. She 
is a PhD student at the University of Queensland, and her research area 
is artisanal mining, the mining of gemstones in Africa, women miners and 
entrepreneurship. 
Danellie Lynas
Danellie Lynas is a Research Fellow and PhD candidate within 
the Minerals  Industry Safety and Health Centre at the University 
of Queensland. Recently, she has been working with the Minerals 
Commission of Ghana to capacity build within the inspectorate to 
enable development and delivery of OHS training specifically targeting 
formal artisanal and small-scale mining. Past roles have included projects 
related to improving safety in mining equipment design, new mining 
technologies, injury prevention strategies and health-related policy review 
at corporate level. To date, her PhD research data collection has been 
undertaken in Papua New Guinea and Ghana.
Professor Andrew McWilliam
Andrew McWilliam is a Professor of Anthropology at Western Sydney 
University. Andrew’s research interests are Timor ethnography, minorities 
and governance in Indonesia and East Timor, customary land and 
resource tenures, forms of religious practice in eastern Indonesia, mining 
and development, applied anthropology in economic development and 
Australian Aboriginal customary land interests and cultural heritage.
Dr Daniele Moretti
Daniele Moretti is an experienced sustainability consultant with 
particular expertise in ASM in the Asia-Pacific. He has worked for research 
organisations, governments and companies, including both producers 
and manufacturers. His PhD in social anthropology (Brunel University) 
focused on ASM in Papua New Guinea. He also holds an MSc in human 
xxi
NOTeS ON CONTRIBUTORS
resource management from the London School of Economics. Before 
his work as a consultant, he  was Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the 
University of Cambridge and a lecturer at Brunel University.
Dr Rachel Perks
Rachel Perks is a Senior Mining Specialist within the Oil, Gas and 
Mining Unit of the Energy and Extractives Global Practice of the World 
Bank. She is based in Washington, DC, and provides technical assistance 
on ASM to several mining lending projects within her unit. Prior to 
joining the World Bank, she worked and lived for 12 years in the Horn 
and Central Africa. The focus of her work has been on managing the 
transition from conflict to peace in countries where natural resources have 
played a catalytic role in conflict, and may equally play a catalytic role in 
state building. Her PhD was on the formalisation of artisanal mining in 
Rwanda.
Dr Phuong Pham
Phuong Pham, PhD, is an Assistant Professor at the Harvard Medical 
School and Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, and Director 
of Evaluation and Implementation Science at the Harvard Humanitarian 
Initiative. She has over 15 years of experience in designing and 
implementing epidemiologic and evaluation research, technology 
solutions and educational programs in ongoing and post-conflict 
countries such as northern Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Rwanda, Central African Republic, Iraq, Cambodia, Colombia and other 
areas affected by mass violence and humanitarian crisis. She co-founded 
peacebuildingdata.org (a portal of peace building, human rights and 
justice indicators) and KoBoToolbox (a suite of software for digital data 
collection and visualisation).
Professor Ton Salman
Ton Salman studied philosophy and anthropology at the University 
of Amsterdam and also did his PhD there in 1993, on shanty-town 
organisations  in Chile under dictatorship. After working at several 
Dutch, Chilean and Ecuadorean universities, he is now established at the 
Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam, in the position of Associate Professor 
and head of  the Department of Social and Cultural Anthropology. 
His  research  interests include social movements, democratisation, 
citizenship, ethnicity and small-scale gold-mining. Among his recent 
publications are (2015, with Felix Carrillo and Carola Soruco) ‘Small-scale 
BeTWeeN THe PLOUGH AND THe PICK
xxii
mining cooperatives and the  state in Bolivia: Their histories, memories 
and negotiation strategies’, in Extractive Industries and Society 2(2), 
360–67, and (2016) ‘The intricacies of being able to work undisturbed: 
The  organization of  alluvial gold-mining in Bolivia’, in Society and 
Natural Resources 29(9), 1124–38.
Professor Ranabir Samaddar
Ranabir Samaddar is the Director of the Calcutta Research Group, and 
belongs to the School of Critical Thinking. He has pioneered, along with 
others, peace studies programs in South Asia. He has worked extensively 
on issues of justice and rights in the context of conflicts in South Asia. 
The much-acclaimed The Politics of Dialogue (2004, Ashgate) was the 
culmination of his work on justice, rights and peace. His  particular 
researches have been on migration and refugee studies, the theory and 
practices of dialogue, nationalism and post-colonial statehood in South 
Asia, and new regimes of technological restructuring and labour control. 
He has authored a three-volume study of Indian nationalism, Whose Asia 
Is It Anyway?: Nation and The Region in South Asia (1996), The Marginal 
Nation: Transborder Migration from Bangladesh to West Bengal (1999), and 
A Biography of the Indian Nation, 1947–1997 (2001). His recent political 
writings published in the form of a two-volume account, The Materiality 
of Politics (2007, Anthem Press), and Emergence of the Political Subject 
(2009, Sage) have challenged some of the prevailing accounts of the birth 
of nationalism and the nation state, and have signalled a new turn in 
critical post-colonial thinking.
Professor Sashi Sivramkrishna
Sashi Sivramkrishna did his masters in economics from the University 
of Bombay, Mumbai, and went on to complete his PhD at Cornell 
University, USA. He is currently Professor of Economics at the School of 
Business Management, Narsee Monjee Institute for Management Studies, 
Bangalore. His areas of research include contemporary macroeconomics, 
as well as economic and environmental history. His recent work has 
been published in the Journal of International Development,  Journal of 
Human Development and Capabilities, International Journal of Agricultural 
Resources, Governance and Ecology,  Environment and History, Global 
Environment, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, and 
Economic and Political Weekly. His book, In Search of Stability: Economics 
of Money, History of the Rupee (2015, Routledge), traces the history 
of the rupee from 1542 to 1971. Sashi is also an ardent documentary 
xxiii
NOTeS ON CONTRIBUTORS
filmmaker;  his films have been screened at international film festivals 
including the Royal Anthropological Institute International Festival 
of Ethnographic Film (UK) and Days of Ethnographic Films (Russia), 
as well as on India’s national television channel (Doordarshan) and the 
National Geographic Channel.
Professor Alexandra Urán
Alexandra Urán is a Professor at the Anthropology Department of the 
Universidad de Antioquia in Medellín, Colombia. She has a bachelor’s 
degree in mining engineering and anthropology, a masters degree in 
environmental anthropology from Kent University, England, and a PhD 
in sociology and social sciences from Kassel Universität, Germany. She is 
a senior researcher at the National System of Social and Environmental 
Research. She studies issues associated with the relationship between 
exploitation of natural resources and governance, ethnography of the state 
and natural resources and socio-political conflicts in Colombia. Recently, 
her projects have been focused on the development of artisanal mining in 
indigenous communities, and Afro-descendants’ land in the Chocó region 
of the Colombian Pacific and in the Colombian Amazon. She is also an 
active researcher of the GOMIAM International Network (a knowledge 
network on small-scale gold mining and social conflicts in the Amazon), 
with insight into mining-related conflicts by comparing various cases in 




Reframing the debate 
on informal mining
Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt
It is common to see slums comprising makeshift housing, innumerable 
squatters, pavement-dwellers and street vendors occupying space in 
urban centres of Global South countries. They contain people who have 
migrated from rural areas in search of better living, people who carry out 
most of their trade in cash, or work in small workshops that manufacture 
components for larger industrial units. Together, these countless 
(and often uncounted) people, businesses, workshops and their services 
and produce comprise a significant part of their country’s economy. They 
add value to the services and goods that make up most of the economy 
of the countries that comprise ‘most of the world’ (Chatterjee 2004: 59). 
However, these people and their economic contributions remain unknown 
or poorly known, loosely governed and mostly unrecorded, at times 
illegitimate, and often at the mercy of the state’s law enforcement. Very 
large numbers of people constitute this economy and make a living within 
it while negotiating with the state and its various arms, and they remain 
unconsidered by the discussions in the formal parts of the economy.
Millions of poor all over the mineral tracts of Global South countries 
labour in a range of mineral extractive practices; some operations are 
small-scale, some are licensed, others evade tax payments and some have 
been traditionally carried out for generations in contrast to more recent 
establishments. Practices occur across the spectrum of mining, from the 
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most artisanal and individual opportunistic enterprises to licensed small-
scale firms that hire labourers on contract. Final products often reach non-
local or even foreign markets. These mineral practices and those involved 
make up the subject matter of this book. These multitudes are from diverse 
origins, but ones located between the plough and the pick, sometimes 
shifting between both. Their livelihood choices and the  context within 
which they take them up are still poorly understood, the conceptual 
problems they create by engagement with global commodity markets are 
not yet adequately debated, and the serious consequences of their labour 
for their own well-being and for the local environment of the areas where 
they operate pose an urgent problem for scholarly articulation. Miners 
use mercury for gold extraction, care little for rehabilitation of denuded, 
deforested and disturbed land, and have been at times marginalised and 
ostracised as reckless environmental and social criminals. Neither these 
people, nor their practices, have been at the forefront of debates on 
resource extraction, nor have they been interrogated in light of recent 
theoretical advancements in understanding the political economy of 
livelihood diversification and transformations of rural society. These 
informal extractive practices are described as artisanal and small-scale 
mining (ASM), implying that it is a ‘sector’ or smaller part of the resource 
extractive economy, and a problematic one. This definition, with clear 
indication to its sectoral belonging, leaves unanswered questions about 
its relationship with rural transformation, with globalisation and 
development processes, with the advent of large-scale extractive operations 
and extractivist economic policies followed by states, and with migration 
and labour studies intensely scrutinised through Marxist analyses. 
One aspect of the problem centres on the question of developing a deeper 
understanding of a fluid, marginal and extremely poor people, and their 
livelihood changes under diverse pressures. This book proposes resolution 
through deep engagement with the problem holistically and through 
a multidisciplinary approach. 
The term ‘informal mining’ in the book’s title adds some clarity by 
informing readers that the type of mining dealt with is part of the heavily 
populated informal economy, in which ‘most of the people’ in mining 
today are concentrated, and which is primarily found in countries that 
Chatterjee (2004) describes as ‘most of the world’. Such mining practices, 
even when licensed or legal but on a smaller scale, are characterised 
by informality in labour and production structures, and the rules and 
norms that determine practices. Several contributors to this book have 
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used the more widely accepted global acronym ‘ASM’, and I reiterate 
that no difference is implied by my preferred use of the term ‘informal 
mining’. Some ASM scholars interpret ‘informality’ to mean ‘illegal’ 
mining activities (for example, Verbrugge 2015) or extra-legal, following 
De Soto’s argument1 (Siegel and Veiga 2009); however, a wider and more 
complex understanding of the reality of informality is possible. The term 
‘artisanal’ conveys labour intensiveness, low technology and low capital 
investment common to mineral extraction processes and their essentially 
premodern labour organisation.2 The ennobling connotation of the term 
‘artisan’ can be a misnomer, however. The confusion is perhaps why the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) consistently used a scale-based 
nomenclature in its various publications (Jennings 1999).
The use of ‘informal’ also adds a political–economic dimension to 
ASM literature that is increasingly nuanced and enriched by a range of 
explanatory approaches. The designation not only implies its contrasting 
binary in the formal economy to enable us to think broadly about 
a pluralistic, hybrid economy of resource use,3 but also draws attention to 
the condition of informality,4 besides aspects of labour (such as division 
and exploitation of labour) and aspects of production (such as simple 
reproduction with inexpensive and simple instruments sometimes for 
subsistence) within the practices and communities (Porter et al. 2011). 
It draws attention to the global politics over resources within which ASM 
has grown—neoliberal economic policies based on distinction between 
public and private property rights, and unitary and stable ownership 
based on the ‘fixing of values’—to allow us to more easily understand ‘the 
constant negotiability of value and the unmapping of space’ (Roy  and 
1  This argument suggests that people take ‘the other path’ because of procedural difficulties and 
delays, and advises a cutting down of bureaucratic formalities associated with obtaining a licence.
2  Artisans are usually known to be endowed with a tradition of the craft they practice (Littrel and 
Dickson 2010). Although some peasants might have a generational history of mining as their primary 
occupation, as in the case of the Banjara tribe in South Kalimantan, Indonesia, or some communities 
amongst the Bheels in Central India, today’s peasant miners are, in most cases, first-generation miners 
moving away from agriculture.
3  More details of this way of thinking about the economy as a whole are found in various works of 
Hart (2010), Gibson-Graham (2006) and Amin (2009), who emphasise that all human action always 
has some measure of informality.
4  The idea of informality is generally associated with modes of human settlements and is more widely 
debated within the urban context where settlement, housing and trade operate outside of legal structures 
but in full vision, cohabiting and sharing the space with more formal structures. Porter et al. (2011) 
argue that these are the ‘other’ of the way spatial planning envisions ordered social spaces, and hence 
are often presented as a law enforcement or policy problem. However, the basic questions are related to 
property rights—the rights to say who can do what and where—and issues around sustainability.
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Al Sayyad 2004: 5). Property rights characteristics can also be seen in a more 
nuanced manner. When viewed from a historical perspective, property 
rights can be beyond the simplistic binary of public and private, or formal 
and informal. Jyotishi et al. (2017) illustrate this by using the dimensions 
of ‘excludability’ and ‘rivalry’ to identify a matrix of institutions governing 
artisanal gold-mining activities in an Indian context. They show that 
institutions governing mining not only move from informal to the formal 
sphere, but can also move in a reverse direction. Again, even within formal 
there are shades and layers of informality when labour arrangements are 
considered. In an analysis of the multiple coal-mining economies in 
India, using detailed empirical data from the field, Lahiri-Dutt (2016) 
shows how the formal and informal overlap and intermingle with each 
other to produce ‘diverse worlds’ of coal mining in India. ASM has been 
changing the global reliable and familiar map of mineral extraction in 
recent decades, pushing resource and commodity frontiers (Hilson 2013) 
and establishing capitalist frontiers. From the analytical perspective, the 
political–economic framework is expansive enough to accommodate 
considerable social and economic diversities apparent in the experiences 
and practices of informal, artisanal and small-scale mining.
Drawing on the previous example, these mines and the miners are 
squatters on the contemporary extractive landscape and collectively 
comprise a radically different kind of mining commonly envisaged by 
the term ‘mining’ in the context of industrialised, large-scale extractive 
operations. These mines and quarries redefine what is generally seen as 
the extractive economy at global and national scales of interpretation. 
Heavily capitalised and industrialised operations that have been the 
dominant mode of mineral resource extraction since the industrial 
revolution in Europe and the New World replaced the chaotic, ruthless 
world that had been unleashed by rushes for mineral resources in Australia 
and North America. Yet, their hegemony within our thought processes 
make us forget that the poor—in their desperate attempt to survive and 
make a living in the globalised world, and suffering from dispossession 
and unforeseen social, economic and political pressures—are no longer 
completely outside the wider political–economic processes influencing 
resource extraction (Smith 2011). They also make us forget that mining 
has a long history as an ancient livelihood in many of these countries, 
where modern industrial production has not kept pace with the rapidity 
with which they were incorporated within the global economy.
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It is well documented that labourers in artisanal or informal mineral 
extraction practices are often the poorest and most exploited labourers, 
often erstwhile peasants caught in global change, and performing insecure 
and dangerous tasks. Although located at the margins of the mainstream 
mining economy, their extractive practices produce enormous amounts of 
mineral resources, securing a livelihood (and often a path out of poverty) for 
some. Although labourers in informal ASM comprise the poorest, they are 
also inextricably engaged with, or bound to, global commodity values and 
supply chains. As cheap labour, they are intimately involved in production 
of new extractive territories and rural economies by complicating what is 
meant by resource access and control. As migrant rural labour, they reshape 
agrarian communities and landscapes. Collectively, these miners also 
redefine our understanding of political economies, political ecologies and 
resource geographies of commodity extraction. This social and economic 
milieu also holds significant implications for scholarly understandings 
of contemporary mineral-dependent livelihoods, agrarian transitions, 
informality and the social meanings of destitution and poverty.
Diversity and difficulties of explanation
Almost all mineral-rich tracts in poorer countries of the Asia-Pacific, 
Africa and Latin America now have millions of squatters, labouring and 
making a living through mining in various scales and capacities, 
and together throwing up important conceptual and practical challenges. 
The great diversity of labour and production systems, organisations and 
mining practices blur the binary distinction between the formal 
and  informal as they are commonly understood. In the context of 
a particular mineralised tract, mineral extraction ranges from smaller-scale 
mines and quarries worked by casual labourers in a few large enterprises—
which run mechanised operations on reasonably sized leases and compete 
with many smaller firms with lower capital investment and production—
to innumerable producers working their own land, most likely without 
licence or lease, using family labour, including children, and producing 
tiny amounts. Similarly, minerals extracted range from most to least 
valuable for many purposes: precious and semi-precious gemstones and 
metals such as gold; other metal ores such as copper, zinc, manganese, 
fluorspar and tin and coltan; industrial minerals such as limestone 
and marble; rare earths; and construction materials, including kaolins, 
feldspars, clays, sand and gravel. Together, 15 to 20 per cent of all global 
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minerals and metals, including up to 80 per cent of all sapphires and up 
to 30 per cent of gold, is estimated to be produced in this way (Sippl and 
Selin 2012). 
The mineral extractive practices have elements of petty commodity 
production, localised production, circulation and appropriation. These 
practices range from individual opportunistic enterprises to licensed 
small-scale firms hiring contract labourers. Although the labour is 
primarily for subsistence, extracted materials may fulfil wider market 
needs beyond those of a household or village community, and cannot be 
described simply as production for use rather than for exchange. Such 
mining may involve capital investment in trade and usury, and generate 
rent in kind rather than in money. But it also exhibits characteristics of 
informality such as extraction of surplus from the direct producer, political 
decentralisation and a fusion of economic and political power at the point 
of production, as well as a localised structure of power wherein landlords 
exercise judicial or quasi-judicial powers in relation to the dependent direct 
producers. Attempting to make sense of the situation, the International 
Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM 2010) classified these mining 
practices into five overlapping categories: traditional practices carried out 
for generations in an area that may form part of traditional livelihoods; 
seasonal activities that complement other livelihoods, such as agriculture 
or livestock rearing; permanent cohabitation in areas connected with 
large- or medium-scale mining, such as miners working abandoned areas, 
tailings dams or downstream of larger operations; shock mining resulting 
from unexpected events such as drought, economic collapse, commodity 
price fluctuations, conflict, retrenchment from mining parastatals and 
unexpected closure of commercial mines; and influx or opportunistic rush 
or rapid in-migration to an area where minerals have recently been found. 
However, these categories primarily look at the origin and present neither 
the vast diversity of extractive practices within this kind of mining, nor 
link them to the causes, and in a sense reflect a difficulty in approaching 
the thematic field. 
The other difficulty is official recognition; unlike large-scale, formal, 
industrial mining, the definition of ASM or SSM (small-scale mining) 
varies widely between countries, with no universally accepted and precise 
definition. Only a few countries recognise ASM in state laws; for example, 
the People’s Mining Act of Indonesia (of 1967) recognises the tradition of 
mining by communities in the country. In most countries, for example in 
India, mines are classified by size, production and labour requirement, or 
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minerals commodities are classified in a way as to lend themselves to either 
large- or small-scale mining.5 It has remained a challenge to accurately 
estimate the numbers involved. For example, the figure of 35  million 
provided in 2005 by Communities and Small-Scale Mining (CASM) is 
substantially higher than the 13 million provided in 1999 by ILO. Since 
then, the world has experienced the main commodity boom in the late 
2000s, and the implications of neoliberal economic policies on the poor 
have also been more fully understood. For example, in Ghana there are 
an estimated 1  million men and women miners operating without a 
licence (Tschakert  2009). The United Nations Economic Commission 
for Africa, in its 2011 report (UNECA 2011) on the role of minerals in 
the continent’s development, noted the growing number of rural people 
in ASM. Consider also that estimates were often based on incomplete 
secondary data and extrapolation from limited surveys, and primarily 
considered extraction of high-value material commodities and precious 
stones such as gold and diamonds. Therefore, the material commodity 
under consideration partly influences estimates. The extraction of most 
industrial or construction commodities, such as coal or even stone, sand and 
gravel, are not included in this estimate. If extraction of these materials is 
considered, the numbers of extracting peasants would increase. Moreover, 
as ASM often complements or replaces other rural-based livelihoods such 
as farming in season, and many people can be simultaneously involved in 
both, a clear identification becomes difficult to offer. 
Yet another challenge is the lack of standardised production regimes in 
ASM/SSM or informal mining, which presents an array of production 
and  labour practices. These practices range from the most artisanal to 
reasonably capitalised extraction—from the sole entrepreneur trying out 
his luck with a  pick and basket, to large-scale rushes where thousands 
descend upon an area to create horrendous landscapes; from community 
groups following traditional livelihoods to modern mechanised operations 
where labourers toil in bondage. The only distinctive feature is that these 
people make a  difficult, rough and risky living, making use of what 
Ali (2009) described as the ‘treasures of the earth’. The clientelist system 
resembles other ‘illegal’ uses of resource such as logging, which ranges 
from highly capitalised actors with significant funds and industrial-
scale operations, to mid-size entrepreneurs, down to village or family-
5  For example, in India coal is classified as a ‘major mineral’, implying that it can only be mined 
by big players, thereby illegitimising any other form of coal mining.
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based groups. For example, in south and east Kalimantan in Indonesia, 
informally organised operations by PETIs (penambang tanpa injin, 
literally translated, ‘those who mine without a licence’) use reasonably 
capital-intensive earth-moving equipment to cut coal seams and truck 
them to Banjarmasin port. The  material is transferred onto large coal 
barges that supply ships outside Indonesian waters for export to China 
and South Korea. Yet, next to them, often occupying the same space and 
extracting the same resources are the ‘gurandils’. These fleeting masses 
literally ‘jump from cliff to cliff’, and operate clandestinely by staying 
small and invisible to the state machinery of law enforcement, some 
selling to the local markets and others supplying the barges that carry 
coal from the trucks to the ships. Not far from the general region is a 
traditional diamond-mining area where indigenous Banjars have mined 
diamonds for generations. This is different from the Brazilian Amazonia 
where multitudes of itinerant miners—wildcat garimpeiros—clear the 
jungle to extract gold and other precious commodities. The Galampseys 
in Ghana, Barranquilas in Bolivia, and the Ninjas of Mongolia each have 
different contexts and characteristics. These diverse contexts are only 
partly the products of historical continuity in mining, and each have 
a distinctiveness best explained through local studies that highlight the 
importance of place in shaping the political–historical trajectories.
While exact numbers of these workers are unknown, we realise that the 
scale and extent of their presence is difficult to explain with theories 
developed in the context of post-industrial resource extraction and capital 
accumulation processes. There are stories of spectacular ‘rushes’ of gold 
or diamonds—which are often equated with those that took place in 
the New World—occurring throughout the mineral-rich Global South. 
But in analysing such a ‘New Gold Rush’ in Zimbabwe, Kamete (2008) 
found that the rush was clearly linked to the economic crash and created 
a situation in which ‘five per cent of the official national population, 
are directly involved in gold panning. The numbers are increasing at 
a phenomenal rate’ (ibid.: 40). The extent is apparent from the fact that, 
by the early 1990s, more than 100 metric tons of gold was produced 
annually, and gold-mining had become the second-most important 
economic activity in Amazonia (following the combined ranching/
agriculture sector) (Godfrey 1992: 460). Godfrey stated, ‘At least half 
a million gold miners now operate in Amazonia’ (ibid.). To this might 
be added the large number of merchants, restaurateurs, sex workers and 
others who service the miners. He noted, ‘in certain areas, gold-mining 
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has become the leading economic sector … [and] the dynamics of gold-
mining … call into question several common assumptions about the so-
called agrarian frontier in Amazonia’ (ibid.). Clearly, in Brazil, mining 
rather than agriculture has been pushing this frontier. 
This evidence points to highly mobile rural communities scrambling for 
minerals, engaging with the market to extract values, competing with 
multinational mining companies or complementing them in many ways 
in search of minerals. The miners cannot be easily contained within 
concession boundaries or sedentarised as they move around and dig 
everywhere (referred to in Lao PDR as khut thouathip) to frustrate the 
governments (Lahiri-Dutt et al. 2014). The transitory nature of miners 
who follow the material commodities, with their undercover, surreptitious 
operations, make it difficult not only to explain but also to administer in 
the conventional way. They point to a significant change in contemporary 
extractive landscapes that is directly linked to stagnating rural economies. 
Glimpses into a paucity of data show that this unprecedented rush has 
remained not only a theoretical challenge, but also is unimagined and 
largely unaccounted. As much as 65 per cent of Peru’s gold production 
in 2005–06 came from non-formal sources—that is, other than from 
large mining companies. Gold production from informal sources in 
1992 contributed an estimated 76 per cent of mineral export earnings 
of Tanzania  (Tesha 2000). Of the nearly 600,000 carats of diamonds 
officially exported from Sierra Leone in 2006, as much as 84 per cent 
originated from peasant extraction (Government of Sierra Leone 
2011). In Indonesia, in addition to gold and diamonds, coal, tin and 
manganese are mined informally in vast quantities, the majority reaching 
the international market (Lestari 2013). In Mongolia, where mining is 
the  fastest growing segment of the national economy, former herders 
endure harsh winters to extract gold to reclaim their moral rights to natural 
resources (Lahiri-Dutt and Dondov 2016). Their numbers eclipse those 
employed by formal mining industries, and they produce more gold than 
the country’s corporate mines. Approximately 20 per cent of Mongolia’s 
labour force is thought to be engaged in mining and mineral processing 
without licence (UNDP 2009).
In official documentation and in social science studies, miners and 
mine labourers are dissociated from rural peasantry. The peasantry is 
conventionally regarded as a traditional occupational and demographic 
category comprising sedentary farming communities. The quarry labourer, 
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as Bryceson (2002) observes, is typically regarded as an opportunistic 
rural migrant scrambling for income. Such conceptualisation enables 
a rethink of ASM as part of the wider global political economy. This type 
of mining is rewriting the meanings of commodities and materials, the 
meanings of places and territories, and the meanings of labour and social 
relations in production in a way that defies old explanations. Something 
unheard of before is happening: field-based scholars and experts are 
noting and commenting on mining, not just as involving capital and 
capitalist enterprise, but also as rural labour moving out and around. 
These rural people have been ‘opening up’ once remote locations to 
link them with global capital and commodity networks. Neither fully 
a labourer nor a peasant anymore, these people inhabit the margins of 
the mainstream mining economy; these labourers attest to the state’s 
failure to accommodate their livelihoods within existing legislative and 
formal institutional frameworks (Jønsson and Bryceson 2009). Elsewhere, 
these miners apply techniques that involve staying small, bribing local 
government officers and mining in remote areas to avoid law enforcement. 
In yet other places, they present pathetic figures dulled by exploitation—
earning the lowest wages, exploited in feudal or semi-feudal production 
systems, unrecorded and uncared for. They are the true outcasts of 
modernity and modern capitalist mining expansion. Collectively, these 
innumerable workers, toiling in mineral-rich regions, produce enormous 
quantities of minerals that we are little aware of.
Of the millions who shift from rural areas to informal mining or ASM—
either as independent entrepreneurs or working as groups or wage 
labourers—very few can rise out of poverty. These people are the new 
mining precariats, toiling as unstable and unregulated labourers in mines 
and quarries in areas that are often difficult to access and lack any services. 
Informal labour in the Global South highlights their diverse and multiple 
precarity as historically specific to the poorer countries (Breman 2013). 
For this reason, the lack of social insurances such as old-age pensions, 
health and unemployment benefits and lack of safety within the mines 
and quarries, assume significance. Reframing therefore involves greater 
attention to labour conditions within ASM, and interrogation of the 
state’s apathy that allows such persistent conditions. 
An issue often confronting those who suggest that ASM is ‘poverty driven’ 
(Jennings 1999) is the preponderance, in certain locations, of heavy 
mining machinery that requires sizeable amounts of capital investment. 
One end of informal mining is heavily mechanised with wage labour 
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hired by external investors to operate the machinery. This emphasises 
mode of production, the integrated complex of two interdependent 
factors—productive forces and social relations of production. If we 
accept that mode of production is an articulated combination of relations 
and forces of production that enables capital accumulation—in turn 
financing the transformation of rudimentary extraction processes into 
mechanised operations with sophisticated work practices and revenue-
sharing arrangements—then it is easier to locate informal mining or ASM 
within petty commodity production. With increasing mechanisation 
and capitalisation, production quantities rapidly increase, leading to the 
most crucial policy question related to the environment—‘what is to be 
done’ to address the rampant environmental degradation in open-access 
commons such as forests and grazing fields (Suzuki 2013).
Mining experts have offered explanations for the prevalence and 
contemporary growth of ASM. Geologists in remote regions have 
noted many people digging for minerals—sometimes valuable metals 
or gemstones. They explain such mining by invoking the nature of the 
‘reserve’: the manner in which deposits of ore or minerals were laid by 
Mother Nature for humans to use as resource. Geologists argue that 
certain deposits were either too small, too ‘ribbonlike’, too scattered, too 
shallow or too remote for large-scale mechanised operations. The  ease 
of extraction, for example of surficial placer deposits, facilitates local 
people to dig them up. Mining engineers noted that if some deposits 
are ‘leftover’ by large mechanical operations, they can be extracted on 
a small scale using low levels of technologies. In these formulations, the 
explanation therefore hinges on not only the properties of the materials, 
but also the ‘scale’. Scale of the extraction is related to the ‘level’ of 
technology used: larger scale requires higher levels of capital. The hidden 
assumptions are not difficult to detect. The first assumption is that such 
mining is a  scaled-down version of larger-scale mining, implying there 
is no essential difference between the two. This is a purely technically 
biased worldview that reduces human endeavours to definitions based on 
their size. The second assumption is that the existence of such mining is 
environmentally determined, implying they existed because that was the 
only way these minerals could be extracted. Although nature does primarily 
determine the availability of minerals, it is unreasonable to suggest that 
nature determines resource extraction. The third assumption is that small 
scale and low technology are correlated. This assumption has inherent 
problems as we now know that both are no longer correlated as they 
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were; many small-scale technologies are much more widely available and 
accessible by those who could not previously afford it. Capital investment 
in small-scale mining is no longer and not always local, thereby enabling 
the use of a wider range of technologies—from metal detectors to find 
gold, through to excavators, pumps and crushers. 
Environmental geologists (for example, Douglas and Lawson 2000) 
noted the extremely deleterious cumulative effect of small diggings spread 
around an area. The impact of a large number of small operations can 
be harmful for the overall environment: forests are cut and farming land 
destroyed, rivers are chocked with sediments, the water table falls, the 
air fills up with dust and smoke. However, some experts also offered 
a variation of the environmentally deterministic argument to suggest that 
environmental degradation, leading to severe livelihood stress, explains 
the growth of informal, artisanal mining. A widely used example is 
that of Mongolia, where several successive and extremely severe winters 
destroyed herding livelihoods, forcing the destitutes to take up informal 
mining in the early part of the new century (Fernández-Giménez et al. 
2012: 836). Such environmental determinism is locally true, and it is not 
difficult to find examples of a degraded subsistence resource base pushing 
local environment-dependent communities into informal mining. This 
explanation, however, is only partly applicable. Most often, instead of 
one single cause, several factors create a situation where informal mining 
becomes a more attractive livelihood option for the poor.
Contrary to these observations, archaeologists and historians have 
presented irrefutable evidence that communities in many parts of the 
world have traditionally extracted minerals. Archaeologists who draw 
evidence from material artefacts have argued that human civilisation did 
not necessarily ‘progress’ in a linear manner from hunter-gatherers to 
farmers to industrial labourers. They show that sometimes mining has 
been the primary occupation; however, some communities have actually 
never been farmers as was imagined commonly in the linear explanation 
of advancement of human endeavour. At other times, the use of minerals 
or extractive activities (such as stone-cutting) was an important part of 
human cultures (Knapp and Pigott 1997). Social historians as well as 
historical archaeologists show that mining and agriculture often coexisted. 
For example, Phimister (1974: 445) shows that in west and south-central 
Africa, local inhabitants engaged in the production and trading of gold, 
primarily alluvial gold, for over 900 years, which is even earlier than 
mining from gold reefs. Reef mining started as the demand for gold 
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expanded, allowing the Iron Age miners to develop more sophisticated 
prospecting and mining methods.6 Early alluvial gold-mining was 
a seasonal activity,7 undertaken ‘only because of the poverty of other local 
resources’ (Phimister 1974: 445). Although Africa was the primary source 
of gold for Europe for a long time, very little is known about it today. 
Werthmann (2007: 394) cites three reasons for this paucity of knowledge: 
the remarkable secrecy about the sources of gold, the many unsuccessful 
attempts and failures to strike new deposits, and, more importantly, 
the ‘myth-making’ around mining. Caballero (1996) reviews how gold-
mining continued as part of the flow of traditional livelihoods amongst 
the indigenous communities in Benguet province in the Philippines. 
In Peru, scholars (Deustua 1994; DeWind 1977) have shown that the fine 
details of the form of the economy varied depending on the nature of the 
mineral: silver mining entailed artisanal production with little technology, 
while copper mining demanded more capital-intensive processes of 
smelting and refining in plants.
In their global report on ASM, Hentschel et al. (2002: 9–10) provided an 
historical review of the manner in which the international development 
community has treated the issues. They show that the primary approach 
in dealing with ASM has shifted over the decades: during the 1970s, the 
primary focus was on definitional issues; the 1980s reflected a preoccupation 
with technical issues and physical impacts;8 and, during the early 1990s, it 
shifted towards integration of technical, environmental, legal, social and 
economic issues. Throughout the 1990s, there was particular focus on 
legalisation of ASM, although development planners had begun exploring 
the relationship between large mining corporations and ASM, focusing 
on more specific labour issues including gender and child labour during 
the mid to late 1990s. Finally, with the establishment of CASM and the 
Mines, Minerals and the Sustainable Development (MMSD) Project 
by the British non-government organisation International Institute of 
6  Again, Phimister (1974: 446) thinks that reef-mining methods were owed to alluvial gold, 
which, in some places, was worked by shafts sunk into riverbanks.
7  Besides the need for resources to trade, geological availability and climatic and riverine factors 
determined alluvial gold-mining. The Angwa, Mazoe and Ruenya rivers were of importance, as were 
areas of Manyika (currently Mozambique), where rivers are perennial.
8  Of these, the impact of the use of mercury in gold processing—on the local environment and on 
populations using it—remains a concern. The Global Mercury Project, funded by the United Nations, 
scrutinises mercury use by artisanal gold-mining communities. It continues to focus on health and 
environmental impacts of mercury use by artisanal gold-mining communities. The scholarly and 
international policy attention on various aspects of mercury use in processing gold, while also yielding 
a large body of literature, was productive for social science knowledge on the extractive practices. 
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Environment and Development (IIED), community issues including 
those related to livelihoods came to the forefront. The MMSD sponsored 
reports related to mining, of which the global report on ASM (Hentschel 
et al. 2002) remains one of the most authoritative accounts. CASM, 
under the auspices of British Foreign Aid and the World Bank, was to 
act as a global networking and coordination facility. With the mission 
‘to reduce poverty by improving the environmental, social and economic 
performance of artisanal and small-scale mining in developing countries’ 
(ibid.: n.p.), it was also crucial in linking research with international 
development and policy-making. This close proximity with mainstream 
policy-making widened the scope of attention on ASM to the poverty and 
desperation of the people involved, and rescued ASM from association 
with sensational accounts of ‘resource curse’ and ‘resource wars’; however, 
it did not really lead to full articulation of an analytical framework within 
which to place such mining.9 A similar shift in scholarly literature has more 
explicitly engaged with development: from looking at ‘socio-economic 
impacts of ASM’ (Hilson 2003) and physical impacts, to the exploration 
of what might be causing the rural poor to move from traditional forms of 
subsistence to mineral extractive practices, giving rise to a significant body 
of development literature (Buxton 2012, 2013). As consensus was reached 
that ASM is largely poverty-driven, programs and projects searched for 
alternative livelihoods and cooperatives for these communities, albeit 
with not very significant results (Levin and Turay 2008). 
Anthropologists tend to explain ASM differently. Examining ASM 
through deep ethnographical engagement and attention on the local 
context, scholars (such as High 2008) contest the notion and suggest 
that the argument that it is spreading throughout the Global South due 
primarily to poverty is simplistic. High argues that, in Mongolia, such 
mining is linked to customary ideas about patriarchy, generosity and 
the obligation to share wealth. Moreover, High and Schlesinger (2010) 
emphasise not just the long history of mining but also the centrality 
of mining—particularly of gold—to Mongolian politics and economy 
traditionally. Rather than analysing the herders-cum-informal miners as 
either victims or greedy agents, High suggests that artisanal mining is 
linked to ‘Mongolian ideas about patriarchy, generosity and specifically 
the obligation to share wealth’. Explaining the ‘cultural logic’ of informal 
9  In a previous work, I have criticised the use of macroeconomic theories such as resource curse 
to explain ASM (see Lahiri-Dutt 2006).
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mining, she shows that many ‘ninja miners’ she spoke with during her 
20 months in the field often ‘cast themselves in opposition to mining 
companies, which they regard as “bad for Mongolia”, “they steal our 
wealth”’ (High 2012: 257). The moral economy of resources becomes 
apparent through these interpretations (also see Lahiri-Dutt 2014 for the 
Indian context). Ethnographic insights into social and cultural features 
of artisanal mining communities (such as by Walsh 2003; Grätz 2002; 
Nelson 2016) also allow the reader to move beyond the greed, blood and 
violence, and the monetisation of everyday life, which have now become 
associated with these mining communities. More importantly, they 
illuminate the importance of the specific context: deep connections to 
rural pasts, attitudes towards fortune-making, risk minimisation cultures 
and friendship ties in coping with an uncertain way of life that presents as 
many everyday challenges as opportunities. 
The contemporary political economy of globalisation is pushing millions 
out of agriculture to negotiate the material world, which is the world 
of commodities. Rural communities are organising new systems of 
production and diversifying their economies and livelihoods. Sometimes, 
they are giving up farming altogether—a process that is described as 
‘de-peasantisation’10 and/or deagrarianisation. In this process, peasants 
leave agriculture in favour of urban jobs, or move within the agricultural 
wage labour circuit diversifying their livelihoods, not as a temporary 
measure but permanently. Scholars such as Bryceson (2002) and Bryceson 
and Jønsson (2010) articulate that deagrarianisation is prominent in Africa 
where ASM has flourished as a means of rural livelihoods diversification. 
Pressured from external forces, rural communities are negotiating the 
free market and the state to make the best of constraining and enabling 
opportunities, accessing knowledge, resources and vistas of rights 
(Bebbington 1996). Following this argument, one can argue that rural 
communities, ousted by extractivism of states and international agencies, 
are adapting to the political economy of mineral extraction, and derive 
some benefits from the forces that are undermining their well-being 
(Verbrugge 2016).
10  Araghi (2009: 138) notes that de-peasantisation is neither synonymous with proletarianisation, 
nor is it a completed or self-completing process leading to the death of the peasantry, and observes 
that peasantisation and de-peasantisation are not necessarily two mutually exclusive phenomena.
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This book examines informal, artisanal and small-scale mining, to locate 
it within the broader debates on rural transformation and resource politics 
of these countries, and the gamut of theoretical, analytical and practical 
challenges it presents to scholars, practitioners and policymakers. These 
challenges range from defining the composition of informal or artisanal 
and small-scale mining, theoretically explaining it, contextualising 
contemporary concerns over environmental integrity and labour safety 
standards, to governing it in a situation where no alternative livelihood 
plans work (Siegel and Veiga 2010). This book’s contributions take up 
these challenges to reinterpret informal, artisanal and small-scale mining. 
Irrespective of historical antecedents, their collective numbers have grown 
to such an extent that, although scattered over (and bound to) mineralised 
and often remote areas, they have come under the intense scrutiny of 
scholars and other professionals. 
Structure of the book
Contributions from multiple perspectives and disciplines reflect the 
diversity of ways that informal, artisanal and small-scale mining can 
possibly be perceived. Holistically, they represent a universe fraught with 
confusion and ongoing debates, and each contributes to one of three 
broad areas. Consequently, they are arranged into three sections. The first 
section deals with the historical antecedents of ASM and articulates the 
ways values—of commodities and of moral judgements—are constructed. 
The second section highlights aspects of precarious labour in this kind 
of mining to underline the broader political–economic perspectives. 
The third section focuses on aspects of conflicts and governance that pose 
significant difficulties in dealing with these extractive practices. 
Deborah Bryceson outlines how gold rushes dramatically heighten 
people’s  expectations of the future. In societies where gold is highly 
valued as a  source of wealth accumulation and adornment, and bears 
enduring economic value, the discovery of gold becomes irresistibly 
enticing. Contemporary gold rushes in the Global South have provided 
millions with a remunerative occupation, and often self-determination 
and local-level democracy, in ways both similar and dissimilar to the ‘gold 
fever’ that spurred large numbers to gold concentrations in the United 
States, Australia and Canada during the late nineteenth century. Bryceson 
explores  what kinds of people take up shovels and picks to seek their 
17
1 . ReFRAMING THe DeBATe ON INFORMAL MINING
livelihood or fortunes, and suggests that a historical and comparative 
outlook indicates the paradoxical aspects of artisanal mining as 
a transformative occupational frontier. 
Katherine Donahue deals with an aspect of commodity production and 
trade: the creation of value not through labour but artificially, through 
middlemen and brokers. The globalised world of capitalised commodity 
production comprises buyers and sellers, in Tanzania and in the United 
States, creating a new sense of ‘value’ that goes beyond the use value of 
a commodity being its power to satisfy a want and exchange value being 
the quantity of other goods and services. Here, we see how economic 
value is created in a globalised market system through valuation principles 
and notions of value that create a private good for only those who own the 
stones. Thus, the notion of value of the commodity lies in the preparedness 
of someone to give up something in order to acquire what has now been 
constructed as a valuable commodity. Donahue  shows how traditional 
Maasai communities participate in a global web of commoditised 
product—tanzanite, a gemstone that has expanded its market in recent 
years through publicity. She analyses this phenomenon of value creation 
not only for its impact on the Tanzanian economy, but also shows how 
the tanzanite moves through a globalised exchange system in which value 
is not necessarily determined by the amount of labour embodied in 
the gemstone. 
Arnab Roy Chowdhury and Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt study gemstone mining 
by the Khonds, a local indigenous group or tribe. This chapter on the 
politically and economically volatile Kalahandi area of India shows that 
the recent spurt in mining has been associated with an increase in global 
demands and the entrance of various opportunistic outsiders who collude 
with the local state, caste leaders and class elites, police and bureaucracy. 
They present a political–economic explanation of de-peasantisation of an 
indigenous community to show that the Khonds have, since the opening 
of the Indian market of gemstones to the world, moved into the mining 
of gemstones. The Khonds, however, benefited little from entering the 
globalised world of capital—whilst out-migration has slackened, many 
more indigenous people are now without land and have turned into wage 
workers labouring in mines. In fact, the value they have created has not 
benefited them, as the tribes have remained just as impoverished.
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Saleem Ali argues that the time has come to consider the overall trajectory 
of artisanal and small-scale mining from a broader socio-ecological 
sustainability lens. International agencies and development donors can 
play significant roles to rescue it from falling into the interpretative 
simplistic binary of seeing ASM either as a problem of illegality or as an 
exemplar of entrepreneurial development. Although ASM has existed for 
millennia, is ingrained in many cultural traditions and has an immense 
livelihood potential, the ecological and health impacts remain significant. 
Ali suggests technical interventions to improve mineral outputs or 
alternative techniques for safer extraction will reduce environmental costs 
associated with such mining. Further, he suggests that a middle path that 
considers ASM as part of a hybrid livelihood strategy and a transitional 
opportunity for catalysing development is now needed. 
Chapters in the second section of the book primarily focus on different 
aspects of labour processes. This section begins with the contribution 
of Ranabir Samaddar, who brings attention to the ‘informal’ condition of 
labour forms and its variety in terms of work, agreement, labour process 
and nature of the job performed. He argues that in the contemporary 
neoliberal economy, the extensive presence of informal labour conditions 
within the economy at various scales—global, national and within 
different  sectors—signals as if there is a law ordaining the informal 
conditions of labour in the interest of capital in almost all spheres of 
economy. Based on Marxist analysis, he shows that these informal 
conditions can be obtained only in productive activities described broadly 
as ‘extraction’. Moreover, labour deployed in the domain of extraction will 
be transient and migrant labour—in other words, multiplication of the 
forms of labour. These three features are interlinked, because the neoliberal 
economy is essentially an extractive economy, forming the backdrop to 
the return of primitive accumulation. The extensive emergence of labour 
in decentralised and informal extractive processes contributes to primitive 
accumulation. He proposes two sets of investigations: to investigate the 
wide variety of forms in which production and extraction feed into each 
other in the neoliberal economy, and the role transit labour plays in this 
dynamic; and to examine the specific nature of politics produced by the 
regime of extractive and transit labour. 
Danellie Lynas presents the innumerable safety and health concerns of 
women miners. Gender is crucial in ASM communities in determining 
who does what, where and how. Men and women are differently involved 
in and differently affected by ASM practices, cultural practices and 
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legislative practices. Consequently, in a traditionally patriarchal country 
such as Papua New Guinea, such a gendered division of labour determines 
economic and social power differently according to one’s gender. Restricted 
by lack of ownership over mining land, with almost all registered mining 
leases, agreements and customary land held by men and transmitted 
patrilineally, women find themselves disadvantaged. Lynas  argues that 
understanding how gender-specific health and safety concerns impact 
on the lives of the women will allow implementation of programs that 
directly address their needs, improve their quality of life and allow them 
to participate safely in extractive practices. 
Lynda Lawson’s chapter is about the lives of women involved in the 
coloured gemstone trade of East Africa. It tells the story of two groups 
of women: gemstone miners in rural south-west Madagascar, and women 
in Madagascar and East Africa who make their living further along the 
gemstone supply chain by adding value to gemstones through faceting, 
polishing, jewellery making and trade. Their life histories show how their 
lives have transitioned and reveal that while women in general are locked 
into subsistence activity, some have become skilled craftswomen and 
entrepreneurs. 
Gernelyn Logrosa, Maureen Hassall, David Cliff and Carmel Bofinger 
discuss the health and safety of miners. They argue that the introduction 
of certain technology has the potential to alleviate or exacerbate these 
impacts depending on how the technology is accepted and used by 
miners over time. They show that using the ISO 31000:2009 standard as 
guidance has both notable strengths and limitations. Risk management 
approaches can be used to identify and assess the key factors on whether 
it will alleviate or exacerbate worker, family and community health and 
safety impacts.
In the final contribution to this section, Rachel Perks, Jocelyn Kelly, 
Stacie Constantian and Phuong Pham bring forth the perspectives of 
researcher–policy practitioner. They argue that access to finance—often 
seen as a perennial barrier for miners’ well-being and formalisation—is 
the primary cause of miners suffering undercapitalisation, even when 
there is a legal title. The lack of financial means pushes miners to borrow, 
typically from middlemen buyers. The authors offer an example, based 
on primary research, to show how some mining networks in Rwanda are 
organised around off-take agreements or royalty-sharing arrangements 
with international trading houses, European manufacturers and local 
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export houses. These alternative ways of financing are discussed against 
the backdrop of their application to the global industrial mining industry, 
to ask if such arrangements might be a step towards formalisation.
Contributions to the third section of the book are grouped around the 
challenges of conflicts and governance. Amalendu Jyotishi, Kuntala 
Lahiri-Dutt and Sashi Sivramkrishna chronicle gold-mining and 
informalisation processes in the Nilgiri–Wayanad region of Southern 
India using historical documents of the colonial period. The 1970s 
saw the settlement of Tamil repatriates from Sri Lanka in the region, 
adding a crucial dimension that helped the continuation and growth of 
informal gold-mining. By using a property rights framework, it explores 
changes in institutions and governance structures through four phases: 
early colonial (up to 1870s), corporate speculation phase (from 1870s to 
1900), open-access phase (from 1900 to 1970s) and the current phase 
from the 1980s. 
Marjo de Theije and Ton Salman present an analysis of conflicts 
surrounding artisanal and small-scale gold-mining in a number of 
countries—Bolivia, Colombia, French Guiana, Peru and Suriname—
located in the Amazon region, with a focus on notions of territoriality, 
marginality and access to the gold in forested and remote areas. They 
argue that physical and organisational distance from the centralised state 
plays a role in conflicts between state representatives, local communities 
and miners. The marginality of the territory is also created by the very act 
of mining activities that constitute territorial organisations and claims. 
They show that different politics in Amazonian countries cause conflict, 
but also generate opportunities for different actors. Miners cross the 
borders easily and without even being noticed, and differential access to 
the mineral-rich grounds sometimes triggers conflicts between actors. 
Alexandra Urán’s contribution is placed within the intensification 
of a  neo-extractivist model of industrial and mechanised mining in 
Colombia during the last decade—a strategy that has excluded small-scale 
miners as local agents and decision makers. In areas that are literally at the 
margins of the official government, SSM activities occur beyond the reach 
of official administrative control. In the same area, the armed group has 
created an alternative political setting to control rural areas. The strong 
presence of the FARC guerrilla and other illegal armed groups in these 
rural areas have increased procedures for managing and administrating 
natural resources separately from the official legal system, and outside 
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of the government’s control, and they have also fabricated an extended 
conflict in response to the political competition for power. The chapter 
evaluates how the radical left in the political context may be included 
and recognised as a political actor to change the rules on mining and the 
administration of mining resources. 
Sara Beavis and Andrew McWilliam focus on conflicts caused by the 
environmental, health and social impacts of artisanal and small-scale 
mining in the Indonesian archipelago where ASM is poorly governed. 
It highlights gold-mining in Southeast Sulawesi where there has been 
widespread and sustained use of elemental mercury for processing gold. 
This has resulted in extensive, unregulated releases of mercury into rivers 
that support valuable downstream land and riverine activities including 
irrigation, tambak fish ponds and estuarine fishing. Although the major 
rush since the first discoveries of alluvial gold is over, and the active 
mining population has declined substantially as a result of declining 
gold yields and greater government control over licensing and access for 
authorised mining companies, hydraulic mining of the riverbanks and 
channels continues. The legacy of mercury use has been long-lasting and 
deleterious for the environment. Moreover, traditional livelihoods have 
been affected as downstream flows in two affected river catchments still 
exhibit regular, extreme levels of turbidity and sediment loads—a result 
of intensive mining of riverbanks and beds in the upper catchments in 
combination with heavy seasonal monsoon rains.
The next chapter by Daniele Moretti and Nicholas Garrett brings 
readers back into the domain of governance. They note that much of 
the literature on ASM in the Asia-Pacific region suggests that national 
mining laws and mining governance frameworks within the region do not 
adequately provide for ASM. Yet, they argue, there are a few detailed and 
up-to-date case studies of such governance systems. Their contribution 
takes up the discussion of ASM governance in the Lao PDR, where ASM 
has long been present but has lately become an ‘emerging issue’, drawing 
increasing attention from government and international donors to show 
how national legal frameworks translate into, or differ from, realities on 
the ground. Further, it outlines ASM governance, in its current form 
and in light of proposed changes to ASM-specific laws, with a view to 
highlighting its main implications from a development perspective.
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The final chapter of this book is by Keith Barney, who outlines the 
elusive idea of formalisation of ASM. From regulation, ASM debates 
have moved onto regularisation and formalisation. Yet, the form and 
processes remain controversial, due to the social illegibility (the lack 
of data and social knowledge required for fostering state control), the 
resourcefulness of miners (in contesting state initiatives) and labour 
exploitation and presence of middlemen. Most formalisation plans are 
conceived as processes of integration, as means to incorporate informal 
activities into the sphere of state legality through some kind of group 
formation. However, some of these initiatives tend to be oversimplified 
recipes, a one-size-fits-all prescription based on standardised rules.11 
Barney’s contribution, drawing on evidence from three locations in 
India, Indonesia and Lao PDR, analyses the variations in material, social, 
economic, political and technological ‘assemblages’ of informal mining. 
These variations comprise what he describes as ‘assemblages’, producing 
the local contexts in all their enormous variations. He places the question 
of formalisation of informal mining in relation to these assemblages that 
comprise local socio-political struggles for rights to livelihood by local 
miners and resource-dependent communities, and the state–institutional 
governance and capital relations that reproduce vulnerability and 
establish conditions of informality. He recommends that public policies 
supporting formalisation need to better account for the connections 
between local processes, state institutions, the scale and use of technology, 
ecological externalities and the functioning of informal gold markets and 
commodity chains. By underlining the political nature of both miners’ 
and local communities’ livelihoods, social mobilisations and collective 
actions, he brings the readers back into the political economic debates.
The book ends with a postscript, which provides a rough summary 
of  important issues emerging from the chapters and indicates new 
directions for possible research in future.
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Artisanal gold‑rush mining and 
frontier democracy: Juxtaposing 
experiences in America, Australia, 
Africa and Asia
Deborah Fahy Bryceson
Gold rushes dramatically heighten people’s expectations of the future. 
Not all societies value gold, but in those where gold is viewed as a source 
of wealth accumulation, adornment and enduring economic value, news 
of the discovery of gold is irresistibly enticing for many. Most of those 
who succumb have no previous mining experience, and unwittingly 
enter an occupational transformation with unpredictable outcomes. 
The compulsive force of the gold rush phenomenon rests on mounting 
hype and hope of both local and migrant populations.
The nineteenth-century gold rushes of California and Australia gave 
rise to a rich and varied literature based on government record keeping, 
journalist accounts and miners’ personal letters home, memoirs and 
diaries.  By  contrast, in our twenty-first century of instantaneous 
communication by cell phone and internet, gold rushes may generate 
media and academic interest after a lapse of time, but on-the-spot 
empirical accounts of events and activities of participants, be they miners, 
residents of the mining settlement or officials, are relatively negligible.1 
1  There are notable exceptions; for example, the African case studies of Werthmann (2000, 2003, 
2010) and Grätz (2002, 2010, 2013).
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‘Gold fever’ is portrayed as a contagion affecting growing numbers 
of people who irrationally ignore the hardships, dangers and possibility of 
failure, keen to try their luck at catapulting into a more remunerative 
livelihood and better life. In effect, gold rushes are high-risk journeys into 
the unknown, with a strong possibility of disconnection between ends 
and means; the mirage that the individual sees on the future horizon as 
opposed to miners’ meagre means to realise their goals given their lack 
of mining skill and the unpredictability of conditions at the mining site. 
In their quest, what stands out is the individual’s intent to succeed as 
a miner largely through learning while doing. The individual embarks 
on a process of becoming an artisanal miner through skill acquisition, 
economic exchange, psychological orientation and social positioning 
at the labour site, and gains a sense of proficiency and occupational 
professionalism through persistent work and collegial support (Bryceson 
2010). An artisanal gold miner is self-propelled from the initial decision 
to migrate to a mineral site, arriving at the work site to begin an on-site 
apprenticeship and a mining career that entails material hardships and 
technical difficulties, and the inevitability of mineral depletion over time 
(Bryceson and Jønsson 2014). Before nineteenth-century mass artisanal 
gold-rush mining, gold was usually produced within tied labour relations 
of slavery, bonded labour or tribal tribute obligations that then formed 
the production base for long-distance commodity chains, involving 
a series of local middlemen and foreign merchants. Gold miners were 
locationally circumscribed and subject to tribal or other localised controls 
and exactions, with little awareness of the gold commodity chain that 
they supplied.
I argue in this chapter that gold rushes since the nineteenth century, 
involving individualised, highly mobile artisanal gold miners, may encourage 
the evolution of frontier democracy, depending on the extent to which 
hierarchically organised labour circumstances do not pose a constraint. 
At the outset, some definitions are in order. ‘Artisanal mining’ is labour-
intensive mineral extraction with limited capital investment using basic 
tools, manual devices or simple portable machinery (Bryceson and 
Jønsson 2014).2 I use the term ‘artisanal mining frontier democracy’ to 
refer to miners’ independent exercise of agency in the pursuit of their 
2  It should be noted that hard-rock extraction worldwide tends to be performed by men, while 
women and sometimes children are more likely to be found panning, processing the hard rock, 
reworking tailings or working in the service sector of the mining settlement.
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mining activities; free association amongst people from various localities, 
occupations and class backgrounds who are focused on the artisanal 
extraction of gold, with scope for collective self-governance and political 
activity in furtherance of their mining interests.3 
There are three essential conditions of existence for artisanal frontier 
democracy. First, miners voluntarily enter and exit artisanal mining sites 
on a relatively egalitarian basis. Second, working together, they assert 
a strong collective identity as artisanal miners in the process of acquiring 
skills and evolving shared professional norms and ethics. Third, they mine 
in nation-states where they have scope to devise the modus operandi of 
their work relations and mineral-access rights consensually on a trial-and-
error basis (Bryceson and Geenen 2016). 
Increasing numbers of people worldwide appreciate gold’s value as 
a  consumption and investment good. Gold production has expanded 
over the past two decades of economic boom and bust, catalysing the 
appearance of large numbers of artisanal miners in long-established 
as well as new strike sites. Technological innovations have facilitated the 
spread of information about gold strikes. Many artisanal miners travel 
over long distances. What is significant in terms of the focus of this 
chapter is that some arrive at ‘pure gold sites’, metaphorically termed, 
where they have scope to be self-employed, rather than subject to waged, 
bonded or enslaved labour arrangements imposed by pre-existing property 
ownership and power structures. Untied, independent artisanal labourers, 
engaged in high stakes and hazardous work, are inclined to cooperate with 
one another for mutual benefit. Therein lies the foundational basis for 
frontier democracy. 
This chapter chronologically considers the nineteenth-century experiences 
before turning to twentieth-century African and Asian gold-mining sites 
in Tanzania and Mongolia, where deagrarianisation has been a powerful 
catalyst to labour diversification (Bryceson 1999, 2002). I argue that gold 
rushes taking place globally during the last two centuries in varied cultures 
and historical contexts converge remarkably towards similar forms of 
economic and cultural organisation characterised by exceptionally hard 
work and hard play in challenging physical circumstances. But not all 
display the dynamic of frontier democracy. The fundamental question 
explored here is when, how and why frontier democracy arises in some 
3  My use of the term ‘frontier democracy’ is centred on the notion of a labour, rather than land, 
frontier (Dumett 1998; Grätz 2013; Bryceson and Geenen 2016). 
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places and not others. The following sections, based on secondary 
literature, are intended as a preliminary exploration of where and when 
this tendency is likely to occur.
Nineteenth-century gold rush experiences
Forty‑niner miners in California
The voluminous literature on the California gold rush includes a wealth 
of personal memoirs of nineteenth-century gold rush participants’ 
migration and settlement (see, for instance, US Library of Congress n.d.; 
Street 1851; Brown 1894; Canfield 1906; Holliday 2002). It is apparent 
that there is a recording bias towards nationals with middle-class origins 
(Clay and Jones 2008). 
The discovery of gold at Sutter’s Creek in California in January 1848 
catalysed an avalanche of local in-migration to the area. According to 
Vaught (2007), the person most instrumental in spreading news of the 
discovery was a San Francisco entrepreneur who advertised gold-panning 
equipment, thereby alerting the general public in the city and countryside 
beyond. By the end of the year, the news had reached Washington DC. 
President James K. Polk announced California’s gold riches to the nation 
on 5 December 1848, prompting a large westward demographic shift 
of young men from eastern and mid-western states to the country’s new 
California territory over the next four years. The local newspaper, The San 
Francisco Californian, charted the influx from its outset:
It was the work of but a few weeks to bring almost the entire population of 
the territory together to pick up pieces of precious metal. In less than four 
months, the prospects and fate of Alta California had been revolutionised. 
Then, capital was in the hands of a few individuals engaged in trade and 
speculation; now labor has got the upper hand of capital, and the labouring 
men hold the great mass of wealth in the country—the gold. (The San 
Francisco Californian, 14 August 1848, cited in Rohrbough 1998: 7)
A couple of months later, a report in the London Times was sceptical 
about the rush and its effect: 
The discovery of gold in the Sacramento … has produced a confusion 
of rank and a startling degree of equality … we must hear more of 
this El Dorado before we bestow upon it … our serious consideration. 
(The Times, early November 1848, cited in Hocking 2006: 21)
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Discounting journalistic hyperbole, it is revealing that the California 
gold rush was immediately identified not only as a profitable opportunity, 
but one democratically open to able-bodied men.4 An estimated 
40,000 ‘forty-niner’ migrants made their way to the goldfields in 1849 
(Vaught 2007).
The gold strike occurred soon after the United States had wrested Alta 
California away from Mexico in the Mexican–American war. This had 
been an unpopular war, criticised for its expense and the conquest of 
territory considered of little value for the United States. Hence, President 
Polk was eager to broadcast news of the California gold strike. At the 
time, Alta California, as it was called then, was a territory not a state, and 
was not subject to US federal law. What makes the California gold rush so 
iconic as a frontier experience is that incoming multi-ethnic miners faced 
a seeming ‘free -for-all’ arising from the legal hiatus in the transition from 
Mexican to American political control. The existing Mexican settlers in 
Alta California had not been aware of the gold’s existence. State regulation 
of mineral extraction was absent, with no mining licence system5 or legal 
clarity about who the gold finds belonged to. California was quickly 
granted statehood in 1850, but the precedent had been set. The forty-
niner miners retained relatively unimpeded access to mining. 
Local migrants from San Francisco and the surrounding countryside 
numbered approximately 5,000 by the end of 1849. Thereafter, tens of 
thousands followed, coalescing to over 100,000 as migrants from western 
parts of the United States and others from the East Coast travelled overland 
or by boat around the Horn of South America or through the isthmus 
of Panama, disembarking and walking to the Pacific coast where they 
boarded a boat to California. Nicknamed ‘argonauts’, this surge of people 
populated the new American state in what was a territorially expanding 
nation. Over 90 per cent of the gold-rush migrants were male, under 30 
and generally planned to return to their farms (Vaught 2007).
The first wave of migrants were mostly unskilled, focused on alluvial placer 
mining using simple technology, generally a shovel and pan. Rohrbough 
(1998: 12–13) observed, ‘Open access to the gold in California seemed 
to represent the purest example of American economic democracy in 
4  The stream of migrants was over 95 per cent male (Clay and Jones 2008). 
5  Non-US nationals were charged a foreign diggers’ tax, which included indigenous Hispanics, 
Europeans and later Chinese, giving American nationals a digging edge.
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the middle of the nineteenth century’. Miners worked on the general 
principle of ‘finders keepers’. Shinn (1884, cited in Rawls 1999) argued 
that the miners devised a code of conduct that governed the mining 
camps.6 Individual panning gave way to use of a boxlike ‘cradle’ for sifting 
sediment that was optimally operated by four people. 
As alluvial gold yields declined, digging commenced. A system of mine 
claims evolved consensually amongst miners, beginning with early 
placer rights based on discovery, rather than landed property rights. 
Miners were not allowed to hold more than one mining claim. Claims 
amounted to usufruct rights recognised and maintained by continuing 
labour input (McDowell 2013). The mounting numbers of the miners 
gave them not only a strong demographic presence, but also economic 
and political power. 
Census and survey analysis during the California gold rush suggests that 
on average miners succeeded in gaining higher earnings relative to what 
they could have expected in their pre-rush residences. However, given 
the high cost of living driven by exorbitant food costs, their real earnings 
were disappointing. The average earnings of non-mining service sector 
providers, in fact, superseded those of miners (Clay and Jones 2008).
The duration of expansion of artisanal mining settlements was roughly 
six years. As surface gold deposits became depleted, environmentally 
destructive industrial hydraulic extraction methods were introduced to 
achieve large-scale hard-rock underground excavation, which required 
heavy investment in technology and technical training. Artisanal mining 
was increasingly sidelined. Having begun with placer mining open to large 
numbers of unskilled men seeking their fortune as individuals, larger-
scale capitalist mining operations took over (Douglass 2002). 
During the gold rush’s heyday, social levelling was visibly evident in 
the simple work clothing people wore, which downplayed the fact that 
the migrant stream encompassed a wide range of lower- and middle-class 
people. The mining camp population was an economically and socially 
diverse assembly that necessarily had to operate on a trusting basis, both 
6  Royce (2002) challenged this interpretation as over-romantic and oblivious to miners’ inhumane 
behaviour towards Native Americans and non-white migrants.
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to facilitate their work and also because carried large amounts of gold in 
their pockets due to the absence of banks. Conspicuous consumption, 
with the notable exception of alcohol, was generally avoided. 
The gold rush climaxed by the mid-1850s, having involved an estimated 
300,000 people. Cornford (1999) observed that it was one of the largest 
occupational migrations of labour in American history, with 4,000 
migrant  miners in 1848, growing to approximately 100,000 in 1852. 
By the end of the decade, the miners who remained were wage labourers 
rather than self-employed. The migration coincided with a period when 
smallholder agriculture was declining in the US. Most gold-rush miners 
returned to their home areas or moved on to new mining sites elsewhere, 
including Australia. Of those who stayed on, some made the transition 
to industrial mining, mostly as wage labourers, and in far fewer cases 
as capitalist investors, but the majority remaining in California started 
farming, notably wheat, or were absorbed into industrial and service 
activities, contributing to the state’s non-mining development take-off 
(McCone and Orsi 1999).
Australia’s imperial gold finds in Victoria
There were several parallels and linkages between the gold rushes in 
California and Victoria. Two generations after Europeans first settled 
in  Australia, interest was kindled in the continent’s mineral wealth. 
Relying on Blainey’s (1964) detailed account of the Australian gold rush, 
its progression is outlined here.
Ironically, in the early 1850s, significant numbers of Australians had set 
sail for California to mine gold, not realising they were leaving a gold-rich 
country. James Esmond, an Australian who had returned from Californian 
diggings, struck gold in Ballarat in July 1851. News of Ballarat and other 
finds were eagerly snapped up by the national press, triggering a national 
gold-rush migration. Gold had also been discovered in New South Wales 
further to the northeast. Amidst these gold discoveries, New South 
Wales  was subdivided, creating Victoria as a new, separate colony in 
which Ballarat was located. 
Issuing of mining licences commenced in the latter part of September 
1851 in Victoria. Deposits of gold and silver were the designated property 
of the Crown. Victoria’s goldfields were considered the richest in the world 
at the time, prompting the government to immediately proclaim Crown 
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rights, ruling that it was illegal to search for gold without a licence.7 
The  government registered and regulated miners’ activities through 
a  licensing system that required a monthly payment of  30 shillings 
for a licence.
A succession of gold finds followed those of Ballarat, most notably in 
Bendigo. So many men made their way to the goldfields that labour 
shortages appeared in critical occupations—blacksmiths, sailors and civil 
servants. Nearby Melbourne experienced an acute shortage of men, while 
women gravitated to settlements in the hope of meeting and marrying 
a rich digger. In early 1852, news of the rich finds reached Europe, enticing 
adventure-seeking men to risk the hazards of a three-month sea journey 
from Europe to Australia. Tens of thousands arrived by boat. Foreigners 
began to outnumber Australians in the camps. The mining camps 
consisted of row after row of tents. Men from a wide array of occupations 
mined side by side. The most successful miners usually tended to be the 
physically strongest, rather than the best educated. 
The cultural trappings of the virtually all-male population, earning above-
average incomes, veered towards laborious weekdays and with pleasure-
seeking, heavy drinking and liaising with prostitutes in ramshackle hotels 
on the weekend. Despite overcrowding and heavy drinking, the crime 
rate was not higher than in Australia generally, and a consensual moral 
economy existed at the diggings, where trust and morality were considered 
to exceed that prevailing elsewhere in the country.
In Victoria, miners were required to have and display their licence while 
working at all times. Miners who failed to produce a licence for police 
inspection faced a group of intimidating, armed constables and a fine of 
40 shillings or seven days’ imprisonment. The taxation system became a 
great source of irritation for miners. The presence of foreign miners—Irish, 
continental European and American—who had no political allegiance to 
the British Crown, contributed to the growing disgruntlement against 
licence fee enforcement. Miners greatly resented the legal imposition, 
7  This ruling was immediately enforced, unlike in New South Wales where news of gold had 
attracted hundreds of men to panning and digging activity faster than the government could assert 
control over it. There were not enough police and soldiers to enforce the Crown’s property rights, and 
the Governor of Australia informed London that it would be unrealistic and hazardous to prevent 
the incoming miners from their gold-rush search. A new Commissioner of Crown Lands for the 
gold district was appointed to set up the licensing system, settle disputes and provide justice in petty 
courts. However, as the gold rush spread to various scattered sites, miners often succeeded in avoiding 
fee payment in the more far-flung areas (Blainey 1964).
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particularly when they were asked to pay while down in a pit, necessitating 
their ascent, or when the tattered or water-damaged state of their licence 
was challenged (Keesing 1967). As the goldfields became depleted, the 
number of miners failing to find gold rose. One observer estimated that 
no more than 20 per cent of miners had made finds. Miners’ monthly 
licence payments became difficult (Chandler 1990, cited in Hocking 
2006: 126).
Political activism surged when the new Governor of Victoria, Sir Charles 
Hotham, was appointed. Soon after his arrival he reported to the Colonial 
Secretary:
no amount of military force at the disposal of Her Majesty’s Government, 
can coerce the diggers, as the gold fields may be likened to a network 
of rabbit burrows. For miles, the holes adjoin each other, each is 
a fortification … nowhere can four men move abreast, so that the soldier 
is powerless against the digger, who well armed, and sheltering himself by 
the earth thrown up about him, can easily pick off his opponent—by tact 
and management must these men be governed; amenable to reason, they 
are deaf to force … (Hill 2010: 170)8
Only a month later, a couple of public disorder incidents prompted miners 
to amass and register their protest. In the heat of the moment, the crowd 
marched to the Eureka Hotel and set it alight. The arrest of three suspects 
for the burning of the hotel and the imposition of another government 
licensed ‘man-hunt’ led to a further mass meeting, and the demand for 
the sacking of the local police chief. Military reinforcements were sent 
to Ballarat, while political tensions escalated. At another mass meeting, 
miners established the Ballarat Reform League and elected digger leaders to 
develop a charter. In addition to calling for the cessation of the gold licence 
fees and the reform of Crown land laws and goldfields administration, the 
charter called for universal suffrage, the abolition of property ownership 
as a qualification for becoming a member of parliament, short-term 
parliaments and ballot voting. These were considered radical demands 
that sowed the seeds for Australian independence (Hill 2010).
The showdown between miners and government troops took place 
at a  wooden stockade, which 1,500 miners had collectively built 
as a precaution against attack. On the night of 3 December 1854, 
8  This was part of a communication from Hotham to Bar, 18 September 1854, Dispatch no. 112, 
VPRS 1085/P unit 8.
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approximately 150 miners were surrounded by 300 troops in a surprise 
attack. Firing into the stockade, 22 miners were killed, many more were 
injured and over 100 were arrested, as opposed to the seven soldiers who 
lost their lives. 
In the immediate aftermath of the Eureka rebellion, Governor Hotham met 
with heavy public criticism. He set up a commission of inquiry; however, 
before the commission handed down its findings, 13 miners were charged 
with high treason. The trials began in February 1855 and, one after another, 
the accused were acquitted. The commission of inquiry ruled in favour 
of the miners in recommending the abolishment of the miners’ licence 
fee,9 making land available for miners to purchase for house building and 
extending the franchise to enable diggers to be represented in parliament. 
Peter Lalor, a young digger who took a leading role in the Eureka Rebellion, 
was elected as a member of parliament for Ballarat in 1855. The miners’ 
collective political action engendered a  democratic victory oft-cited in 
Australian history books for establishing the foundational principles of 
governance in the struggle against British colonial rule.
Blainey (1964) cites official estimates that there were 30,000 adult miners 
in June 1852, ballooning to 100,000 in 1855 with availability of gold 
supply still at accessible levels, down to the water table at roughly 30 feet. 
The size of mining claims in Australia were smaller than in California, 
such that there was a great deal of movement between sites as old sites 
became depleted and word travelled about new sites. Arriving at a new 
strike site early gave diggers a big edge. 
Despite its laissez-faire capitalist context, the enduring memory of the 
Australian gold rush is of an egalitarian spirit, freedom and mateship of 
the gold diggers, culminating in their demands for democratic reform in 
1854 at Ballarat’s Eureka Stockade (Goodman 1994: 8). Gold was seen as a 
‘democratic mineral’ (Bate 1999: 40). Diggers came together to protest on 
the basis of moral economy rights, confronting the bureaucratic demands 
of imperial officialdom; in so doing, they were seen to be advancing 
democratic nationalist demands (Goodman 1994). 
9  ‘The licence fee has been undermined by widespread evasion, which has become a practiced and 
skilful art, and that its effective enforcement produced violent results … To carry out the law in its 
integrity … required a constant exercise of authority … scenes between the police and the miners, 
were a daily occurrence, where mutual irritation, abuse, and gross violence would ensue … The 
present system of a licence fee [should] be given up.’ Report from the Commission Appointed to 
Inquire into Conditions in the Goldfields, Victorian Parliamentary Papers, Legislative Council, Votes 
and Proceedings, A76/1854–55,Vol. II (cited in Hill 2010: 190).
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Probing the nature of nineteenth‑century artisanal 
mining democracy
Social levelling, identified with ‘mateship’ in Australia, and ‘the great 
adventure of the common man’ in California (McWilliams 1949, cited 
in Cornford 1999: 78) offered potential economic advantage to a broad 
spectrum of novice ‘greenhorn’ miners, many of whom could not have 
hoped to gain the same level of earnings in other occupational avenues 
in their home areas. However, not everyone who arrived in the goldfields 
achieved economic success or feelings of camaraderie. Many were 
frustrated by late arrival, lack of luck or ability to adapt to the new work 
setting.10 
Above all, a sense of democracy was delimited to men of European descent. 
Racial and ethnic tensions intensified as the availability of gold dwindled. 
In the first years, men of whatever background dug side by side; however, 
as the gold supply dwindled and incomes stagnated or declined, rancour and 
discrimination set in, with hostility defrayed by individuals moving on to 
new strike sites (Paul 1969). The Californian artisanal mining democracy 
eroded as American citizens were distinguished from Europeans, Latin 
Americans, Chinese and Native Americans. Distrust amongst diggers was 
strongest against foreign-speaking miners, including the French, Chileans, 
Mexicans and Chinese, leading ultimately to expulsion of Mexicans and 
open hostility towards the Chinese (Rohrbough 1998). 
By far the most marginalised participants in the gold rush were Native 
Americans. Before the gold rush, the territory was characterised by the 
native Californian population who engaged in a hunting and gathering 
mode of livelihood, and did not mine or value gold (Rawls  1999). In 
the first months of the rush, when the labour force was drawn primarily 
from Alta California’s local population, more than half the gold diggers 
were Native Americans employed by Mexican rancho owners. Only a few 
of them dug or traded independently. However, as the old Hispanic 
paternalist order of agrarian semi-feudal estates disintegrated, the Native 
American presence faded. The  incoming migrant mine population 
engulfed Native American land. Conflicts over land usage were an excuse 
to deploy US army troops and volunteer militia companies. By 1854, army 
10  The historian Oscar Lewis (2007) estimated that less than 5 per cent of gold-rush miners left the 
goldfields with more money than when they arrived. 
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expenditure on these incursions reached almost US$1 million, with total 
removal and killing of the Native American population in many places 
(Goodman 1994). America’s creed of ‘manifest destiny’ had taken hold at 
immense loss of livelihood and lives of the Native American population.11
So too, Australian artisanal mining democracy was severely delimiting. 
Aboriginals were marginalised. Gold was certainly not a democratic 
mineral for them, as they lost their land and were excluded from 
citizenship; thus, their grievance testimonies were not admissible in court. 
The Chinese miners, at times constituting as much as one-third of the 
diggers (Goodman 1994), were considered to be quiet and hardworking, 
but were subjected to derogatory treatment as foreigners, and ostracised 
from the camaraderie of mateship. General wariness towards the Chinese 
prevailed on the grounds that they were worryingly present in growing 
numbers and remained aloof from Christian conversion, at a time when 
a Christian moral discourse was omnipresent. In 1856, European diggers 
initiated an attack on Chinese diggers at Buckland where 750 of their tents 
were destroyed. Many Chinese miners returned to China, discouraged by 
the hostile threats of violence directed at them.
Thus, the democracy narrative of artisanal mining can only be recounted 
with the proviso that it was deeply flawed, not unlike Greek democracy’s 
indifference to the rights of women and slaves. Artisanal mining 
democracy in California and Victoria represents an historical interlude 
in which artisanal miners became enmeshed in a frontier nation-building 
narrative. They took centre stage in a pioneering ethos associated with 
the countries’ spatial and political frontier expansion. Moving into low-
population density areas where the regional state’s presence was new and 
the state regulatory apparatus was not well established, artisanal miners 
had scope for occupational self-determination. 
Other countries experiencing artisanal gold rushes in the nineteenth 
century with more established state governance were less amenable to 
miners’ democratic self-direction. These included the Ghana gold boom 
of the 1870s in the British Gold Coast, which saw an influx of European 
11  At the start of the gold rush in 1849, the Californian Native American population was estimated 
at 100,000. By 1860, their numbers had declined to approximately 35,000. While some died of 
disease, Russell Thornton is unequivocal that the largest number and most deliberate killings in the 
United States took place in northern California during the gold rush decade when ‘case after case 
was recorded of Indian villages being massacred by larger or more powerful groups of Non-Indians’ 
(Thornton 1987: 109, 201).
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expatriates intent on setting up mining companies for the pursuit of 
mechanised mining alongside a coastal Creole mercantile elite who were 
sub-leasing mining land for industrial mining from chiefs (Dumett 1998). 
This constellation of mechanised mining interests played a formative role 
in the gradual development of industrial mining in Ghana during the late 
nineteenth century and into the twentieth century, when Ghana became 
Africa’s second-largest gold producer after South Africa.
Similarly, the gold rush of the late 1880s in the South African Rand 
virtually precluded open entry of artisanal miners. Cecil Rhodes and 
Alfred Beit had already established controlling interests over the Kimberly 
diamond fields. They were in a strong position to seize economic and 
political hegemony in gold production together with other key investors, 
and came to be known as South Africa’s ‘Randlords’. The comradeship 
of diggers was pre-empted by the Randlords’ supremacy; the fact that 
the gold deposits were embedded in a mass of deep hard rock further 
contributed to artisanal miners’ difficulty in getting a significant foothold 
(Meredith  2007). By 1888, speculative investors had established 
450 gold-mining companies. Over time, the mining of deep hard rock 
seams, monopolised by such companies, was based on the employment of 
black wage labour. 
Twentieth- and twenty-first-century frontiers 
in Africa and Asia
Moving a century forward to the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, 
gold certainly has not lost its lustre. The world price of gold began its 
ascent during the troubled years of the global oil crises of the mid-1970s, 
stabilising during the 1980s and early 1990s, only to scale new dizzying 
heights as the world plunged into economic recession in the latter 2000s 
(Figure 2.1).
The following two country case studies drawn from Africa and Asia 
illustrate how national governments by default or design may have benign 
or indifferent policies to the presence of artisanal miners, which afford 
artisanal miners scope for democratic occupational self-determination, 
at least in the early stages of the gold rush.

















Figure 2.1: Trends in the gold price since 1960
Source: Author’s graphical representation. Data source: Global economic Monitor 
Commodities. Viewed at data.worldbank.org (20 June 2015).
Tanzania: Evolution of artisanal mining under the 
blind eye of the state
It is impossible to chart Tanzania’s turn-of-the-century artisanal gold rush 
in terms of precise dates and names of strike sites, since the country’s 
gold boom quietly coalesced from the early 1980s at a time of extreme 
duress. Following the 1979 international oil crisis, the country was 
economically crippled at the same time as the international price of gold 
was on the ascent (Figure 2.1). In need of foreign exchange, the Tanzanian 
Government passed the Mining Act 1979, allowing Tanzanian nationals 
to prospect for minerals and initiate mining activities not requiring 
investment in industrial machinery. 
Tanzania’s gold seams largely follow the bifurcation of the East African 
rift, forming a ‘ring of gold’ (Bryceson et al. 2012). Clearly farmers 
and ex-workers at the industrial gold mine had been aware of the 
rift’s potential riches; however, prior to the 1979 Act they were not at 
liberty to engage in artisanal mining. Multiple gold discoveries started 
unobtrusively unfolding. With the increasing use of mobile phones 
in the twenty-first century, news of the gold finds spread. Gold rush 
fever gripped the mineral-rich regions (Jønsson and Bryceson 2009). 
Artisanal mining took off; yet, at the national level, there was very little 
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recognition of the occupational tsunami underway. Certainly the press 
were not reporting gold strikes. At promising gold sites, in-migration of 
artisanal miners and service providers caused populations to balloon from 
a few hundred nearby villagers to 10,000 or more within three months. 
In 2011, the total population of artisanal miners throughout Tanzania 
was estimated at 685,00012 out of a population of 40 million. Artisanal 
gold production spurred urban growth within the gold-mining regions 
(Bryceson et al. 2012).
In the mining camp, miners and residents represented a spectrum 
of occupational backgrounds, education levels and classes. However, 
the majority migrated from rural areas and entered a multi-ethnic, 
cosmopolitan experience divorced from the ascriptive age and gender 
hierarchies of the countryside. The rank and privilege of birth, education 
and class were replaced with the rough and tumble of market relations 
and work output. Tanzanian artisanal gold-mining, as elsewhere through 
time, was a relatively open-entry occupation that did not necessitate 
a large amount of starting capital. The functional division of labour 
involved a pyramid of ‘claim owners’, who were restricted in number and 
usually aloof from pit production, ‘pit managers’, who organised the work 
process on behalf of the owner, and ‘diggers’ (Bryceson and Jønsson 2010). 
The division of output between these three categories varied from place to 
place, but usually approximated roughly a third of the hard rock mined 
by diggers being allocated to each category (Jønsson and Fold 2012).
While the pit managers were the ‘headmen’ orchestrating pit work, 
there was nonetheless a spirit of camaraderie and teamwork. This rested 
on the material fact that everyone was exposed to the physical hazards 
of the pit, and necessarily cognisant of the primacy of cooperation to 
ensure survival. So too, they were all subject to the fluctuation of mining 
fortunes, such that diggers could rise to become pit managers, who in 
turn could experience a reversal and return to being diggers when their 
resources to finance digging operations declined (Jønsson and Bryceson 
2009; Bryceson and Jønsson 2010). In the pit, the miner had to prove 
himself to his workmates, showing his skill, capability to work hard and 
trustworthiness. Thus, in choosing to join one work team as opposed to 
another, these considerations prevailed over those of ethnic ties. 
12  Provisional estimate according to Dr Crispin Kinabo of the Geology Department, University 
of Dar es Salaam.
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Claim owners by and large did not participate in gold production, and 
comprised only 1 per cent of the total population of artisanal miners. 
Yet, ironically by law, they were the only Tanzanian artisanal miners with 
legal mining rights. This raised a number of ambiguities and potential 
tensions between the state and artisanal miners. The main source of 
contention was the state’s mediation between small- and large-scale 
foreign mining interests. 
In a number of cases, beginning in the late 1990s, artisanal miners were 
told that their diggings encroached on mining company concessions 
(Kulindwa et al. 2003; Lange 2008).13 Artisanal miners organised political 
protests against the state and foreign mining firms, but they were usually 
forced to leave the site. In the lead-up to the opening of Tanzania’s biggest 
industrial gold mine at Bulyanhulu in Kahama, owned by African Barrick 
Gold, artisanal miners claimed that 50 of them had been buried alive 
and killed during eviction from the concession by Tanzanian police using 
graders to destroy their pits. Barrick and the police denied the allegations, 
while various international agencies, called to give independent 
assessments, were divided about what had happened. 
More recently in 2013, Barrick Gold’s North Mara mine faced violent 
contestation from artisanal miners, who waged a continuous daily protest 
campaign against the mining company, which they blamed for the death of 
five artisanal miners (Hodges and Biesheuvel 2013). With these pressures 
weighing on their business reputation, coupled with the decline in the 
global gold price, Barrick Gold began a process of divesting in African 
Barrick Gold in Tanzania (Financial Times 2014).
In the space of three decades, Tanzania has transformed from a primarily 
agricultural country to a mainly mining country, measured in foreign 
export earnings. During the 1980s, its artisanal miners pioneered gold 
exploration,14 generating a regional economic boom in the country’s ‘ring 
of gold’ (Bryceson et al. 2012). They benefited from the open-entry nature 
of artisanal mining and participated in occupational transformation 
that yielded more lucrative earnings than farming. In the process, they 
gained a new occupational identity as artisanal miners, freedom from 
the age and gender divisions of labour enforced by male gerontocracy 
13  For example, this occurred with regards to Tom Mines in Mahenge, Barrick Mines in Bulyanhulu, 
North Mara Gold Mine in Tarime and East African Mines IAMGOLD in Buck Reef. 
14  Artisanal miners inadvertently acted as gold prospectors for the large-scale mining companies 
that followed them.
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in villages  and,  in some cases, challenged the growing hegemony of 
industrial mining. This took place despite the World Bank and national 
government’s prioritisation of foreign direct investment of large-scale 
industrial mining companies. 
Mongolia: Ambiguities of artisanal mining 
in a national mineral boom
Traditionally, Mongolia’s economy was comprised primarily of nomadic 
herding households. However, rapid deagrarianisation over the last three 
decades associated with the collapse of the country’s Soviet-influenced 
commandist economy, and catastrophic weather conditions between 
1997 and 2002, resulted in drastic reductions in the size of households’ 
livestock herds. Similar to Tanzania, facing heavy debt, the Mongolian 
Government adhered to the World Bank’s insistence on economic 
liberalisation and encouragement of foreign direct investment, which 
triggered foreign mining companies’ attraction to Mongolia’s gold wealth. 
Artisanal mining surged as well (Cane et al. 2015). Historically, 
Mongolian herders had been aware of gold-rich areas, but under both 
the Qing dynasty of the nineteenth century and later under a repressive 
Soviet-style government, there were heavy penalties imposed on people 
who dared to engage in artisanal gold production (High and Schlesinger 
2010). Furthermore, Buddhist ethics traditionally ordained a sense 
of harmony with the environment, which posed a moral dilemma for 
herders-cum-miners accustomed to adapting rather than disrupting the 
natural landscape (High 2008). The ‘gold rush’, as it became known 
nationally, marked a drastic rupture with the traditional economy and 
culture of Mongolia. The first wave of artisanal miners in the mid-1990s 
was primarily composed of former industrial miners who had lost their 
jobs when the state mining industries folded after the collapse of the 
Soviet-influenced government, followed by a second wave of ex–state 
farm workers. The third and by far the largest wave of migrants was 
composed of herder families reacting to the loss of livestock and general 
deagrarianisation (Grayson et al. 2004). 
Most of the literature to date on Mongolian artisanal mining relates to 
its environmental impact, but very little has been written about the social 
and political changes underway. Mette High’s (2008, 2012) insightful 
study of herders-cum-miners in one of the main mining regions reveals 
what happened at the local level within communities and households. 
BeTWeeN THe PLOUGH AND THe PICK
48
In a country where people were accustomed to migrating in family units 
to graze their herds, migration to mining areas often involved the entire 
family, while others already located close to a mine site could mine part-
time while continuing to tend their herd. 
These tendencies contributed to widespread occupational shifts of herders, 
factory workers and even bureaucrats towards gold-mining, spurred by 
the promise of enhanced earnings from the high price of gold in the 
world market.15 Hence, Mongolian artisanal mining became a site of 
immense labour absorptive capacity. In 2013, artisanal miners numbered 
over 100,000 out of a national population of just 3 million, representing 
20 per cent of the rural workforce (Villegas 2013). The mining sector 
experienced astonishing growth, generating 75 per cent of national 
export revenue by 2008, with artisanal mining far superseding industrial 
employment and output in the late 2000s (High 2008).
The legal position of artisanal miners changed under pressure from the 
World Bank, various foreign and local non-government agencies, and 
rising resource nationalism on the part of the Mongolian public and state. 
During the 1990s, Mongolia opened the door to foreign investment, 
but by the 2000s there was increasing resentment about the presence of 
foreign mining companies, and the feeling that Mongolian nationals were 
not benefiting sufficiently from the country’s mineral wealth. In 2002, 
a draft law was proposed whereby artisanal miners were required to be 
licensed and organised into cooperative groups; however, local governors 
had the right to arbitrarily terminate artisanal miners’ agreements and 
licences. Rising concerns about environmental destruction, the use of 
banned mercury and growing resource nationalism on the part of the 
public who resented the presence of foreign mining companies caused 
the government to insist on Mongolian state equity participation up to 
50 per cent in all industrial mining. While the formulation of temporary 
regulations allowed artisanal miners some room to manoeuvre, the legality 
of artisanal mining remained hazy. 
Although artisanal mining is identified with distress migration away 
from herding, wealthy households and part-time herders are active 
participants. High’s 2008 research in Uyanga traced the effects of a gold 
rush that began in 1999. She observed class and ethnic diversity amongst 
15  High (2008) observes that gold miners are likely to earn four times the national average salary 
of approximately US$60 per month.
49
2 . ARTISANAL GOLD-RUSH MINING AND FRONTIeR DeMOCRACy
the miners as well as a tendency for social levelling that encompassed 
women. Interestingly, returns to individuals in the miners’ work groups 
were divided equally at the end of each workday, regardless of age and 
sex. This egalitarianism starkly contrasted with the social hierarchy of 
patriarchal herding households where women’s herding and domestic 
work was undervalued. Nor did they receive payment on par with men 
during Mongolia’s socialist era on the collective farms and in the towns 
(Lahiri-Dutt and Dondov 2016). Above all, the existence of Mongolian 
artisanal mining was appreciated for its role in labour absorption and 
poverty alleviation. People from various walks of life gained higher than 
average livelihoods during the gold rush. Many herders transferred their 
economic dependency from herding to artisanal mining (Grayson et al. 
2004). Meanwhile, their enhanced purchasing power supported the 
expansion of a labour-generating service sector in remote areas, with 
the potential for small town growth.
Twenty-first-century frontier democracy dissected
The two country cases of frontier democracy reviewed here—Tanzania 
and Mongolia—have a similar chronology, whereby peasants and herders 
facing hostile conditions, be it drought and famine or, alternatively, 
structural adjustment austerity, found gold-mining as a lifeline or 
lucrative alternative. In both countries, the golden opportunity generated 
widespread egalitarian tendencies that crossed class, ethnic and, in 
Mongolia, gender boundaries. 
While nineteenth-century gold rushes were characterised by discovery 
and excavation of gold in remote, sparsely populated regions viewed as 
political frontiers in the eyes of the state, by the twenty-first century, 
populations had become denser and state territories were generally 
permanently fixed. Given ample supplies of local manual labour within 
the country, nation-states are now far less likely to publicly encourage 
international in-migration of miners, in contrast to what had happened 
during the Californian and Victorian gold rushes. However, foreign 
migrants from neighbouring states can cross borders unnoticed and 
usually pass as natives. Artisanal miners, migrating in large numbers from 
within their national borders to gold rush sites, are most common. 
Like nineteenth-century artisanal gold rush sites, those of the late twentieth 
and twenty-first century represent a spectrum of outcomes, ranging from 
temporary easing of artisanal mining controls to repressive policies aimed 
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at actively dissuading or eliminating artisanal miners. For example, gold-
rush mining in West Java, triggered by the 1997 Asian financial crisis and 
the fall of the autocratic Suharto Government, led to an estimated 26,000 
illegal artisanal miners flooding into Pongor; the composition of the 
migration flow reflected the legacy of insecurity from the Suharto period 
(Lestari 2007, 2011). Migrants from Banten Province or nearby cities 
aimed to occupy the most valuable sites, and formed rival gangs to achieve 
that end. Some of Indonesia’s military generals became involved with 
medium-scale operations involving equipment, hiring artisanal miners 
or monopolising existing pits and renting them out. Artisanal miners’ 
self-employed status was thereby compromised. Conflict between Antam 
mining company and the artisanal miners flared in December 1998, and 
intensified into the millennium. Clearly, the artisanal gold rush of the late 
1990s and early 2000s in Indonesia was far from approximating collegial 
occupational transformation and a democratic frontier in labour relations.
Ghana’s gold rush in the 2010s has included migrants from China, 
neighbouring African countries and a sprinkling of other nationalities of 
which Russians are noteworthy, but the majority of miners are Ghanaian 
nationals intent on earning a livelihood. Chinese miners started being 
arrested in 2013, this was followed by a presidential crackdown on the 
local illegal artisanal galamsay miners (Levin 2013). Several military 
operations have been staged with the objective of eradicating their 
digging activities. The media demonised the galamsay, but criminalising 
them did not deter their presence (Hilson and Hilson 2015). Steeped 
in gold history, Ghana’s artisanal mining context was metaphorically 
a bubbling cauldron of melded vested interests of small-, medium- and 
large-scale gold producers, in situ local communities, chiefs and regional 
and national governments. The ensuing contestation and conflict acted to 
throttle artisanal miners’ individual and collective democratic voice. 
Conditions of existence: Gold rush frontier 
democracy then and now
I have explored the dynamics of frontier democracy with respect to the 
numerical size and demographic composition of miners; the nature of 
the  labour process, notably organisational aspects of the work teams, 
their social and political identity and coherence as a collective labour 
force; the  material and legal aspects of mineral access; the artisanal 
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mining presence vis-à-vis the state; and artisanal miners’ interaction with 
other external agents, notably the indigenous population and corporate 
mining interests. 
The narrative emerging from this historical review is one of remarkably 
similar social transformations experienced by gold rush migrant 
populations spanning the nineteenth to the twenty-first century, despite 
widely differing cultural origins of the migrants. In the nineteenth 
century, European populations dominated the frontier artisanal labour 
expansion in colonial and post-colonial North America, Australia and 
New Zealand, whereas the twenty-first century, with its unprecedented 
international gold prices (Figure 2.2), witnessed the spread of innumerable 
artisanal  gold sites across Asia, Africa and Latin America. Regardless 
of migrant gold rush miners’ differences in beliefs pertaining to social 
hierarchical order, nature and resource utilisation, most miners were 
likely to embark on artisanal mining with a strong sense of expediency, 
adopting a lifestyle of hard work and hard play, infused with an infectious 
sense of expectation. Artisanal miners working side by side to find and 
extract gold shared a common identity and ethos. Their associational ties 
as miners were underpinned by an innovative can-do determination and 
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Figure 2.2: International gold prices, 1850–1960
Source: Author’s graphical representation. Data source: usagold.com/reference/prices.
Curiously, during the mid-nineteenth century, public opinion and the 
media were highly favourable to the gold rush miners, often seeing them 
as pioneering role models, whereas in the twenty-first century, they tend 
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to be ignored or viewed as a nuisance standing in the way of ‘modern 
mining’, as is the case in Tanzania and Mongolia. In countries with 
longer mineral production histories, more entrenched mining company 
interests and governments supporting large-scale mining, artisanal miners 
were usually disparaged as environmental polluters and illegal workers, 
subjected at times to criminalisation, as exemplified by Ghana. Yet many 
artisanal miners, facing a stiffening atmosphere of hostility, nonetheless 
found room for occupational manoeuvre in these settings, although the 
experience of frontier democracy largely eluded them.
A number of criteria associated with national and local governments 
preclude or undermine frontier democracy. First, contested local interests 
in land and mineral rights: given higher population densities than 
prevailed 150 years ago, local property interests of people with different 
modes of livelihood tend to be both complex and deeply entrenched. 
Second, mining policies are now skewed towards large-scale mining. 
Transnationalism of corporate industrial mining over the twentieth century 
has brought large-scale mining interests to the fore in far more places 
than ever before. The global surge in market liberalisation policies from 
the 1990s onwards engendered a proliferation of national and foreign-
owned mining companies. Third, under global economic liberalisation, 
increasing mutuality of interests of multinational mining corporations 
and national governments has evolved (Moody 2007; Campbell 2009). 
All three criteria appear to be more prevalent in the twenty-first century. 
Such circumstances stack the odds heavily against artisanal miners’ 
activities and the emergence of frontier democracy. 
Despite these obstacles, manifestations of frontier democracy have emerged 
in various places in the twenty-first century, but through different forms 
of mutuality between the state and artisanal miners. The development of 
frontier democracy during the nineteenth century arose in a historical 
period of nation-state expansion into remote geographical areas where 
artisanal mining proved useful to state-building agendas of governments, 
albeit often at the expense of the aboriginal populations. 
In the twenty-first century, with national borders worldwide relatively 
fixed, interests of artisanal gold miners and state agents are most likely 
to converge when government politicians seek to win votes from the 
mass numbers of artisanal miners. They may also converge in the process 
of individual government officials or commercial middlemen seeking 
pecuniary gain along the gold commodity chain between local sources of 
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gold supply and the foreign export of gold. For example, in Tanzania it 
is rumoured that most artisanal unprocessed gold is smuggled to Dubai, 
evading royalty payment (Fold et al. 2014).16 This kind of subterfuge in 
foreign exports would most likely benefit state and/or market elites in the 
capital city. 
The duration of a gold rush tends to be short-lived, as miners using 
handheld artisanal implements reach a depth where they cannot proceed 
further without considerable capital investment in equipment. Four to 
six years is the norm before there is a substantive tail-off of the rush. The 
significance of temporality in relation to the unfolding non-renewable 
nature of mineral deposits, fluctuating rates of in-migration, state attempts 
to assert control and the availability of alternative options have altered 
labour patterns over the centuries. In the nineteenth-century Californian 
and Victorian gold rushes, it is believed that many if not most artisanal 
miners migrated back to their home areas as large-scale capitalised 
mining displaced artisanal mining. In both places, the gold rush catalysed 
economic diversification in services and industry, beckoning former 
miners, especially since many had witnessed the high returns to labour in 
services as the gold rush proceeded. 
Perhaps the most significant and enduring difference between the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries is the post–gold rush phase. In the 
twenty-first century, smallholder farmers find it difficult to compete 
with larger-scale producers and agro-industry. Many are not attracted to 
returning to their rural home areas, having grown accustomed to higher 
levels of income and a freer, non-traditional lifestyle. In the service sectors 
around the mining sites, formal jobs are very scarce, and the informal 
sector is already oversubscribed. Thus, artisanal miners are likely to try 
to eke out a subsistence reworking tailings—a precarious existence with 
low returns and high risks of falling foul of enforcement agencies of the 
mining companies or state. Fundamentally, artisanal miners’ persistence is 
premised on the lack of better work options elsewhere, contrasting starkly 
with the nineteenth-century’s industrial expansion and proliferation of 
urban employment that offered abundant alternative work options. 
16  Given the sensitivity of the subject matter this is difficult to document, but Geenen (2015) has 
succeeded in providing a detailed account of the gold commodity chain for the eastern Democratic 
Republic of Congo.
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Paradoxes of frontier democracy: 
From mirage, to material reality, to 
enduring legacy
In exploring frontier democracy with respect to artisanal gold rush miners 
during the nineteenth century as opposed to now, I have conceptualised 
frontier democracy as the realisation of economic opportunity, class 
levelling, trust and cooperative interaction amongst manual labourers 
arising from their occupational solidarity as migrant artisanal miners 
and, in some cases, their engagement in collective political protest against 
external agents seen to be standing in the way of the manifest destiny of 
their search for gold.
Dumett (1998: 8) observed that gold has given rise to ‘legends, 
exaggerations, and delusions’ leading to ‘myths and fantasies’ through 
recorded history. I would add, with respect to the era of nationalism-
cum-globalisation spanning the mid-nineteenth century to the present, 
the production of artisanal gold has generated many positive economic 
and political labour trends followed by a clutch of paradoxical outcomes. 
Positively, gold-mining’s accessibility to masses of people willing to work 
with simple handheld tools has provided employment to impressive 
numbers of artisanal miners; forged a strong occupational identity within 
a short period of time fostered by collectively experienced risktaking and 
hard work; and generated a democratic ethos in a number of places when 
and where the ‘vent for democracy’ is not preempted by the state, existing 
local vested interests in gold-mining or large-scale industrial mining.
These outcomes challenge the common belief that artisanal gold miners 
are necessarily overly acquisitive and irresponsible. True, the quest 
for El  Dorado is an important motivational force underlying miners’ 
migration over long distances, and persistence of hardship and uncertainty. 
But, too often, the emphasis on artisanal miners’ end goal overlooks their 
mode of working, notably the collegial ties and occupational integrity of 
working together on a common occupational footing regardless of class 
and educational level, and their creativity in devising a modus operandi 
of shared work practices. It is not accidental that Fetherling (1988) 
called the phenomenon ‘the Gold Crusades’ to denote the intensity of 
purpose and common identity involved. Gold seekers were credited 
with transforming California from ‘a half-tamed wilderness to a settled 
commonwealth’ (Billington 1956: 218), while similarly gold-mining was 
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viewed as altering Victoria from ‘a minor pastoral settlement to the most 
celebrated British colony’ (Serle 1963: 369). Despite moral criticism of 
artisanal miners by vocal segments of the population at that time, this 
pioneering narrative has prevailed, identifying artisanal miners with 
foundational democratic principles (Goodman 1994). The irony is that 
artisanal miners’ contribution to economic and social development at 
present could be argued to be far more laudable than that of earlier gold 
rush miners, who participated in a highly ‘delimited democracy’ focused 
primarily on European settlers, at the expense of local people. Twenty-first-
century artisanal mining has been more socially and ethnically inclusive, 
engaging larger numbers of the working population, mostly nationals. 
It is lamentable that their contribution to egalitarian democracy has 
received negligible recognition, and is woefully under-recorded in terms 
of what they have achieved materially and culturally. Present-day artisanal 
miners should be encouraged to record and disseminate their stories 
of how they negotiated the organisation of artisanal mining, regardless 
of differences in class and education. Their testimony is vital to ensure 
appreciation of twenty-first-century artisanal mining’s social significance. 
At the very least, artisanal mining has provided vital poverty alleviation 
through employment generation and on-the-job occupational training for 
millions in Africa and Asia. Additionally, the Eureka ethos and labour 
frontier democracy represent invigorating forces of change, invaluable 
for national rehabilitation and renewal in the present, as well as during 
nineteenth-century nation-building. 
The final irony is that neoliberal casino capitalism has paradoxically 
generated the conditions for the recent boom in artisanal mining, as 
well as its ultimate demise. Capitalism’s gold price spiral, its expanding 
unregulated labour markets and the ongoing process of deagrarianisation 
displacing millions from age-old agrarian work patterns has triggered 
the artisanal gold boom. Yet, these same neoliberal economic forces, 
combined with the natural depletion of gold at depths accessible to 
artisanal miners, are likely to spell the eventual eclipse of artisanal mining 
by large-scale global mining interests. Generally, national governments, 
beholden to international financial institutions’ neoliberal agenda, play 
a central role in this process. Inevitably in the twenty-first century, small-
scale producers, in whatever occupational sphere, face the Goliath of 
international capitalism. The democratic legacy of artisanal gold-rush 
mining of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries is too valuable 
for the future to be ignored, forgotten or derided. 
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Tanzanite: Commodity fiction 
or commodity nightmare?
Katherine C. Donahue
Rafiki Nderema1 leaned back in his chair, finishing off the last piece of 
goat. A plane landed nearby at the Kilimanjaro International Airport. 
We were talking about the tanzanite mines not far from the airport. Rafiki 
is a part-time dealer in tanzanite. ‘It can be dangerous,’ he said, ‘so I hire 
a woman to take the bus to the mines and pick up the tanzanite. No one 
knows she is carrying it. Sometimes she changes buses, just to make 
sure.’ When she is confident she is not being followed, she brings the 
raw gemstones to Arusha, Tanzania, where Rafiki lives, and where tourists 
usually begin their safaris to nearby national parks or to the Serengeti. 
Rafiki’s wife prepares the tanzanite by cleaning and heating it. A relative 
helps them with the processing. The treated tanzanite is then marketed.
Tanzanite is available in many shops in Arusha, and it is frequently sold on 
the streets. Experienced buyers know what to look for, but cost-conscious 
tourists sometimes end up with lumps of dark glass. The tanzanite 
gemstone business is just one of several enterprises Rafiki undertakes to 
support his family. He works in the safari business for himself and for 
1  The name is a pseudonym, as is that of a later source. Pseudonyms are used here because the 
gemstone industry can be dangerous. Hold-ups and shootings still occur in the region. Tanzania is 
not the only place where gem dealers are robbed; it happens in the US as well. One American jeweller 
with whom I spoke says that Colombian gangs in particular acquired a specialty in such thefts, staking 
out jewellery stores for possible marks.
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other companies, as both a driver and a guide. He is a fine mechanic. 
He supports not only his wife and children, but also occasionally other 
family members. His businesses bring him into contact with tourists who 
may be interested in tanzanite. But to go into business in a bigger way is 
hard. Credit is difficult to get, and financing large purchases of anything 
is difficult. His enterprises are all small in scale, but Rafiki gets by. This is 
a very Tanzanian story.
The problem
The commodity description of labor, land, and money is entirely 
fictitious  … Nevertheless, it is with the help of this fiction that the 
markets for labor, land, and money are organized. (Polanyi 1957: 72)
Karl Polanyi’s discussion of the fiction of land, labour and money 
as commodities was neither the first nor the last analysis of the social 
meanings attached to things. Things exist in a world of goods (Douglas 
and Isherwood 1979), they have social lives (Appadurai 1986) and 
they are circulated and controlled in a web of socio-ecological relations 
(Donahue 2003). The fictitious nature of commodities, of their supply 
and of the demand for them, is exemplified in the story of a stone. This 
chapter discusses the recent commodification of tanzanite, a product 
sold globally as a semi-precious gemstone. Reported to be ‘1,000 times 
more rare than diamonds’ (Nones 2005), tanzanite is found solely in one 
small region of Tanzania, East Africa. Popular with Americans, it has been 
widely marketed in the US and the Caribbean. Advertisements use the 
mystique of Mt Kilimanjaro and the Maasai to do so. 
However, after 11 September 2001, allegations that al-Qaeda bought 
tanzanite to finance its operations led to close scrutiny, and almost the 
collapse, of the tanzanite market. Journalists Robert Block and Daniel 
Pearl, on the trail of al-Qaeda’s financial dealings before 11 September 
2001, reported in a November 2001 Wall Street Journal article on the links 
between al-Qaeda and the tanzanite trade (Block and Pearl 2001). I describe 
more fully here how the impact of that article, which appeared at the 
same time that Douglas Farah (2001) of the Washington Post reported on 
al-Qaeda’s connections to the diamond trade in Sierra Leone and Liberia, 
led to an immediate decline in sales of tanzanite. The adverse publicity 
concerning ‘conflict’ or ‘blood’ diamonds since 2001 (see Farah 2001, 
2004a; Campbell 2002), and especially since the 2006 release of the film 
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Blood Diamond, has awakened interest in the role of easily transportable 
and therefore easily smuggled gems in money laundering, in the purchase 
of weapons and other goods, and in the financing of insurgencies. 
However, since early 2002, the US and Tanzanian governments have 
argued that there is no evidence that al-Qaeda is currently involved in the 
tanzanite trade.
The lure of profit in Tanzania, where the average person currently lives 
on  about US$920 a year (see World Bank 2014), led to the quick 
growth of Mererani, the main town near the tanzanite mines, with 
attendant problems of HIV/AIDS, prostitution and drug use. While 
the commodification of tanzanite has created profit for gemstone buyers 
and dealers, and skilful marketing has brought tanzanite to the attention 
of cruise ship passengers in the Caribbean at the same time that it has 
been featured as a desirable present for birthing mothers and film stars 
on the Hollywood red carpet, it has also led to unsafe mining practices, 
violence over disputed mining rights and pitched battles between small-
scale miners and TanzaniteOne, a mining corporation with South African 
roots. Before the sale of TanzaniteOne to a local Tanzanian company 
in December 2014, armed security officers for TanzaniteOne patrolled 
the mining block controlled by this corporation, both above and below 
ground, in order to keep small-scale miners out. Several miners and 
a TanzaniteOne employee have died in these disputes. Flash-flooding of 
mines and faulty air pumps have also led to deaths in Mererani. Tanzanite 
has thus become both a commodity fiction and a commodity nightmare. 
Approaching the field
Several colleagues at my university and I have taken students to Tanzania 
to research community-based conservation in two areas of the country. 
One is on the western slopes of Kilimanjaro, north of Arusha, between the 
villages of Tinga Tinga and Engare Nairobi. I first encountered tanzanite 
in the summer of 2002. Students in that year’s field course had heard about 
tanzanite from publicity concerning the 1997 film Titanic. The students 
were not the only ones who thought the large blue stone, ‘The Heart of the 
Ocean’, worn by the actress Kate Winslet, was actually tanzanite. Internet 
advertisements also featured the connection. Babb (2013) noted that 
jewellers in Jaipur, India, believed the film was responsible for introducing 
tanzanite to the global market.
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In January 2004, I visited two stores in Key West, Florida, a cruise ship 
destination, which prominently advertised the fact that they sold tanzanite. 
When I inquired, a store employee said that it was one of their fastest 
selling commodities. Later, back in Tanzania in the summer of 2004, 
I spoke at some length with a tanzanite dealer, who described the process 
he went through to buy and prepare it. Subsequently, I have interviewed 
jewellers in Florida, Massachusetts and New Hampshire in the United 
States, have read relevant court cases and searched accounts of gemstone 
commodity production. I attended and wrote about the trial of Zacarias 
Moussaoui, the so-called 20th hijacker of 9/11 (Donahue 2007), who was 
also named in a lawsuit connected to tanzanite, and I have pursued the 
numerous stories of funding sources for al-Qaeda.
What follows here is a discussion of the process by which a stone has 
become commodified. It has been assigned value despite, or perhaps 
because of, the fictions that surround this commodity. Other scholars, 
such as Kelsall (2004), Lange (2006), Schroeder (2010) and Helliesen 
(2012) have skilfully written about the impact of tanzanite mining, the 
designation of tanzanite as a conflict gem and on the businesses and people 
of Tanzania. The violence that attends tanzanite mining has been reported 
in Tanzanian newspapers (see, for instance, Philemon 2013). Numerous 
reports have been written about conditions in the mines by researchers 
for institutions such as the International Labour Organization, the US 
Department of Labor, United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and 
the World Bank, some of which are discussed in this chapter. Here, 
I  describe some of the social and political issues that have developed 
because of the tanzanite industry, but my focus is on the development of 
the market for tanzanite, the adroit ways in which it has been marketed 
and the reception of that marketing on the part of buyers in countries such 
as the US. The emphasis, therefore, is on the downstream ripples created 
by this particular commodity, ripples that spread to the United States and 
back to Tanzania. In the first section, I describe the discovery of tanzanite 
and its subsequent marketing to a worldwide clientele, but in particular 
to Americans by companies such as Tiffany and TanzaniteOne. Next, 
I describe the connection between the United States and the tanzanite 
trade, focusing in part on the allegations that tanzanite was a ‘conflict 
gem’. In the third section, I describe the relationship between the large-
scale mining company and the small-scale miners, and the conditions in 
which the miners work. In the fourth section, I explore the role played 
by local Tanzanians, some wealthy, some not, in attempting to control 
portions of the tanzanite trade.
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The tanzanite story: Fact or fiction
Tanzanite had a difficult, dirty and dangerous beginning in the Maasai 
Steppe of Tanzania. Various stories credit its discovery to at least three 
people: an Indian tailor, Manuel D’Souza from Arusha, Tanzania; 
a Maasai cattle herder, Ali Juyawatu; and a Meru cattle herder, Jumanne 
Ngoma. In July 1967, according to one report, D’Souza was prospecting 
for rubies in the area east of Arusha when Maasai cattle herders showed 
him some blue stones. Legend, widely spread on the internet, has it 
that a lightning strike started a grass fire, as frequently happens in the 
dry season there. When the fire burned out, some beautifully coloured 
gemstones were found in the burnt grass. The stones were a rare form 
of zoisite, a calcium aluminum silicate. The semi-precious gemstone in 
its natural state is often a rather uninteresting purple/brown in colour. 
But when this particular form of zoisite is heated to 300–500 degrees 
centigrade, it turns a sapphire blue, or purple or red. In the gem trade, 
this trait is referred to as ‘trichroic’, as having three colours when the 
stone is turned to the light. To date, this form of zoisite is found only in 
the Manyara region, Simanjiro district of Tanzania. The mining area is 
in the Mererani hills southeast of Arusha, not far from the Kilimanjaro 
airport, and north of the Simanjiro plain. The Maasai people, primarily 
cattle herders, have lived there since their migration south from Kenya 
hundreds of years ago. Some have become brokers for tanzanite, but the 
miners themselves often come from elsewhere in Tanzania, leaving behind 
their own poverty to engage in more poverty, to dig and crawl through 
the more than 300 pit mines and accompanying tunnels to depths of 500 
m. Some miners work 18-hour shifts. Some miners were reportedly only 
seven years old. Drugs, alcohol, sex, HIV/AIDS and crime are commonly 
reported there. In 2004, Daniel Yona, the minister of energy and minerals, 
declared during a visit to Mererani that 60 per cent of the inhabitants had 
HIV/AIDS (Arusha Times 2004a). This was most likely an exaggeration, 
however unwitting, but the figure did indicate the social perceptions of 
the area.
When buyers from Tiffany, the upscale New York–based jewellery 
company, first saw the stones in the 1960s, their interest was aroused. 
It was Henry B. Platt of Tiffany who reportedly gave the name ‘tanzanite’ 
to the stones, and who said that the discovery of the gemstone was ‘the 
most exciting event of the century’ (Time 1969). Another statement 
from Tiffany said that tanzanite was ‘the most beautiful blue stone to 
be discovered in 2,000 years’ (Tanzanite Foundation n.d.). Although the 
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market did not expand through the 1970s, its popularity grew during 
the 1980s through good advertising. By the time of the release of the 
film Titanic in 1997, interest in tanzanite had expanded to the point 
that jewellery stores in the Caribbean, in Florida and even in Alaska had 
difficulty keeping it in stock. Not unlike the techniques used in marketing 
diamonds, tanzanite had acquired its own mystique and legend. ‘From the 
foothills of Mt. Kilimanjaro’, said the internet marketers on one website. 
‘Unlocking the riches of Mt. Kilimanjaro’, said another (Nones 2005). 
One website claimed that the Maasai give tanzanite to women who have 
just borne a child. It displayed a photo of a Maasai woman  wearing 
a tanzanite stone. While it is the case that many Maasai women wear blue 
clothing, some websites, such as that for Tanzanite Gallery (2007), a gem 
dealer, stated:
Recent Maasai tradition tells of how pieces of tanzanite were given by 
Maasai Chiefs to their wives on the birth of a baby to bestow upon the 
child a healthy, safe and positive life. According to their customs, only 
women who have been blessed with the miracle of new life have the 
honour of wearing blue coloured beads and garbs.
In this vein, the Tanzanite Foundation, a non-profit group established 
by the TanzaniteOne mining company, was created. The website for the 
Tanzanite Foundation once stated that it: 
strives to develop the tanzanite industry by growing demand and 
creating value for stakeholders in the tanzanite value chain. By striving to 
standardize methods of practice and conduct, the Tanzanite Foundation 
aims to uphold an ethical route to market in accordance with the Tanzanite 
Tucson Protocols, and invests in meaningful and sustainable upliftment 
projects developed in harmony with the indigenous communities in 
Tanzania. (TanzaniteOne 2007) 
The foundation, run by a public relations firm, launched a tanzanite 
marketing campaign in 2006 specifically aimed at the ‘Push Present’ 
market, meaning the market for presents to women who have just pushed 
through labour (Colored Stone 2005). According to one online dictionary, 
Karen Heller in the Austin American-Statesman on 31 March 1992 wrote 
of the Oscars: 
Let us say that Annette Bening has lost all that baby weight—Warren must 
have given her a ThighMaster as a push present—and looked understated 
yet ravishing. (Double-Tongued Dictionary 2007)
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The website for the Tanzanite Foundation included in its image gallery 
a  photo of a Maasai woman wearing blue, with a baby on her back 
and a  large tanzanite necklace around her neck, hanging just above the 
baby’s head (TanzaniteOne 2008). By 2007, the foundation had created 
awards for the designers of jewellery made as part of their ‘Be Born to 
Tanzanite’ campaign. They did move beyond marketing to build two 
schools, an orphanage, a clinic and the Maasai Ladies’ Project, teaching 
Maasai women how to use wire to make jewellery using discarded 
tanzanite, and serving as an advocacy group overall. However, because of 
unrest in Mererani, by August 2014 the Tanzanite Foundation had closed 
its operations, as did TanzaniteOne.
An American story: The market for tanzanite
The market for tanzanite in the United States and Caribbean is 
a particularly American story. In the 1990s, it was something new and 
still somewhat affordable for Americans, and was considered a good 
investment if you knew what you were looking for. The production 
and marketing of tanzanite became problematic once reports surfaced 
that tanzanite was bought and smuggled out of Tanzania by al-Qaeda 
members. After the attacks of 11 September 2001, Robert Block and 
Daniel Pearl of the Wall Street Journal investigated the trade in tanzanite 
at its source; their report brought a halt to the importation of tanzanite to 
the United States. The US State Department, the Tanzanian Government 
and the gem industry reached an accord in February 2002—the ‘Tucson 
Tanzanite Protocol’—that reopened imports to the US. After that, the 
market for tanzanite became steadier, but the production at the source 
became less so. Schroeder (2010) has described the impact of the move 
toward ensuring ethical mining practices on the Tanzanian Government 
and the stakeholders in the tanzanite mining industry. The argument 
has been made that disputes between small-scale miners and AFGEM 
(African Gem Resources)/TanzaniteOne, as well as poor infrastructure 
and low foreign direct investment have caused a drop in production. 
The American and Tanzanian governments worked to take steps toward 
the regularisation and control of the export of tanzanite, steps mirrored 
in other mining and export sectors, and new marketing strategies such as 
those by TanzaniteOne to support interest in the stone. Thus, the future 
of small-scale and large-scale miners of tanzanite was linked to American 
politics and concerns about terrorist acts on American soil.
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The al‑Qaeda connection
On 16 November 2001, Robert Block and Daniel Pearl’s piece 
(‘Underground Trade: Much-Smuggled Gem Called Tanzanite Helps Bin 
Laden Supporters’) on al-Qaeda’s involvement in buying and  smuggling 
tanzanite appeared in the Wall Street Journal (Block and Pearl 2001). After 
the bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, and 
particularly after 11 September 2001, the United States searched for any 
sources of money that might support al-Qaeda, and proceeded to shut down 
a number of banks and aid associations. Al-Qaeda apparently sought out 
other means of moving money after 1998, including buying diamonds in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone (see Farah 2001, 2004a, 2004b; Campbell 2002). 
Block and Pearl reported that al-Qaeda members were also buying tanzanite 
in Tanzania, which the buyers then smuggled out of Tanzania into Kenya, 
and thence to buyers in Dubai and elsewhere. Block and Pearl identified an 
imam of a mosque in Mererani who was sympathetic to Osama bin Laden, 
and a  tanzanite dealer who worked with that imam. Daniel Pearl was 
murdered in Pakistan in January 2002, while still on the trail of al-Qaeda’s 
finances for the Wall Street Journal. As a result of Block and Pearl’s article 
and other news stories, large gem retailers such as QVC, Birks, Peoples, Wal-
Mart, Zale Corp. and Tiffany & Co. all stopped selling tanzanite, much 
to the concern of the Tanzanian authorities, for whom the US market for 
tanzanite represented the majority of its exports of that gemstone (Roskin 
2002; Hübschle 2004). The US State Department investigated, and said it 
found little evidence connecting al-Qaeda with tanzanite. By 9 February 
2002, the Tucson Tanzanite Protocols were announced in Tucson, Arizona, 
which is a major centre for the global gem industry. Edgar Maokola 
Majogo, the Tanzanian Minister of Energy and Minerals, representatives of 
international gem dealers’ associations and Michael O’Keefe of the US State 
Department Office of East African Affairs were all present. The Tucson 
Tanzanite Protocols stated that the Government of Tanzania ‘has taken and 
continues to take significant steps to safeguard this gemstone’ by licensing 
miners and traders in Tanzania, and ensuring for all countries ‘transparency 
and accountability in the supply chain’. Furthermore, warranties were to be 
required of exporters and ‘all those in the downstream chain of commerce’ 
(Tanzanite Gems 2002). 
As a result of the reported links between al-Qaeda and tanzanite, a lawsuit 
was filed in the federal district court in New York City. In February 
2002, lawyers for families of three victims of the 11 September terrorist 
attacks filed a wrongful death suit against STS Jewels, Inc., owned by 
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Sunil Agrawal, a tanzanite dealer, and the Tanzanite Mineral Dealers’ 
Association (TAMIDA). The plaintiffs wanted an injunction banning 
STS Jewels from selling tanzanite and:
forcing it to contribute all proceeds from any past tanzanite sales to a court-
supervised 9/11 victims’ relief fund. The suit also sought $1 billion in 
compensatory damages from other defendants, which included not only 
TAMIDA but also Osama bin Laden, the former Taliban government of 
Afghanistan, the Iraqi government, and the supposed ‘20th hijacker’ of 
9/11, Zacarias Moussaoui. (Tanzanite Gems 2002)
The suit was withdrawn with prejudice on 8 April 2002, meaning that the 
case could not be brought again. According to Sunil Agrawal, the head 
of STS Jewels: ‘To a potential plaintiff, the lawsuit’s withdrawal sends 
the message: there’s nothing there … I feel vindicated’ (Tanzanite Gems 
2002; see also Markon 2002).
In March 2002, after the Tucson Protocols were announced, Tanzanian 
Minister Majogo accused AFGEM, the South African tanzanite mining 
company, of inviting Robert Block of the Wall Street Journal to Arusha 
and Mererani to write about the tanzanite trade. Minister Majogo accused 
AFGEM of intending to make it difficult for the local Tanzanian miners 
to sell their unbranded, undocumented gems on the market. AFGEM was 
at the time preparing to ensure that each gemstone sold from their mine 
was to be identified and guaranteed, and they reported that the controls 
they were initiating were designed to bring order to the tanzanite industry 
(Beard and Kondo 2002; Kondo 2002).
By early 2002, questions had been raised as to the veracity of Block and 
Pearl’s article. According to one source, the imam of the mosque described 
by them was incorrectly identified. Other names and facts were said to be 
inaccurate, and the people identified in the article denied their sympathies 
with Osama bin Laden’s cause (see, for example, Maharaj 2002; Hübschle 
2004). Annette Hübschle, in a report on crime in southern Africa, 
suggested that Block and Pearl’s article was a case in which ‘journalists in 
need of a good news story may have blown an allegation out of proportion’ 
(Hübschle 2004: 9). Michael O’Keefe of the US State Department, who 
was present at the announcement of the Tucson Tanzanite Protocol, said:
I think they looked at the trade … saw it was chaotic, not totally 
controlled, with a certain percentage lost to smuggling, and they tied that 
to al-Qaeda … [But] our resources are a hell of a lot bigger; we have an 
intelligence community. (Beard and Kondo 2002) 
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The gem dealers were happy. By September 2002, the Jewellers’ Circular 
Keystone reported that:
U.S. State Department representative Michael O’Keefe has repeatedly told 
the jewelry industry that there is no evidence that any terrorist organization 
is funding operations through the sale of tanzanite. (Roskin 2002)
Tiffany began to sell tanzanite jewellery again in June 2002, saying that:
Based on lack of credible evidence linking tanzanite and terrorism as well 
as progress to further controls over trade in tanzanite, Tiffany & Co. has 
resumed the sale of jewelry containing this gemstone. (Roskin 2002)
Furthermore, the American Gem Trade Association announced in 
October 2002 that tanzanite was to become a December birthstone, along 
with turquoise and zircon. Although other stones had been added to the 
list, news reports circulated that tanzanite became the first gemstone to be 
added to the birthstone list since 1912 (Weldon 2002). The demand side 
of the tanzanite story became healthy again.
A jeweller from St Maarten in the Caribbean said, ‘In the 1980s no 
one had heard of tanzanite. Three years ago (1999) everyone started to 
carry it’ (Roberts 2002). Tourists in the Caribbean are now well versed 
in tanzanite. As one couple’s website said:
Do we look like tourists? We’re guessing Key West has seen a tourist 
or two in her day. We did a lot of shopping and returned to the ship 
loaded down with key lime souvenirs (and a little birthday tanzanite). 
(Bundy and Schilling 2002)
According to many reports, 80 per cent of all tanzanite has gone to buyers 
in the United States (see Roskin 2002; Hübschle 2004). Most of the rest 
of it goes to the Caribbean. There, it is bought by cruise ship passengers, 
many of whom are North Americans. Diamonds International began 
doing business in 1986 in St Thomas, and now has over 100 stores in the 
Caribbean, Florida, Mexico, Las Vegas and Alaska. Seizing on the interest 
in tanzanite, Diamonds International created a separate chain of shops, 
Tanzanite International. There are several competitors selling tanzanite on 
Duval, the main shopping street in Key West. Some jewellery stores post 
large signs outside the shop advertising the sale of tanzanite. One such is 
the Jewel Port, which, on its signs and on the internet, claimed it had the 
‘Best Collection of Tanzanite, (10%–70% off select items)’. One jeweller 
there told me in 2004 that tanzanite was the gemstone most cruise ship 
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passengers were interested in buying. Some of those passengers become 
informal experts on tanzanite. One former cruise ship passenger wrote 
in the following about a 2003 cruise:
Day 5: Grand Cayman
Just behind Columbian Emeralds there are a number of shops situated 
around a courtyard. For those interested in Cigars, there is a very nice 
shop located in this area, as well as a shop called Island Pleasures. This 
is also a jewelry store but they sell a lot of loose Tanzanite. Normally 
Tanzanite can sell for up to $700 a carat but I was able to but [sic] a pair 
of 2 (identical in color and shape – 1 ½ carats total) for $299.00. Loose 
stones also do not have to be declared on your Customs forms. After some 
other souvenier [sic] shopping we went back to the ship. (McClure 2003)
In November 2005, one cruise ship passenger, ‘Irish Boy’, posted the 
following query to fellow readers of a cruise ship message board:
Hi Gang
Just got off the Victory & Imagination in October and if I ever hear the 
word Tanzanite again I will jump off the nearest bridge … what is this 
stuff I never heard of it before but never heard so much about it for 7 days 
on the cruise, do the cruise lines own a mine or what … observations 
please. :confused. (Irish Boy 2005)
A travel writer observed that tanzanite had become so popular with the 
cruise ship industry that it appeared as the only gemstone listed in a glossary 
of nautical terms, along with ‘port’ and ‘starboard’ (Clausing  2008). 
She went on to say that:
Tanzanite is a beautiful blue or purple stone seemingly found only in two 
places in the world: Tanzania, and cruise ships. You may find it in shops 
at home, but it seems to be a particular obsession in cruising circles—
on some sailings you can’t swing a shuffleboard cue without hitting 
a boutique specializing in the stone. 
Even in Ketchikan and Skagway, Alaska, cruise ship passengers are briefed 
by ‘port lecturers’ on tanzanite acquisition at local gem stores. In turn, 
the stores are expected to pay the cruise lines a certain percentage of 
their profits (Glass 2012). One jeweller said he had paid US$25,000 and 
was expected to give 10 per cent of his earnings to the cruise shopping 
programs in addition. Complaints from customers and local businesses 
came to the attention of the consumer protection authorities for the state 
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of Alaska; in 2013, the state of Alaska moved to require port lecturers 
to reveal the fact that they are advertising for these jewellery companies 
(Gutierrez 2013). 
In October 2005, rings at one store in New Hampshire in the US 
were retailing at US$139 for tanzanite set with diamonds; a bracelet of 
tanzanite and diamonds was US$399. By January 2007, the same store 
was selling a tanzanite ring set with diamonds for US$799, and a bracelet 
of tanzanite and diamonds cost US$1,400, while anzanite pendants were 
selling for US$200–300. By January 2008, earrings and pendants were 
selling for US$400 each, while a set containing a ring, earrings, and 
a pendant was US$199. Demand had declined by 2008, a  salesperson 
said, because tanzanite was not marketed as widely, and it was less 
available. Another jeweller in New Hampshire said he usually bought his 
tanzanite from a  gem dealer in Boston, Massachusetts, but that dealer 
now spends more time buying sapphires in Sri Lanka than tanzanite in 
Arusha, Tanzania.
A carat is one-fifth of a gram. According to one jeweller in Massachusetts, 
cut tanzanite sells for between US$500 and US$3,000 a carat 
(2016 prices), depending on the cut, clarity and the quality of the stone. 
Cut diamonds can sell for US$5,500–6,000 a carat. Tanzanite occurs 
naturally in a variety of sizes and it often requires preparation by cutting 
and polishing. I have seen an unpolished and uncut 20-carat stone, valued 
at US$2,300, and a photo of a smaller cut tanzanite that was sold for 
US$8,000. It should be noted that the terms ‘precious’ and ‘semi-precious’ 
for gemstones are used less frequently now than in the past. For instance, 
a good-quality semiprecious tourmaline is usually more expensive than 
a lesser-quality diamond.
The global downturn in the economy after 2008 has had an effect on 
commodity production. One example is provided by Tiffany, the New 
York jeweller. When Wall Street provided end-of-year bonuses, Tiffany’s 
Wall Street store was visibly advertising its wares. Holiday sales were 
an important source of income, but soft sales in 2009, as well as, for 
example, in 2015, led Tiffany to reduce its staff (Beilfuss 2016). Tanzanite 
International and its parent company, Diamonds International, continue 
to serve the cruise ship trade in the Caribbean and Alaska, but the stand-
alone Tanzanite International store in Key West, Florida, eventually closed. 
Jewellery store owners, with whom I  talked between 2009 and  2015, 
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reported that they do not get as many requests for tanzanite as formerly, 
and order it only as needed. Three jewellery stores each had only five or 
six small stones on hand. 
Mining in Mererani
To allow the market mechanism to be sole director of the fate of human 
beings and their natural environment, indeed, even of the amount and use 
of purchasing power, would result in the demolition of society. (Polanyi 
1957: 73)
The mines at Mererani were nationalised by the Tanzanian Government 
in 1971, and the State Mining Corporation, or STAMICO, took over 
production. This occurred during President Julius Nyerere’s period of 
Ujamaa, Tanzania’s version of socialism. Despite his and the program’s 
best intentions, nationalisation failed to produce economic development. 
The movement’s efforts to avoid the social injustices of free markets in the 
West were a test of an economic system that did not have the support of 
an infrastructure, both national and international, to keep it going. State 
mining efforts and production declined steadily at Mererani, while small-
scale mining increased rapidly.
By 1990, the Tanzanian Government tried to increase control over the small-
scale miners, and divided the area into four blocks. Block A was licensed 
by Kilimanjaro Mines Ltd, Blocks B and D were reserved for small-scale 
miners and Block C was taken by Graphtan Limited, a graphite mining 
company. Graphtan ceased production in 1996, and AFGEM acquired the 
licence. According to the TanzaniteOne website, AFGEM began tanzanite 
production in 2001. TanzaniteOne, based in Bermuda but with directors 
also associated with AFGEM, took over control of Block C in 2004.
Disputes arose when the small-scale miners expanded tunnels out 
and under other blocks, in particular into Block C, the AFGEM/
TanzaniteOne block (Hernandez 2003: 10). In 2001, conflict erupted 
between small-scale miners and AFGEM. Gunfire was exchanged between 
AFGEM guards and miners in April that year, and an AFGEM building 
was bombed during Easter weekend (Ngowi 2001: 32). By March 
2002, the Tanzanian mining minister had accused AFGEM of inviting 
the Wall Street Journal reporters to Mererani to investigate the al-Qaeda 
connection. AFGEM sought good public relations by providing water to 
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Maasai people and cattle during a December 2003 drought (Arusha Times 
2003). In December 2006, the Manyara regional police commander gave 
TanzaniteOne, AFGEM’s successor, the authority to use ‘reasonable force’ 
to protect its mining concession from artisanal miners, particularly those 
who tunnel underground into Block C. ‘Reasonable force’ included the 
use of air guns and live bullets. This action, the police commander said, 
was necessary because the small-scale miners used explosives underground, 
not only to frighten the TanzaniteOne security guards, but also to blow off 
grills that were placed to keep out the small-scale miners (Ihucha 2006).
Small-scale mining operations, while apparently chaotic, appear to be 
increasingly self-regulating. Bryceson et al. (2013) argue that small-
scale miners have provided a democratising force in countries that are 
becoming increasingly ‘mineralised’—that is, reliant on mining for 
economic improvement as traditional agriculture becomes less dependable 
as a source of income. The government has not acquired much control 
over operations. As miners arrived to try their luck, they began to register 
and licence themselves through informal and formal mining associations. 
According to Hernandez (2003), rights to plots of lands that were 25 m 
x 25 m have been given out to these miners. More recently, the small-
scale miners have pushed the government to impose restrictions on export 
of unprocessed tanzanite in order to provide more jobs for Tanzanian 
processors. In a hearing in Mererani in January 2008, representatives of the 
miners asked for in-country annual auctions to ensure that international 
gemstone buyers would leave their money in Tanzania and, presumably, 
not deal with sources in India or elsewhere (Juma 2008).
Social and environmental issues in tanzanite 
production
[T]he alleged commodity ‘labor power’ cannot be shoved about, used 
indiscriminately, or even left unused, without affecting also the human 
individual who happens to be the bearer of this peculiar commodity. 
(Polanyi 1957: 73)
Tanzanite mining, as with mining elsewhere, relies on the labour of the 
young and agile. Predominantly male, these young people have left 
subsistence agriculture behind, hoping to find gems. Small-scale mining 
occupies approximately half a million Tanzanians (Kinabo 2003) or 
more. Eftimie et al. (2012) reported that there were 550,000 small-scale 
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miners in Tanzania, of whom 25 per cent were women. According to 
a miner, Mzee Nyumbani (a pseudonym), and others, there is substantial 
migration of young Arusha, Meru and Pare to the area of the tanzanite 
mines (Sheridan 2005). Some become farmers, growing maize and beans, 
while others work in the mines. The urban area of Mererani has grown 
from 37,109 people in 2002, according to the Tanzanian Housing and 
Population Census (United Republic of Tanzania  2002) to 50,800 in 
2012 (Tageo.com 2012). A report on the Tanzanian mining sector said 
that 79 per cent of inhabitants of Mererani were people who moved in 
between 1985 and 1995 from other regions of Tanzania; those surveyed 
had earlier been farmers and civil servants (Mwalyosi 2004: 12).
For some Tanzanians, the system works to their benefit. Kelsall 
(2004: 47) describes Asfoku Mollel, a Maasai who entered the mining trade 
early and now owns several pits, reportedly worth hundreds of millions 
of Tanzanian shillings (as of early 2016, TZ2,100 = US$1). Mollel has 
invested in an hotel, a bus company, a football team and real estate. 
Mzee Nyumbani described his own experiences as a Pare miner to Michael 
Sheridan, an anthropologist, as follows:
In 1978, I started to dig for these gemstones [tourmaline?]. I was able to 
build a house in the town of Landanai, and I was able to buy first one 
vehicle then another. I continued to mine until I reached where I  am 
today, now I have 15 vehicles and 32 houses. This kind of success from 
gemstones is what draws many youths from all over Tanzania, and this 
is indeed the reason why Pare agriculture is left to old people … Many 
youths who mine don’t need much skill because it is their strength that is 
important. (Sheridan 2005) 
Nyumbani went on to say that after the Europeans left, their equipment 
stopped working properly, increasing the need for physical labour. 
‘There in the bush near Arusha now there are about 20,000 people who 
are mining for gemstones every day’ (ibid.).
According to Groves (2000), 11 per cent of the young miners in Mererani 
had not been to school and 75 per cent were under 16, the legal age 
for mining in Tanzania. A 2003 South African report placed the number 
of child labourers in Mererani at 22,500 (Kinabo 2003). Many of these 
children do not actually work in the mines but are hired to bring water 
and food to the miners, or, according to this report, to spy on the miners 
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to ensure the miners will not steal the gemstones. Child miners, some 
as young as seven, are reported to number between 2,800 and 3,200 
(ibid.: 48). 
An International Labour Organization report (ILO 2003) on international 
child labour issues profiled a young former miner, Hamisi, who spoke 
of his time in the mines:
I nearly suffocated inside the pits due to an inadequate supply of oxygen … 
At the mining sites and in the township we were called ‘nyokas,’ or ‘snake 
boys,’ since we literally crawled along the small tunnels underground just 
like snakes.
He said he often worked up to 18 hours a day with only one meal of buns 
and boiled or cooked cassava. According to the report:
Children who work under the supervision of pit owners at the Mererani 
mines are paid around US$ 0.60–1.20 when they are assigned some tasks. 
Some children try their luck sorting the gravel left over by pit owners 
and can make considerably more on the extremely rare occasions that 
they find a gemstone. Their earnings in such cases may range from 
US$ 24.57–122.60.
Gem Slaves: Tanzanite’s Child Labour, a short film made by the UN 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, was released 
in 2006. The film stated that 4,000 child miners worked in the mines 
every day (IRIN News 2006b). The film was quickly criticised by some 
Tanzanians, and by TanzaniteOne, for the figures used for child labour 
(Newman 2007).
In 2011, the TanzaniteOne mining company donated TZ3 million to an 
orphanage that had brought child miners back to school (Arusha Times 
2011). The director of the orphanage at the time was Dorah Mushi, 
a former member of parliament and one of the founders of the Tanzanite 
Women Miners Development Association in 2004.
Conditions in the mines are difficult for those of any age. In April 1998, 
rainwater flooded the mines and more than 50—some sources later 
reported up to 200—miners died (BBC 1998). On 22 June 2002, the 
BBC reported that as many as 42 miners had died in the tanzanite mines. 
This time, a fresh air pump had failed. Following the air pump tragedy, 
the Tanzanian Government temporarily halted all mining activities at 
Mererani (BBC 2002). Things were not much improved when miners 
returned. In April 2004, the Arusha Times reported that on 19 April two 
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young men were found dead in an unused mine in Block B. They had 
never been employed by the owner, according to the paper, and the police 
thought that they had probably suffocated because of lack of air in the 
tunnel (Arusha Times 2004b).
There continue to be other environmental consequences as well. Those 
who have money in Mererani can afford to buy bush meat, reported by 
the Arusha Times to come from poached animals, some of whom are killed 
when they move across Arusha National Park boundaries. Zebra, bushbuck, 
giraffe and buffalo meat have all been confiscated or found at markets both 
in Mererani and in Sanya Juu, a town to the north (Nakora 2004).
Bråtveit et al. (2003) reported in the Annals of Occupational Hygiene 
that exposure to dust in Mererani’s 300 privately owned mines was high. 
The 15,000 miners, working occasionally at a depth of 500 m, are usually 
without protection. Small-scale miners are at high risk for chronic silicosis, 
with ‘total’ dust at a median level of 28.4 mg/m3 (Bråtveit et al. 2003: 
235). Given these conditions, it is no wonder that the miners engage 
in risky behaviour. The Arusha Times in July 2003 (Nyaumame 2003) 
reported that the:
Simanjiro District Commissioner, Mr. Fillemon Shelutete said the town’s 
residents are noted for smoking bhang, chewing khat and drinking the 
illicit liquor popularly known as ‘gongo’.
To make conditions somewhat more difficult, Mererani, as with many 
mining towns, has a larger number of males compared to females. A Tanzanian 
census found that by 2002 there were 21,000 males and 16,000 females 
in the region (United Republic of Tanzania 2002). Given the spread  of 
HIV/AIDS, the health workers were concerned—a 2012 UNICEF report 
indicated that 1.5 million Tanzanians (of a total population of 48 million), 
or 3 per cent, were HIV positive. For adults aged 15–49, the number was 
5.1 per cent. In the Mererani area, the figure may be substantially higher. 
On 1 June 2004, Daniel Yona, the minister of energy and minerals, opened 
a four-day workshop for the small-scale miners of Mererani. He was quoted 
as saying that 60 per cent of all inhabitants of Mererani were HIV positive, 
and that there were at least 500 female sex workers in the town (Arusha 
Times 2004a). In 2005, the prime minister at the time, Edward Lowassa, 
said Mererani had a HIV prevalence rate of 16.4 per cent, in comparison 
to the national average of 7 per cent of all adults (IRIN News 2006a). The 
60 per cent figure was most likely misheard in place of the 16 per cent 
cited by the prime minister, but there is no way to confirm it at present. 
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Missionaries have increasingly spent time in Mererani, establishing schools 
and bringing in health clinics to help with the problem (see Rothery and 
Rothery 2004). In 2004, women formed the Tanzanite Women Miners 
Development Association, or TWMDU; in 2005, women were finally 
allowed to enter the mines (Kondo 2005). They now have a strong voice in 
discussing conditions at the mines. There is also now a dispute committee 
in Mererani, which attempts to mediate conflicts between miners (ibid.). 
In March 2015, Jumanne Ngoma, the Meru cattle herder who had said 
he was the first to find tanzanite, was awarded the Order of the United 
Republic, second class, by President Jakaya Kikwete (Mwakyusa 2015). In 
what could be called a victory for local Tanzanians, on 26 November 2014, 
Richland Resources announced the conditional sale of its Tanzanian mining 
operations to Sky Associates Group Limited, an Arusha company. Richland 
said it planned to focus on developing the Capricorn Sapphire mine in 
Queensland, Australia. Then, on 2 February 2015, Richland Resources 
reported it was shutting down its Tanzanite Experience retail operations 
in Tanzania (Interactive Investor 2015). In April 2015, the Arusha store 
and museum was reopened, featuring a  full-scale tanzanite mining shaft. 
According to their website, its goal is to educate tourists about tanzanite 
mining, and they sell certified tanzanite there and at another location in 
Arusha and in Ngorogoro (Philemon 2015). In the summer of 2015, 
Minister of Energy and Minerals George Simbachawene announced an 
initiative to conserve Mererani itself as a tourism destination (The Guardian/
IPP Media 2015). On the face of it, tanzanite looked as though it could 
have been profitable. Ihucha (2016) reported that export revenues were 
US$38 million, and worldwide revenues were US$500 million a year. 
But, in January 2016, TanzaniteOne, now controlled by Sky Associates of 
Arusha, laid off half of its workers. Citing reduced production of tanzanite 
(50 per cent during fall 2015), and expenses in buying mining equipment 
and pay, they let go 618 out of over 1,200 workers. One of the directors also 
said that increased illegal mining had led to this decision (Brummer 2016). 
In a way, the small-scale miners had won.
Conclusion
The complicated fictional web of land, labour and money that has been 
spun around tanzanite is similar to that woven around other commodities. 
Diamonds, rubies, lumber, water, air, manmade objects, natural objects 
and knowledge are all caught in the webs of human significance that 
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humans have created, and from which humans find it difficult to extricate 
themselves. There remain unanswered questions concerning tanzanite: Why 
was the US State Department so dismissive of the connection to al-Qaeda 
made by Block and Pearl? What will become of the small-scale miners 
if the Tanzanian Government does indeed gain control over the mining 
operations and the cutting and export of stones? What will happen when 
the supply of tanzanite runs out? Tanzanian resilience and entrepreneurial 
ability keeps these people afloat. It will take a combination of local control, 
government monies and continuing investment to make the situation easier 
for the inhabitants of Mererani, and for those who wish to join them.
As Polanyi (1957: 73) has said:
Robbed of the protective covering of cultural institutions, human beings 
would perish from the effects of social exposure; they would die as the 
victims of acute social dislocation through vice, perversion, crime, and 
starvation … But no society could stand the effects of such a system of 
crude fictions even for the shortest stretch of time unless its human and 
natural substance as well as its business organization was protected against 
the ravages of this satanic mill.
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Agrarian distress and gemstone 
mining in India: The political 
economy of survival
Arnab Roy Chowdhury and Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt
Approaching Kalahandi
We reached the village Hinjlibahal in the Kalahandi district of Odisha1 and 
noted the grazing fields were dried and desiccated; parched surroundings 
familiar to the district. This is where even a casual visitor cannot help but 
notice the small pockmarks on the face of the land. These are remnants of 
holes that have been dug by villagers searching for gemstones. As they are 
left unfilled, they formed muddy puddles after the mild rains.
When questioned about the condition of these fields, a villager2 said, 
‘They were searching for ratna (gemstones)’. When asked about the 
people searching for gems, he said, ‘Most of them are inhabitants from 
this village’. He also added that some time back, somebody from the 
village had a chance encounter with a very large piece of manik (ruby/
corundum ore) while tilling the paddy field. He said the person sold the 
gems for about INR20,000 (about US$300) and was hiding somewhere. 
Apparently, the amount earned from selling the gem was sizeable, and 
1  Formerly known as Orissa.
2  A Kulita farmer interviewed in Hinjlibahal on 12 June 2015. Kulita and Agariya are farming 
castes in this region. 
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he had to go into hiding to avoid losing it or having to loan it to others. 
The news spread immediately, and many others began to dig their fields 
and the lands around the village.
We asked the villager what he did for a living. ‘I am a “chasi” (peasant)’, 
he  said. ‘Why don’t you try your luck also?’ we asked. When asked 
repeatedly, he said:
I do it sometimes to earn extra incomes but not always, I am old now, 
mining is unpredictable and dangerous … Young people do it, sometimes 
for themselves or mostly working with the bigger chasis and gauntias3 in 
their fields. Most villagers are poor and live on a daily basis on meagre 
incomes. Smarter ones have left the village after earning some money. 
The rest spend the money as soon as it is earned, sometimes for innocuous 
and necessary causes such as to repay debt, buy family groceries, buying 
food etc. and sometimes on vices [he winked his eye] such as … on modo 
(alcohol) and randis (prostitutes).
We asked another in the village whether he considered himself a peasant 
or a miner. This young Khond adivasi 4 man, who works part-time as 
a speculative gemstone digger, mostly for himself, also owns a small piece 
of land for paddy cultivation, which provides subsistence for his family. 
Slightly irritated by our question, he proffered an almost philosophical 
discourse on mining. 
We are also chasis, sometimes we dig for paddy and sometimes for stone. 
Mother Nature gives us paddy from the soil after we give our energy and 
sweat in it. We dig it and then sow the paddy, grow it with care, harvest 
it, husk it and process the paddy before we eat or sell it, we cannot eat 
paddy directly from the plant right? … In the same manner, we dig and 
put our energy and sweat into the soil and Mother Nature bestows us with 
these gemstones, we wash them, cut them and polish them, and sell them, 
gemstones are like flowers of the soil, beautiful, variously coloured … but 
we add value to them … otherwise what value these stones have anyway?
We still live on our soil. Yes, mining is unpredictable. Sometimes, you 
find stones and sometimes you don’t, but so is farming here, sometimes 
there is drought, no rain … sometimes we have food and sometimes we 
don’t. So what is the difference?5 
3  Traditional and erstwhile village headmen, the positional status is no longer valid; however, 
politically, socially, and economically they are still influential. 
4  An umbrella term used to denote a heterogeneous group of tribes and indigenous group 
of people in India. 
5  Between the peasant and a miner in this context, he implied.
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We were dumbstruck and did not have any suitable response to match his 
explanations, which drew an interesting simile between agriculture and 
mining. Indeed, he is absolutely right in pondering what ascribes value to 
gemstones. In a study on sapphire mining in Madagascar, Walsh (2010) 
wrote that it is an example of ultimate ‘commodification of fetishes’. 
Various stories, narratives and geographic origin of stones add ‘value’ 
in a sense to mined sapphires (which are varieties of corundum), which 
otherwise can be easily produced in laboratories. But the international 
market value attached to naturally produced sapphire, termed as a ‘work 
of god’, cannot be produced in laboratories (ibid.: 111).
A substantial reserve of ruby weighing about 5,348 tonnes is located in 
the state of Odisha, mainly in Kalahandi and Nuapada districts (Das and 
Mohanty 2014: 1). It is one of the poorest, driest agricultural regions 
of eastern India. Starvation deaths and farmers’ suicides, not its gemstone 
reserves, brought the region to global attention. 
Although traditionally the Khonds knew the art of gemstone mining, 
they practised it during the non-farming, drier season between the 
kharif 6 and the rabi 7 crops after the rains stopped. The produce was 
brought to the Nagavamsi King families who ruled Kalahandi, and sold 
to the local landlords or zamindars.8 The seasonal activity was adopted 
to diversify their livelihood bases. Agriculture, particularly monsoon-fed 
paddy cultivation, remained the mainstay of economic life. Like other 
adivasis in this region who are subsistence farmers, peasants and landless 
labourers (Anonymous 1988), the terms adivasi and chasi conventionally 
represented their identity. As more villagers take up mining, their identity 
becomes complex, making it difficult to express through a single, generic 
term or profession. One question then arises: How do the villagers of 
Hinjlibahal like to represent themselves? We attempt to address this 
question in the conclusions. 
We argue that agrarian distress and the frequent occurrences of drought 
for over a century initially led small peasants and labourers to practise 
artisanal mining, and allowed them to switch and shift between the 
two occupations seasonally. This occurred in the political–economic 
background  of an extremely polarised and exploitative class structure, 
6  Monsoon crop, that lasts from April to October. 
7  Winter crop, sown in winter and harvested in spring.
8  In a similar vein, diamond washing has been traditionally done by Savara in Sambalpur and the 
Gonds and Kols in Madhya Pradesh (Biswas 1994: 401).
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traditionally advantageous to those with larger agricultural landholdings. 
We also show that since the liberalisation of the Indian economy in the 
1990s, opening up the region to foreign investments has brought in 
speculative and opportunistic traders from outside. Investments have 
connected the artisanal gemstone miners, as minute and insignificant 
labour, to a global market far beyond their comprehension. As national 
and international market chains generated interest and demands for 
gemstones, the adivasis and so-called ‘lower caste’ communities were 
assimilated into the ‘value chain’ primarily as labourers. The ‘gem rush’ of 
Kalahandi created more inequities than before.
Mining by peasants
Artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) practices are informal modes of 
mineral extraction, mainly carried out by indigenous people, peasants 
and farmers globally (Hentschel et al. 2002). Artisanal mining covers 
relatively unorganised, clandestine, informal mining activities with a very 
low level of mechanisation mainly carried out by indigenous people and 
rural proletariats in common land or forest lands. Small-scale mining, 
on the other hand, is mechanised at a medium level, with organised and 
synchronised activities by a significant number of labourers, and generally 
controlled by a licensing authority. In our study region, gemstone mining 
includes scavenging, washing from alluvial deposits, digging in shallow 
trenches or inclines and surface mining such as quarries. It also includes 
small-scale mines such as unmechanised underground and surface mining. 
In the absence of a clear definition of informal mining in India, production 
processes that involve manual methods such as panning and scavenging 
are considered ‘artisanal’. In reality, a very large segment of all mining 
activities in India fit the definition of ASM (Deb et al. 2008). We define 
such mining as ‘informal’ to imply that it is part of the informal sector 
of the Indian economy. The characteristics of informal economy that 
Hart (1987) describes fit well with the informal mining economy. Small-
sized production, low productivity, free entry and exit, labour-intensive 
production, activities determined by the casual labour market and the 
proliferation of self-employment are some characteristics of the informal 
economy and informal mining alike.
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It becomes necessary to notionally distinguish between legal, illegal and 
non-legal aspects of informal mining in India. In issues of community 
subsoil rights in the case of Panchayat Extension of Scheduled Areas Act 
1996 (in the 5th and 6th schedules) of the state, it allows indigenous 
community ownership of mineral resources, such as artisanal coal mining 
in Meghalaya. Then there are ‘illegal’ artisanal mining cases on commons, 
state and private lands. However, scavenging gemstones from the banks 
of Mahanadi River near Hirakud Dam in Odisha or panning gold from 
the riverbank sand in Subarnarekha River in Jharkhand can be called 
non-legal or probably extra-legal, as no laws specifically criminalise these 
activities. Mining is mainly for livelihood purposes, but miners make very 
little money. Many miners live hand to mouth, and are extremely poor 
(Deb et al. 2008).
For some, artisanal mining is a continuation of their traditional 
livelihood. Others are thrown out of their community spaces by sudden 
economic and political changes of predatory globalisation, bolstered 
by large corporations in partnership with the state, causing large-scale 
displacement and forceful appropriation of land, water and forest resources 
of the poor through ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Harvey  2004). 
Increasingly, large numbers of people in rural areas have lost their land, 
livelihood and cultural life-worlds due to a rise in land grab. They are 
pushed from traditional agricultural practices into the informal sector by 
global capitalist forces and designs. There is a surge in the number of 
development refugees (most of whom are erstwhile peasants) in informal 
mining in various parts of the developing world (Lahiri-Dutt 2007). Also, 
there is increasing tendency among the agriculturists to diversify through 
other temporary wage labour jobs, or even by leaving farming in favour 
of other jobs in rural areas, or migrating to the cities. This leads to what 
is known as deagrarianisation and de-peasantisation (Banchirigah and 
Hilson 2010).
Thus, poverty induced by factors over which the peasants and farmers 
have no control is one of the chief causes of the rural proletariat shifting 
to wage labour in mining. Banchirigah (2006: 165) explains how World 
Bank reforms in Africa led to rural impoverishment, and forced a large 
number of peasants into informal mining. The World Bank’s International 
Roundtable on Artisanal Mining summary report, published in 1996, 
identified a link for the first time between rural impoverishment and growth 
of ASM. The roundtable delegates openly discussed that ‘to a large extent 
informal mining is a poverty driven activity’ (Barry 1996). The United 
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Nations (UN) and the Department for International Development 
(DFID) have since publicised these ideas. Labonne (2003: 131), speaking 
on behalf of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, said, 
‘Because artisanal mining is largely driven by poverty, it has grown as 
an economic activity, complementing more traditional forms of rural 
subsistence earnings’. A Mining, Minerals, and Sustainable Development 
(MMSD) report observed that ASM activities in rural areas in many cases 
represent the most promising, if not the only, income opportunity available, 
and is often a strategy of diversifying the livelihood basket (MMSD 2002: 
314). Banchirigah (2006: 166) argues that organisations that condemn 
the existence of ASM and poverty are also those responsible for it. 
In sub-Saharan Africa, policies pursued by the World Bank, International 
Monetary Fund and DFID have given rise to a dual mining economy. 
The large-scale mining industry is flourishing and is often monopolised 
by multinational corporate players. Conversely, the expansion of large-
scale mining, land acquisition, decreased land for peasant farming, loss of 
jobs, structural adjustment programs and privatisation of state enterprises 
has forced many into illegal ASM, operating in the interstitial spaces of 
capital—in conflict and in negotiation with it. In India, and in particular 
Kalahandi, initiating reform has a cascading malefic effect in forcing 
people to artisanal mining. 
Bryceson (2002) argued that income diversification of most rural dwellers 
is for ‘meeting daily needs amidst declining returns to commercial 
agriculture’. Many families have retained their base in subsistence 
farming and at the same time experimented with diverse non-farm 
livelihoods. These livelihood forms and choices are dependent on various 
agro-ecological, geographical and historical factors. Bryceson called this 
phenomenon a ‘multiplex livelihood’, and states that this diversification 
has, nevertheless, not produced a viable gainful employment, serious 
technical innovations, increase in purchasing power or improvements in 
forms of welfare. Citing Madulu (1998), she gave the example of Mwanza 
region of Tanzania where agrarian values run deep; however, the region 
has experienced a more recent boom in diamond and gold-mining. Eighty 
per cent of people involved in mining also farm in Mabuki village. When 
the farmers are asked who they think among their sons and daughters 
were ‘successful’ in life, in most cases they name those who are farmers. 
Here, pursuing farming and having large families are seen as markers of 
social status. 
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Amidst increasing conflict between agriculture and mining is some 
literature that discusses ‘mining–agriculture complementarity’, whereby 
their coexistence generates socio-economic development. That is, on the 
one hand, mining competes with agriculture for land, water and labour, but 
pollutes agricultural water. On the other hand, mining generates income 
supplements for farmers to buy fertilisers or hire labourers and send their 
children for higher education (Hilson and Garforth 2012, 2013). 
For example, the Bolivian Gold cooperatives workers have diversified 
their economy by combining agricultural activities with mining. This 
complementarity gives rise to a low degree of conflict and polarisation 
between agriculture and mining. This also suggests a relatively low 
mobility of mine workers where they are also attached to agriculture 
(McMahon et al. 1999).
Yeboah (2014) asserted there must be better understanding of the dynamics 
of mining and agriculture interaction. Understanding the nexus between 
the two is essential for producing healthy interaction so that mining does 
not jeopardise agriculture. However, the catch is that ASM is significantly 
more income-generating than agriculture, but it is less sustainable. Besides, 
large-scale mining generates significant ‘externalities’ such as pollution 
and displacement. Displaced farmers often try to regenerate their income 
from ‘illegal’ artisanal mining (Slack 2013). It is generally young farmers 
who choose ASM; farmers older than 50 usually avoid ASM because of its 
unsustainable nature (Yeboah 2014).
Despite its income-generating potential, Yeboah (2014) argued that 
mining cannot really replace agriculture; it is not an alternative economic 
activity, but is complementary. Citing the example of Ghana, Yeboah 
stated that many cocoa farmers and non-farming miners often get into 
conflicts due to claims of ownership over land that was customarily owned 
by farmers, without any documented rights. The local government usually 
intervenes to give these lands to non-farmer miners at low prices. Yeboah 
quoted one of the farmers who was interviewed—‘These houses that you 
see were all built with cocoa money, this is what feeds us’—and argued 
that farmers still have significant affinity for farming. 
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In the case of Kalahandi, we find both sentiments in support of agriculture 
and mining present in the people, but differentiated along class lines. 
The poor who work as mine labourers still imagine themselves as farmers, 
and the rich send their children to higher education with this money. 
So, the complementarity only helps the rich in this case.
Therefore, it is necessary to understand that unregulated and unlicensed 
mineral extraction by syndicates on a massive scale must be differentiated 
from ASM for managing livelihood. It would be unfair to label the poor 
person with ‘illegality of action’, who somehow manages their life because 
of a lack of other choices (Bhanumathi 2003; Vagholikar et al. 2003). 
However, official state policies or civil society often talk about formalising 
these spheres, thus regularising business production and supply chains. 
Siegel and Veiga (2009) use De Soto’s theory of ‘extra-legality’ to explain 
informal mining. In the extra-legality framework, formalisation is 
a process of absorbing existing customary practices, developed informally 
by different communities into the mainstream of a country’s legal and 
economic affairs. 
However, there is a reverse current of logic that flows within the capitalist 
system as well, particularly in its neoliberal varieties, which casualises and 
informalises labour, and accumulates capital on the back of this cheap 
reserve pool of informal labour. In explaining the persistence of informality, 
Verbrugge (2015) argued that there are certain barriers and impediments 
to formalisation in informal mining. Some of them are certainly political 
and legalistic entry barriers; however, there is a complementary economic 
logic of mining pursued by vested interests. Referring to his own work, 
he illustrates that ASM in the Philippines can be seen as the ‘product of 
a transition away from capital-intensive large-scale mining to a flexible 
regime of accumulation built around the exploitation of informal ASM 
labour’ (ibid.: 1024). This is a new capitalist logic of flexible accumulation 
(Verbrugge 2015). To conceptualise it further, Tsing (2009), in a slightly 
different context, talked about the emergence of ‘supply chain capitalism’. 
Supply chain capitalism occurs when large corporate houses accumulate 
capital and create value by colonising the commons and natural resources 
by integrating global supply chains. That way, informal production of 
commodities are connected to the more institutionalised channels and 
centres of capital. By doing this, capitalists reduce the overhead costs of 
employing a permanent workforce, create a wide continental crossing scale 
of supply chains and convert exploitation of environmental commons 
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and natural resources as ‘externalities’ of the capital. This is the new model 
of capitalism that very aptly fits in understanding the coloured gemstone 
mining and production industry. This mode of integrating the informal 
chains of artisanal mining into global capitalist supply chains occurs 
throughout the world, and the Kalahandi gemstones are no exception.
Lahiri-Dutt (2014: 6) suggested that five major factors can be identified as 
operating at the confluence of the State and the Capital (with capitalised 
‘S’ and ‘C’) that are pushing peasants out of agriculture to mining: state 
reform and attracting foreign direct investment; poor productivity of 
agriculture; the state trying to maximise revenue from mineral extractive 
industries following a development model that equates ‘mining’ with 
development; environmental degradation at regional and local levels due 
to various interlocked climactic patterns giving rise to the displacement 
and rise of numbers of ‘environmental refugees’; and incentive to earn 
cash income to meet the rising price of commodities. All these lead to the 
social formation of ‘extractive peasants’, who were formerly peasants but 
are now engaged in various ASM activities for subsistence. Throughout 
Africa, Latin America and South Asia, this pattern is becoming increasingly 
obvious.
In Kalahandi, historical agricultural distress and low productivity was 
compounded by exploitative social structures that hindered social 
mobility. These play a huge role in setting the stage for farmers to practise 
artisanal mining in the initial phase. Later, that process was accelerated 
by the liberalisation of the economy after the 1990s, which attracted 
a vastly larger number of peasants to artisanal mining. The presence of 
gemstones in Kalahandi was little known to the outsiders; the region is 
a trove of many varieties of gemstone such as cat’s eye (lahsunia), sapphire 
(pukhraaj/neelam), aquamarine (beruz), emerald (panna) and garnets 
(gomed ). Historically, the place is called Karunda Mandal, or the abode of 
corundum9 (rubies). The important corundum- and ruby-bearing zones 
in Kalahandi are Jhillingdara, Hinjlibahal, Banjipadar and Kermunda. 
Kalahandi also produces some very good quality rubies. Most of these 
are eluvial and alluvial corundum that can be mined artisanally, and can 
be scavenged from the soil surface directly or by making small ditches 
(Das  and Mohanty 2014: 1). The whole of western Odisha along the 
Mahanadi riverbank is historically known for its gemstone deposits and 
9  Slightly low-quality rubies, which are often cut into cabochon shape and are sold as the ‘Indian 
Star Ruby’.
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diamonds.10 The Sambalpur group of diamonds found in Mahanadi 
riverbanks, washed down from the lamprosite rocks of Madhya Pradesh, 
have been well recorded in history (Satapathy and Goswami 2006).
In ancient history, Kalahandi was ruled by the Nagavamsi rulers, whose 
family deity is aptly known as Manikeshwari (the goddess of rubies). 
Archaeological evidence from the nearby Asurgarh fort shows that these 
kings traded in gemstones. It is the Khond adivasis who used to mine, 
wash and polish the stones for the kings (Deo 1987).
Kalahandi district is surrounded by the districts Nuapada, Bolangir, 
Kandhamal, Rayagada, Koraput and Nawrangapur, and shares a part of 
the border with Raipur in Chhattisgarh (Mohanty 2010). The district was 
originally constituted by five zamindaris (landlords): Karlapat, Lanjigarh, 
Kashipur, Mahul-Patana and Madanpur-Rampur. Currently, the district 
comprises an area of 11,835 km2 (Pati 1999: 345).
Kalahandi has a high percentage of adivasis and scheduled caste population, 
at 28.65 and 17.67 per cent respectively. About 45 per cent of adivasis are 
Khond and the rest belong to the Gond and Savara tribes. The Khonds 
are mainly divided along two clan lines: the Dongariya and the Kathuria. 
The  former mostly inhabit the hills and practise shifting cultivation, 
whereas the latter is involved in cultivating plains (Padel and Das 2010). 
Agrarian distress in Kalahandi
Dalkhaire;
desare kala akala
Ghara duara chhadi bidese ghara
Dalkhaire peta kaje harabara.
(O leaf eater, drought occurred in the country and sent us abroad, beyond 
homeland, unrest for belly, O leaf eater) (Local folk song quoted in 
Mishra 2011: 5)
The popular fable in Kalahandi tells the story of Indra, the god of rain, 
who was once angry with the people of Kalahandi, punishing them by 
withholding rain for 12 years. This prolonged drought resulted in an 
unprecedented famine in the region: people and livestock died of starvation. 
10  Artisanal mining of alluvial diamonds occurs in some places of India. In Africa, artisanal mining 
of diamonds from riverbeds employing divers is common (Van Bockstael and Vlassenroot 2008).
99
4 . AGRARIAN DISTReSS AND GeMSTONe MINING IN INDIA
The story then says that there was an old farmer, who summoned his 
sons, asking them to stop merrymaking now that he had become old like 
‘mature leaves of the dry tree’ and might die soon. So he told them they 
must learn the technique of cultivation (Mishra 2011: 3–4). So he took 
his sons and bullocks to till the field, but the earth was dry and quite 
difficult to penetrate. So he took his sons to the riverbed, which was sandy 
and relatively softer. They started ploughing the riverbed; this would give 
them an idea about how to plough the field in rainy season. Seeing the 
idiosyncrasy of these farmers, Indra descended from heaven in the guise 
of a Brahmin. He asked the old man why he was ploughing the riverbed. 
In response, the old man said that he knew it was futile to plough the 
sand at the riverbank, but he should not forget his occupation. According 
to him, ‘parents must teach their descendants their parental occupation’, 
in the hope of securing their future, ‘otherwise where would they go and 
what would they do after their parents are gone’. This was an enlightening 
realisation for Indra. He returned to his home in heaven and ordered his 
four sons (four clouds) to learn how to precipitate rain on earth. Now the 
barren earth of Kalahandi was pouring with rain. The clever farmer thus 
emotionally roused the rain god and made him sympathetic to the people 
and extracted rain (Misha 2011).
The conditions of drought and famine in Kalahandi are a stark reality, 
a recurring historical event and leitmotif in the life and livelihood of 
Kalahandi farmers. Therefore, the story’s traces and utterances abound, 
and are embedded in the mythical, cultural and social life of the people. 
However, famines and droughts are not merely ‘events’; they are processes 
of slow emaciation, starvation, loss of energy and death of an entire 
community, and they have totally devastated the rural areas of Kalahandi 
slowly over the years (Mishra 2005).
Nevertheless, since 1985—paradoxically when the drought was relatively 
stabilised—the discourse of drought, famine and hunger entered national 
and international consciousness. It was in the 1990s that journalists started 
using the term ‘Kalahandi syndrome’ to depict periodic food shortages, 
decreasing income levels and starvation amidst plenty that continues here, 
despite significant and prolonged development interventions by the state 
and civil society. Kalahandi is not poor in resources. Outsiders flock here 
in huge numbers to tap its mining and forest resources; however, this does 
not contribute to any local development. 
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Bouts of severe drought occurred in this region in 1866, 1868, 1884 and 
1897. One of the most devastating droughts occurred in 1899 and in 
a way broke the backbone of the economy of this region (Mishra 2011). 
This famine, also known as Chhappan Salar Durbhikshya, affected people 
to such an extent that, even today, if a child cries for food, the mother 
says, ‘why are you hankering like a drought-affected child of Chhappan 
sal?’ (Mishra 2011: 2).
In the late colonial period from 1919 to 1920, the drought was followed 
by diseases like cholera and influenza due to lack of food and resources. 
Drought occurred intermittently from 1922 to 1967, making three-
quarters of the crop fail, which created a reserve army of landless, 
unemployed agricultural workers. Finally, drought became relatively 
stabilised in the 1980s. However, it had devastating economic, political, 
psychological and corporeal consequences.
The landed class were the worst affected by the drought of later years. 
Due to social prestige of the class and status, they were not able to work 
as manual labour. Drought in a way created downward mobility of class 
rank and file; it pushed the classes such as rich peasants, middle peasants 
and other middle classes to lower positions. These categories of people 
turned into landless labourers in other’s farmlands, colloquially called the 
Sukhbasis, meaning one who lives happily—the connotation is that one 
who has no possessions to worry about eventually lives happily (Mishra 
2005, 2011). Each year, people have left the area en masse, permanently. 
Altogether, about 10,000 people, mostly from scheduled caste and tribe 
categories, have moved out of the Bolangir–Kalahandi area to Raipur in 
Chhattisgarh (Mishra 2011).
Despite droughts, famines and devastation, Kalahandi surprisingly is 
not rainfall poor. Data show that from 1977 to 1988, rainfall was about 
1,255 mm; by 1991, this rose to 2,247 mm. In this period, there was 
above average (than other districts of Odisha) production of food grains 
(Pradhan 1993: 1085). 
This creates a conundrum for this region, the answer to which lies in its 
political, economic and social history. The drought that occurs in Kalahandi 
is not meteorological or agricultural drought. It is a situation of human-
induced drought and scarcity. The two main reasons behind this drought 
are poor management of the irrigation system and oppressive feudal social 
structures that created a polarised society—whereby landholding, and 
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consequently economic and political power, lies with the upper class, who 
are also the upper caste. These issues are a deep chasm that polarise the 
society in such extremely unequal power poles, which disorientates and 
demoralises the oppressed. 
Kalahandi is a paddy-cultivating region. Paddy is largely a water-
dependent crop, so a large number of tanks, reservoirs, ponds and wells 
were constructed here for that purpose. The onus of maintaining these 
water bodies was with the local communities, and the gauntias (village 
heads) and the kings in the pre-colonial period. 
With the advent of British colonialism, which introduced permanent 
settlement, a series of changes in land settlement and a set of new 
intermediaries were introduced in 1883, 1885 and finally in 1904–05 
(Anonymous 1985). That created a drastic transformation in the land 
relations, social structure and power dynamics within and between 
various communities. This also permanently alienated the adivasis from 
their land and forest rights (Mishra and Rao 1992). Managing common 
resources were previously the responsibility of the rural feudal classes and 
communities. With the usurpation of ‘common’ land, water and forest 
bodies, managing them became nobody’s duty. So the reservoirs, no 
longer managed by the older feudal nobilities and communities, became 
neglected and dilapidated structures. 
In post-colonial times, this trend continued with improper water 
planning. This is compounded by the fact that Kalahandi has a spell of 
‘resource curse’: rich in resources and hidden from the public eye under 
the shadow of a poor state like Odisha, outsiders and businessmen flock 
here for opportunities such as gem mining and trade (Pradhan 1993).
Agrarian class structure in Kalahandi
Kalahandi historically has a very exploitative rural class structure: on the 
one hand, the trade and business is controlled by urban outsiders, mostly 
Marwaris; on the other hand, the power in the agrarian class structure is 
monopolised by erstwhile gauntia (both Brahmin and non-Brahmin) and 
zamindar families. In Kalahandi, the gauntias or the village headmen are 
at the top of the rural class (and also caste) hierarchy (Sahu et al. 2004).
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Their power was initially bestowed by pre-colonial states for collecting 
revenue at the village level. This was later consolidated and legitimised 
by the colonial government through land revenue settlements. They 
usually controlled the best lands and also gained control over wastelands. 
They  leased these lands on behalf of colonisers, and villagers who did 
not own any land were dependent on them. Slowly they started wielding 
immense power in the region (Sahu et al. 2014: 216).
Kalahandi was pre-colonially ruled by the Nagavamsi rulers, who brought 
in Brahmins11 and Kulitas from Sambalpur and Raipur region to Kalahandi. 
The Brahmins were mainly brought in to create a hegemonic state effect 
over the adivasi collective consciousness and bring them within the fold of 
Hinduism. Their presence ensured that the large transformation towards 
a peasantised and Hinduised caste and class-based hierarchical society 
emerged with a degree of social legitimacy. Striking consensus in an 
intense conflict-ridden field was to ensure maximised surplus production 
and tapping of resources in a peaceful process. The Kulitas were known 
to be hardworking and industrious farmers who could produce surplus 
grain and food for the population and revenue for the state. These people 
displaced most of the adivasis and the lower castes in the region (aided 
by the pre-colonial rulers and by the British colonisers) from their lands 
into marginal spaces (Pati 1999: 346).
The pre-colonial period saw a Brahmin, Kshatriya and Kulita alliance. 
Later, the colonial state legitimised this oppressive class structure and 
became the fourth and most powerful entity in this alliance. Hence, in the 
colonial period, increasing discrimination against the adivasis continued. 
In the process of dispossession, intense conflict occurred, such as the 
Kandha (same as Khond) rebellions of 1882, mostly directed against 
the colonial state and the Kulitas (Pati 1999: 347).
The oppressive agrarian rural structure and class base created a polarisation 
of land holdings, mostly owned by the erstwhile gauntias families and 
the rich Kulita and Agariya farmers, causing the poor peasants and tribes 
to become extremely indebted historically. Distress sale is a common 
phenomenon in Kalahandi that leads to enforced commercialisation of 
land, labour and crops. In the villages, the credit is informal and non-
institutionalised. The gauntias and the rich peasants, who were also the 
moneylenders, offered such credit. This kind of borrowing would lead 
11  The ritually highest caste in the Indian caste hierarchy. 
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to distress sale, where ‘[t]he crop in the field was usually purchased by 
the moneylender himself during harvest time at a nominal rate and 
the price was adjusted against loan including the interest on the credit’ 
(Government of Orissa 1980, cited in Sahu et al. 2004: 216).
Kalahandi was merged with Orissa on 1 January 1948. However, the 
gauntia system and its exploitative structure remained. When this was 
finally abolished in 1956, they had reconfigured, restructured and 
consolidated their power in the villages. Their power remained intact in 
post-colonial Orissa, in the scenario of limited possibility of land reform 
(Pati 1999: 355). 
After independence, the Orissa congress government tried to improve 
the position of these small holders (ryots)—who did not hold any title 
to the land, and were vulnerable to moneylenders—through protective 
legislations. However, it failed to create much change in the rural society 
(Sahu et al. 2004: 215–16).12
Extreme cases of distress have led to a population of farm labourers 
steeped in loans and mortgages. Given a chance, people would migrate 
easily to other adjoining states, with non-tribals being the first to 
migrate. The tribes are too attached to their lands; they also migrate, but 
mostly in extreme situations (Banik 1998). Poverty, debt and scarcity 
lead to starvation, death and suicides of farmers in significant numbers. 
From  2009 to 2015, a sizeable number of farmers took their lives 
(Dharitri 2009, 2015). 
Relief is a usual thing that comes to salvage the drought and famine-
stricken. Through relief, the state reinforces its paternalistic responsibilities. 
The  state purportedly provides relief of some kind, with the hope that 
it would trickle down to the poor, even when it is siphoned off in the 
middle through various channels of corruption. A number of non-
government organisations have emerged in this process. In addition, 
there is a politics of relief that ensures by the time it is undertaken or 
the materials reach the community, its back is already broken and it 
is disempowered, which is visible in their destitution and starvation. 
The local people jokingly call the drought relief measures the teesra fasal 
(the ‘third crop’) (Sainath 1996). 
12  Even in 1976, bonded labour existed in Kalahandi (Sahu et al. 2004: 216).
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Kalahandi is in the central location of the geography of hunger in 
western Odisha. By the time drought relief is available, already a ‘complex 
progression of coping mechanism’ and strategies are enacted. The 
Dongariya Khond face acute food shortages for about three to five months 
a year, mainly from May to June in the post-sowing monsoon period, and 
again in March by the time the kharif crop is already exhausted (Mohapatra 
2012: 57). During this period, they eat dried, powdered and detoxified 
mango seed kernels, make a gruel with millet called mandia and consume 
liquor derived from the mowha (Madhuka longifolia) flower collected 
from the forest (Pati 1999: 348). They also consume berries, mushrooms, 
tubers, leaves and tamarind, mainly from the forest. The forest base is also 
shrinking due to depletion from large-scale, aggressive mining activities in 
Niyamgiri. Many families go into debt because of loans incurred to buy 
food (Mohapatra 2012: 57).
The post-reform gem ‘rush’ in Kalahandi
After liberalisation in 1991 and the consequent economic boom, the gems 
and jewellery industry rapidly grew in India due to demand from outside. 
From 1993 to 1998, the Odisha branch of the Geological Survey of India 
carried out a high-resolution airborne survey in collaboration with World 
Geoscience Corporation of Perth, Australia. This survey generated data 
for more than 330,000 line kilometres covering an area of 75,000 km2 in 
hard rock terrain of the state (Directorate of Geology n.d.). It identified 
gem resources and ‘mother lodes’—the main area of concentration of 
gemstone ores in western Odisha. The survey was done to identify and tap 
the main gemstone-rich areas through capitalised and mechanised mining. 
This rumour circulated within the gem and production industry, and huge 
interest grew in western Odisha. Gems had always been produced locally at 
a limited scale until then, mostly controlled by the class and caste elites for 
regional markets. The stones were mined by indigenous tribes and other 
so-called scheduled caste labourers. Speculative investors, businessmen, 
brokers and agents arriving in this region after the 1990s sparked a gem 
rush. Many people, irrespective of caste and class, started coming into 
the business to make the most of the emerging opportunities, using their 
existing traditional knowledge of gem production (Roy Chowdhury and 
Lahiri-Dutt 2016).
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They came with different levels of investment of capital and knowledge, 
in different capacities, to participate in the trade. Before the gem rush, 
tribal people were digging for the caste and class elites, mostly in off 
seasons at a relatively restricted and limited production scale. With the 
gem rush, the Khonds, other adivasis and other marginalised and so-called 
lower castes started digging for themselves individually and in groups, 
and also sometimes for illegal syndicates. Some also formed smaller 
groups of three to four people  working as independent entrepreneurs; 
many of these groups have started working full-time in artisanal mining 
(Roy Chowdhury and Lahiri-Dutt 2016).
The increasing interest in mining was also in a way the last straw that poor, 
marginalised people could have grabbed at, against failing agriculture 
and economies of transition. That was the only option left for many of 
them before they would have migrated out of the region temporarily or 
permanently. In a way, agrarian distress, together with the reform, pushed 
and pulled a significant number of erstwhile marginal rural proletariat 
into artisanal mining. It became an activity in which they became doubly 
vulnerable to exploitation of various kinds—on one hand by the traditional 
elites and, on the other hand, by large corporations who pushed them out 
from their lands (Roy Chowdhury and Lahiri-Dutt 2016).
This area has recently started attracting many large corporate interests. 
A Special Economic Zone (SEZ) for gems and jewellery manufacturing 
is planned to be opened in the area by the Geetanjali group, one of the 
oldest companies in this industry. Chhattisgarh Futuristic Infrastructure 
Development Company has also proposed to open an SEZ for gems and 
jewellery manufacturing in Bhubaneswar, covering 150–200-acre lands 
with an initial investment of about US$45 million. Additionally, the 
Oriental Timex company has acquired mining rights for black granite 
in the Malkangiri district of western Odisha. Multilateral development 
organisations such as the United Nations Development Programme 
have assisted the Odisha Government in setting up a semi-mechanised 
panning and screening facility, with mobile washing plants on the banks 
of the Mahanadi River (Government of Orissa 2009). Around 1991, the 
state of Odisha established a gem-testing laboratory in the Directorate of 
Geology under the guidance of the United Nations, which tests various 
kinds of stones at a very cheap rate (Biswas 1994).
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The Government of Odisha’s Department of Steel and Mines is planning 
a survey of 80,707 km2 in northwest and central Odisha to find traces of 
coal, gold and gemstones. It has sought the assistance of the Odisha branch 
of the Geological Survey of India (GSI). They are also planning to survey 
the Kalahandi district for gemstones. Somewhat related to these mineral 
explorations, the state is also planning to draft a state-specific policy on 
SEZs, corporate social responsibility and industrial policy resolution. A 
total amount of approximately US$1.7 million has been allocated for this 
survey (Business Standard 2014). The Odisha branch of GSI revealed that 
they have found significant gemstone deposits of topaz, tourmaline, agate 
and minerals like gold in the Boudh–Ramgarh area, along the Mahanadi 
and Tel riverbeds (Sahoo 2014). Through plans and programs, the state 
is aiming to extend and consolidate its extractive terrains in collaboration 
with capitalist firms. However, the global coloured gemstone production 
economy is slightly different from other mineral sources or even the 
diamond economy. 
It is necessary to understand the process of mining rough stones and 
the social life that gems acquire after processing. After gems are mined, 
they pass through a chain of miners, brokers and wholesalers before 
being cut, polished and sold to the retail market. Many people in the 
coloured gemstone industry operate in the informal market, and are 
therefore difficult to track down. In contrast to diamonds, coloured 
gemstones are produced from relatively small, low-cost operations with 
a few dominant monopolisers in the market. Artisanal mining accounts 
for about 80–90 per cent of gemstone production (Cross et al. 2010).
The extremely fragmented nature of the gemstone market at every value 
chain makes it very difficult to identify significant actors. The global trade 
of coloured gemstones was roughly US$4 billion in 2008. Trade analysts 
say that this market has grown considerably since 2003. Most deposits 
of coloured gemstones are low yielding, and therefore mainly mined 
and produced through artisanal methods. The non-diamond coloured 
gemstone industries are cyclical and register a high point of production 
when a deposit is discovered, then go to a low point when it is exhausted. 
Different countries have emerged as prominent locations of coloured 
gemstone markets: Brazil in the 1950s and 1960s, Tanzania in the 1970s, 
and Afghanistan in the 1980s (Cross et al.: 17). This current phase will 
likely open up a high production point of coloured gemstones in the 
history of western Odisha. 
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Officially, 605 mining leases have been sanctioned in Odisha, of which 
only 16 to 21 are for precious and semi-precious gemstones (Murthy 
and Giri Rao 2006). Among these, 13 legally leased gemstone mines 
are situated in Kalahandi (Government of Orissa 2009). But official 
gem mines are scarce in Odisha, so the main sources of gems are mined 
artisanally.
The mining pits are mostly dug in agricultural lands. Mining pit owners 
are usually rich farmers—mostly Kulita, Agariya or Mali13 by caste. Many 
pits are also owned by Brahmin gauntias. Most mining activities are 
carried out clandestinely in pits hidden in the agricultural fields.14 
Most of the adivasis and the so-called scheduled caste miners, who do not 
hold any land, work in artisanal mining as wage labourers employed by 
pit owners to dig. Their chore is the same as agricultural labourers tilling 
fields, but they earn a little more in wages (Roy Chowdhury and Lahiri-
Dutt 2016).
Some pits are also dug in jungles, inaccessible mountain areas and 
common lands by individuals, loosely organised groups or highly 
organised syndicates. The syndicates also employ the adivasis and the 
lower-caste population as wage labourers in the mine. They operate at 
night in relatively difficult areas of the forest, clandestinely hiding their 
activities from forest officials and the police.15 Women’s participation 
focuses on washing stones and sorting uncut pieces. Most labourers live 
hand to mouth, eating pakhala (fermented rice soaked in water) in good 
seasons and mandia in lean seasons. They are relatively better paid than 
the farm labourers. But their job is also risky in terms of health, life and 
legal issues involved.16 
The process of mining is very rudimentary and primitive, using shovels 
and pickaxes. Because of the bluntness of these heavy instruments, 
sometimes stones get cracked internally and good-quality stones are 
not always produced (Roy Chowdhury and Lahiri-Dutt 2016). Pits are 
usually dug vertically like wells, about 1–3 m deep. Sometimes the pits 
are dug horizontally over a large area, as miners find good caches this way. 
Sometimes, small holes are carved in pit walls horizontally, just enough 
13  Caste of gardeners. 
14  Interview with a Khond local opinion leader in Thuamul Rampur, 14 July 2015.
15  Interview with a policeman in Bhawanipatna, Kalahandi, 1 July 2015.
16  Interview with a Khond miner in Kesinga, Kalahandi, 14 June 2015.
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to crawl into, for a person to work inside. These pits are generally built 
without any reinforcements, and they often collapse after rains. Accidents 
and deaths of miners are common in these pits. But people take these risks 
for daily subsistence money and in hopes of getting lucky.
Sometimes people do get lucky. A Kulita man from Kalahandi, now 
staying in Sambalpur, narrated how in 1994 his father, while crossing 
the Tel River on a boat, found something shining underneath the water 
in the shallow, sandy riverbank. He descended into this knee-deep 
water and picked up the piece. It was a large chunk of diamond. Later, 
he sold the stone to a Marwari businessman in Sambalpur, who paid 
him INR1million (about US$17,000). His father invested the money 
in building a house in Sambalpur. They currently live there and he has 
started his own gem business.17 There are several rags-to-riches stories in 
Kalahandi. Many rich peasants and erstwhile gauntias send their sons and 
daughters to be educated in the most elite institutes in India or abroad 
under their own sponsorship. 
Various kinds of stones are produced from these mines—ruby, corundum, 
aquamarine, cat’s eye, sapphires (mostly white and yellow) and many 
other semi-precious stones. Alexandrite18 mining is also being pursued 
in Tel River valley near the Kalahandi–Chhattisgarh border (Sahu 2013).
These stones are usually bought at a wholesale rate from the mines by 
middlemen employed by bigger businessmen, who mostly come from 
Rajasthan and operate their base from the adjoining Katabanji in Bolangir 
(Banerjee 1993). These stones gain a social and economic life of their 
own. They are sorted and go through a process of cleaving (giving an 
initial cut or shape), calibrating, cutting and bruiting (polishing) mostly 
on the local or regional lapidary. The best stones travel through Raipur 
and Jharkhand, and usually end up in Rajasthan’s international gem 
market. Here, stones are further cut and sorted, and sold directly from 
the retailer, either loose or more usually embedded in jewellery produced 
there or exported outside the country.19
17  Interview with a gem shop owner in Sambalpur on 20 June 2015. 
18  First discovered April 1834 in Russia, it is named after the Czar Alexander II. It demonstrates 
a property of dual colour under different wavelengths of light (see www.gemstone.org/index.
php?option=com_content&view=article&id=127:sapphire&catid=1:gem-by-gem&Itemid=14).
19  Discussion with Jamal (name changed), the key informant in Sambalpur, on 20 May 2015. 
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As the businesses at the local level are mostly run by the caste and class 
elites, they have some degree of power, legitimacy and control over the 
local administration, which mostly act as docile and silent observers, for 
which they are paid. The local politicians also get a share of the trade, 
often given to them during elections. People stay docile; whoever tries to 
raise a voice is intimidated and ‘taken care of ’ (Banerjee 1993). 
Conclusion
Historically, Kalahandi’s gemstone deposits have been artisanally mined 
by the Khonds, other adivasi and so-called low-caste labourers who mostly 
work seasonally for the feudal class of people such as gauntias, zamindars 
and the kings, and later in the fields of rich Kulita farmers. In conditions 
of severe drought and agrarian distress, this form of diversification of 
income was a survival strategy. Drought was so severe that it pushed many 
farmers out of the state to seek employment. But after the 1990s, there 
was a rediscovery of gem mining through interests initiated by economic 
reforms and resources in this region. In a pre-existing scenario of agrarian 
distress and knowledge of gemstone mining and production, there 
began and increase in demand and corporate interest, and opportunistic 
tradesmen and businessmen from outside the state. The anarchic 
opportunistic moment of gem rush absorbed both the poor and the elites 
to the extractive geography of gemstones in Kalahandi. In this process, the 
caste and class elites, and the merchant outsiders accumulated most of the 
capital by exploiting the informal labour of the adivasis. The marginalised 
and the vulnerable, in turn, were self-exploited for a slightly better life 
and relatively higher wages, as a survival strategy against extremely rapid 
economic, political and social transitions. Agriculture is still undertaken 
here along with mining, but this complementarity only helps the caste 
and class elites who are large landholders and who mine their land as well 
as use it for agriculture. 
Revisiting the question briefly that we raised before: How do the villagers 
of Hinjlibahal like to represent themselves? Their identity is internally 
fractured now. They always practised cultivation, whether in the valley 
or in the hills. Mining was a lean season activity that supplemented 
cropping. They were always proud to be identified as a chasi or a peasant. 
Now, on the one hand agriculture is in distress, and on the other there is 
the anticipation of reform, and slow reform itself, in mining. These issues 
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are pushing and pulling them out of their traditional occupation. These 
political and economic transformations are changing their life-world, and 
affecting the internal psychological world they are grappling with. They 
are part of the gem-mining labour process, but face an identity crisis and 
disenchantment collectively, due to the level of greed and fragmentation 
it produces socially. So they cling to their peasant identity that gave them 
a sense of honour, and are rationalising, renegotiating and trying to make 
sense of their transforming world. 
As Banchirigah (2006) has shown in sub-Saharan Africa, economic reform 
fuelled an artisanal mining rush because it induced poverty. So, policies 
that are created for growth in the name of the poor itself tend to pauperise 
them. However, economic reform can trigger different societal responses, 
and the processes of pauperisation might take different routes in various 
contexts—as in the case of Kalahandi, reform of mining is at the same 
time pushing and pulling peasants into artisanal mining. 
However, this is just the beginning. Corporatisation and land grabbing 
for gem mining has not yet been significant in Kalahandi. This is 
a transitional phase, as this space probably would soon be taken over by 
multinational gem mining and manufacturing houses for the creation of 
SEZs. As of now, companies are slowly moving in to colonise this space. 
The local elites and businessmen would probably adapt to these shifting 
political and economic situations in their own ways. The accumulation of 
capital would probably then be continued by companies by exploiting the 
adivasis as labourers. However, gemstones are finite resources, exhausted 
within a very short time; therefore, sustaining a life on this basis would 
remain as unpredictable and precarious as ever for these marginalised 
labourers.
References
Anonymous, 1985. ‘Drought and Poverty: A Report from Kalahandi 
Orissa.’ Economic and Political Weekly 20(44): 1857–60.
Anonymous, 1988. ‘Kalahandi: A Stark Picture.’ Economic and Political 
Weekly 23(18): 886–8.
111
4 . AGRARIAN DISTReSS AND GeMSTONe MINING IN INDIA
Banchirigah, S.M., 2006. ‘How Have Reforms Fuelled the Expansion of 
Artisanal Mining? Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa.’ Resources Policy 
31(3): 165–71. doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2006.12.001
Banchirigah, S.M. and G. Hilson, 2010. ‘De-agrarianization, 
Re-agrarianization and Local Economic Development: Re-orientating 
Livelihoods in African Artisanal Mining Communities.’ Policy Science 
43: 157–80. doi.org/10.1007/s11077-009-9091-5
Banerjee, R., 1993. ‘Orissa: Discovery of Rich Deposits of Precious 
Stones  Lures Villagers Towards Illegal Mining.’ India Today, 
15 November. Available at indiatoday.intoday.in/story/orissa-discovery- 
of-rich-deposits-of-precious-stones-lures-villagers-towards-illegal- 
mining/1/ 303345.html 
Banik, D., 1998. ‘India’s Freedom from Famine: The Case of 
Kalahandi.’ Contemporary South Asia 7(3): 265–81. doi.
org/10.1080/09584939808719844
Barry, M. (ed.), 1996. ‘Regularizing Informal Mining: A Summary of 
the Proceedings of the International Roundtable on Artisanal Mining.’ 
Industry and Energy Department Occasional Paper No. 6. Washington 
DC: World Bank, pp. 17–19.
Bhanumathi, K., 2003. ‘Labour and Women in Mining.’ Background 
paper presented at the Mines, Minerals and People for the Indian 
Women and Mining seminar, Delhi, April. Available at www.mines 
and communities.org/article.php?a=858 
Biswas, A.K., 1994. ‘Gem Minerals in Pre-modern India.’ Indian Journal 
of History of Science 29(3): 389–420.
Bryceson, D.F., 2002. ‘Multiplex Livelihoods in Rural Africa: 
Recasting the Terms and Conditions of Gainful Employment.’ 
The Journal of Modern African Studies 40(1): 1–28. doi.org/10.1017/
S0022278X01003792
Business Standard, 2014. ‘Odisha to Survey in 80,707 sq km Area 
for Traces  of Gold, Coal, Gemstone.’ Business Standard, 27 July. 
Available  at  wap.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/odisha 
- to- survey -in-80-707-sq-km-area-for-traces-of-gold-coal-gemston 
e-1140 727 00 737_1.html
BeTWeeN THe PLOUGH AND THe PICK
112
Cross, J., S. van der Wal and E. de Haan, 2010. ‘Rough Cut: Sustainability 
Issues in the Coloured Gemstone Industries.’ Amsterdam: Centre for 
Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO).
Das, S.K. and J.K. Mohanty, 2014. ‘Characterisation of Eluvial Corundum 
(Ruby) from Kermunda, Kalahandi District, Odisha, India.’ Journal 
of Geology and Geosciences 3: 180.
Deb, M., G. Tiwari and K. Lahiri-Dutt, 2008. ‘Artisanal and Small-Scale 
Mining in India: Selected Studies and an Overview of the Issues.’ 
International Journal of Mining, Reclamation and Environment 22(3): 
194–209. doi.org/10.1080/17480930701679574
Deo, P.K., 1987. ‘Why Kalahandi is called Karond or Kharonde?’ 
The Orissa Historical Research Journal 31: 9–14.
Dharitri, 2009. ‘Farmer Suicide in Kalahandi District of Western Odisha.’ 
18 November. 
Dharitri, 2015. ‘Farmer Attempts Suicide in Kalahandi.’ 5 March.
Directorate of Geology, n.d. Available at orissaminerals.gov.in/Geology/
Default.aspx 
Government of Orissa, 2009. Compendium of Mineral Resources of Orissa. 
Department of Steel and Mines, Government of Orissa. 
Hart, K.J., 1987. ‘Informal economy.’ In J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and 
P. Newman (eds), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. London: 
Palgrave MacMillan. doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_804-1
Harvey, D., 2004.  ‘The “New” Imperialism: Accumulation by 
Dispossession.’ Socialist Register 40: 63–87.
Hentschel, T., F. Hruschka and M. Priester, 2002. Global Report on 
Artisanal & Small-Scale Mining. Minerals Mining and Sustainable 
Development, no. 70. International Institute for Environment and 
Development, World Business Council for Sustainable Development. 
Hilson, G. and C. Garforth, 2012. ‘“Agricultural Poverty” and the 
Expansion of Artisanal Mining in Sub-Saharan Africa: Experiences 
from Southwest Mali and Southeast Ghana.’ Population Resources 
Policy Review 31(3): 435–64. doi.org/10.1007/s11113-012-9229-6
113
4 . AGRARIAN DISTReSS AND GeMSTONe MINING IN INDIA
Hilson, G. and C.J. Garforth, 2013. ‘“Everyone Now is Concentrating on 
the Mining”: Drivers and Implications of Changing Agrarian Patterns 
in the Eastern Region of Ghana.’ The Journal of Development Studies 
49(3): 348–62.
Labonne, B., 2003. ‘Seminar on Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining 
in Africa: Identifying Best Practices and Building the Sustainable 
Livelihoods of Communities.’ In G. Hilson (ed.), The Socioeconomic 
Impacts of Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining in Developing Countries. 
The Netherlands: A.A. Balkema. doi.org/10.1201/9780203971284.
ch9
Lahiri-Dutt, K., 2007. ‘Illegal Coal Mining in Eastern India: Rethinking 
Legitimacy and Limits of Justice.’ Economic and Political Weekly 
42(49): 57–67.
Lahiri-Dutt, K., 2014. ‘Extracting Peasants from the Field: Rushing for 
a Livelihood?’ Working Paper Series No. 216. Asia Research Institute, 
National University of Singapore. 
Madulu, N.F., 1998. ‘Changing Lifestyles in Farming Societies of 
Sukumaland: Kwimba District, Tanzania.’ Working Paper No. 27. 
Dar es Salaam: Institute of Resource Assessment, and Leiden: African 
Studies Centre. 
McMahon, G., J.L. Evia, A. Pascó-Font and J. Miguel Sánchez, 1999. 
‘An Environmental Study of Artisanal, Small, and Medium Mining 
in Bolivia, Chile, and Peru.’ World Bank Technical Paper No. 429. 
Washington DC: The Word Bank. 
Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development (MMSD), 2002. 
Breaking New Ground. London: Earthscan Publications.
Mishra, A., 2005. ‘Local Perceptions of Famine: Study of a Village 
in Orissa.’ Economic and Political Weekly 40(6): 572–8.
Mishra, M.K., 2011. Kalahandi Drought Lore. Solo, Central Java, 
Indonesia: Centre for River Basin Organizations and Management.
Mishra, D. and R.S. Rao, 1992. ‘Hunger in Kalahandi: Blinkered 
Understanding.’ Economic and Political Weekly 27(24–25): 1245–6.
Mohanty, L. (ed.), 2010. ‘Kalahandi District.’ Orissa Review 
(Census Special) 67(5): 127–30.
BeTWeeN THe PLOUGH AND THe PICK
114
Mohapatra, G., 2012. ‘Hunger and Coping Strategies Among Kondh 
Tribe in Kalahandi District, Odisha (Eastern India).’ Transcience 3(2): 
51–60.
Murthy, A.A. and Y. Giri Rao, 2006. Status Paper on Mining Leases 
in  Orissa. Bhubaneswar: Vasundhara, Conservation and Livelihood 
Team.
Padel, F. and S. Das, 2010. Out of this Earth: East India Adivasis and the 
Aluminium Cartel. New Delhi: Orient BlackSwan.
Pati, B., 1999. ‘Environment and Social History: Kalahandi, 1800–1950.’ 
Environment and History 5(3): 345–59.
Pradhan, J., 1993. ‘Drought in Kalahandi: The Real Story.’ Economic and 
Political Weekly 28(22): 1084–8.
Roy Chowdhury, A. and K. Lahiri-Dutt, 2016. ‘The Geophagous Peasants 
of Kalahandi: De-peasantisation and Artisanal Mining of Coloured 
Gemstones in India.’ Extractive Industries and Society: 1–13. doi.org/ 
10.1016/j.exis.2016.03.007 
Sahoo, A.K., 2014. ‘Gem Stones Deposits Found in Odisha River.’ Deccan 
Chronicle, 13 July. Available at www.deccanchronicle.com/140713/
nation-current-affairs/article/gem-stones-deposits-found-odisha-river 
Sahu, J.S., 2013. ‘Kotwar Guarding Alexandrite Gemstone in 
Chhattisgarh!’ Daily Pioneer, 21 April. Available at www.dailypioneer.
com/state-editions/raipur/kotwar-guarding-alexandrite-gemstones-in-
chhattisgarh.html
Sahu, G.B., S. Madheswaran and D. Rajasekhar, 2004. ‘Credit 
Constraints and Distress Sales in Rural India: Evidence from Kalahandi 
District, Orissa.’ The Journal of Peasant Studies 31(2): 210–41. doi.
org/10.1080/0306615042000224285
Sainath, P., 1996. Everybody Loves a Good Drought. New Delhi: Penguin.
Satapathy, R.K. and S. Goswami, 2006. ‘Mineral Potential of Orissa State: 
A Kaleidoscopic Review.’ Orissa Review (May): 1–14.
Siegel, S. and M.M. Veiga, 2009. ‘Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining as an 
Extralegal Economy: De Soto and the Redefinition of “formalization”.’ 
Resources Policy 34: 51–6. doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2008.02.001
115
4 . AGRARIAN DISTReSS AND GeMSTONe MINING IN INDIA
Slack, K., 2013. ‘The Growing Battle Between Mining and Agriculture.’ 
29 March. International Network of Economics and Conflict, United 
States Institute of Peace. Viewed at inec.usip.org/blog/2013/mar/ 29/
growing-battle-between-mining-and-agriculture (site discontinued)
Tsing, A., 2009. ‘Supply Chains and the Human Condition.’ Rethinking 
Marxism: A Journal of Economics, Culture & Society 21(2): 148–76.
Vagholikar, N., K.A. Moghe, and R. Dutta, 2003. Undermining 
India: Impacts of Mining on Ecologically Sensitive Areas. New Delhi: 
Kalpavriksh.
Van Bockstael, S. and K. Vlassenroot, 2008. ‘Perspective and challenges.’ 
In K. Vlassenroot and S. Van Bockstael (eds), Setting the Scene: 
Perspectives on Artisanal Diamond Mining, Amsterdam: Academia Press.
Verbrugge, B., 2015. ‘The Economic Logic of Persistent Informality: 
Artisanal and Small Scale Mining in the Southern Philippines.’ 
Development and Change 46(5): 1023–46. doi.org/10.1111/
dech.12189
Walsh, A., 2010. ‘The Commodification of Fetishes: Telling the Difference 
Between Natural and Synthetic Sapphires.’ American Ethnologist 37(1): 
98–114. doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-1425.2010.01244.x
Yeboah, S., 2014. ‘“Crops” or “Carats”? Interaction Between Gold 
Mining and Cocoa Production and the Livelihood Dilemma in 
Amansie Central District of Ghana.’ 30 October, United Nations 
Research Institute for Social Development. Available at www.unrisd.





The social ecology of artisanal 
mining: Between romanticisation 
and anathema
Saleem H. Ali
Artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) has existed for millennia, and is 
ingrained in many cultural traditions. However, as this book’s first four 
chapters have demonstrated, the activity has often faced challenges of 
acceptance by mainstream institutions because it occupies an interstitial 
space ‘between the pick and the plough’. It is at once an extractive sector 
but is also practised as a seasonal activity of agrarian peasants. It may not 
have all the hallmarks of a formal enterprise, but it is also seldom anarchic 
plundering of a resource. Thus, in this chapter, I attempt to negotiate 
through these seemingly conflicting elements of ASM by offering 
a  synthetic conceptual anchor for the preceding chapters. I am guided 
in this task by an acute recognition that environmental concerns about 
ASM would need to be addressed in any effective framing of its social 
development imperative.
Development donors have considered ASM as suitable for technical 
interventions to improve yield of minerals or alternative techniques for safer 
extraction. The World Bank and the Communities and Small-Scale Mining 
(CASM) program1 was operational from 2000 to 2010, and developed a 
1  Details of the CASM program of work can be found at World Bank (2008).
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broad repertoire of information exchange in this arena. The United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and Swiss Development 
Agency’s efforts to focus on the use of mercury in ASM gold-mining are 
examples of such undertakings. Mercury reduction efforts have been 
spurred by the advent of the Minamata Convention on Mercury Reduction 
that has thus far been signed by over 128 countries, and ratified by 88 (as of 
January 2018).2 The Convention recognises that mercury usage in artisanal 
and small-scale mining will likely be a challenge for many more years to 
come, given the remote locations of the mining sites and the relatively low 
cost of mercury worldwide. More recently, United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) has also started to engage with low-value minerals 
and the role of ASM in quarrying of industrial and construction materials, 
particularly in African, Caribbean and Pacific Island states (See UNDP 
2015 for details of the program). 
The goal of this chapter is to make the argument that all these laudable 
efforts need to consider the overall trajectory from a broader socio-
ecological sustainability lens. Regulation—from tax collection, to 
environmental health and safety concerns, to conflict determinism—
has vexed development practitioners for decades. Given the current 
context of sustainable development and the advent in 2015 of the 17 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), ASM should be considered 
as part of a hybrid livelihood strategy or a transitional opportunity 
for catalysing development. Thus, it is imperative that we find a more 
meaningful theoretical construct that could have broader development 
planning activity in order to ameliorate the plight of miners and assuage 
the concerns of governments alike.
The relevance of social ecology theory
The term ‘social ecology’ has developed in two parallel intellectual 
traditions that have seldom communicated with each other, despite 
having congruent objectives. First, the concept of social ecology was 
developed in psychological discourse, particularly by Arnold Binder 
(1974), and found grounding at the University of California through the 
establishment of the School of Social Ecology. The core aspects of this 
approach were subsequently summarised in six principles by Dave Taylor 
(1999) as follows:
2  A frequently updated status of Minamata signatories is available at www.mercuryconvention.org/
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• Identify a phenomenon as a social problem.
• View the problem from multiple levels and methods of analysis.
• Utilise and apply diverse theoretical perspectives.
• Recognise human–environment interactions as dynamic and active 
processes.
• Consider the social, historical, cultural and institutional contexts 
of people–environment relations.
• Understand people’s lives in an everyday sense.
The field in this inception builds upon traditions of human ecology, which 
were developed in geography, anthropology and environmental history. 
The context was that humans were an essential part of ecological systems 
and that environmental problem-solving must consider the transformative 
role of human societies on the environment.
Second, the term was embraced by the ‘green anarchist’ scholar Murray 
Bookchin as a response to what he perceived as a hierarchical approach to 
ecological problem-solving that was being posited in policy-making circles. 
Instead of regulating our way to solutions, Bookchin and his protégés 
at the Institute for Social Ecology (based in Plainfield, Vermont, USA) 
were focused on social transformation through decentralised inculcation 
of ecological ethics. It is important to note that through his intellectual 
development of social ecology, Bookchin dismissed some of the absolutist 
elements of anarchist thought around electoral participation. Instead, 
‘green anarchy’ focused on how grassroots community organisations, 
which had direct connections to the land and livelihoods, could contribute 
effectively in local governance.  
Despite his atheism, there was perhaps an inadvertent element of the 
Catholic social teaching of ‘subsidiarity’ within the approach posited by 
Bookchin as his writings matured, whereby the lowest functional level of 
governance was to be given ascendancy. Artisanal and small-scale mining 
cooperatives and localised governance forms are in congruence with such 
a paradigm as well. Interestingly enough, the most recent encyclical on 
ecology issued by Pope Francis, entitled Laudato si’ (translated from 
medieval Italian as ‘Praise be to You’, and subtitled ‘On Care For Our 
Common Home’) echoes these themes of subsidiarity. At the 2015 
conference of the Transnational Institute for Social Ecology, Ian Bekker 
astutely observed an ‘overlap between the message of Laudato si’ and the 
Social Ecology project of Murray Bookchin’ (2015: 1). 
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In the context of mining, it is particularly important to also consider that 
larger mining firms have been a frequent target of activism by Catholic 
charities. Overtures by some of the larger mining company executives 
to the Vatican in an effort to improve perception of their development 
impact with the church have achieved mixed results. On the one hand, the 
church continues to express strong concerns about the negative impact of 
large-scale mining in Catholic countries such as the Philippines.3 On the 
other hand, three major mining companies have been engaged in dialogue 
with the Vatican over a two-year project through the Kellogg Innovation 
Network.4 As with other social advocacy organisations, mining continues 
to pose a dilemma for the Vatican in terms of its long-term contribution 
towards sustainability. Minerals are noted as essential, and often their role 
as catalysts of development is recognised. Yet, the scale and scope of the 
activity remains contested at multiple levels.
Since ASM is largely a decentralised activity, and many of the major 
concerns ensue from its environmental impact, a social ecology approach, 
in either of its intellectual lineages, has potential for better policy 
formulation. The ongoing debates about the governance and benefits 
of artisanal and small-scale mining, and its relationship with large-scale 
mining, can benefit from what Bookchin (1995a) called ‘dialectical 
naturalism’. Dialectical methods can broadly be conceived to have 
four fundamental principles,5 which Bookchin embraced, but with 
modifications:
• Human activities are transient and finite, existing in the medium 
of time.
• Human behaviour is composed of contradictions (opposing forces).
• Incremental changes lead to turning points when one force overcomes 
its opponent force (quantitative change leads to qualitative change).
• Change occurs in spiral not circular form—hence there is an evolution 
process that comes forth when contradictory perspectives interact with 
each other.
3  A summary of the Pope’s concerns about mining can be found on the Vatican Radio (2015) 
website.
4  For details of the multi-faith outreach effort by the industry, refer to the Kellogg Innovation 
Network (2015) website, which has reports released in 2015.
5  These principles can be derived from a variety of texts on dialectics. An excellent framing of the 
use of this approach in organisations in policy and planning can be found in Mitroff and Emschoff 
(1979).
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Bookchin (2005) was quite conscious about differentiating his approach 
from what he termed Hegel’s ‘empyrean idealism’ as well as what he called 
Marx’s wooden, often scientistic dialectical materialism. His approach 
embraces science and society, as providing feedback loops towards more 
effective ecologically sustainable governance at a non-hierarchical localised 
level. Through the lens of social ecology, in its tradition of dialectical 
naturalism (Brincat and Gerber 2015), ASM has the potential to be 
structured as a decentralised activity, but it remains to be seen whether 
the ecological impacts can be managed within such a devolved paradigm. 
The Irvine social ecology framework provides us some guidance on how to 
better formulate our approach towards effective problem-solving of ASM. 
Through this process, some mechanisms of governance can be identified 
and the seemingly contradictory elements of ‘thinking locally’ about its 
social context but ‘acting national or globally’ on its ecological footprint 
can find some reconciliation. The spiralling trajectory of dialectical 
naturalism can thus lead us towards more ecologically viable livelihoods 
generated from ASM in the short term, and broader community 
development outcomes in the long term. However, such a pathway will 
require us to navigate in far greater detail specific aspects of ASM activity, 
in order to make the application of these lofty philosophical principles 
more palpable for decision makers.
Applying social ecology concepts 
to ASM governance
Artisanal mining is a highly arduous activity that is extremely difficult to 
govern. Thus, its role as a livelihood strategy needs to be considered in 
those terms, with a focus on improving the living condition of miners and 
affording improved government or community oversight. The remoteness 
and desperation of many communities in ASM make them easy targets 
for exploitative practices, including child labour and bondage. For many 
miners, particularly in the gemstone arena, this profession is a transitory 
career to find a prized stone, and then to move on to less risky professional 
pursuits. In other cases, the profession is seasonal, and coupled with 
agricultural practices and trade. Mining rushes can create a frenzy of 
resource extraction that can degrade land and water bodies to the point 
where these alternative livelihoods, particularly agriculture or fishing, 
become unviable. 
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Much of the literature on ASM acknowledges that it is often a seasonal 
activity and that it can be considered a resilience strategy against downturns 
in agricultural productivity due to natural or anthropogenic activities. Even 
vociferous supporters of ASM as a development strategy acknowledge that 
those miners who engage in the activity for most of their lives do so because 
of poverty (Hilson 2010). The mineral ‘rush’ phenomenon associated 
with ASM, which can draw people from other professions, can occur with 
gemstone deposits (Cartier 2009) but is less prevalent with gold-mining. 
The difficulty of governing ASM within a conventional administrative 
framework has been amply documented in the literature on the challenges of 
‘formalization’ efforts by governments (Lahiri-Dutt 2004). As a result of this 
challenge, social scientists have struggled to provide a meaningful theoretical 
frame whereby ASM governance could be operationalised, particularly with 
consideration of its ecological and health and safety impact on miners 
and communities. Siegel and Veiga (2009) attempted to use Hernado De 
Soto’s theory of ‘extra-legality’ as a means of formulating a more effective 
governance mechanism for ASM. However, De Soto’s approach as applied 
to ASM in this context aspires to coopt customary practices and use those as 
an ‘extra-legal’ formalisation process, which also transitions artisanal miners 
to careers in small- and medium-scale mining. The direct ecological impacts 
are not as clearly problematised by De Soto, nor have they been effectively 
addressed in terms of land use remediation and the long-term ecological 
impact of ASM. Perhaps the approach recently posited by Capra and Mattei 
(2015) in their book The Ecology of Law can provide better guidance in 
this regard. In their view, in order to have functional economies involving 
natural resource extraction, we need to transform ‘legal institutions from 
being machines of extraction, rooted in the mechanistic functioning of 
private property and state authority, into institutions based on ecological 
communities’ (ibid.: 5). Governance and regulatory enforcement, through 
such ‘ecological communities’ that have appropriate education on natural 
constraints of extraction, is likely to be the best way to manage ASM.
Often ASM governance gets framed in terms of risk management at the 
level of the individual, as well as collectively at the level of society. Human 
and environmental health exposure is perhaps the most direct encapsulation 
of this risk trade-off. However, this aspect of ASM has been addressed 
through numerous studies on technical solutions related to ASM usage 
of mercury (Sippl and Selin 2012) and cyanide exposure (Hilson and 
Monhemius 2006) in gold-mining. Mercury-use reduction targets in 
ASM gained momentum with a UNIDO/UNDP Global Mercury Project 
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from 2002–07 that had a focal area on ASM,6 and particularly since the 
promulgation of the Minamata Convention on Mercury Reduction in 
2013. Safety concerns are also being addressed through distribution of 
personal protective equipment by non-profit organisations; although this 
area still deserves far greater attention (Smith et al. 2016).
However, the ecological externalities generated by ASM remain an 
imponderable aspect of the ‘extra-legal’ approach, especially since 
many miners are migrants and have little traditional connection to the 
activity. Retorts that might reduce mercury exposure to the miner can 
still be a contaminant in the environment if improperly disposed. Where 
ecological factors have been included through a reclamation plan, such as 
the work of the Asia Foundation and the Swiss Development Corporation 
in Mongolia, there has been some local government enforcement interface 
(Lindberg and Purevjav 2013).
The social ecology approach allows us to consider this deficiency in the 
current frame of analysis around ASM. Since much of the criticism 
comes from the environmental damage and the negative impact on other 
potential land uses that ASM can cause, addressing those challenges 
will be absolutely critical. The career trajectories of miners appear to be 
highly heterogeneous. The pioneering study of ASM miners in Tanzania 
conducted by Bryceon and Jønsson (2010) showed that only 5 per cent of 
miners who had previously been involved in agriculture consider a return 
to agriculture. Most had a diverse set of interests in business enterprise 
and using ASM as a means of social mobility, which was not ‘rash’, even in 
the wake of a mineral ‘rush’. The incentive mechanism, for ensuring that 
the land being mined was ecologically rehabilitated for future agrarian 
use, therefore appears even more limited. The miners may see their 
career path in the dialectical spiral that is negotiated through contrarian 
forces of short-term versus long-term gains. Ecological factors could be 
brought forth through appropriate regulatory mechanisms that respect 
the devolved nature of ASM at a social and economic development level, 
but modulate its environmental and health and safety impact.
Social ecology thus provides a hybrid approach to addressing the negative 
externalities of ASM, but without losing its core entrepreneurial ‘high-
risk high-reward’ function in peasant societies. Mining cooperatives may 
be another important mechanism for implementing a more decentralised 
6  Details on their ASM activities can be found on the website of UNIDO (n.d.).
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approach to ASM in the spirit of subsidiarity. Some of the past challenges 
of cooperatives, as documented by Levin and Turay (2008) could also be 
addressed by a social ecology approach. ASM, particularly in the gemstone 
industry, is a highly individualistic activity and has the potential to reduce 
itself to anarchistic arguments of autonomy from any regulatory mechanism. 
Fostering the value of cooperation through access to markets has often not 
been an adequate incentive for developing cooperative systems. Ecological 
and public health–oriented norms have greater potential for providing 
an incentive for cooperative development. Some form of standard-setting 
and regulatory enforcement can be better justified through such means. 
The dialectical principle of quantitative changes leading to qualitative 
changes can be embraced in the context of ASM by carefully monitored 
environmental health and safety education programs, coupled with 
enforcement against non-compliance. The proverbial ‘carrot and stick’ can 
find conceptual harmony through Bookchin’s naturalism (Biehl 2015) and 
eventually lead to a dialectical ‘turning point’, whereby those engaging in 
ASM see ecological consciousness as a necessary part of their social system.
Conclusion: The development imperative
One cannot escape the fact that contemporary ASM is largely 
a phenomenon confined to the developing world, and is an adaptation 
strategy for poverty alleviation. It provides a conduit of livelihoods for 
vulnerable groups in society, but can also be a means of exploiting their 
vulnerabilities. The gender dynamics of ASM have been well studied in 
this regard and must also constitute an important part of the development 
goals that a social ecology paradigm may enable for this activity. During the 
15-year period from the promulgation of the Millennium Development 
Goals until their date for completion in 2015, there have been several 
donor-driven programs to provide capacity around artisanal and small-
scale mining. Many of these programs have arisen because of concern 
about mercury usage in ASM, which has been rising as a percentage of 
total mercury use, due to the obsolescence of other mercury uses in chloro-
alkali plants and electronics. A few programs have targeted the gemstone 
industry because of linkages to conflict or governance failures. The CASM 
network provided a clearinghouse for almost a decade for these various 
activities. We thus have 15 years of program evaluation that needs to be 
better evaluated and harnessed for future development planning, and 
could indeed be used to connect ASM activity to the new SDGs and the 
2030 development agenda.
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No doubt the overall national development impact of large-scale mining 
in terms of fiscal flows and royalties to communities is likely to dominate 
the conversation in donor circles. Therefore, it is also essential that 
large-scale mining should have a more constructive relationship with 
ASM. Although there are cases where ASM activity has been allowed 
on large corporate mining concessions, a systematic approach with clear 
development indicators in mind has not been followed. The social ecology 
approach also has the potential to link these scales of activity to clear 
development metrics at different levels of governance. While large-scale 
mining can provide fiscal flows and development investment at a macro 
scale, ASM has the potential to deliver specific livelihood opportunities 
at a micro level.  
Ecological consciousness can be the bridging element in this regard, 
and the social ecology approach to framing ASM allows us to consider 
this development imperative more directly. It is worth noting that 
political ecology (Peluso and Watts 2001) discourse in this regard has 
largely focused on a critique of resource scarcity determinism in conflict. 
Thus, political ecology has traditionally had a more diagnostic frame of 
analysis, whereas social ecology has been more prescriptive in its analytical 
trajectory. However, there can be a more constructive link between 
political ecology and social ecology in the context of ASM’s contribution 
to development. The diagnostic insights of political ecology around land 
use and livelihood decisions of miners can be moved to the next phase 
through social ecology by developing a hybridised model of sustainable 
development and poverty alleviation. Social transformation through 
ecological learning and multi-tiered governance solutions will be essential 
to realise the development outcome of ASM. Perhaps Agrawal’s (2005) 
notion of ‘environmentality’ can be used in this regard, building on 
Foucault’s seminal work on knowledge and power in governance beyond 
conventional political institutions (governmentality).7 Such an approach 
has direct relevance to ecological and health impacts of highly devolved 
social activities such as ASM, whereby conventional governments 
recognise their limits of influence. The role of governments thus becomes 
one of enabling knowledge acquisition in communities. Governments 
can also provide a forum to negotiate the contradictions in development 
objectives, which the theory of dialectical naturalism suggests they will 
inevitably encounter.
7  Much of Foucault’s work in this regard can be traced to his later years, particularly The Government 
of Self and Others: Lectures at the Collège de France 1982–1983 (Foucault 2010).
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This chapter has attempted to show that ASM cannot be romantically 
considered a manifestation of pristine poverty, and an ode to self-
reliance and resourcefulness of the peasant. It is part of a broader human 
consumptive quest, and linked to the dominant capitalist industrial system, 
which we must find more pragmatic means of managing. No doubt it 
has the potential to provide economic resilience, but the ecological cost 
of the activity must be better internalised through a multi-level approach 
to its governance. Social ecology theory provides the most cogent way to 
grapple with this complex activity, which involves some level of inherent 
obsolescence, anarchist reward structures and considerable environmental 
cost. As we ponder the future of this challenging, entrepreneurial and 
adventurous arena of human endeavour, let us ensure that our decisions are 
driven by good research and deliberations with those desperate diggers who 
imperil their lives to bring us treasures from the bowels of the landscape.
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Theorising transit labour 
in informal mineral 
extraction processes
Ranabir Samaddar
Between the plough and the pick there is a range of labour forms, all 
marked by what is known as ‘informal’ conditions—that is, informal 
terms of work, informal agreements, informal labour processes, informal 
nature of the job performed, informal nature of relations between those 
who work, as well as between those who work and those who own capital, 
and at times even the informal nature of the supply chain including 
the front and back ends. Yet, we have to note at the outset that there 
are several instances where informal and formal conditions were woven 
into one another in the structure of industrial processes.1 This variety is 
not accidental. The division of the economy into formal and informal 
sectors—based on the assumption that in certain sectors labour would 
be highly formalised while in others it would be to the contrary—has an 
epistemological problem involved in it. There is also a historical confusion 
in considering as eternal this binary division of work conditions and 
work organisations as formal and informal. Throughout the history of 
capitalism, work conditions and work organisations have been a mix of 
the two. Yet, contemporary capitalism utilises the cheap labour, and makes 
1  On the work condition in the tannery industry in Tangra, Kolkata, see Samaddar and Dutta 
(1997).
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use of the global supply chains, as never before. I argue that three changes 
are signified by the extensive presence of informal labour conditions in 
the economy as a whole—at global, national and sectoral scales—and 
in  mining in particular. Seen from this perspective, informal, artisanal 
and small-scale mining becomes more easily legible.
The three changes point to a reconsideration of surplus value accumulation 
as outlined by Marx. First, it seems as though capital is ordaining 
the informal conditions of labour in almost all spheres of economy, 
including the so-called formal sphere. Second, these informal conditions 
are dominant in productive sectors that can be described broadly as 
‘extraction’. The extraction could be primarily of nature and natural 
resources, known as ‘nature’s capital’, but in this particular instance it 
is know as mineral resource extraction. Third, labour deployed in the 
domain of extraction will be mostly mobile, migrant labour, moving from 
one place to another. It may be thus termed as labour in transit, transit 
labour or migrant labour; in other words, labour transiting from one 
site to another, and one form to another, resulting in multiplication of 
the forms of labour.2 The phenomenon of transit labour constitutes one 
of the prominent dimensions of the functioning of the economy under 
neoliberal policies.
These three changes are interlinked. From opening up new areas for 
mining to building new towns, extraction seems to be the hallmark of the 
expansion of the neoliberal economic policies. Essentially, they constitute 
the background to a return to primitive accumulation in the contemporary 
times. Yet, this is not the age of primitive capitalism, because on one 
hand, organised, large-scale, centralised production systems are devouring 
small- and medium-scale producers, while on the other, cheap labour 
is being utilised extensively in decentralised and informal production 
processes. Seen from this perspective, the unique growth of informal 
2  Samita Sen (2012: 4) defines transit labour as follows: ‘How do we conceptualise “transit labour”? 
I would suggest that we see this at the intersection of two major conceptual grids characterising the 
understanding of labour in the present: first, transitional forms of labour, which are inextricably 
related to transitions in mode of production, involving change in forms of labour arrangements, 
shifts in, creation or closures of labour markets, and in types and structures of labour deployment; 
and, second, transitory labour, which may be considered in chronological/empirical frame to denote 
changing and shifting patterns of employment or, in a more particularised sense, may address 
questions of labour mobility, both physical and structural.’
Mouleshri Vyas (2012: 10) pointed out three features of the concept: migration as a continuing 
phenomenon; sectoral profile of labour demand and supply; and labour flexibility and the inbuilt 
problem of city and labour.
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extractive industries that contribute to primitive accumulation no longer 
appears to be an insoluble paradox. However, there is a need to investigate 
what causes this return to what we know as ‘nature’, as the site of renewal 
of capital. What does it do to the labour form and reproduction of labour 
power? Also, how does this return become a condition for neoliberal 
economic growth?
Unstable division between formal 
and informal
In this context, a set of investigations may be proposed. First, how does the 
neoliberal economy revolving around the development of infrastructure 
and cities become a site of extraction, an extractive zone impacting on 
all other productive processes? Second, to the extent it becomes so, what 
is the role transit labour plays in this metamorphosis of the economy 
from being a site of industrial production and liberal citizenship to one of 
extraction and disenfranchised migrant labour? That is to say, what does 
it mean in terms of organisation of production, its capillary forms, and 
the multiplication of labour processes? These two questions are important 
because, taken together, they have a strategic stake in our understanding 
of global capitalism in the neoliberal milieu today.
To repeat, transit labour stands at the crossroads of the trends referred to 
above—namely, extraction and new spaces of extraction, development of 
infrastructure, informal labour conditions, multiplication of the forms 
of labour and the politics all these give shape to—and in turn these trends 
are shaped by politics. This chapter will attempt to explore some of these 
trends that are concealed in the figure of transit labour.
Extraction I: The dust bowls of Bellary and other 
mining sites
Bellary mines are situated near the ruins of Vijayanagara, the former 
capital of the Vijayanagara Empire that flourished during the fourteenth 
to sixteenth centuries in Karnataka, India. The international boom 
in demand for iron ore made India the third largest exporter of iron ore 
in the world; a third of these exports came from Bellary. The rush for iron 
ore is evident from the estimate, by the mining and geology department, 
that the Bellary region alone exported 15 million tonnes of high-quality 
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iron ore worth US$67 million overseas, mainly to China. At the same 
time, the international price of iron-ore rose from US$17 per tonne in 
2000–01 to its peak of US$75 per tonne in 2005–06. The demand from 
the Indian steel producers also grew, pulling export figures, which earlier 
made up 75 per cent of the total production, down to 60 per cent. The iron 
ore began to be supplied in greater volume to the Indian market, where 
steel-producing giant industries—Arcelor Mittal, Posco, Tata Steel and 
Jindal—consumed the ore in their plants. In 2008, steel prices doubled, 
surpassing US$700 per tonne. In view of the abnormal rise in demand for 
iron the world over, several countries banned or regulated exports in order 
to keep domestic prices at reasonable levels.3 In response, the mining of 
iron ore became widespread in Bellary, symbolising the surge in demand 
for iron ore and the accompanying shift to privatisation and open-market 
economy in India. 
Meanwhile, agrarian stagnation forced the landless agricultural labourers 
and marginal peasantry to look for other means of wage earnings. 
Migrant labour ‘floated from mining plot to mining plot searching 
for sustenance in an informal system of contract labour in the mining 
triangle’ (Bulgarelli 2014a). By 2005, the hectic scramble for iron ore 
led to social and ecological chaos in the area (Deccan Herald 2011). Most 
mining operations were undertaken by small mining companies, often 
operating without a licence, which did not follow any environmental or 
social regulations.4 Local landlords supplied labourers to the contractors, 
who extracted commissions from the wages paid to the labourers. There 
was no direct transaction between the mine owners and the labourers, 
and this system of sub-contracting freed the actual employers of all 
responsibilities towards the labourer (Dey et al. 2013). The number of 
daily wage labourers rose above 70,000, of which half were children 
under the age of 14 and around 20,000 women (Bulgarelli 2014b). The 
working conditions of the workers were highly exploitative and the living 
condition was insanitary. Mining dust was rampant (Menon 2015). All 
these factors affected mine workers, several of whom developed serious 
and chronic illnesses. 
3  On the China-led global demand for iron and steel, the general commodity boom in the last 
10 years and the subsequent decline, see the report by Miller and Samuel (2016: B1), which stated: 
‘Between 2012 and 2014, for example, Phoenix-based Freeport-McMoran Inc., the biggest US 
mining company paid out $4.7 billion in dividends, according to securities filings.’
4  Taken from a collection of reports from the website dedicated to the mining scam: bellary0.
hpage.co.in/reddy-bros_1024057.html (accessed on 12 October 2015; the site is no longer accessible).
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The recent history of the resurgence of this kind of mushrooming growth 
of decentralised and informal mining is important to understand the 
phenomenon of transit labour. This resurgence has been evident in 
various mineral-rich states of India during the last decade. They involved 
encroachment of forest areas, underpayment of government royalties and 
violation of the land and forest rights of the indigenous people. They also 
unleashed violent protests, and the ruthless suppression of the protests 
by the state was evidence of the co-mingling of political and mining 
interests.5 
Extraction II: Migrant workers in the coal mines 
of Meghalaya
Migrant labour, including from Nepal, makes coal mining in the 
ecologically sensitive Jaintia Hills located in the northeastern Indian 
state of Meghalaya possible. The hills are pockmarked with holes. Money 
lies at the bottom of steep, sheer holes dug 100–180 feet deep into the 
ground. Sudden rain, a tipped cart, a falling rock—just about anything 
can mean death in the hostile pits of the Jaintia Hills. Some estimate that 
a staggering 70,000 children from Nepal, Bangladesh, Assam, Bihar and 
Jharkhand work in these private mines. Typically, a labour camp shelters 
25 miners. Mining is rewarding, for while a driver may not earn more 
than INR5,000, mining can fetch around INR8,000–10,000 a month.6 
Around 100,000 metric tonnes of coal, worth around INR500 million, 
is extracted from the Jaintia mines every day, and the government 
receives a royalty of INR290 per tonne; the mine owners sell it for 
INR4,200  per  tonne. Life is temporary in every way in the rat mines 
of Meghalaya. The government does not think that any special action 
is necessary in this situation. As one report quoted the Deputy Chief 
Minister Bindo Lanong (Majumdar 2010):
5  The UN Special Rapporteur’s report on the human rights of the migrants distributed by the 
General Assembly on 3 April 2014 noted the risks of particular groups of migrant workers, and 
reminded us of the situation described here (United Nations 2014).
6  This section draws from a report in Tehelka Magazine, by Kunal Majumder (3 July 2010). 
Figures and citations have been taken from this report. In Let me Speak, Domitila Barrios (1978) 
describes the work of women miners known as the ‘rock pile women’, who were mostly widows of 
miners who died in the Bolivian mines or were killed in massacres. These women miners worked on 
the artificial hills of rocks that had been thrown from the pits, which thus had some mixture of ore 
and stone. The women had to break the rocks and separate the two (Barrios 1978: 104–6).
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Jaintia Hills mines are completely obsolete and environmentally 
hazardous  … Since I took up the responsibility of mines a year back, 
we have been drafting a policy to take care of these important issues … 
Prohibiting may not be necessary to include in the mining policy, but we 
will consider. Why I say it is not necessary is because it is already there in 
the Central labour legislation, which does not allow children below 18, 
especially small boys, to work … It is for the Department of Labour to 
take action. They should impose the labour laws, knowing that these little 
kids are employed there. We will take up this matter.
Meghalaya as a Sixth Schedule State has three autonomous district 
councils, which, by law, have the sole authority to lease and licence mines 
(Lahiri-Dutt 2016). Traditional institutions openly flout mining norms, 
and land is let out at will to private operators. Most mine owners procure 
gelatine sticks and detonators on the black market from licensed contractors. 
Accidents often go unreported. The government collects royalties from 
mine operators and even issues them receipts.
Extraction III: Sand and other materials
Sand is formed as sediments are brought by a river and get deposited 
downstream. In tropical, monsoon-fed India, the process is repeated every 
rainy season, when new sand is deposited on the riverbed. Himalayan 
rivers carry enormous quantities of sand, the deposits of which force 
the rivers to change their courses frequently. The removal of sand from the 
river is a necessity to keep the riverbed intact, so that the carrying capacity 
of the river is maintained. 
However, unplanned sand removal, or indeed sand mining, has flourished 
throughout India in response to the construction boom. Construction 
needs have relegated environmental concerns to the bottom of the priority 
list. Sand mining involves money, and large profits are to be made on little 
capital investment. Rampant sand mining has baffled the government, 
encouraging it to produce detailed guidelines on sustainable sand mining 
in response, to monitor the rivers and to increase the penalty against 
illegal miners.7 However, it has been unable to control sand mining 
(Ei Shomoi 2015).
7  See the discussion on IHRO@yahoogroups.com, 15–17 September 2015. See also Aggarwal 
(2015), and Government of India (2015). See for details of the state of sand mining, Ministry of 
Environment and Forests (2013). 
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In this context, we may recall how Marx, while discussing primitive 
accumulation, repeatedly invoked the association of blood with intense 
exploitation of labour.8 Observers, when discussing mutation in rural 
labour forms, do not bring into their analysis questions of accumulation 
and assume that savagery in the mutation of labour form is a matter 
of the past. Living labour in the post-colonial context is marked by 
increasingly informal conditions of work. Marx’s formulation on primitive 
accumulation refers to conditions of life when it has been reduced to the 
minimum, so that capital can emerge. In the post-colonial situation today, 
labour migrates from work to work, and the peasant becomes a semi-worker, 
then a full worker, only to return to till his/her small parcel of land or work 
in others’ fields when industrial, semi-industrial, semi-manufacturing or 
extractive jobs become scarce. In this context, it is important to note that 
the footloose post-colonial labour is also a consequence of international 
investment chains in countries of the Global South in overwhelmingly 
export-oriented production systems. Wages are often low, the work force 
is markedly female and the labour supervision rules are strict and marked 
with violence. Primitive accumulation involves the process of separation 
of labourers from the means of production so that they become free wage 
labourers for the purpose of capitalist exploitation. This is not a natural 
development, but the result of violent confrontations. This process not 
only speaks of a past (the process of initial transition from the precapitalist 
to the capitalist mode of production), it continues to this day on a great 
scale in the post-colonial world. The human factor is always present in 
production, and capitalist accumulation must depend on the continuous 
separation of the labourer from the means of production. In informal 
mining, accumulation is transition (transiting the borders of production 
and circulation), while primitive accumulation is the specific mark of 
this transition, reminding us that the transition from say feudalism to 
capitalism did not happen as a natural process. We cannot take transition 
for granted merely because history happened that way. The  ‘extra-
economic’ factors are always present within the economic, and only in 
this way can an adequate understanding of capitalism become possible. 
Capital accumulation begins in this contradictory mode—economic, 
but violent. A post-colonial critique of the capitalist accumulation 
process requires treating primitive accumulation not as a process of the 
8  Marx (1990: 875); however, we have no way of knowing if Marx had thought of such possibilities 
also, though we know he wrote of the prices of native scalps. Also see page 920, where Marx invoked 
the association of blood with formation of capital 11 times in Part VIII of Capital, where he discussed 
the issue of primitive accumulation.
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past, but as something happening today. It also means that capital has to 
circumvent the dividing line between its own prehistory and history of 
its present. Human sacrifice in the interest of accumulation should not 
astonish us if we recall Federici (2004), who recently argued that primitive 
accumulation must incorporate the disciplining of women through 
a campaign of terror in the witch-hunts of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. The medieval woman gradually became domesticated, her 
labour mystified, making it pivotal for her husband to be put to work by 
capital. In Federici’s words: 
The most important historical question … is how to account for the 
execution of hundreds of thousands of ‘witches’ at the beginning of the 
modern era, and how to explain why the rise of capitalism was coeval with 
a war against women. (ibid.: 14)
It will therefore be important to ask how global (or national) mining 
capital benefits from the reification of labour, through the division of the 
latter between formal and informal, organised and unorganised, rural and 
urban, industrial and artisanal, legal and illegal, male and female, and 
licit and illicit (thus mining, quarrying, extracting, digging, ploughing, 
threshing, loading, carrying and finally dying, in ways other than what 
we think to be normal), because the final goal is always accumulation 
of capital. 
Labour in artisanal and small‑scale mining 
in India
The report on artisanal and small-scale mining in India (Chakravorty 
2001: 68–70) noted the transient element in the making of an informal 
miner: 
On an average, the piece-rated workers, with long experience in any 
particular type of job, have the highest weekly income although it 
fluctuates considerably from season to season and is dependent upon 
availability of ores and minerals … In those mining areas, where the 
migrant labourers coming from different districts or even States live side 
by side in the ‘huttings’ changes occur in socio-cultural practices, religious 
customs and behavior patterns. Both the tribal and non-tribal workers 
reciprocate with each other in this aspect. 
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However, the report has very little to say on how transit labour becomes the 
most critical element in the economy of informal (small-scale, artisanal) 
mining. Yet, migration is the crucial factor in artisanal and small-scale 
mining. Peasant households supply the kind of migrant labour (frequently 
in the form of family labour) that contributes to accumulation. Without 
taking migration into consideration, it would be difficult to understand 
how peasant labour enters the capitalist dynamics of accumulation. To the 
same extent, without migration the transient forms of labour cannot 
emerge. And once again to the same extent, only transient forms of labour 
make possible the kind of exploitation that exists in informal and artisanal 
mining. Yet, the reification of political economy leads us to a discussion 
of variegated peasant labour, leaving out the salience of transit labour, 
particularly in the age of neoliberal capitalism when, besides machines 
producing machine, money is also producing money—a process requiring 
an endless process of extraction of all kinds of conceivable resources. With 
transit labour, the capitalist can now imagine everything as a resource to 
be extracted, processed and sold in the market, each stage in this process 
producing profit for the capitalist. The reification of labour is thus not 
astonishing.
Transit labour comprises the backbone of the informal sector of Indian 
economy. The Expert Group on Informal Sector Statistics, working as 
part of the National Commission on Enterprises in the Unorganised/
Informal Sector, estimated in 2007 that the contribution of the informal 
sector to the net domestic product was 48 per cent. The informal 
sector was estimated to constitute about 55 per cent of the total gross 
domestic product. This included agriculture, mining, construction, trade, 
transport and storage, real estate, renting, business services and hotels and 
restaurants (Raveendran 2006).
According to a comprehensive report on the unorganised workers, 
about 60 per cent of migrants join the unorganised workforce (National 
Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganized Sector (NCEUIS) 2007: 
94). This has been an established trend since colonial times (Sen 2004), 
and has continued in the post-colonial times (Mazumdar et al. 2013). 
The NCEUIS report at the same time commented that the figures could 
be misleading and the extent of migration for unorganised work may be 
much more. According to the 2001 Census, the total migrant population 
in the country was 315 million (Srivastava and Sasikumar 2005). Both 
the Census and the National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) data 
indicate that the rate of migration has increased. NCEUIS observed:
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This [migration] could be reflective of the impact of structural changes on 
availability of employment opportunities … [which have] led to greater 
mobility of workers, a welcome fact, if it arises out of choice and not sheer 
economic compulsion. (NCEUIS 2007: 95)
However, as we know, the very idea of ‘choice’ has little meaning for 
the Indian poor. According to one study, 56.7 per cent of total male 
migration for work in 2001 was interstate, and male migration for 
work was 37.6  per  cent of the total male migration (Mukherji 2013: 
204, Table 10.11). The report also added, ‘If all low grade occupational 
groups of migrants are added up, then it comprises as high as 60 per cent 
low grade workers among males, and 65 per cent among females (of all 
durations)’ (ibid.: 212).9 Further, NCEUIS noted:
Temporary or short duration migrants need special attention because they 
face instability in employment and are extremely poor. They are engaged 
in agricultural sector, seasonal industries or in the urban sector as casual 
labourers or self-employed. By all accounts, the numbers of such migrants 
is much larger than that estimated in the official sources. The NCRL 
[1991] estimated the number of seasonal migrants at 10 million in rural 
areas alone. Such migrants work in agriculture, plantations, brick kilns, 
quarries, construction sites and fish processing. Some estimates suggest 
that the total number of seasonal migrants in India could be in the range 
of 30 million.10 (NCEUIS 2007: 97)
Methodologically, a crucial way to understand the phenomenon of transit 
labour would be to weave the empirical realities of migrant labour into the 
empirical realities of unorganised sectors. The Second National Commission 
on Labour Report (Ministry of Labour 2002) noted that the rate of accidents 
in the Indian mining industry was very high when compared with similar 
situations in other countries (Dharmalingam 1995; Dewan 2005). 
9  The India Labour Report prepared by TeamLease and IIJT (2009: 48) states: ‘Unorganized sector 
male wage employment is primarily in manufacturing, construction, trading and transport. For 
women, trading and transport can be replaced by domestic services. Depending on how we count, 
the total is around 70 million. These figures are from 2004–05. They must have increased since then 
and it is a considerable number. Hence, one should ask the question: How do these workers find out 
jobs are available and decide on temporary or permanent migration? The answer is simple. Barring 
limited instances of job offers at factory gates, there are only two channels: informal (family, caste, 
community) networks and labour contractors. This kind of information dissemination cannot be 
efficient, apart from commissions, exploitative or otherwise, paid to agents. Other than such dis-
intermediation and information dissemination being inefficient, there can be no question of skill 
formation if recruitment is through such informal channels.’
10  See also Srivastava (2005) and NCEUIS (2007: 95–6), paragraphs 6.5 and 6.8. Sharma and 
Das (2009: 38) suggest that there will be greater growth of plantation industry in small sectors (small 
growers), drawing more employment there as compared to the larger sectors. 
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The category of self-employed workers (as distinct and perhaps 
counterposed to migrant workers) needs to be analysed rigorously. 
However, that is beyond the scope of this chapter at present. In a way, the 
self-employed is the most readily available labour, part of the light infantry. 
The only difference is that while transit labour is most readily available 
on sites of extraction, for the self-employed the labour process in some 
cases may be different. In any case, we do witness an intense extraction of 
labour power of the body in the case of the self-employed. One can say 
that the complementary worlds of the self-employed and migrant labour 
mirror in the capitalist universe the complementary relation of the peasant 
households and the labour involved in informal mining and quarrying 
(Siddiqui and Lahiri-Dutt 2015: 27–32). For a more nuanced study on 
the same theme, where she argues for a combination of the insights from 
labour studies with peasant studies, see Lahiri-Dutt (2014). See also, 
Lahiri-Dutt et al. (2014: 119), where the authors write, scolding analysts: 
In studying rural livelihoods, much has been written on the mobility of 
rural labour from one region to another, from rural to urban settings. 
Comparatively less scholarly attention has been directed towards inter 
sectoral movement as a livelihood choice, and even less attention has been 
paid by scholars of South East [and South] Asia to the mineral dependency 
of rural sedentary or shifting farmers and nomadic herders. 
The examples in this chapter bring to light the importance of adopting 
a cross-sectoral view of rural mobility, with the hope of continuing further 
research on mineral-based rural livelihoods. The misinformed synonymity 
of informality with illegality affirms the absolute and contested 
ownership of mineral resources by the colonial state and, more recently, 
by corporatised mineral enterprises.
Theorising transit labour
We should be in a better position now to summarise our arguments as to 
why the concept of transit labour is important: it is because of the linkages 
between extraction, infrastructure and labour. Indeed, the concept of 
transit labour will help us assess the problematic of who joins the working 
class today. To clear any possible misunderstanding, this is not a study on 
informal, small-scale artisanal mining; it is also not a study on the workers 
employed in the informal sectors. 
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Migration is crucial as a theme to the problematic of the neoliberal 
economy today, and sectoral mobility constitutes the core of the 
present dynamics of primitive accumulation, which is the other site of 
financialisation of the economy. Migration directs us not only to the supply 
chain of a commodity, but draws our attention specifically to labour power 
as a commodity. The working class evolves; it is not a solid, homogenous 
crust of material to be preserved in a museum (Schmidt 2014). Many of 
the formal features of capitalism, such as formal free wage agreements, 
may not be enough to understand neoliberal capitalism, which is marked 
by an enormously heterogeneous and complex composition. One of the 
effective routes to understand this heterogeneity is to see how gender, 
caste, race, age, territory, occupational holds and skill act as fault lines. 
These fault lines point out not only the borders and boundaries of capital/
labour, but also how migration of labour acts as the deux ex machina 
of modern capitalism to cross those borders.11
We can neither argue that the peasant mode of production remains 
resilient, nor can we predict its demise in the wake of capitalism. Whether 
peasant society exists, whether peasant labour is actually multifarious 
labour is beside the point—and after a point, meaningless. Such debate 
unnecessarily valorises a sociological category and ignores the central 
question under capitalism—namely, what happens to labour? It is that 
enquiry in which we must be involved today.
11  Thomas Nail has argued in his recent book, The Figure of the Migrant (2015), for a more historical 
approach to migration that will tell us of its varying structures and connections, and its importance to 
capitalism. It is interesting to note that Saskia Sassen recognises the role of migration in the evolution 
of the global city, specifically mentioning the role of immigration as a ‘major process through which 
a new transnational political economy and trans-local household strategies are being constituted. It is 
one largely embedded in major cities insofar as these concentrate most immigrants, certainly in the 
developed world, whether in the United States, Japan, or Western Europe. It is, in my reading, one of 
the constitutive processes of globalization today, even though not recognized or represented as such in 
mainstream accounts of the global economy’ (Sassen 2005: 39). However, she does not link this to the 
much broader phenomenon of migration (including within a country and therefore perhaps excluded 
from the globalisation process) and accumulation. 
On the other hand, Mouleshri Vyas (2012: 12) writes, ‘The interlocking of migration, sectoral labour 
requirements and employment opportunities, and governance and policy framework, create a web-
like situation for informal labour—one where it is in flux, where there is constant negotiation and 
claim-making through both formal and informal mechanisms, resulting in some segments of labour 
always being in transit on an everyday basis in cities in various parts of the world. In those where 
poverty, inequality and the informal economy are in evidence, the dynamic takes place in a specific 
physical direction as well.’
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In India, the discussion of the peasant mode of production was subsumed 
in the academic debate around the general question of mode of production 
(see Patnaik 1991; also Patnaik and Moyo 2011), and took place in the 
wake of the peasant struggles in the decades of the 1960s and 1970s. And 
as happens with academic debates, while peasant struggles in the old form 
slowly gave way to other forms of struggles, the academic debates hovered 
over dead or dying issues. In part, our obsession with the transition 
question was responsible for this, and Marxist analysis was kept confined 
to issues of two transitions: from feudalism to capitalism, and transition 
from the division of labour under artisanal production to factory-based 
organisation of labour (Custers 2015). That they could coexist and 
that a new capitalist reality could incorporate artisanal arrangements 
into a global economy was not considered. We are now in a time when 
capitalism is marked by what can be called a production complex consisting 
of the artisanal, manufacturing, large-scale factory organisation and 
technologically automated production chains.
To conclude, the concept of transit labour is delinked here from the 
concept of transition, and this chapter, in focusing on the concept, asks 
the readers to conceptualise transit labour as a process distinct from labour 
in situ.12 The concept forces our attention to the process of circulation 
(as opposed to production) because it compels us to study the transient 
forms of labour occasioned and caused by borders and internal structural 
boundaries of capital. Migration sits at the heart of the concept of transit 
labour. Yet this notion will not be fully understandable and analysable 
unless we take into account the organic relation between migration and 
the persistence of the unorganised form of work in capitalism. This is 
the reason why this chapter focuses on the extractive sites of production 
in modern capitalism, because the extractive sites bring the phenomena 
12  Byasdeb Dasgupta, commenting on the concept of transit labour wrote, ‘an attempt to 
understand the very process of labour in transit as opposed to the traditional process of labour in situ 
in production processes and to unfold in its term the very transition of economy and society as it is 
taking shape against the backdrop of a globalised reality construed by the dictate of global capital. 
The question of transition is perhaps a never-ending process of evolution and negation and a journey 
which goes on and on in any social plane … Representing labour in transit in terms of class processes 
we can say the work performed by transit workers fall in two categories—Fundamental Class Process 
and Subsumed Class Process categories … Labour in transit is much more disaggregated, decentred 
… We would like to portray labour in transit as footloose labour in the true sense of the term. It is 
from nowhere to nowhere the journey, the mobility, the transition is shaping the live-forms and 
livelihood risks of these men and women. The real transition at the micro level—in our rendition 
which class as well as need-based transition—should be understood in the broader perspective of 
resistance to global capital and the current waves of globalisation’ (2012: 24–5).
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of migration, financialisation, accumulation and the commodity chain 
together. Labour is the ultimate commodity chain, and presents the 
most inscrutable supply chain of a commodity. Transit labour represents 
this truth. Marx (1962: 92) wrote, scoffing at those who ignored the 
particularities of circulation: 
The general forms of the movement P … P is the form of reproduction 
and unlike M … M, does not indicate the self-expansion of value as the 
object of the process. This form makes it therefore so much easier for 
classical Political Economy to ignore the definite capitalistic form of 
the process of production and depict production as such as the purpose 
of the process, namely that as much as possible must be produced and 
as cheaply as possible, and that the product must be exchanged for the 
greatest variety of other products, partly for the renewal of production 
(M-C), partly for consumption (m-c).
It is then possible to overlook the peculiarities of money and money-
capital, for M and m appear here as transient media of circulation. The 
entire process seems simple and natural, i.e., possesses the naturalness of 
a shallow rationalism.
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A good business or a risky 
business: Health, safety and 
quality of life for women small‑
scale miners in PNG 
Danellie Lynas
Alluvial and small-scale mining operations in Papua New Guinea (PNG) 
are collectively referred to as small-scale mining (SSM). Artisanal and 
small-scale mining (ASM), as this practice is most often referred to in 
the literature, describes an economically significant and growing area 
in more than 80 mineral-rich developing countries, and producing 
approximately 15–20 per cent of global minerals and metals (Jennings 
2003; Buxton 2013). A 1999 International Labour Organization (ILO) 
estimate (Jennings 1999) places the number of people directly and 
indirectly dependent on ASM at 100 million. However, the worldwide 
mineral boom of the last decade, coupled with continued diversification 
of rural livelihoods suggests that this number is steadily increasing (World 
Health Organization (WHO) 2013). With no universal definition of 
ASM, it is usually distinguished as low-technology, labour-intensive 
mineral extraction and processing found across the developing world, and 
distinguished from industrial mining by low rates of production, lack of 
long-term planning, inadequate equipment and poor safety, health and 
environment conditions (Hilson 2002; Hilson and McQuilken 2014).
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PNG alluvial gold-mining dates back to the late 1880s, when during the 
colonial era the industry was dominated by Europeans who employed 
PNG nationals (Hancock 1994; Susapu and Crispin 2001; Lole 2005). 
By the late 1960s, most Europeans had abandoned their leases and 
growing numbers of nationals commenced their own operations. Since 
independence in 1975, ASM has rapidly increased in scale, underpinning 
economic activity in much of rural and remote PNG (Moretti 2007; Papua 
New Guinea Mine Watch 2015b). While many miners are satisfied with 
non-mechanised mining to sustain their livelihood, others are looking for 
opportunities to form joint-venture operations that may provide necessary 
capital and skills to increase production levels and improve livelihoods 
(Crispin 2006; Moretti 2007). Unlike other parts of the world, PNG 
recognises SSM as a legal contributor to the national economy, with 
estimates of up to 90 per cent of alluvial gold production being extracted 
by rural-based miners using sluice boxes and panning dishes, with some 
mechanised operations using predominantly portable dredges, water 
pumps and excavators (Crispin 2003; Javia and Siop 2010). Mercury is 
widely used in PNG, with between 60 and 90 per cent of operations 
reportedly using it in capturing and amalgamating the gold (Crispin 
2006; Leonhard 2015). Alluvial and small-scale mining is administered 
by the Mineral Resources Authority (MRA), and governed by the Mining 
Act 1992 and the Mining (Safety) Act & Regulations 2007, which apply 
equally to alluvial and hard-rock mining. Current legislation recognises 
customary landowners, allowing non-mechanised alluvial mining on 
their land without the need to obtain a registered lease, while large-scale 
mining leases are required to have at least 51 per cent national ownership. 
While alluvial and placer gold is found almost everywhere in PNG, the 
remoteness of many of these sites makes it difficult both financially and 
technically to locate mechanised equipment on site. As a result, simple, 
non-mechanised techniques remain the most widely used.
Research indicates that most of the SSM population lacks the financial 
and educational capacity required to undertake fully mechanised or larger-
scale mining operations. SSM is most often undertaken in family units of 
two to five people, with estimates indicating that this group comprises 
almost 99 per cent of total SSM operations (Lole 2005; Crispin 2006; 
Moramo 2015). Similar to other mineral-rich developing countries, 
alluvial mining in PNG is extensively practised as an alternative economic 
seasonal activity where, in times of economic stress, many miners live 
a subsistence lifestyle driven by commodity prices and basic needs, and 
switch between fishing and market gardening, and mining. Their level of 
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involvement is often governed by festivities and family expenses, such as 
school and medical fees. Reports indicate that SSM is usually undertaken 
at will, without systematic planning of operations, employs rudimentary 
equipment and involves high labour intensity, with an average weekly 
gold recovery of approximately 2.5 grams (Moramo 2015). Additionally, 
PNG miners often undertake multiple income-generating activities at the 
same time (Lole 2005; Javia and Siop 2010; Moramo 2015). 
While representing an important livelihood strategy for rural households, 
SSM generally encompasses a significant amount of risk and vulnerability, 
including problems with government licensing schemes, disputes over 
land ownership, environmental degradation and health and safety issues 
(Javia and Siop 2010; Lole 2005; Leonhard 2015; Moramo 2015). Recent 
press releases quote Morobe Province Governor Kasiga Kelly Naru as 
confirming ‘alluvial mining is the source that measures the income and 
livelihoods of ordinary landowners involved in the activity’, and for most 
miners it is a survival strategy for remote and rural communities. Morobe is 
one of the oldest mining areas of PNG. For miners seeking greater financial 
outcomes by entering into joint venture partnerships, acquiring a mining 
lease is a long process. The applicant must meet regulatory requirements 
by submitting detailed survey reports, development plans, compensation 
plans, environmental plans and financial capacity reports to the MRA for 
approval. In another press release, the MRA’s managing director, Philip 
Samar, has been quoted as saying, ‘Alluvial mining is a sleeping giant 
that has captured Mineral Resource Authority’s (MRA) attention and the 
goal is to encourage and promote alluvial mining to meet Governments’ 
medium and long term development plans because the bigger mining 
companies could not deliver alone’; further commenting, ‘by 2020–30, 
alluvial mining would double the revenue for the Government coffers’, 
and that as the government mining regulator, the MRA would design best 
practices to protect it (Papua New Guinea Mine Watch 2015a).
Health and safety
Definitions of occupational health and safety vary across authors. 
However, as defined by the WHO, ‘occupational health deals with all 
aspects of health and safety in the workplace and has a strong focus on 
primary prevention of hazards’ (WHO n.d.-b), with health defined as 
‘a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely 
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the absence of disease or infirmity’ (WHO n.d.-a). Across the developed 
world, the most effective health and safety management programs are 
based on strong risk management principles, underpinned by knowledge 
that provides the ability to assess and manage work-related hazards. While 
aspects of ASM health and safety have captured international attention 
and concern, primarily due to the use of mercury in gold processing, 
a lack of information exists on the other health and safety risks impacting 
these miners. An extensive literature review reveals that most health and 
safety issues faced by ASM workers are attributed to the illegal nature 
of the operations, in combination with competing socio-economic 
demands, lack of expertise and training in safety measures and inadequate 
equipment (Jennings 1999). Basic record-keeping and data collection 
remains minimal in ASM administration, largely due to miner illiteracy, 
workforce itinerancy and lack of human resource capacity within the 
regulatory bodies overseeing ASM operations (Minerals Commission 
Ghana 2014; Minerals Resources Authority 2015). Although widespread 
illegality within ASM generally leads to under-reporting of accidents and 
deaths, Jennings (1999) reports indicate that non-fatal deaths in ASM are 
up to six to seven times that of formal large-scale operations (Hinton et 
al. 2003). A study by Hentschel et al. (2002) found the most common 
occupational health and safety deficiencies in small-scale mining to be 
lack of awareness of the risks in mining, coupled with lack of education 
and training. 
It is reported that many underground ASM accidents result from poor 
understanding of mine shaft ventilation practices, with asphyxiation 
frequently occurring as miners either work in shafts while compressors are 
operational or miscalculate and re-enter shafts before adequate ventilation 
and air quality have been re-established, post blasting (Gratz 2003). 
Reports from South America and sub-Sahara Africa indicate that most 
accidents among ASM operators are caused by rock falls and subsidence, 
use of poorly maintained equipment and poor safety practices, including 
non-compliance with wearing proper protective equipment. Inadequate 
understanding of mining and ventilation practices have been identified 
as the major causes of fatality with suffocation, uncontrolled explosions 
and being trapped or buried listed as the top three incidents leading to 
miner deaths. Other identified health issues include dust, food quality, 
extreme heat in the pits and shafts, mercury vapour inhalation, water-
borne diseases, water-related problems, such as falls when the site is 
slippery, red eyes caused by muddy water, and body pains from lifting and 
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carrying heavy loads. Concerns also include pit instability and collapse, 
load falls resulting in injury or death, rising water from the underground 
water table and flooding of pits, shafts and ghettos (Tschakert 2009; 
Lopez-Trueba 2014). A 2009 presentation by CEO Toni Aubynn to the 
Ghana Chamber of Mines listed health and safety as one of the four key 
challenges faced in regulatory management of ASM in Ghana. 
Communities that have ASM operations nearby are in turn exposed to 
environmental safety and health hazards due to contamination of the 
larger environment through water run-off, air contamination, ground 
contamination, landslides and subsidence, as SSM operators rarely 
attempt land rehabilitation post mining operations (Hilson 2002; Hinton 
et al. 2003; Veiga and Baker 2004; Moretti 2007). Water contamination 
due to improper waste disposal, erosion in mining sites and mercury 
and cyanide poisoning have been linked to increased rates of cancer 
and skin lesions, while contamination in water systems also disrupts the 
aquatic ecosystem, eventually affecting humans (Veiga and Baker 2004; 
Moretti 2007). 
Mercury and cyanide are the two most significant chemicals widely 
used in gold processing across most countries where ASM is practised. 
Mercury is poisonous to humans and other living organisms, and the 
effect is intensified through bioaccumulation. While the most significant 
side effect on the human body is neurotoxicity, mercury also crosses the 
placenta, causing foetal abnormalities, and it also affects the respiratory 
tract, digestive system, skin and eyes. The effect of mercury on the human 
body and the environment has been extensively researched and reported, 
and elimination of mercury from gold processing remains the focus of 
many funded programs, such as the World Bank, International Council 
for Mining and Metals (ICMM), Fairtrade Foundation and Alliance 
for Responsible Mining, Blacksmith Institute and, most recently, the 
Minamata Convention on Mercury Reduction. Many authors argue that 
the health effects of environmental pollution are disproportionately felt 
by women miners because of their role as primary carers responsible for 
the health of their families, and as agriculturalists and miners. Women’s 
reproductive role increases their vulnerability to mercury and other heavy 
metals in water and food supplies, with mercury known to severely affect 
foetal development (Hinton et al. 2003; Lahiri-Dutt 2006; Van Hoecke 
2006; Hayes 2008; Simatauw 2009; Jenkins 2014).
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Women in ASM
Men and women are differently involved in, and differently affected by, 
mining practices, cultural practices and legislative practices, and often 
their role is dependent on the mineral commodity mined. Estimates 
indicate that the proportion of women engaged worldwide in ASM is 
approximately 30 per cent (Hilson 2002; Hinton et al. 2003). In Asian 
countries it is reported that women make up close to 50 per cent of 
miners, and in parts of Africa, anywhere between 40 and 100 per cent 
of the workforce are women (Jennings 1999; Hilson 2002; Lahiri-Dutt 
2008). Current estimates indicate that over 100,000 persons are involved 
in alluvial mining across PNG, of which approximately 30 per cent are 
women (personal communication, A.B. Comparativo, Manager Small-
Scale Mining Training Centre, Wau, PNG (SSMTC), 23 October 2015). 
Traditionally, women are associated with the labour-intensive tasks of 
transporting and processing, involving high levels of manual activity 
to extract mineral remnants by hand from tailings, and panning and 
sluicing mud and sand to recover particles of gold, while yielding the 
lowest economic return (Hinton et al. 2003). Benefits from mined and 
processed resources frequently reside with the men, while the women 
often do not receive an independent wage, and earn less than their male 
counterparts for performing similar work. In some countries, women 
do own mines and mining equipment, but this is not common practice 
(Hentschel et  al.  2002; Hilson 2002; Heemskerk 2003; Hinton et 
al. 2003; Van Hoecke 2006). Typically, women encounter difficulties 
obtaining development assistance, including access to bank credit, 
technical knowledge and skills development (Hilson 2002; Hinton et al. 
2003; Eftimie et al. 2012). This poses significant challenges for women 
who are household heads, as mining is often their only economic option. 
A number of studies indicate that money generated by women miners 
contributes more directly to household well-being than that of the men, 
with women’s income providing for food, education, medical expenses 
and replenishing agricultural cropping needs, while men’s income is often 
spent on gambling, prostitution and alcohol (Jennings 1999; Krimbu 
2005; Javia and Siop 2010). While women’s mining contributions are 
often in ancillary roles such as food vendors, sex workers and other 
service providers, these roles are performed in addition to their domestic 
responsibilities, often making their contribution ‘less visible’, and therefore 
less recognised and valued (Lahiri-Dutt 2006, 2012). A comprehensive 
157
7 . A GOOD BUSINeSS OR A RISKy BUSINeSS
literature critique by Jenkins (2014) provides valuable insight into the 
ways women are affected by ASM mining activities, with the author 
highlighting a lack of in-depth analysis of women’s diverse experiences as 
mine workers across a number of parameters, including gender impacts 
of mining, changing gender dynamics and gender inequalities in mining 
communities. 
Access to education is critical to empowering women to derive 
greater benefits from ASM. However, in many countries, girls are still 
discriminated against in terms of education, mainly due to social and 
cultural barriers, and family expectations that they will assume domestic 
responsibilities. Additionally, cultural taboos and superstitions often 
exclude women from working in mines due to beliefs that they will bring 
bad luck by attracting bad spirits or offending the gold god (Hinton et 
al. 2003; Moretti 2006). While women are critical to the stability and 
cohesiveness of their communities and often act as change facilitators, 
they are often excluded from the decision-making process based on gender 
(Hinton et al. 2003). Lahiri-Dutt (2012) emphasised the importance of 
‘asking what mining really means to [women in] poorer communities’. 
In communities where women feel they do have the ability to influence 
decisions, they often lack access to knowledge that will better equip them 
to act in an informed capacity. 
Current occupational health and safety 
issues in PNG
Small-scale mines in PNG experience many of the global health and 
safety issues. Trainers from the MRA-managed SSMTC located in Wau 
in Morobe Province, the oldest mining area of PNG, have identified the 
low education level of the miners, particularly in relation to technical 
knowledge and mining expertise, lack of knowledge of the dangers 
associated with mining operations, the rudimentary nature of the 
equipment used, low production outputs, the propensity of the miners 
to spend all that they make and not save and the seasonality of their 
operations as challenges to developing effective health and safety practices. 
Additional significant management challenges include the location 
and accessibility of operations, cultural practices and social beliefs, the 
technical and economic environments the mines operate in, including 
lack of access to available credit facilities, fair access to market and fair 
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price for the gold they mine. Trainers indicate that records show at least 
five to six reported deaths per year in SSM largely due to unsafe work 
practices. 
In an account of women alluvial and small-scale miners in PNG, Crispin 
highlighted the vital source of income that mining provides for many 
rural-based communities, arguing that ‘access for women to the economic 
benefits, skills involved, and awareness of possible health and safety 
issues is important for community based mining to remain sustainable 
and to continue to contribute to economic survival and development’ 
(2006: 256–7). Following fieldwork undertaken in the Mount Kaindi 
area, Moretti observed that local women ‘face serious obstacles to full 
and equitable participation in mining’ (2005: 133–4). These obstacles 
included cultural beliefs, land tenure practices, unequal control of 
household resources and gendered division of labour. In many regions 
of PNG, women are considered a dangerous presence on a mine site, with 
the belief that they can pollute the gold and anger hikoapa, the ancestral 
and nature spirits that guard the land and its riches (Moretti 2005). 
As in many other developing countries, PNG women often take their 
children on-site, as there is nowhere else to leave them. Reports indicate 
that around 30 per cent of school-age children are working on SSM sites 
rather than attending school; however, extensive awareness campaigns have 
seen this number reduced to around 15 per cent (personal communication, 
A.B. Comparativo, Manager Small-Scale Mining Training Centre Wau, 
PNG, 23 October 2015). Girls make up the largest proportion of this 
number, often being kept back from school simply for gender reasons 
(Krimbu 2005). Child labour remains a significant issue in PNG, with 
many children leaving school in order to mine to support themselves and 
their families. Children on the site are exposed to dust, falling objects, 
machinery noise, heavy manual work and mercury vapour. Women and 
children are particularly exposed to drugs, communicable diseases such as 
HIV/AIDS and gender-based violence (GBV). 
Typical of many SSM communities, PNG women mine on a seasonal 
basis, either at times of increased financial commitment such as payment 
of school and medical fees, or in conjunction with other seasonal income-
earning activities such as market gardening, cropping and animal rearing. 
Lack of community access to clean running water and sanitation facilities 
substantially adds to the impact and challenge of managing health-
related issues within the communities. While many communities accept 
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the situation as a normal way of living, exposure to water-borne diseases 
such as malaria and cholera, and continued use of unsafe and often 
mercury-contaminated water for cooking, drinking and washing remains 
detrimental to the health of the whole community. 
In a thesis completed on an Andean mining community in Bolivia, 
Lopez-Trueba (2014) makes a distinction between specific ‘health 
and safety risks’ and the broader range of dangers, uncertainties, risks 
and ambiguities associated with miners’ livelihoods, referring to them as 
‘occupational uncertainties’, and indirect causes of occupational health 
and safety risks. Taking this broader approach allows for further exploration 
and understanding of the health and safety issues from the perspective 
that these issues are rooted in the immediate and wider socio-political 
and economic contexts in which the miners live and their livelihoods take 
place. This discussion takes up this concept and explores health and safety 
issues among women small-scale miners and their communities in an 
alluvial gold-mining province in PNG. 
Methodology
Ethnographic research provided the opportunity to better understand 
how gender-specific health and safety concerns impact on the lives of two 
groups of women involved in alluvial gold-mining in PNG. Two field trips 
were undertaken to the Wau area where local women actively engaged 
in small-scale mining in their local area were interviewed. One group 
comprised of 16 women and the other had 12. Group and individual 
semi-structured interviews, direct field observation, photos and video 
footage were used to gain an overall picture of the health and safety issues 
experienced by the group. An interpreter was used for the interviews. 
The  questions asked in the semi-structured interviews covered basic 
parameters such as age, education level, years spent mining, why they had 
started and continued mining, if they would prefer to not be mining, and 
if so what they would prefer to do, how much time they spent mining, 
and how much time on agricultural work and family responsibilities, 
if the lease was held in their name, and how much longer they thought 
they would continue with mining. Specific questions were then asked 
regarding health and safety issues they encountered both in relation to 
their mining and to their family and community responsibilities. They 
were also asked if they would prefer if their children did not become 
miners and, if so, what kind of employment they would like them to have.
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Women in SSM in PNG: Reflections from 
the field
We have been neglected for a long time, even our parents were neglected. 
It is only now we are being recognised and recently there has been some 
change. We need to be recognised, I have had enough of working in 
rivers … if I could do something else … or if there was machinery we 
could use to help us so we don’t need to work so hard, I could keep going.
Cultural diversity within PNG means the status and role of women varies, 
with some areas being matrilineal and some patrilineal, with economic and 
social power differing accordingly. Women in PNG are predominantly 
restricted by their lack of ownership over mining land, with almost all 
registered mining leases, tributary agreements and customary land being 
held by men and transmitted patrilineally. While in practice some women 
do hold certain secondary rights to land and resources of their kin, these 
rights are mostly claimed and exercised by their spouses and male relations 
(Moretti 2005).
This is evident from an extract from the group interviews:
I have had no control over the lease since my husband died—others 
[‘settlers’] have come in and we are trying to move them on. My son-in-
law and grandsons make the decisions.
With this division of ownership rights come problems of domestic 
violence, rape, HIV/AIDS and lack of economic equality between women 
and men, as well as lack of adequate opportunities to obtain equality 
(Crispin 2006). Some of the women in the group reported being victims 
of domestic violence. Recent media reports from the Porgera mine area in 
PNG highlight the gang rape of women while scavenging mine site tailings 
(Papua New Guinea Mine Watch 2015a). Women in mining regions are 
particularly vulnerable to socio-economic hardship, and are largely forced 
towards mining for the economic survival of their families. An account by 
Macintyre (2006) of women in Lihir Province indicated that women take 
on multiple roles simultaneously, leading to them being overworked and 
overburdened. This was supported by the evidence gathered through the 
field narrative: 
My body is tired. I want to stop working, I will only work when we 
need extra money for school and medical help. (Older woman from SSM 
alluvial mining area in PNG)
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Traditionally, women undertake heavy manual work, and a number of the 
interviewed group reported back and knee pain from shovelling, lifting and 
carrying heavy rocks. In most SSM in PNG alluvial gold-mining, women 
reported working long hours bending and twisting to pan and sieve, while 
standing or squatting in water often contaminated by mercury. Some of 
the group reported back pain and internal organ pain/uterine pain, and 
many of the women indicated they had to continue lifting heavy and 
awkward equipment and loads while pregnant. Most reported that they 
worked while pregnant and breastfeeding, and all reported concerns about 
miscarriages when working while pregnant. The women also described 
work practices leading to musculo-skeletal, joint and abdominal pain, 
infected cuts that were slow to heal and abrasions and bruising from stones 
falling on them. On observation, many of the women had abrasions on 
their hands and feet and broken toenails. A typical narrative is as follows:
I work long hours in the river water, I have sores on my fingers that don’t 
heal. Rubbing the gravel on the sluice boxes gives me a rash and blisters 
that take a long time to heal. I have sores on my feet from standing for a 
long time in the river.
Many of the women reported extreme tiredness, as their mining work is 
additional to their domestic responsibilities, and indicated that tiredness 
led them to undertake what they considered unsafe practices in order to 
complete their mine work to get back to their families. Typical narratives 
included:
My body aches. I have back pain, my joints hurt. I have back pain, 
and pain in my shoulders and knees from using shovels and crowbars. 
My hands and fingers are sore from long hours using sieves. I have sores 
that don’t heal from handling big stones. I get headaches from working 
long hours in the sun. I am exhausted.
My back hurts all the time now and my insides hurt by the end of the day, 
I am standing in water all day, I have been doing this since I was seven 
years old—my body is just so tired, I don’t think I can do this anymore. 
If there was another way to do this maybe I could keep working. 
Mercury is widely used across alluvial mining activities in PNG, and all 
women interviewed reported concerns about mercury use and its effect 
on them and their families. Almost all reported symptoms attributable to 
exposure to mercury, and many admitted they burned mercury at home 
on the kitchen stove for amalgamation. It is often reported in literature 
that amalgamation is usually undertaken by the men; however, the women 
interviewed indicated that they were responsible for burning the mercury 
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to amalgamate the gold they had panned during the day. Practised out 
of necessity rather than choice, recovered gold is amalgamated daily 
and sold to provide immediate money for household essentials. Many 
of the women reported eye problems from the mercury fumes, and 
many displayed physical signs of eye irritation such as redness and tears. 
However, most of the women indicated that they would continue the 
practice as it meant that at the end of the day they had money for food 
and other family necessities. Typical narratives included: 
I know I shouldn’t burn the mercury on the stove at home, but the days 
are long and I am bending and panning all day, I get home tired. I get up 
early to get my housework done and my children to school, then I travel 
by truck to river, it is a long way. I spend long hours lifting, shovelling and 
throwing stones, it’s a long day and by the time I get home I am exhausted. 
If the day is too long I bring home the gold and do it [the amalgamation] 
at home so I can sell it to pay for food.
I get up at 6 am to do my housework and get my children ready for 
school. I then work until 3 or 4 pm collecting concentrate. I then need to 
amalgamate it. Sometimes I am still on site at 6 pm. I am too tired at the 
end of the day so I take it home and burn it at home.
Most of the women indicated that they lived in traditional houses, often 
without running water or sanitation facilities, meaning that in addition 
to their mining work they need to carry fresh water to their houses for 
washing and cooking. In a vicious cycle, the mining contamination of 
local water bodies means additional distances need to be travelled to 
collect water suitable for drinking and cooking. Transport limitations add 
to the day, with long hours on foot or travelling in the back of a truck to 
their mining lease or to shopping facilities. Some families reported living 
on the riverbank in makeshift housing to be close to their lease, and to 
protect it from either being mined by others or being robbed. A number of 
the women interviewed indicated that the time they had to spend mining 
impacted negatively on the time they could spend with their children, and 
on other home-related issues. Most reported that despite their concerns, 
financially they had no choice but to continue mining as they needed to 
have money to support their households. Some of the women interviewed 
indicated that the men would go away to sell the gold and often waste 
the money on alcohol and prostitutes. Of the women who had been able 
to give up mining or reduce their time spent mining, health and safety 
concerns were cited as the main reason for their decision.
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A possible way forward
Women involved in ASM operations face huge socio-economic issues. The 
women indicated that accidents, injuries or lack of family support often 
forced them into mining operations. Without adequate knowledge of good 
safety and health practices, these women face work-related risks, forcing 
them into actions that by western standards would be viewed as unsafe 
and unacceptable. While in some areas few women are involved in mining, 
in other areas several generations may be seen mining together, including 
children, mothers, aunts and grandmothers. Safety records remain negligible, 
and as a result awareness of occupational health issues and prevention of 
accidents remains minimal. Women in these communities face competing 
responsibilities, including child rearing, domestic duties and subsistence 
farming, and often need to take their children with them to the mine 
site where they too are then exposed to health and safety issues associated 
with mining activity. However, recent figures have shown a positive trend 
indicating the number of school-age children on mine sites has reduced 
from approximately 30 per cent in 2005 to around 15 per cent, largely due 
to extensive awareness campaigns across the country highlighting the need 
for education opportunities to be maximised. Women do not have as many 
opportunities to acquire mining skills as their male counterparts, and so do 
not have equal access to the cash made through mining, despite playing an 
active role in the mining process. Education opportunities for women and 
girls in the mining areas are essential to their futures—many of the women 
interviewed lacked basic literacy stills. Essentially, the women lack access to 
information, microcredit and training. 
Time is the most significant issue impeding these women from accessing 
opportunities to improve their livelihoods. The second-most significant 
issue for these women is their lack of literacy. The women who formed the 
discussion groups indicated that they could not attend training programs 
because the programs currently offered did not take into consideration 
their need to fulfil family and domestic obligations first and foremost, 
meaning they were not able to attend full-day or longer live-in programs. 
Thus, some issues to consider when developing training programs for 
women in remote mining communities are: 
• Time constraints: the women are time poor, so delivery methods need 
to be flexible, sensitive and accommodating of their domestic and 
family obligations.
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• High rates of illiteracy and lack of basic education (this needs to be 
incorporated into all training programs).
• Women stereotyped as not being technically savvy.
• Traditional cultural beliefs and values precluding them from certain 
mining activities, meaning they often miss out on the benefit streams 
that naturally flow to the men.
• Lack of business/financial management skills. 
• Lack of understanding of health and safety issues: mercury dangers, 
ground stability, mining methods, GBV, child labour, HIV/AIDS, 
water-borne diseases.
• Lack of access to microcredit. 
Most importantly, training programs must be seen by the women to: 
• Add value to their daily life and livelihoods. 
• Must lead to activities that are practical, tangible and sustainable, 
and designed specifically for the users.
• Build capacity and empower the women.
• Not expose them to higher levels of GBV.
The women in the interview groups expressed a desire for information 
on safer working practices to enable them to understand what was safe 
and what was not. However, their health and safety concerns extend 
beyond work-related illnesses, to other issues that impact their families 
and communities. In particular, the women wanted training related to: 
• Access to simple machinery and the technical knowledge of how to 
operate and maintain it. 
• Safer and less physical mining practices. 
• Understanding the hazards associated with mining practices, and how 
to undertake safer mining practices.
• Understanding how to prevent injury to themselves and other family 
members engaged in mining.
All of the women interviewed expressed health and safety concerns, with 
many expressing the opinion that it was their responsibility to ensure the 
health and safety of their families, including male members of their family 
having a good understanding of safe working practices. While some of the 
women expressed a desire for an alternative source of income, for many of 
those interviewed mining was the only occupation they had generational 
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experience in, and they wanted to remain miners, not wanting to re-skill 
as farmers or service providers. All indicated they would value a means 
of obtaining knowledge and information to help them understand and 
manage the health and safety issues they saw as major concerns influencing 
their family’s welfare. 
In 2005, the Assistant Director of the Small-Scale Mining Branch of the 
Department of Mines, PNG, contended that the fundamental safety issue 
in SSM in PNG was that most miners lacked knowledge and skills on 
health and safety issues. This lack of knowledge translated to the inability to 
identify hazards and underestimation of the risk of being injured or killed, 
as the primary goal was to access high-grade gold for economic survival. 
It would seem that 10 years on this still remains a significant challenge 
for the Small-Scale Mining Branch of the MRA. At the Alluvial Mining 
Congress in Lae, PNG, held on 29–30 September 2015, representatives 
from the MRA-managed SSMTC highlighted some of the health and safety 
issues associated with alluvial and small-scale mining, and the difficulties in 
reaching small-scale miners with training. Operating since 2009, the centre 
conducts live-in two-week courses covering a number of mining-related 
subjects, including occupational health and safety, and outreach training 
programs across many remote alluvial mining areas of PNG, including 
adjacent islands. A significant challenge for the centre is the low literacy 
level of alluvial and small-scale miners attending the courses. Courses 
are developed and conducted at three levels: illiterate, semi-literate and 
educated. Despite having a high practical component, financial constraints 
make it difficult to attract attendees. By 2015, the centre had trained over 
4,500 alluvial and small-scale miners; however, trainers estimate over 90,000 
miners remain untrained. While courses are available to both male and 
female participants, the programs are delivered either in a two-week training 
block requiring participants to live at the facility, or as a one-week outreach 
program. While all women interviewed expressed genuine concern at their 
lack of health and safety knowledge, all indicated that family responsibilities 
generally preclude them from attending formal training programs that 
require extensive time commitments. Women in general tend to stay away 
from outreach programs for miners.
In order to provide effective training programs, it is necessary to accurately 
document target audience concerns, and provide training for local people 
in their local language. When asked what kind of program would work 
best for them, the women indicated a preference for flexible and informal 
training programs lasting two to three hours per day over three days of 
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the week. The program would need to incorporate a level of basic literacy 
training for the women. Development of a program such as this would 
have widespread application, not only to other communities in PNG, but 
also to other countries where women are engaged in ASM activities. 
Conclusion
Health and safety issues are inextricably linked to community, economic 
and environmental aspects of SSM. Despite the significant health and 
safety issues related to small-scale mining, alluvial gold-mining remains 
attractive in PNG, as miners can receive up to 70–90 per cent of market 
value, compared to rural commodities, which are paid at a much lower rate 
and generally take longer to realise any financial return. While women’s 
participation is estimated at around 30 per cent, men and women are 
differently impacted upon by mining practices, cultural practices and 
legislative practices. The interviews provided a rich and valuable source 
of gender-specific information on SSM-related health and safety issues, 
which have not been well documented to date. 
These interviews provided valuable insight and information that will assist 
the development of targeted training programs to help women better 
understand and manage health and safety issues that affect them and their 
families, and are consequently a step forward to improving their overall 
quality of life.
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Rice, sapphires and cattle: Work 
lives of women artisanal and 
small‑scale miners in Madagascar
Lynda Lawson
Strong global demand for coloured gemstones,1  particularly in India 
and China, has led to a phenomenal expansion of the market in recent 
years (KPMG 2014). Levin (2012) suggests that globally, 80 per cent of 
gemstones are mined artisanally. In Africa, with the notable exception 
of Gemfields, a London-listed large-scale miner of gemstones in Zambia 
and Mozambique, most of the mining of coloured gemstones is poorly 
regulated and conducted by artisans using hand tools. Artisanal mining 
of gold has been widely investigated, but that of coloured gemstones has 
received comparatively less attention. The role of women in gemstone 
mining has received even less.
In the past 17 years, Madagascar has risen to become one of the world’s 
largest producers of fine sapphires, ranging from the best blues to yellows, 
pinks, oranges and purples (Shigley et al. 2010). Large investments by the 
World Bank to professionalise mining and to create sustainable livelihoods 
through, for example, the creation of lapidary training centres have had 
limited success. For the most part, rough stones are shipped out of the 
1  The technical term used for coloured stones—not diamonds—such as sapphires, rubies and 
emeralds, but also a wide range of other minerals such as aquamarine, garnet, amethyst, opal 
and citrine.
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country to be cut in the large specialist gemstone-cutting centres in South 
Asia, and then onto showrooms in Hong Kong (Cartier 2009). My review 
of project documents showed that the role and unique contribution of 
Malagasy women in artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) is all but 
ignored.
Madagascar remains one of the poorest countries on earth, with 88 per 
cent of the population living on US$1.25 a day (World Bank 2014), with 
most of the poor living in rural areas with high and chronic levels of 
food insecurity (World Bank 2011). There have been marked increases in 
poverty following the political crisis of 2009 and environmental shocks 
such as extended drought and cyclones. Poor economic development 
hampers Madagascar’s capacity to respond to changing climate and 
unexpected shocks (ibid.). Madagascar is expected to be severely affected 
by climate change and attendant increases in cyclones, drought and floods, 
with significant decreases in its farming communities’ capacity to produce 
staple crops (Harvey et al. 2014).
In 2013, Madagascar was officially declared a fragile state—that is, ‘a state 
with weak capacity to carry out basic governance functions, and lacks the 
ability to develop mutually constructive relations with society. Fragile states 
are also more vulnerable to internal or external shocks such as economic 
crises or natural disasters’ (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) 2013). Madagascar combines extreme poverty 
and aid dependence with all the above-mentioned features of a  fragile 
state.
In response to these challenges, ASM has provided a lifeline to an 
estimated 800,000 people (personal communication, Rupert Cook, 
August 2014), with a significant number of these people working in the 
gemstone sector. Roughly half of those working in ASM are thought 
to be women. Very little in revenue has returned to the state, or worse, 
most has been misappropriated (Duffy 2007; Cartier 2009). There 
are just a  handful of  scholarly publications that have studied ASM in 
Madagascar (Walsh 2003, 2012; Cartier 2009; Canavesio 2014), and 
there are a number of World Bank reports that are either dedicated to, 
or reference, ASM (Cook 2012). All make only passing reference to the 
role of women. The one exception is the work of Remy Canavesio (2013), 
a French geographer who spent five years researching gemstone mining 
and supply chains, and who returned to his thesis data to re-interrogate it 
from a gendered perspective. 
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To contextualise the discussion, we begin by reviewing the literature 
related to women and ASM, mostly in Africa, and then focus on women 
miners of gemstones in Madagascar. We outline the methodology used 
and then present cases. 
Women in ASM: The African perspective
The literature on women in ASM over the past 20 years has not been 
extensive, and in many ways it reflects broader societal trends that have 
only recently begun to document and analyse women’s important role 
in, and the impacts on, the extractive industries. Noestaller’s (1987) 
work on ASM commissioned by the World Bank makes no reference 
to women or gender issues. However, in 1995, Béatrice Labonne of the 
World Bank presented on women in ASM at a special event on ‘Women 
and Natural Resources’ at the Fourth World Conference on Women in 
Beijing. Drawing on work by Esther Ofei-Aboagy on Ghanaian women 
miners, Labonne published one of the first papers in this area: ‘Artisanal 
Mining: An Economic Stepping Stone for Women’ (Labonne 1996). 
It paints a positive view of opportunities for women in ASM, but makes 
no reference to the specific health and safety issues faced by women on 
ASM sites. By contrast, in 2003, Heemskerk’s detailed ethnographic study 
of the Maroon women artisanal miners working in rural Suriname found 
that if long-term social and health conditions were considered, work 
on informal mining was not likely to improve the quality of women’s 
lives (Heemskerk 2003). Yakovleva (2007) presents a detailed, essentially 
descriptive, case study of the work, income, health and family of women 
miners in camps and villages in the Eastern Region of Ghana. She argues 
for gender mainstreaming of assistance for ASM. However, it is the work 
of Jennifer Hinton that sets the benchmark for the literature on ASM and 
women in Africa, both as a co-author when considering the impacts of 
mercury for women (Hinton et al. 2003), and in her broad and analytic 
review of mining and gender roles in her doctoral work (Hinton 2011). 
She brought to the fore key issues, such as the impact of the commodity 
and mine lifecycle on the work of women in ASM.
Hinton has warned against over simplifications and generalisations about 
women’s roles (Hinton 2011); however, typically the work women do 
is less visible than that of men. They are not usually found digging the 
main ore bodies and going underground, but they may be found digging 
BeTWeeN THe PLOUGH AND THe PICK
174
or panning around the edges, transporting, washing and processing. 
Malpeli and Chirico (2013) investigated 137 gold and diamond sites in 
West Africa over five years, collecting data directly from women at mine 
sites. They found that women’s participation in mineral extraction was 
dependent on the thickness of the overburden and accessibility of the 
deposit, and that women were mostly involved in processing. Along with 
geomorphology, economic factors such as the value of the commodity 
being mined, the stage of the life of the mine, access to finance, the 
hierarchical organisation of the mine, land, permits and equipment also 
determined women’s participation. 
Women’s work in ASM is often not clearly differentiated from other 
duties; for example, women may grind stones with kitchen equipment, 
and process gold with mercury as they cook, while their children play 
beside them. In Madagascar, it is common to see women sieving for 
sapphires next to others doing the family laundry. Thus, the women’s 
role is often not valued, well renumerated or recognised and, as a result, 
women may not be included in any formal or informal census of those 
involved in ASM, and may not be considered by policymakers (Eftimie 
et al. 2012). Policy may impact men and women miners differently, and 
their specific needs may be neglected in gender-neutral policies (Hinton 
2011). Hinton, in her doctoral study of gender and ASM in Uganda, 
argued that such gender-neutral policy actually negatively impacts on 
women in ASM, thus damaging the whole community (ibid.).
One thing that is well established across the globe, and particularly in 
Africa, is that women involved in ASM earn considerably less than men, 
even when doing the same task. In addition, they work longer hours 
since they still carry the burden of domestic work (Eftimie et al. 2012). 
For example, in a formal gold mine camp in Ghana, women who transport 
gold ore and water, and pound rocks, have salaries 60 per cent lower than 
men involved in digging (Akabzaa and Darimani 2001).
Women’s role in ASM remains constrained by socio-economic and 
cultural barriers, which impact on resource rights and decision-making. 
Women are typically proffered land of less value, and women’s capacity to 
benefit from ASM may be constrained by de jure and de facto inequity in 
access to land and property rights (Meinzen-Dick et al. 1997). In Kenya, 
for example, the traditional social system allows women access to, but no 
control over, the land; thus, their overall production is low (Amutabi and 
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Lutta Mukhebi, in Lahiri-Dutt 2008). Women have difficulty obtaining 
finance from banks and may require their husband’s consent before 
obtaining a permit. 
Women are often excluded from direct contact with more valuable 
deposits, and can be found digging on the less valuable sections of the 
lease while men pursue more lucrative seams underground. Where 
women are involved in the sale of minerals, they tend to deal with less 
lucrative sales deals. For example, Malagasy women traders buy and sell 
the smaller gemstones, while the larger, more precious loads are reserved 
for males acting in concert with other powerful males, such as the mayor 
and the local police chief. This limits their access to real financial power 
(Canavesio 2010). Where ASM has been formalised, women working in 
cooperatives, for example in Ethiopia, are paid less than men (personal 
communication, Solomon Negussie, December 2014). Even women mine 
owners experience gender bias, with men being reluctant to follow their 
orders, and women being forced to use male agents (Tallichet et al. 2003). 
ASM has the potential to provide a livelihood, but there is no capacity for 
resilience and little savings in the case of an accident, illness or a natural 
disaster. Canavesio (2010) describes the tragic situation of women who 
have gone to the sapphire fields in Madagascar in the hope of finding 
an income for their families, have been unsuccessful and, not having the 
funds to return home, have died of starvation.
Women miners’ identity
Critical feminist insights into the oppressed position of women miners and 
into their identity have been provided in the work of feminist geographer 
Lahiri-Dutt, who published on ASM in Asia in 2004. More recently, she 
has reframed the field by referring to peasant miners rather than artisanal 
miners (Lahiri-Dutt 2014)—this is particularly pertinent in rural 
Madagascar. Bryceson’s work in East Africa on rural women’s livelihoods 
began to reference ASM in the mid-1990s (Bryceson 1996). Scholars and 
international aid agencies began noting how deteriorating farm conditions 
were forcing women into ASM, and the unequal and unfair remuneration 
women were receiving (Yakovleva 2007). Bryceson’s most recent work 
on ASM in Tanzania (Bryceson et al. 2014), in particular, has provided 
unique insights into the broader impacts of ASM—its democratising 
impacts, and its impacts on gender relations, marriage and casualised sex. 
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Questions about the identity of women miners are explored in a recent 
critical paper based in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
(Bashwira et al. 2014). Gender-based violence towards women miners in 
conflict zones in the Eastern DRC led to non-government organisations 
attempting to move women from ASM into alternative livelihoods; in 
turn, the DRC Government banned pregnant women from ASM, despite 
the fact that there was little other work (ibid.). As Lahiri-Dutt notes, 
‘popularist and universalist conceptions of femininity and womanhood 
tend to normalise contested gender roles through protective legislation 
that operates against women’s interests’ (Lahiri-Dutt 2013: 224). It 
is vital that policymakers listen carefully. It is time to move beyond a 
stereotypical homogenous view of women in ASM to ‘a far more real 
picture of diversity, opportunism and agency’ (Mahy 2011: 61).
Jenkins (2014), in the most thorough review to date of women in mining 
(both large- and small-scale), argued that the role of women in ASM 
has generally been under-theorised and under-recognised, and that this 
is a key issue in terms of understanding the role of the mining sector 
in relation to development of poor communities in the Global South. 
A challenge for researchers is to go beyond factual accounts and single case 
studies of women’s activities to ‘develop strong critiques of the gendered 
dynamics and power relations at work’ (ibid.: 32). Also, few studies make 
any connection between the broader question of feminism and women at 
work, or the impact of climate on rural livelihoods such as ASM.
Some of the most promising methodological approaches can be found in 
research on male small-scale miners, which considers small-scale miners’ 
decision-making and ‘career trajectories’ (Bryceson and Jønsson 2010: 
382). Bryceson and Jønsson (2010) addressed many of these concerns in 
a study of the lives of Tanzanian gold miners. They describe a ‘coalescing 
career formation arising almost entirely from the small-scale miners’ own 
organizational constructs and individual decision-making’ (ibid.:  387). 
The research contains valuable and vivid detail and, although the sample 
did not include women miners, its comprehensive research design 
provides  the kind of detail needed in future studies of women miners’ 
work–life courses.
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Women ‘help the men’
‘Women? They help the men.’2
In Madagascar, there are just a handful of scholarly publications that have 
investigated ASM (Walsh 2003; Canavesio 2011, 2013; Cartier 2009; 
Cook 2012), and only Walsh (2003) and Canavesio (2011) consider 
women’s role in any detail, even though it is known that women are 
involved throughout the supply chain. Anthropologist Andrew Walsh’s 
(2003) ethnographic studies of ASM miners in Northern Madagascar 
found that while young male miners often considered money earned from 
sapphires to be ‘hot’ money that had to be spent quickly on hedonistic 
pursuits, women miners tended to use ‘cool’ money, which was destined 
for buying houses and cattle. The women interviewed stated that the 
only way to get ahead was ‘to put their money to work’ (Walsh 2003: 
294), spending their money wisely on long-term investments. A typical 
comment was that they were motivated to do this because men ‘have 
made them suffer’ (ibid.: 294), and that careful management of sapphire 
earnings would enable them to live independently of men. This resonates 
with Canavesio’s (2013) comments about the women of the southwest 
that ‘migrate in order to become richer, but they also look for a new life in 
a society where gender inequalities are smaller than in the other parts of the 
country’ (Canavesio 2013: 1). This desire for emancipation also led some 
women to strategically marry foreign traders; such ‘mine marriages’ have 
also been noted in gold ASM communities (Bryceson et al. 2014) and in 
diamond trade communities in Angola, where De Boeck comments that 
‘mine marriages’ tend to ‘serve an economic, purely utilitarian purpose 
in the short term, with the woman involved oftentimes for advantageous 
financial outcome’ (cited in Walsh 2003: 302).
Methodology
The methodology used in this study aims to give women, who have rarely 
had their voice heard, an opportunity to tell their story in their own 
words. This fits with the feminist theoretical framing of the project, as ‘oral 
interviews are particularly valuable for uncovering women’s experiences’ 
(Anderson and Jack 1991: 11). It also fits with the vibrant oral tradition 
2  This comment came from a prominent gemmologist working in the region.
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of storytelling in Africa, and Madagascar in particular. The methodology 
draws on two research approaches: the Panos Oral testimony project 
(Panos Oral Testimony 2014), with its detailed method for collecting 
stories outlined in Listening for a Change (Slim and Thomson 1993) and 
Methods of Life Course Research (Giele and Elder 1998).
Life course research
Life course research is widely used across a range of disciplines, such as 
medicine, social sciences and development studies, and was elaborated by 
Janet Giele and Glen Elder (Giele and Elder 1998). The research approach 
grew out of an outstanding series of twentieth-century longitudinal 
studies of American life, such as Elder’s painstaking and ground breaking 
study, Children of the Great Depression (1974), which followed the lives of 
167 people born in Oakland, California, in the 1930s into the late 1960s 
(Elder 1974). From such research, Giele and Elder (1998) identified 
central themes that determine the shape of the life course—for example, 
location in time and place (cultural background)—and heuristics such as 
life transitions. This multifaceted data is collected primarily in the form of 
life histories through interviews; instruments such as life event calendars 
(Drasch and Matthes 2013) or diaries may be used. The life course 
research paradigm has been used successfully in the development context 
to investigate gender, the work–life course and livelihood strategies in 
a South Indian fish market (Hapke and Ayyankeril 2004).
Analysis of data from the interviews
Data from the interviews was translated, transcribed and analysed using 
content analysis. The categories used to analyse the data were both 
inductively derived—that is, allowed to emerge from the data in relation to 
the research question and scoping visits3—and deductively and iteratively 
determined based on insights from theory and literature, principally life 
course research (Giele and Elder 1998). The thematic categories were 
location in time and place, and climate (cultural background); linked 
lives—for example, family (social integration); human agency (individual 
goal orientation); and the timing of lives and climate change (strategic 
3  For example, a category related to climate change emerged. ASM and climate change are not 
often linked in the literature; however, in interviews a number of women spoke of changes in rain 
patterns, which meant that they were no longer able to grow enough rice to feed their families, and 
this was a factor in their decision to take up sapphire mining.
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adaptation). The heuristics to explain work–life course were life transitions 
or turning points, trajectories, sequences and life events (based on Giele 
and Elder 1998). 
Research questions
Based on the literature and the theoretical and methodological orientation, 
the following research questions were constructed: What does the work–
life course of a woman in gemstone mining look like? What motivates 
women to take up ASM? How have they learned their skills? What have 
been the turning points in their work–life course? How do they manage 
family? How has this work activity impacted on their health? Does it 
provide a reliable source of income? 
Research process
Two preliminary scoping visits were made to the Ilakaka–Sakaraha 
region in 2014. Twelve women found working by the streams as miners 
of sapphires in the Ilakaka–Sakaraha region were interviewed in the 
field, with the assistance of a Malagasy research assistant. Photographs 
and participant observation were also used. For this study, we chose 
to concentrate on the interviews of women whose only livelihood was 
sapphire mining. Of the 12 women approached, seven were working full-
time as miners and their interviews were selected for detailed analysis.
Extended semi-structured interviews were used to elicit narratives of 
work–life course history, and participants were asked to comment 
on specific questions in relation to the research question for each case. 
Work–life stories of women sapphire miners
Alvine
‘The four of us work together.’ 
Alvine is 17 years old, she is married and has a nine-month-old baby, and 
works in a group with her husband and cousins in a team. She has been 
mining for three years across different mine sites in a 50 km radius from 
Ilakaka, and is now working at Bekily. 
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Before I came to mine I used to grow rice, but because there was not 
enough rain and no harvest I started sapphire mining. Sometimes I find 
something, sometimes I don’t. Some days I earn 10–20,000 Ar4 a day but 
often I earn nothing. I use everything I earn on my daily expenses.
The four of us work together (my husband and cousins), the boys dig, the 
girls sieve. I like doing this because we might find something. I can earn 
much more from sapphires than from gold. 
I have a problem with my back. If I get sick I just keep working, I can’t 
afford to see a doctor.
Ravao
‘But unfortunately God hasn’t given me yet.’
Ravao is 20 years old and she came from the south. She has been mining 
in this area at Bevilany for six months. She has one child who is with 
her parents in Fort Dauphin, as she goes to school. Her husband is away 
working on the new site.
My mother grows rice in Fort Dauphin but it did not provide enough to 
sustain us. My mother paid for my husband and I to come here to mine. 
I will keep mining until I have enough, but I haven’t found anything big 
yet. I chose sapphires because I don’t know how to do gold. My brother 
taught me how to sieve for sapphires. I get a bit of money from sieving—
sometimes 500 Ar5 a day, but not every day. If I can’t find anything, I go 
to bed with an empty stomach. If I find a big stone, I will buy a sewing 
machine and some gold jewellery. But unfortunately God hasn’t given 
me yet.
Harena
‘I mine because I want my children to have the same as others who have 
value, that have a better life.’
Harena is 24 years old and her family are from Androy, west of Fort 
Dauphin. She is married with three children aged between five and 
two-and-a-half. She kept sieving until she was seven months’ pregnant. 
She went and had the baby with her parents, and after two months she 
came back to mining, breastfeeding the baby at the same time. She used 
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took up mining. She had been at Bekily just one week, but she had been 
mining for six years at places like Antsoha and Amboalano. She works 
for a ‘boss’, and sometimes they earn 10,000 Ar 6 for three days for three 
people.
The children live with her husband, who also mines sapphires about 
10 km away. They only see each other when they find a sapphire. When 
asked if it was safe for her to live alone on the rush site she said, ‘I do it 
because of poverty. We are both looking for money’.
She has a large sieve and she gives it to the men to use; she then sorts the 
second wash. Her brother died when the earth caved in on the mine when 
he was underground.
I can live on sapphires. I prefer to mine sapphires rather than gold as they 
are more valuable and also I do not know how to pan for gold. I can get 
more for them to buy gold jewellery and cattle. The cattle I have bought 
are with the family. I have found a few small stones and sold them to the 
businessmen. I will continue to mine until I find a large sapphire. I mine 
because I want my children to have the same as others who have value, 
that have a better life.
Titae
‘They belong to me, I bought them with my own money.’
She comes originally from Amboasary (60 km from Fort Dauphin). 
She doesn’t have any children, and she has been mining for eight years in 
many locations around Ilakaka, but she has decided to stay in Bevilany on 
the Maninday River as she no longer wishes to move. Her husband works 
with her; he digs and brings stuff down for her to sieve. They have found 
one good stone. They bought four cattle with it. The money they earn is 
for both of them. If her husband finds, he shares what he finds.
It’s hard. We only do it because we are poor. If we can’t find anything we 
sleep hungry. I will keep mining until God gives us enough. Then I will 
do many things—buy gold jewellery, dresses, cattle. The sieve cost 8,000 
Ar7 and the spade 3,000 Ar.8 They belong to me, I bought them with 
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Vola Julienne
‘I want a sapphire for myself.’
She is 46 years old. She comes from Ilakaka where her parents had 
a hotel. She lived there from 1980, and she was there when the sapphire 
boom started. She started mining then. She has moved around at least 
five mine sites around Ilakaka and Sakaraha. She is now mining at the 
Ambarinakoko mine at Bevilany, on the Maninday River. She is married 
with two children. One is finishing school, and one is married. 
I mine because I am looking for money. I found a sapphire in 2004, 
I built a house and bought cattle and paid for my children’s schooling.
I want a sapphire for myself. The father of the children is dead, this 
husband is their stepfather and I need my own money to look after them. 
I will continue mining until I find something. I want to build another 
house to rent for my old age.
Golden Smile
‘I have been mining for a long time.’
Golden Smile is 46 years old, and she works with her two sons, who mine 
underground. She lost one of her sons, and used the sapphire money to 
bury him.
She sieves by the river. At 11 o’clock she goes up to where her sons are 
working and collects soil to take and sieve by the river. It is a 200 m 
steep walk on slippery ground, and it is hard to keep her balance. She is 
barefoot. She has been mining for eight or nine years. She has worked at 
least five mine sites around Ilakaka and Sakaraha. She lives on the money 
from sapphire mining and is bringing up her granddaughter.
Sapphire mining is an activity for men. I do it because I don’t have 
a  husband. No one taught me but I watched my sons. I watched, 
I watched, I watched and then I did it. I have found some stones and 
bought food and medical treatment. If God wants to tell me to stop, I will 
do it. As you see I cannot dig but I have no money. No one else gives us 
money. If I had money, I would start a second-hand clothes business. 
I don’t feel good, but if I find some sapphires I’ll buy some jewellery.
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Oly
Oly is 25 and has four children under four. One has died. Oly is a Bara 
woman, one of the main ethnic groups living in the southwest. It is 
a group  that has worked traditionally with cattle. She works with her 
husband; he digs for sapphire-bearing soil and stones, and she sieves by 
the river, either the soil he has mined or directly from river stones. They 
mine all year, but in the wet season they also grow rice.
We have two rice crops a year. When the rice is ready we harvest and stock 
and then go back to sapphires. We get 20 big bags each year. We store it 
and resell when the prices go up we buy zebu. I don’t want my kids to go 
to school, I want them to work with me. We want to buy a car and a gun.
Discussion
‘Women are like a thread passed through the eye of a needle.’ 
– Proverb from Masikoro (an ethnic group found in this mining region). 
I have framed this discussion with the Masikoro proverb, which reflects 
the position of these women, who against enormous odds are seeking ‘to 
make change happen for better’ (Cornwall and Edwards 2014: 2). Each 
woman speaks of using sapphire money to do something for herself, to 
help her children, to buy a business or personal items. Their spades and 
seives are their own. There is a sense of agency and some pride in what 
they have achieved. However, the opportunities are very constrained by 
the eye of the needle of these women’s circumstances in a society where, 
structurally and culturally, they often have little power. ASM mine sites are 
typically portrayed as masculine frontiers where women ‘help the men’. 
By talking to these women and hearing their life stories, it is noticeable 
that these women do not identify themselves as just ‘helping men’; some 
are working alongside men in work that may be identified as ‘men’s work’, 
but they have very clear and diverse work–life trajectories. As Canavesio 
(2013) has argued, the rush sites of this region offer opportunities for 
women to find economic and personal emancipation. 
Andrea Cornwall’s (2003) work has been significant. She has investigated 
the failure of development projects, even those that claim to be using 
participatory approaches to listen to and incorporate women’s voices. 
In her comprehensive review and critique of gender and participatory 
development, she argued, ‘what is needed is strategies and tactics that 
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take account of the power effects of difference, combining advocacy to 
lever open spaces for voice with processes that enable people to recognize 
and use their agency’ (Cornwall 2003: 139). Despite extremely difficult 
circumstances, there is no way these women can be constrained into some 
kind of ‘average Third World Woman’ leading an ‘essentially truncated life’ 
(Mohanty 1988: 56). Mohanty argued that many well-meaning feminist 
development researchers emphasise the needs of third-world women, 
and  fail to analyse the work they do, both in the formal and informal 
sectors. The analysis in the following section attempts to address this gap.
Location in time and place, and climate
The women in this study find themselves on the edge of a sapphire 
mining boom that began some 18 years ago, and is strongly controlled 
by foreign buyers of valuable stones. The buyers and those with control 
are predominantly, but not all, male. The easy-to-find stones—‘grass’ as 
they are called in Malagasy—have long gone, and younger, more mobile 
miners have moved to other areas. These women have not progressed to 
becoming stone traders, nor are there any opportunities for beneficiation 
or formal employment. They aspire to buy cattle, businesses and property, 
and to have some control of their circumstances. The ethnicity of the 
woman miner also emerges as a factor in relation to her motivation for 
mining. Madagascar has 18 different ethnic groups and, as is evoked in 
the proverb, many are oppressive to women. In particular, Bara women 
like Oly have few rights in relation to cattle and land ownership. Her 
comments seem unlike the others. She alone does not want to send her 
children to school, and instead of wanting to buy jewellery or a sewing 
machine, she wants to buy cattle and guns. 
Turning points and strategic adaptation
A turning point in the work–life trajectory of all the miners, leading to 
the decision to start sapphire mining, was the persistence of poverty and 
drought. Changing climate patterns seem to be a significant catalyst to 
take up mining. Three women had moved from the south and southeast, 
because the rains there had failed, and they were no longer able to support 
the family by growing rice and manioc. This region of the south is dry 
and particularly prone to changing climate; food insecurity is extreme and 
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sending family members to find work elsewhere is one strategic approach 
to survival (Harvey et al. 2014), and is an example of Elder’s strategic 
adaptation.
Strategic adaptation is also seen in the way they have all moved across many 
different sites when new sapphires were discovered. The older women 
have moved across at least five different sites. They live in makeshift tents, 
with their only tools a shovel and sieve. They all hoped to move on from 
mining and wanted to buy cattle, a potent symbol of wealth in Malagasy 
rural life. Some hoped to establish other businesses such as second-hand 
clothes stalls, dressmaking or farming. They hoped for better lives for their 
children. Harena’s comment sums it up: ‘I want my children to have the 
same as others who have value, that have a better life.’
Linked lives
A strong factor influencing change in work–life trajectories are social and 
personal factors—the linking of other lives with our work decisions. For 
these women miners, there are a complex array of personal relationships 
at play in their work–life decisions. A number have very young children, 
and have given birth at a young age. In our sample, only Titae, Alvine and 
Oly are living and working alongside their partners, and Golden Smile 
does not have a partner but works with her sons. In the other cases, the 
husband and wife are hedging their bets by each working on a different 
site, and only seeing each other when they find a stone. Vola Julienne is 
using sapphire mining in a very strategic way to manage complex family 
issues—she needs to provide for her children from her first marriage as her 
second husband will not, and also to provide for her retirement. 
Oly’s case is different. She was working an area close to the original 
sapphire town of Ilakaka, not one of the more chaotic rush sites where 
the other women were found. Despite the great hardship of losing a child, 
she and her young family are moving ahead using a combination of 
mining, rice growing and cattle. She is a Bara woman, the cattle-based 
ethnic group of the southwest grasslands, and the original owners of the 
sapphire country around Ilakaka. They have been particularly impacted 
by the breakdown in law and order, and ruthless cattle rustlers. This is 
reflected in her wish to buy guns and transport. She is also very protective 
of her children and does not wish them to go to school, but wants them 
to work with the family.
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Human agency (individual goal orientation)
All women display great courage and human agency to provide for 
themselves and their families. Women in this part of Madagascar are not 
in a strong position, ‘especially the Bara women—they don’t have a place’ 
(personal communication, Mayor of Ambrinany and local doctor Alain 
Randrianirina, February 2014).
It has been remarked that artisanal mining provides an opportunity for 
women to have their own money, to use money more wisely than some of 
the male miners and to gain some independence in a system that is quite 
oppressive for women (Walsh 2003; Canavesio 2013). This is evident in 
some of the comments of the more mature women, Vola Julienne and 
Harena, who asserted quite forcibly in these relatively short interviews that 
mining could support them: ‘I can live on sapphires’; ‘I want a sapphire 
for myself. The father of the children is dead … I need my own money to 
look after them.’
Likewise, Titae is proud that she has her own tools and of the personal 
power that they give her: ‘The sieve cost 8,000 Ar and the spade 3,000 Ar. 
They belong to me, I bought them with my own money. It is me who will 
work using them and make money from them.’
Age and time spent mining are also significant. The younger women had 
begun mining in their mid-teens and were working as a family team, with 
men collecting sapphire-bearing gravel from under the ground.
Older women like Vola Julienne are a little different, as she had found 
a large stone earlier in her life and this had permitted her to buy a home 
and cattle. However, she had married again and needed to make money to 
look after children from her first marriage, and also to provide for herself 
in retirement.
Mining of sapphire was both a means of survival in extremely precarious 
circumstances—a number of women spoke of going to bed hungry if they 
didn’t find a stone—but also a means to finance other livelihoods in the 
future: to buy a sewing machine or to sell second-hand clothes. Almost 
all women made reference to God, a typical comment being, ‘I will keep 
mining until God gives us enough.’
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Conclusion
Andrea Cornwall (2003) investigated the failure of development projects 
to listen to and incorporate women’s voices. In her comprehensive review 
and critique of gender and participatory development, she argues, ‘what 
is needed is strategies and tactics that take account of the power effects 
of difference, combining advocacy to lever open spaces for voice with 
processes that enable people to recognize and use their agency’ (Cornwall 
2003: 139). Development agencies are returning to Madagascar after 
the four years of political instability, and there is interest in development 
activities for women in ASM. They would do well to heed this advice. 
Cornwall and Edwards’s (2014) recent work is a response to such critiques. 
It aims to explore in a more holistic way how women in different cultures 
experience change and empowerment in their lives and, in the spirit of 
true feminist research, it seeks to discover ‘hidden pathways, the otherwise 
invisible routes that women travel on to empowerment’ (Cornwall and 
Edwards 2014: ix).
Using the work–life course framework (Giele and Elder 1998) provides an 
in-depth and respectful basis from which to better understand the lives of 
women sapphire miners, and their ‘hidden pathways’ to empowerment. 
The diverse motivations of women and their individual agency it reveals 
are striking. 
A predominant theme that emerges is of rural women from different 
ethnic groups, often from the south of Madagascar, taking up artisanal 
mining in response to deepening rural poverty and food insufficiency, 
caused by the failure of crops and changing climate. This is particularly 
significant in Madagascar, where the impacts of changing climate on small 
farmers are expected to be severe, and where preservation of its unique 
biodiversity is crucial. The issue of climate change and ASM has not 
been widely explored in the literature. The intersection on the pathway 
between women miners, food insecurity and changing climate in this 
research warrants further investigation.
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Is it possible to integrate health 
and safety risk management into 
mechanised gold processing? 
A methodology for artisanal and 
small‑scale mining communities 
in the Philippines
Gernelyn Logrosa, Maureen Hassall, David Cliff 
and Carmel Bofinger
The large number of people involved in artisanal and small-scale mining 
(ASM) worldwide face significant health and safety issues that have an 
impact beyond the miners and their communities. In the Philippines 
alone, ASM sustains more than 500,000 miners and processors (Galvez 
2012, cited in Verbrugge 2014). Its immense contribution—supplying 
80 per cent of the country’s gold supply, which earned PHP48.9 billion 
in 2010 (Mines and Geosciences Bureau 2016)—proves that ASM 
is thriving and is worthy of support.  
The diversity within artisanal gold-mining is recognised by the Swiss 
Agency for Development and Cooperation (Hruschka 2011), and can 
range from formal and responsible ASM communities as pillars of the 
local economy to chaotic and uncontrollable mining sites, where negative 
impacts prevail. Four categories of ASM were recognised for purposeful 
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macroeconomic and sectoral approaches by the World Bank (Weber-Fahr 
2002): permanent ASM, seasonal ASM, rush-type ASM and shock-push 
ASM. These categories are in some way reflected in the primary gold-
mining provinces in the Philippines—Benguet and Compostela Valley—
which are discussed in the following sections. 
In Benguet, ASM developed from the previous workings of the indigenous 
Igorot small-scale miners who originally worked the area. It is a classic 
example of how ASM in the Philippines had thrived long before the 
arrival of large-scale mines (Bugnosen 2002). Artisanal mining operations 
in Benguet are perceived as old and traditional in terms of mode of 
tunnelling and gold extraction, as compared to other ASM areas of the 
Philippines. The cyanidation process of gold extraction is used more 
widely by the small and corporate small-scale mining associations than 
amalgamation using mercury. In Benguet, the Ibaloi and Kan-kanaey 
miners are known as abanteros. Having inherited their skills from their 
ancestors, their knowledge of gold-mining has been shaped by years of 
experience. Some migrant miners from the lowlands have also learned 
these skills. Altogether, this hierarchy of non-industrialised miners form 
a community of ASM, without distinction between miners who use 
the traditional method and miners who employ mechanised and more 
advanced technologies. The provisions of the Philippine Presidential 
Decree No. 1899 allow corporations to also engage in small-scale mining 
(Alternative Forum for Research in Mindanao (AFRIM) 2012).
Traditional mining in Benguet is typically seasonal. The Kan-kanaey tribes 
in Benguet treat mining as a family-based activity, performed during 
agricultural off-seasons. The ore-processing stage is performed usually by 
the women, while the rest of the stages, such as ore extraction, milling, 
gravitation and panning to separate gold from the ore are performed 
by the male members of the family. Until 1996, the tools used were 
simple, such as iron chisels, double-sided iron hammers with a wooden 
handle, iron crowbars, iron shovels and battery-operated lamps. Initial 
breakage of the ores is achieved using improvised crushers. After this, 
grinding proceeds, as the ores are loaded into rod mills or ball mills. This 
is followed by smelting and processing wherein women do most of the 
work (Caballero 1996 as cited in Lu 2012). Households are reformed 
into workplaces as processing of the ore is made to fit into the household 
responsibilities. Inevitably, of course, the inherent risks from these typical 
working conditions emerge, as other members of the family are exposed 
to the hazards of mineral processing (Bugnosen 1998). 
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A different outlook is provided by the ASM community in Compostela 
Valley Province, also known as ‘ComVal’. ComVal typifies a gold rush–
type ASM practice that has sustained itself for more than 30 years. 
The brief settlement history of the ComVal uplands may offer a useful 
perspective in understanding its ASM context. Throughout the 1950s and 
1960s, expansion of corporate logging and mining brought with it to 
ComVal the massive influx of migrant workers from Visayas and Luzon, 
which are located in the central and northern part of the Philippines. 
The gold rush in the 1970s and 1980s expedited the utilisation of both 
the migrant workforce and the unskilled ‘indigenous labour’ in large-
scale companies, such as APEX mining in the municipality of Maco, and 
SABENA mines in New Bataan. However, the gold rush was short-lived. 
The downturn of large-scale mining in the 1980s forced the impetus 
towards the expansion and transformation of ASM through the creation 
of a skilled workforce reserve.
In terms of working practices and degrees of mechanisation and 
capitalisation, Verbrugge (2014) classified ASM in ComVal into three 
pertinent categories. The first category is river panning, which is an 
alluvial mining technique that captures coarse gold, in some cases gold 
nuggets, using a simple pan or sluice box. The miners rely on natural 
conditions, such as the passage of heavy rain, which tends to loosen gold-
bearing dirt. The second category is self-financed tunnelling operations, 
in which a ‘corpo’ is formed by the miners and resources are pooled 
among themselves. The third category, which is supposedly the defining 
feature of ASM in ComVal, is the bigger tunnelling operations. Here, the 
operations are characterised by a much higher degree of mechanisation 
and the employment of heavy machinery, such as pneumatic drills, 
excavators, explosives, 2-MW diesel generators, water pumps and mine 
carts. Consequently, the degree of labour specialisation also increases, 
providing employment no longer limited to the usual portal guards, 
carpenters and electricians. Some cases reveal the hiring of chemists and 
geologists. A  fourth category, which is not highlighted in Verbrugge’s 
account but is still worth noting, is the ‘banlas’ or hydraulic mining, 
which uses high-pressure jets of water to dislodge rock material or loosen 
packed gold-bearing sediments.
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The role of the state
It has been institutionally recognised that there are drivers that push ASM 
to continue performing their gold-processing techniques, despite the 
risks that have been largely discussed in literature, in terms of social and 
regulatory dimensions (Hentschel et al. 2002; Lahiri-Dutt 2004; Buxton 
2013; Hilson et al. 2014). The support from government, local and foreign 
organisations and other institutions has, in part, been directed at finding 
technological solutions to ASM-related problems (Priester et al. 1993; 
Mutagwaba et al. 1997; Hentschel et al. 2002; Hruschka 2011). The most 
common example is the end-of-pipe technology, in forms of retort or 
improvised filters to address toxic mercury emissions. This initiative 
of solving ASM problems related to mercury through the use of technology 
is a model of technical solutions to reduce environmental impacts. There 
are also other modifications of the mineral-processing circuits to mitigate 
unwanted social and environmental impacts (Priester et al. 1993). 
The mechanisation of gold processing holds promise in its potential 
to achieve cleaner and toxin-free ASM practices. However, Hruschka 
(2011) argues that mechanisation does not replace labour in ASM gold 
processing. The mechanisation today in ASM usually starts at a basic level, 
and its primary purpose is to ease physical work conditions and to increase 
productivity. Labour remains the second-most important production 
factor next to mineral deposits in ASM. As a result, ASM produces ‘only’ 
about 15 per cent of the worldwide gold production, but employs more 
than 80 per cent of the workforce (Hruschka 2011).
Scholars have so far focused on how technology use has an impact on 
labour, its regulation, on women’s rights and informality (for instance, 
Nuwayhid 2004; Hermanus 2007; Marriott 2008; Lu 2012; Verbrugge 
and Besmanos 2016). However, there seems to be little discussion about 
health and safety and, in particular, there is no examination of how health 
and safety risk management approach could be used to improve ASM 
methods for processing gold.
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Health and safety project
This study aims to investigate the health and safety conditions in ASM, 
and to integrate health and safety risk management into mechanised 
gold processing, through a gold-processing plant recently designed for 
ASM in the Philippines. It was a collaborative effort, initially made by 
a state university and a government department to improve ASM gold 
processing in the country. The technology offers the customary set of 
principles in gold processing. Innovative mechanisation is highlighted 
by putting in equipment and methods that stand as a contemporary 
and creative approach to the recent technical demands in ASM gold 
processing. The  project seeks to develop a plant that overcomes the 
challenges associated with the two primary ASM gold-processing 
methods—cyanidation and amalgamation—which cause adverse effects 
on health and the environment. Another consideration is that ASM gold-
processing sites may lack adequate facilities for detoxification treatment, 
thus compounding the health and environmental risks they cause. ASM 
gold-processing sites often lack adequate facilities for detoxification 
treatment, thus compounding the health and environmental risks they 
cause. Another consideration is the inefficiency of separation and recovery 
of gold using these processes that leads to major inefficiencies in material 
utilisation. Once this technical challenge is addressed, the economic 
opportunities can be enhanced. 
Technical demands of the small mines industry have been becoming 
increasingly dynamic and complex. This is mainly due to the 
varying mineralogy and metallurgical characteristics of gold ore. 
Thus,  mechanisation has been developed over time. The introduction 
of mechanisation to ASM was not limited to external influence, such as 
government projects (Mutagwaba et al. 1997) and foreign aid. In order 
to meet local conditions, artisanal and traditional techniques have been 
modified, even through unconventional channels (Priester et al. 1993; 
Hentschel et al. 2002). This modification was a definitive task among 
ingenious ASM miners or, as Rawls et al. (1999) described it, enterprising 
amateurs who characterised the gold rush technology.
This contemporary state of ASM working conditions may include more 
modern occupational health and safety hazards that may arise from the 
new machinery. Hentschel et al. (2002) discussed how frequently ASM 
miners try to modify the conventional equipment they have in order to fit 
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their needs. Unfortunately, in many cases, safety features are suppressed; 
for example, in the water supply for drill hammers. Nevertheless, a 
surprisingly large variety of technical solutions to gold processing for 
ASM have been developed for their local activity. 
The risks to health and safety from the gold-processing operations can 
be potentially increased if mechanisation is applied in the absence of 
complementary safety measures. In order to solve this, projects, machines, 
and equipment should be designed according to explicit health and safety 
considerations. Government and donor organisations should serve as 
a model of safe mechanisation by consciously integrating risk management 
into their projects. Good designs have provisions to easily identify hazards 
and risks early on. This can result in reliable predictions and proactive 
controls of the gold-processing technology, which adds value to the ASM’s 
inherent ingenuity.
The ‘risk’ framework
Standards Australia/Standards New Zealand Committee (2009) suggests 
that the risk management model should ensure the integration and 
sustainability of health and safety. Such integration is prescribed by the 
international standard for risk, ISO 31000, as shown in Figure 9.1. The 
complex interactions between different risks, unique workplace conditions 
and recent evolution of mechanised technology together establish the 
context: the first step of  the risk management process. This complexity 
requires that a range of different approaches must be employed to 
identify  the risks. The next step is risk identification. In  the case study 
research, the risk identification element involved collecting data in the 
form of fieldnotes, audio recordings, transcripts and surveys. Another 
data source included a set of on-site video recordings. From the data, 
which covered broad to specific issues of concern, risks were identified 
and categorised. After this, the risk analysis stage proceeded in agreement 
with the sequence of elements in the process, as shown in Figure 9.1.
In the risk analysis step, the data collected is analysed to rank the risks 
based on the severity and frequency of risks. These are prioritised in 
terms of seriousness and relevance to stakeholders. The risk analysis 
and evaluation process utilises the risk identification data to holistically 
inform the introduction and implementation of the proposed gold-
processing plant. Risk evaluation is then performed to identify the more 
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serious risks that need risk treatment. Therefore, the output of the risk 
assessment steps is developed by collating the health, safety and other risks 
that need to be considered and managed. The risk treatment element of 
the process determines how these risks might be managed by suggesting 
controls that can prevent, mitigate or manage the risks. The output from 
the risk management process can then be incorporated into a project 
to help ensure successful implementation and sustainable operation of 
innovative gold-processing plants by the miners in different Philippine 
contexts. In doing so, the risk-based model should identify how the plant 
will impact the ASM miners’ health and safety, and inform stakeholders 
how the risks can be reduced and managed accordingly. The model should 
also highlight if there are risks that the plant may not directly address or 
may exacerbate, so these can be addressed as well. 
Figure 9.1: The risk management process
Source: AS/NzS ISO 31000:2009.
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Methodology trialled
To understand the risks and health and safety considerations associated 
with introducing mechanisation into ASM, it is necessary to grasp the true 
ASM context and to understand stakeholders’ views about the impacts 
of the proposed project. In certain cases, it is only through immersion into 
a community that the full impact and contextual relevance of projects can 
be understood. This risk-based immersion methodology was used to gain 
insights into the range of impacts that mechanisation can have on the 
ASM communities in the Philippines.
Risk identification using field interviews was conducted among 
representatives from the stakeholder groups. Semi-structured interviews 
and participant observation were exploratory in nature and aimed to 
provide baseline information about risks, especially health and safety 
considerations in gold processing in ASM communities. For the purposes 
of the case study, semi-structured interviews were conducted in four 
stakeholder groups, including the technical group (technology providers 
and other technical experts, external to the processing plant project), the 
government group (national and local government units), the social group 
(non-government organisations, civil society organisations, community 
staff of the processing plant project) and the ASM gold group. 
The interview part of the data collection was focused on understanding 
the Philippine ASM. The interview questions were designed to allow the 
stakeholders to discuss their work and their perceptions, and to collect 
information about health and safety. Information was gathered regarding 
stakeholder perceptions of the impacts that the proposed gold-processing 
plant might have on the health, safety and other risks associated with 
ASM activities. These helped reveal the level of acceptance of the proposed 
technology amongst relevant stakeholders, who will be directly affected by 
the changes brought about by its actual implementation. The interview 
questions focused not just on health and safety issues, but also on the 
equally important dimensions of environment, social and institutional 
policy and regulation, and governance.
Another important aspect of the risk-based immersion methodology 
were the insights that resulted from the on-site field observations of the 
current system of gold processing in different Philippine contexts, which 
included the two major ASM provinces of the country—namely, Benguet 
and Compostela Valley. ASM miners were observed going about normal 
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work activities in their natural work settings. These observations were 
conducted to collect information on the actual conditions at the ASM 
gold-processing sites, and about the miners’ typical workday, including 
their processes, activities and the equipment they use. Risks and hazards 
were identified in the working conditions, equipment used and techniques 
performed. Observations were also made to include the manual and 
mechanised techniques the ASM miners used to process their gold. 
A  comparison could then be made with the risk perceptions collected, 
and it helped to understand the details that should not be overlooked 
during hazard identification by the people designing and implementing 
mechanisation within ASM contexts.
Observations, including manual and mechanised techniques in the current 
gold processing of the ASM miners were recorded using a video camera 
for an hour. This was done to capture as many details as possible about 
a typical working day in an ASM community, within time constraints, in 
order to make the hazard identification step effective. Video recording was 
required for thorough analysis of the entire workplace environment, and 
it was also a practical way for the researcher to have primary data records 
to review as often as needed during the data analysis stage of the research. 
Fieldnotes were also taken to complement video recordings as  much 
as possible. 
Key lessons from fieldwork
Important understandings of strengths and limitations emerged when the 
research methodology was put into practice. Their analysis offers reflective 
insights in confirming whether the research goals were adequately 
achieved at this stage of the research study. Additionally, this analysis 
provides insights into whether it is possible to integrate health and safety 
risk management into mechanised gold-processing projects.
Strengths
The interview process predominantly used open-ended questions. Initial 
questions about risk were framed in a general way, so that the participant 
could openly express which among the risks relating to artisanal and 
small-scale gold processing was most relevant to them. The open-ended 
questioning method encouraged participants to raise diversely prolific 
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data relating to the range of threats, opportunities and risks relevant to 
each stakeholder group. As Creswell (2003) stated on socially constructed 
knowledge claims, broadly designed questions allow participants to 
construct the meaning of a situation. Such meaning is a product of actual 
experiences and a series of interactions. Creswell argues that open-ended 
interviews are better as they can focus on specific contexts in which people 
live and work, in order to understand the historical and cultural settings 
of the participants.
Employing open-ended questions also allowed the participants to express 
their expectations of the innovative gold-processing plant project. 
Discussions regarding stakeholder expectations revealed their experiences 
and perspectives regarding the interventions that attempted to affect 
change. This created an inclusive space, especially for the ASM miners, 
in a manner that provided a sense of ownership. For instance, one miner’s 
association in Benguet attributed the reduction in mercury use among 
its members to a synergy of local efforts and external collaboration. 
External support alone often furthers the cause only to a certain extent. 
It was interesting to know that there have been many organisations and 
government projects that have visited these communities through the 
years, with similar environmental objectives. Thus, two separate insights 
were derived: either the environmental outcomes are still yet to be fully 
realised in the area, or there is simply unnecessary duplication of projects 
and strategies.
Video recording facilitated an in-depth analysis of health and safety 
hazards and risks among the artisanal and small-scale mining and 
processing sites visited. The video recordings also show examples of 
how risks to health and safety from the gold-processing operations can 
be potentially increased if mechanisation is applied in the absence of 
complementary safety measures. It was observed and recorded on video 
that there was locally fabricated machinery, which was operated to some 
locally determined standards. It was quite evident how the safety features 
were suppressed in some cases. With the lack of capital and appropriate 
technical knowhow, the ASM miners and their families remain exposed to 
risks in such hazardous working conditions. 
There were three sources of mechanised technology apparent in the ASM 
provinces, captured in the participant observation. First was the application 
of local ingenuity in order to meet local conditions. The miners find a 
way amongst themselves and within their community to improve their 
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practices. This is more culturally influenced and can remain within the 
bounds of traditional practices. This confirms the observations cited from 
literature (Priester et al. 1993; Hentschel et al. 2002). Another source was 
the financier’s scheme, which can be driven to improve efficiency in order 
to enhance profit. Financiers support the ASM through the provision of 
mechanised equipment, under a shared profit scheme. This is a similar 
arrangement to that found with the small-scale miners in Ghana, where 
foreign businessmen assist the miners technically and financially in the 
form of mine support services (Hilson et al. 2014). Finally, there are 
external sources, such as government projects and foreign investments, 
which can be driven by both efficiency and risk reduction, especially when 
they are initiated by government institutions.
The interviews generated rich data. However, it was not always easy to 
gauge stakeholder perceptions of the significance and prioritisation 
of the issues and risks, which are important information for those that 
need to make informed decisions about the development of context-
specific technical solutions. It was beneficial to supplement the interview 
information with a survey instrument that collected participant 
perceptions on the significance and ranking of different types of risks. 
To do this, a conjoint rating and categorisation instrument was created. 
The rating component comprised a six-point scale, where 1 = lowest risk 
priority and/or slightly relevant to the participant’s stakeholder group 
and 6 = highest risk priority and/or highly relevant to the participant’s 
stakeholder group. The categorisation component allowed the participant 
to provide feedback for each of the different risks: health and safety, 
technical, social, environmental and regulatory. The use of two different 
methods—interview and survey—was beneficial because it helped to 
neutralise limitations or biases that have been recognised in literature 
(Creswell 2003). For example, the results from one method can help 
develop or inform the other method (Greene et al. 1989). Alternatively, 
one method can be nested within another method to provide insight into 
different levels or units of analysis (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998).
Limitations
The responses reveal an overlap associated with perceptions of the 
different risks (technical, social, environmental, health and safety 
and regulatory). There seemed to be a lack of clear distinction of each 
type of risk. For  example, with respect to health and safety risks and 
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environmental risks, participants seem to use these terms interchangeably. 
Similar responses indicating this lack of distinction were obtained from 
among the ASM miners, the government, partners and even some 
technical persons. Others use the word ‘safety’ even if they actually mean 
security issues arising from conflict. This mismatch of perceptions and 
expectations among stakeholder groups can introduce confounding 
findings within results. To overcome this limitation and because the 
research objectives were focused on health and safety, probing keywords 
were used, such as sickness, injuries and accidents, to delineate the blurred 
lines between health and safety and the other different types of risk.
Another limitation that was encountered was the finding that some of 
the government agencies and relevant stakeholder groups have limited 
knowledge about the project. Although this finding may be unexpected, 
it is fairly reasonable, given that the gold-processing plant project was still 
in its pre-construction stage when the fieldwork was conducted (2015). 
The limited information at this stage of the project can be acknowledged 
as a barrier to collecting sufficient data to support claims regarding the 
project implementation. However, some respondents were conservative in 
giving information about the project. Reluctance and ambivalence were 
common responses from stakeholders due to a degree of incompleteness. 
Indeed, the design and construction stages may still represent the project 
in its early state. However early, this stage should not be regarded as 
a premature time to discuss the appropriate framework to explore potential 
and perceived risks.
Conclusion
ASM is adopting mechanised technology in order to improve efficiency 
of gold processing and reduce environmental risks. In a given context, 
the exact purpose is driven by the source of the mechanised technology, 
which includes local ingenuity, financers’ schemes and external sources. 
With the ongoing efforts of the government to improve the efficiency and 
mitigate environmental impacts through projects involving mechanised 
technology, there is an opportunity to formally include health and safety 
considerations.
Based on the experiences and lessons from the recent fieldwork in two 
Philippine ASM provinces, important health and safety risks were 
identified and recognised among the artisanal and small-scale mining and 
205
9 . IS IT POSSIBLe TO INTeGRATe HeALTH AND SAFeTy RISK MANAGeMeNT
processing sites visited, and these risks should be addressed. However, 
without appropriate technical and risk management know-how, the miners 
and their families remain exposed to the risks associated with hazardous 
ASM working conditions. The risks to health and safety from the gold-
processing operations can be potentially increased if mechanisation is 
applied in the absence of explicit health and safety considerations. There 
is a lack of clear distinction between environmental risks and health and 
safety risks, as though these two domains can be used interchangeably. 
This can result in some unwanted consequences due to mismatch of 
perceptions and expectations.
To successfully implement sustainable and effective mechanised 
technology in ASM contexts, it is necessary to understand the range of 
risks and perceptions from different stakeholder perspectives. One way 
to understand risk is by immersion-based research. As shown with the 
case study conducted in the ASM provinces of Benguet and Compostela, 
rich data on risk and perceptions can be collected from immersion-based 
research. The data was cross-examined and analysed to identify common 
themes. These themes can be used to form a risk management framework 
that helps people make informed decisions on how technical solutions 
can be best integrated within ASM contexts to minimise health, safety 
and other risks that can adversely impact the successful implementation 
and ongoing sustainability of a technology.
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Resources and resourcefulness: 
Gender, human rights and 
resilience in artisanal mining 
towns of eastern Congo
Rachel Perks, Jocelyn Kelly, Stacie Constantian 
and Phuong Pham
Few things evoke reactions as passionate as issues surrounding gender, 
conflict and mining in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). 
At once reviled by international advocacy organisations and celebrated 
by local communities, mining is viewed as both the scourge and the 
saviour of a region wrecked by decades of violence. Studies have reported 
on human rights as well as on the status of women in the DRC, and 
although some examine the link between mining and sex-based violence, 
little research explores the gender dimensions of artisanal and small-scale 
mining (ASM). The research in this chapter was framed by questions 
such as: Do men and women face similar difficulties when seeking to 
gain employment in mining? Are they afforded similar opportunities 
once they have secured access into ASM? What are the most prevalent 
social, economic and health impacts experienced by individuals. Are these 
impacts gendered? A human rights–based approach informed the range 
of issues examined, such as gender, militarisation of the extraction process 
and free and equal participation in political, judicial and economic 
systems. By speaking with a wide variety of actors who live and  work 
within these communities, we attempted to identify issues that are 
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common to mining-affected areas. The experiences of both women and 
men were examined, but a particular focus remained on understanding 
women’s experiences in mining towns. Hence, the research was ultimately 
guided by the hypothesis that by understanding issues related to safety, 
security and economic opportunities for women, significant gains in both 
economic and social development in the eastern DRC could be achieved.
The Harvard Humanitarian Initiative in collaboration with the World 
Bank conducted two phases of research: Phase 1 (qualitative), followed by 
Phase 2 (quantitative). Research was conducted in North and South Kivu 
provinces, two of the most conflict-affected areas of the DRC. Phase 1 
took place in 2012, with the aim to elicit experiences of male and female 
miners, using a human rights framework of inquiry developed specifically 
for the project. Five key findings resulted from the qualitative research in 
Phase 1, which then informed the quantitative, population-based survey 
in Phase 2. These focused on gender-based violence, discrimination, right 
to health, access to justice and right to participation. Although women 
were vital actors in mining communities and filled many roles, they were 
also among the most vulnerable to sexual and economic predation. Sexual 
exploitation was described as commonplace in mining towns, and many 
women spoke about engaging in transactional sex out of desperation. It is 
important to acknowledge the practice of discrimination, because mining 
jobs are theoretically open to everyone; however, actually acquiring work 
was dictated by one’s ability to pay for access to the mines. Women and 
other vulnerable populations were generally relegated to marginal support 
roles in mining towns. Right to health is important because is it crucial 
to a woman’s well-being. Health problems were summarised into three 
categories: poor labour conditions; poor structure of mining tunnels; and 
public health problems, such as poor hygiene and high levels of infectious 
diseases. For the majority of participants, access to justice was a demand 
arising from the sufferance of  human rights violations. Those most 
vulnerable to human rights abuses, such as orphans, widows, sex workers 
and displaced persons, were also those least able to access traditional and 
formal justice mechanisms. Right to participation in a situation of highly 
restricted access to political participation and widespread discrimination 
was crucial. 
Phase 2 used a quantitative survey to examine the scope of human rights 
issues emerging from Phase 1 in select mining towns. The survey results 
affirmed the human rights issues raised in Phase 1, and provided some 
indications of the frequencies of experience within the total sampled 
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mining populations.1 The survey was a cross-sectional study from three 
territories (Kalehe, Mwenga and Walungu) in the South Kivu Province 
of the eastern DRC. Sites were sampled from a comprehensive list of 
artisanal mining sites, compiled by the International Peace Information 
Service. This list documented 800 mining sites and 85 trading centres, 
with information about armed groups’ presence and involvement, and the 
scale of the mining activity in 2012 and 2013. A total of 998 surveys were 
collected for this project: 357 individuals were female and 641 individuals 
were male. The next section outlines selected research findings, combining 
both qualitative and quantitative data from Phases 1 and 2. 
Women, mining and conflict in the DRC
ASM and its relationship to armed conflict in the eastern provinces of 
the DRC has been has been vividly described, researched and discussed. 
The wars in the mid-1990s accelerated the disintegration of agricultural 
economies that had begun during structural adjustment in the early 1980s. 
Active hostilities stretched into decades of insecurity, and the resulting 
displacement, crop viruses, threat of violence and danger of looting and 
predation by armed groups shaped entirely new economic and social 
systems. ASM assumed a more prominent role in rural economic life. 
In the DRC, some authors have written of the causes and consequences 
of ‘deagrarianisation’—the transition away from agriculture towards 
other rural livelihoods—with respect to the proliferation of ASM (Perks 
2011; Smith 2011; Geenen 2012; Kelly 2014). Important to note from 
these prior research findings is that the manner of transformation of the 
rural economic landscape in the DRC, and the role played by mining 
in this transformation, mirrors the experiences of other mineral-rich 
environments. Also important to highlight are the varying degrees of 
political stability under which ‘deagrarianisation’ and ASM proliferated 
in these environments: from politically stable Ghana (Banchirigah 2008), 
Burkina Faso (Luning 2008) and Tanzania (Bryceson and Jønsson 2010), 
to outright civil destabilisation in Sierra Leone (Maconachie and Binns 
2010).2 Such varied political landscapes under which ASM has proliferated 
1  For purposes of brevity, this chapter concentrates on research results that inform the first three 
findings. Those interested in seeing the full results can refer to the full report from the World Bank 
(2015a), titled ‘Resources and Resourcefulness: Gender, Conflict, and Artisanal Mining Communities 
in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo’.
2  For an overview, see Hilson (2011). 
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across the subcontinent in the last 30 years beg the question for the DRC 
as to the extent to which the proliferation of ASM can be best, or perhaps 
solely, understood from a prism of conflict. Such a reframing of our 
understanding of ASM might further lead to new methods of inquiry 
with respect to the social, environmental and economic externalities 
associated with ASM today. Are human rights issues associated with 
ASM in the eastern DRC best understood as a product of instability and 
armed conflict? Or is there a more complex landscape of contributing 
factors? These are important issues to raise at the outset, for the framing 
of the cause and consequences of ASM in the eastern DRC has often been 
associated most vividly with conflict, despite, as suggested, evidence from 
other environments in sub-Saharan Africa that shows ASM proliferation 
to have significant roots tied to general economic decline in rural areas 
since the 1980s, and poor government regulation of ASM equally since 
that period. 
Unpacking myths and exploring realities 
of human rights in the mines
The nature of ASM in the DRC, given its illegality and the diversity of 
jobs and types of minerals extracted, has been historically difficult for 
many in the international community to comprehend, resulting in a wide 
range of potentially destructive narratives being applied to a remarkably 
diverse and vibrant local economy.
A prevalent narrative surrounding ASM in the eastern DRC is that the 
wealth generated from mining fuels the ongoing conflict in the eastern 
DRC and, as a result, exacerbates the conflict-related abuse of women. 
Advocacy narratives have named so-called ‘conflict minerals’ as a main 
driver of insecurity, and linked it with rape as a weapon of war. However, 
several academic pieces have refuted this simplistic narrative as follows: 
this prominent storyline offers an over-simplified version of reality, in 
which non-state or rebel armies exercise control over mines, and every 
worker is essentially subject to slavery. Coercion is typified as the manner 
in which women end up in mines or mining towns; thus, much of the 
employment is coerced or involuntary. Several scholars have called into 
question this narrative’s simplicity (Geenen and Custers 2010; Autesserre 
2012; Geenen 2012; Seay 2012; Bashwira et al. 2014; Perks 2013; Spittaels 
and Hilgert 2013), the results of which are discussed in the next section. 
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Results: Why people stopped farming
The fear of sexual violence during conflict was specifically cited as 
a reason why people ceased farming and entered mines instead. Women 
in the mining town of Nzibera described how rape in particular affected 
farming: ‘If people went to their farm, they can get raped or even gang 
raped, because we think if we say “no,” they will kill us’. A young woman 
in Nzibera explained, ‘There is lots of hunger here. But if you have been 
raped on your farm, you will never return, and the farm will just die’.
In Nyabibwe, women described insecurity and violence as an ongoing 
deterrent to resuming agricultural activities:
During the war things changed, if you tried to go to the farm they would 
rape you, take your things, the biggest consequence of war is that it locked 
people in, there was no freedom to move to different areas to sell your 
goods or to look for work … After the big war still things remain difficult, 
people tell you there is peace and that it is OK to go to the farm, but when 
you go, if they don’t kill you they will rape you.
Motivations for entering the mines
Phase 1 results revealed a general decline in the viability of agriculture as 
a sole source of income due to the conflict and general insecurity following 
the war. These factors seemed to frame the historical motivation for 
entry into mining, particularly with older respondents. The quantitative 
survey examined the drivers of migration to mining towns in more detail. 
Mining populations participating in the survey were highly migratory: 
here, 48 per cent of women and 38 per cent of men stated that the town 
they currently worked in was not their place of origin (n = 412). Women’s 
rate of migration was statistically higher than men’s (at p <  0.05). 
Individuals who identified themselves as migrants were asked why they 
sought work in mining towns. People were asked about their reasons 
for moving to mining towns, and were allowed to select more than one 
option. The results show that 55 per cent of respondents stated that there 
was no work in their communities of origin; almost as many stated that 
they sought work in mining because there were no services in the areas 
from where they came. Women were more likely than men to cite lack 
of money or employment as a driver to migrate, whereas men were more 
likely to cite lack of services as a motivation. One-third of women and 
men stated that lack of food drove them to migrate to mining towns. 
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Violence and insecurity were less commonly cited as drivers to migrate 
than economic reasons—15.7 per cent of respondents stated these were 
the factors in their decision-making, with relatively little difference 
between men and women. One of the least cited reasons for migration 
was direct displacement by armed groups. These results suggest that the 
conflict may have created the conditions by which mining became an 
appealing industry, but direct conflict-related considerations were less 
important than economic drivers. 
Framing the results along the human rights 
framework
Sexual and gender‑based violence: The blurred lines 
between sex work and sexual exploitation
Many women spoke about engaging in transactional sex out 
of  desperation—a profession that placed them at an increased risk of 
experiencing rape and other forms of abuse. Sex workers were often 
migratory and without social or financial support. Sexual predation by 
armed men was also described as a concern, although it was generally less 
pressing than the everyday violence and abuse that women suffered as 
a result of living in mining towns.
The qualitative research illustrated how running a restaurant, engaging in 
sex work and transporting materials are by no means mutually exclusive 
roles. Instead, one leads to, or requires, doing another. Many women 
spoke about having to transact sex simply to survive. Often, this is because 
they do not have a husband or other male relatives to bring an income 
home, and are forced to fend for themselves. They went on to describe 
how trading sexual favours was a prerequisite for gaining access to small 
jobs in mining towns: 
People also force women to have sex with them by saying that if you 
don’t sleep with me you won’t get to keep carrying bags … Women do 
prostitution so that they can get other work. You are selling yourself, 
tiring yourself to get some money for your children.
Women described the close links between economic and sexual 
exploitation: how they aren’t paid or are underpaid for the work they do; 
are sexually harassed or raped while working; are physically beaten; and 
are forced to perform sexual favours in order to get clients or employment. 
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Those women who speak out about their exploitation are forced out of 
the area under threat. As a young sex worker in Nyabibwe said simply, 
‘If you refuse them (sexually), they will tell you if you return again to the 
area they will kill you’.
All actors interviewed in the qualitative phase of this project emphasised 
that sex work was widespread and commonplace in mining contexts. 
As one man said, ‘The soko [market] of the prostitutes is the mining quarry’. 
Exchanging sex for goods is one of the only ways women can provide for 
themselves and their families. Poverty was described as a defining driver of 
prostitution. Even wives of miners spoke frankly about the temptations for 
their husbands: ‘Yes—it [prostitution] exists because of poverty. Around 
the mines, women prostitute themselves to get money that the miners 
give them and because otherwise they wouldn’t have anything to eat’. 
In many sites, sex workers came from other areas and had to build a life 
without the benefit of social networks or peer support in their new 
environment. Women may also migrate from mining town to mining 
town, looking for a better situation. Miners emphasised the transitory 
nature of the work, saying, ‘There are also many prostitutes from all over, 
Uvira, Bukavu, they here when there is action here. They call their friends, 
everyone comes, we don’t even know their faces’.
Women engaging in sex work may face stigma and social rejection in their 
home communities when they return, particularly if they have children 
out of wedlock. This means that once a woman begins to trade sex in 
mining towns, it can be difficult for her to leave this line of work. Women 
may find themselves caught in a cycle of travelling to look for work 
in places with the most productive mines, where men have disposable 
income. 
The ‘choice’ to engage in sex work is made against a backdrop of 
desperation, violence and coercion. This reality means that respondents in 
the research saw sex work and sexual violence as closely linked. Participants 
described sexual violence as forcing a woman to have sex against her 
will, but they also described other forms of this abuse, including men 
refusing to pay for sexual services. As one miner described, ‘The meaning 
of rape is to take someone by force and even if you haven’t already agreed 
to do it you make them have sex with you, this is a common thing in 
our area’. Women transporters reinforced this, saying, ‘When a man is 
drunk he can also rape a woman without hav[ing] a conversation, and 
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even if it looks like prostitution, it is rape. This happens a lot of time to 
prostitutes’. One young miner simply stated, ‘Ya kila qualite na aina iko 
hapa nyabibwe [There is sexual violence of every quality and kind here in 
Nyabibwe]. When God built the mine here he knew that rape would be 
there as well with the mine’.
Men also said that women could be at fault for their own rape, either by 
dressing provocatively or by getting themselves into dangerous situations. 
The responsibility for avoiding violence was put squarely on women’s 
shoulders. As one young miner explained:
How can we fight rape? It is a personal decision. You [a woman] must 
protect yourself, if you don’t expose yourself in front of a man they cannot 
rape you … rape is here is because the women expose themselves and 
comport themselves in a certain way.
These attitudes illustrate the gross inequality that women face. Excluded 
from power structures and decision-making structures, the only thing 
they are perceived to be responsible for is the violence that is perpetrated 
against them. Often, women made differences in sexual violence from 
civilians versus armed men. Soldiers are described as engaging in forms 
of militarised rape, which have become common as a result of conflict in 
the DRC. As miners in Nyabibwe noted, ‘Soldiers are the ones who are 
used to raping women … but it is usually driven by a gun … But it is not 
that common among us civilians’. As women transporters described, ‘Is 
it here—yes, when there is war. Ntaganda, Nkunda—their soldiers rape 
IDPs [internally displaced persons], then others keep the practice going’. 
The leader of the sex workers’ association in Nyabibwe said, ‘Soldiers they 
usually don’t pay for sex, sometimes demobilised soldiers as well, but even 
miners themselves, many don’t pay for sex afterwards’. 
The experiences of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) were 
explored in order to measure the extent of trading sex for basic goods 
and services. It became clear that money was the commodity that was 
most often traded for sex: 38.1 per cent of women reported this. Also 
common was the need for women to trade sex for protection, with one 
in five women (20.4 per cent) reporting this experience. Protection, as 
described in Phase 1, could include being granted access to safe working 
conditions or protection from violence from other actors. In contrast, 
men’s rates of exchanging sex for any good or service (money, protection 
217
10 . ReSOURCeS AND ReSOURCeFULNeSS
or work) was quite stable, at roughly 6 per cent. This implies that there is 
a small but stable population of men among those sampled who engage 
in transactional sex. 
Active sex work in mining towns is, at least in part, influenced by the 
transient nature of the work, and the fact that men often come to mining 
areas without a spouse or partner. Women may come to mining towns 
expecting to engage in other kinds of work, such as trading or selling of 
small goods, but will find themselves then compelled to engage in regular 
sex work. One-fifth of all women (20.1 per cent) working in mining 
towns identified themselves as sex workers, whereas only 1.3 per cent of 
men did so. Of those who reported engaging in sex work, 93 per cent 
of women and 100 per cent of men say they work for themselves, rather 
than for a boss or association. These findings suggest that although sex 
work is a common profession for women, those engaging in it are not 
controlled by an outside entity.
Twenty-eight women said they were sex workers, but had not planned on 
getting into this work when seeking work in mining. Of these women, 
three-quarters said they were compelled to do sex work because of poverty, 
and another 18 per cent said that sex work was more profitable than the 
work they had originally intended to do. One-third of women said they 
went into sex work because they were not able to get other jobs, and 
18 per cent said they did sex work to gain access to other types of work. 
Above and beyond the varied forms of SGBV, women surveyed in Phase 2 
reported incidences of harassment. For instance, one-third of women 
stated that they had been harassed by men in the mines. Of these women, 
89 per cent said they had experienced harassment in the past 12 months. 
Sex workers had 10 times greater odds of reporting harassment than non-
sex workers (odds ratio = 10.6, p < 0.001). Only 7 per cent of women 
stated that they had ever discussed this harassment or discrimination with 
others; although, encouragingly, almost 30 per cent of women stated that 
associations might be able to help with these kinds of problems. When 
asked what kind of help might be offered, 82 per cent of women said 
that these organisations could provide advice, and 18 per cent said that 
these organisations would be able to speak to authorities on their behalf. 
We return to the pivotal role to be played by forms of social organisation 
later in this section.
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Discrimination
Interestingly, almost five times more men than women reported having 
ever been denied a job in the mines that they wanted to have. It may 
be that men aspire to have more lucrative or competitive jobs, whereas 
women may not seek these positions. When women gave answers about 
which jobs they were denied, they were more likely (in the open-ended 
question format) to state that they had been denied access to the mining 
area as a whole, rather than stating they were denied a specific job. 
Furthermore, 13 per cent of women surveyed in Phase 2 reported that 
they had been told, once having secured a job, that they could not earn the 
same amount of money as men. Finally, 16 per cent of women surveyed 
in Phase 2 reported that they had to turn down jobs in the mines because 
of problems at home. The most common problem cited was caring for 
children (65.5 per cent), followed by caring for others (10.3 per cent).
Outright denial of jobs to women in the mines can, in part, be 
explained by attitudes towards women’s participation in mines, and lack 
of general knowledge about their rights under the Mining Code, its 
accompanying regulations and broader laws on women’s right to work. 
Phase 1 highlighted a number of misconceptions about mining laws 
and regulations. Therefore, Phase 2 incorporated a module dedicated to 
knowledge about and access to information about mining regulations and 
laws in the survey instrument. The ‘Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices’ 
module attempted to assess knowledge, not only about the existence of 
mining-related policies, but also about perceptions around these policies. 
Only 26 per cent of women and 40 per cent of men reported that they 
knew there was a mining code in the DRC. Seventy per cent of women 
and 94 per cent of men stated that they would like to know more about it.
One common misconception was that women were not allowed to 
work directly in mining-related jobs. This may be related to a poor 
understanding of the policy that bans pregnant women from undertaking 
hard labour. Data supports the fact that this is a widely held assumption. 
Only 17 per cent of women and 20 per cent of men thought that women 
had the right to work as miners. Interestingly, when the survey asked the 
same question about women’s right to work as mineral buyers or traders, 
60 per cent of women and 65 per cent of men stated that they did have 
this right. Therefore, misconceptions about the right to work in mining 
may, at least in part, be related to ideas about women doing physically 
taxing work. 
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The Congolese mining code also allows children over 15 years of age to 
work in mining contexts, as long as the work is not physically dangerous. 
However, because of intense international advocacy about the dangers of 
child labour in mining towns, there is great sensitivity about admitting 
that children work in these areas. Although the practice is widespread and 
children often act as porters, washers, vendors and miners, this is often 
hidden from visitors for fear that mining activities may be suspended 
if child labour is discovered. This is reflected in the survey responses. 
Individuals were asked if children were allowed to work in mining towns, 
if the work was not physically hazardous. Seventeen per cent of women 
and 20 per cent of men said that children did not have the right to do this 
kind of work. 
Right to health
Working in mining towns brings with it risks for a number of health 
hazards—from physical injury associated with hazardous physical work, 
to sexually transmitted infections because of high levels of transactional 
sex. Health problems may be compounded by limited access to health 
care in these areas, or limited ability to pay for services that do exist. In the 
qualitative survey of Phase 1, health problems in mining towns were broken 
down into three categories by participants: (i) poor labour conditions; 
(ii) poor structure of mining tunnels; (iii) public health problems such as 
poor hygiene and high levels of infectious disease. The scarcity of public 
health resources in mining areas, such as toilets, clean water supply, waste 
systems and primary care facilities, combined with close-quartered living 
conditions leads to high prevalence of diarrhoea, tuberculosis, respiratory 
infections, malnutrition and malaria. These problems are consistent across 
all the sites visited. Sexually transmitted infections, including HIV/AIDS 
are also described as significant problems, although people have such 
poor access to health care that these conditions are often not officially 
diagnosed. The head nurse in Mulamba describes the biggest health issues 
facing his community:
There is a lot of HIV/AIDS; poverty leads women to exchange sex. There 
are also sanitary problems and many accidents and blunt trauma from 
landslides and rockfalls. There is tuberculosis in the mines. Close to the 
mines, we see cholera, amoebas, diarrhea, measles and typhoid. 
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Lack of access to health care due to financial or geographical obstacles 
exacerbates these issues. Many participants explain how pursuing health 
care is not an easy choice. Miners in Mulamba illustrate the sacrifice 
it often takes to get medical treatment:
When people need care, they are transported to the nearest health centre. 
They must sell their fields or goats to pay for health care. They can’t make 
enough to pay for care from the mines. 
The head nurse in Mulamba goes even further, saying many must choose 
between eating and going to the health centre, and that such barriers 
to health services lead many to put their faith in prayer or magic 
over health care:
You will see that in one family, if someone falls sick, the little they make is 
not enough to pay [for health care]. Many people die because their family 
decides to eat rather than to pay the clinic fees for one person. This is 
because of the kind of poverty we live in. People say that health problems 
are a result of witchcraft. They pray instead of getting care.
Phase 2 used the quantitative survey instrument to delve deeper into 
frequencies of health issues. Fifty per cent of women and 40 per cent 
of men reported having a medical issue in the past year. Encouragingly, 
of  those individuals reporting a problem, 78 per cent of women and 
70 per cent of men said they accessed care for this problem. 
A majority of women (71 per cent) and men (88 per cent) said that the 
care they received was adequate. However, a notable percentage of women 
(27 per cent) and men (10 per cent) said that the care they received was 
not adequate. It is striking that women were three times more likely than 
their male counterparts to say they received poor care at a health facility 
(as defined by the participants’ perception). 
Fourteen per cent of women and 7 per cent of men stated that they had 
been denied medical care at least once in their lives, with women twice as 
likely as men to experience this problem. When asked about the reasons 
why they were denied health care, the vast majority of both women 
(84 per cent) and men (81 per cent) stated that they could not pay for 
health care services. The second-most commonly cited reason was that the 
clinic did not know how to treat their condition; this reason was cited by 
10 per cent of women and 7 per cent of men. One in four women and 
men said that they had taken out a loan to pay for medical care. 
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When one disaggregates the experience of being denied health care by 
profession, clear differences emerge. Those in less prestigious jobs are 
more likely to report denial of care. Miners, food vendors and sex workers 
are the most likely to report this experience, whereas those in positions of 
power are much less likely to be denied care. Those who were most likely 
to report being denied access to health care were those who also reported 
experiencing a health problem in the past year. These results speak to the 
fact that those in the least privileged jobs are the most likely to have health 
issues. 
Discussion
The popular advocacy narrative surrounding ASM in the eastern DRC—
that the wealth generated from mining fuels the ongoing conflict and, 
as a result, exacerbates the conflict-related abuse of women—has been 
questioned by a number of scholars, who argue that over-simplification 
has led to misguided policies and a lack of understanding about the true 
issues facing women (and men) in the mining areas of the eastern DRC 
(Pact Inc. 2010; Hayes and Perks 2012; Seay 2012, 2014; Kelly et al. 
2014a, Kelly et al. 2014b). The findings of this project emphasise that the 
conditions and dynamics in which people work in ASM sites are more 
complex, but there are also concrete points for positive change. 
The respondents in both phases of this project were highly migratory 
populations with low levels of education. Women cited a lack of money 
or employment as reasons for migrating, whereas men moved most 
often because they lacked access to services in the areas from where they 
came. Women who seek work in mining towns are often the sole income 
earners in the family, either due to the loss of husbands or male family 
members through conflict, or due to the failure of their traditional income 
earning strategies (Hayes and Perks 2012). The higher rates of women’s 
migration to unfamiliar towns can also bring a number of vulnerabilities, 
including lack of access to social support groups and lack of access to, 
and knowledge of, goods and services. The least reported reason for 
migration was displacement by an armed group, which highlights how 
economic and development opportunities were a greater motivator for the 
respondents sampled than conflict insecurity—a finding that is consistent 
with other recent studies (Geenen 2012). 
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This report also highlights how acts of discrimination and exploitation in 
mining areas can range from the subtle—such as a lack of representation 
among mining authorities, political disenfranchisement, exposure to 
occupational health hazards without proper access to health services and 
illegal taxation—to the extreme—such as sexual violence, child labour and 
debt bondage. Although the latter abuses often receive the most attention, 
the former are perhaps the most pervasive. Consider the findings from 
a 2014 US Agency for International Development (USAID) survey in 
artisanal mining towns in northeastern DRC: although labour trafficking, 
forced marriage, and debt bondage were reported by survey participants, 
these abuses were relatively rare and many of the perpetrators were 
described as family members, mining bosses, other miners or government 
officials, as opposed to armed actors from a particular group (Kelly et al. 
2014a). The same report details abuses such as usurious lending, work 
without pay and predatory taxation. These practices were, however, 
undertaken mostly by civilian authorities rather than armed actors (ibid.). 
These types of exploitation also emerge in the findings from the present 
report, confirming prior research results cited herein.
Although women are vital actors in mining communities and fill a variety 
of roles, they are also among the most vulnerable to sexual and economic 
predation. The more profitable jobs are, more often than not, kept for 
men. Women are paid less than men for the same amount of work or level 
of effort, and are excluded from high-level conversations that ultimately 
dictate their circumstances (Hayes and Perks 2012; Kelly et al. 2014a). 
Unfortunately, such practices are not exclusive to the DRC alone, as 
described by Eftimie et al. (2012), Lahiri-Dutt and Macintyre (2006), 
and Hinton et al. (2003) in other ASM contexts across the globe. 
This report details how gendered employment patterns emerge in mining 
towns. The job of miner was almost exclusively filled by men, whereas 
the vast majority of women worked in support roles, such as selling food 
or engaging in transactional sex. Past research also found that women 
are excluded from the highest-paying jobs, with many relegated to 
occupations such as sorting, gathering, washing, cooking, selling goods 
and/or engaging in transactional sex (Hayes 2008; Hayes and Perks 
2012). No women worked as chefs d’equipe, comptoirs or PNGs, and only 
eight men reported being sex workers. Looking at the marital background 
of men and women who seek work in mining towns highlights a notable 
difference: whereas most men working in mining towns are single 
or married, a very high proportion of women therein reported being 
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widowed or divorced. These findings suggest that women who have lost 
the support of a male relative, either through death or separation, may 
be forced to seek work in mining towns in order to survive. As noted by 
Hilson (2009), mining towns can provide opportunities for employment 
for traditionally marginalised populations. The jobs that are available to 
these vulnerable groups, however, are often low paying and exploitative. 
Results from this work also highlight the overly simplistic nature of the 
narrative of ‘rape as a weapon of war’. Women in ASM communities 
navigate a complex backdrop of sexual abuse. Sex is frequently a necessary 
component of employment in ASM, either as a profession in and of itself, 
or as a requirement in order to access other work opportunities or security. 
Women deal with myriad challenges, sometimes in the form of men failing 
to pay after sex or forcing the woman to have sex even if a price has not yet 
been negotiated. In focus groups, women reported sexual harassment, rape 
and forced performance of sexual favours, and the USAID report found that 
7.1 per cent of the female survey participants had experienced forced sex 
within the past year (Kelly 2014). Responses to the USAID survey highlight 
the additional vulnerability implicit in this kind of transactional sex work, 
as women who reported having engaged in sex work were significantly more 
likely to also report sexual violence (ibid.). Bashwira et al. (2014) and Mahy 
(2012) support these findings, reporting on the complex dynamics between 
sex, employment and power in ASM communities.
Exclusion for political processes and entrenched discrimination were 
described as the norm in the communities visited for Phase 1. Vulnerable 
groups, including women, the elderly, the poor and landless, children and 
the handicapped (to name a few), were absent from political decision-
making. Instead, participants stated that power resides in the hands of 
a few individuals. Marginalised groups described their efforts at self-
organising into associations in an attempt to gain a sense of self-agency. 
However, they lack the financial means, human capacity and political 
influence to make lasting impacts.
The reasons behind marginalisation of women in particular are myriad. 
However, they seem to rest principally on three mutually reinforcing 
axes: cultural norms, altered family structure (resulting from decades of 
war and destruction) and education. Despite women’s rise in the public 
work domain, many traditional and socially entrenched patriarchal beliefs 
continue to prevent women from engaging in meaningful, productive 
employment in the mines. The burden of the female single wage earner 
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becomes even starker, as the most vulnerable women face higher rates of 
sexual predation than their married female counterparts. This culture has 
further retained and made remarkable use of common superstitions that 
perpetuate the belief that women working in mines are a form of bad luck. 
Hayes and Perks (2012) provide the example of a prevalent belief held among 
miners in Orientale and Katanga provinces: if a woman enters a mine, the 
minerals will vanish. These norms and taboos are perpetuated by a lack of 
education regarding mining laws and codes. Kelly et al. (2014b) provide the 
example of an article within the 2002 Mining Code for the DRC, dictating 
that pregnant women cannot engage in hazardous or heavy labour. This 
specific mining code article has enjoyed sweeping misinterpretation across 
the mines in the DRC, in order to prevent women from engaging in any 
mining activity. As shown in the report, people are often ignorant of the 
rights they have under national and international law. In fact, ignorance 
and misconceptions about mining laws and regulations are widespread. The 
continued marginalisation and exploitation of women and children is but 
one expression of this ignorance. 
This work particularly investigates patterns of discrimination and political 
exclusion. Women were more likely to be denied access to the mining 
area, overall. Notably, there was a widespread perception that women 
were not allowed to work as miners or in other physically taxing jobs. 
These misconceptions do not lead to the total exclusion of women and 
children from mining areas but, rather, to their marginalisation to low 
paying support jobs. 
The lack of structures to ensure fair practices and to promote justice 
served to reinforce a culture of predation on women—fostering an ethos 
of both cultural and judicial impunity. As highlighted by an outside 
scholar and by an SGBV expert during a feedback session on the report 
results in Washington, DC, the general erosion of state institutions 
has contributed enormously to the abuse of women—economically, 
physically and sexually—both in the mining and non-mining areas of 
the eastern  DRC (see  World Bank 2015b). Putting aside the question 
of whether the culture of impunity is more acute in mining versus non-
mining areas, it is important to recall the nature of these extractive 
environments—by and large remote, isolated geographic spaces where 
alcohol and drug consumption is prevalent (Pact Inc. 2010). Those 
most vulnerable to human rights abuses, such as orphans, widows, 
sex workers and displaced persons, are also those least able to access 
traditional and formal justice mechanisms. It has emerged clearly from 
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this feedback session that rebuilding state institutions needs to be placed 
front and centre in the fight to promote women’s rights in these settings. 
In viewing SGBV as an expression of a much wider societal breakdown, 
one begins to see how multifaceted human rights issues are in mining 
areas, by consequence requiring a holistic, multisectoral approach towards 
rebuilding individuals, families and communities at large. 
One could consider, for example, the health consequences of SGBV alone 
to understand the need for a multisectoral approach. Participants in the 
research project spoke particularly about HIV/AIDS as an emerging threat 
that the nearly non-existent health infrastructure in most isolated mining 
areas is not equipped to handle. Close quarters and hard labour mean that 
other health issues, including physical trauma, diarrhoea, tuberculosis, 
respiratory infections, malnutrition and malaria, are rampant. It is certainly 
plausible that HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted infections (STIs) 
may be more prevalent in mining towns in the eastern DRC, as is the case 
in other settings (Clift et al. 2003; Conro and Walque 2012). Furthermore, 
superstition often replaces education about the spread of disease, increasing 
the likelihood of high STI prevalence rates in ASM communities (Pact 
Inc. 2010). Populations working in and around mines are at risk of a great 
number of other health risks due to structural issues, exposure to minerals, 
ergonomic concerns and a lack of sanitation and safety equipment. Health 
issues include, but are not limited to, mining disasters, mercury exposure, 
radioactive material exposure, gastrointestinal disease, malnutrition, 
infection, lung disease, bone and muscle injuries and heat stress (Walle and 
Jennings 2001; Hayes and Wauwe 2009; Pact Inc. 2010; Kelly et al. 2014a). 
Pregnancy, reproductive problems and injuries due to SGBV are also issues 
of concern for women specifically, especially given the general lack of access 
to adequate health care (Pact Inc. 2010; Hayes and Perks 2012). Drug and 
alcohol abuse is described as being rampant in mining towns and inside the 
quarries themselves. Substance abuse has led to an increase in violence and 
a breakdown in the social fabric of their villages. 
Of those who needed health care in the past year, a majority of respondents 
from Phase 2 said they accessed it and thought the care they received was 
adequate. Women, however, were three times more likely to say that the 
care they received was not adequate. This potentially speaks to the health 
system being ill prepared to provide for the health care needs of women, 
which includes unintended pregnancy, sexual and physical violence and 
STIs. Women also reported health facilities as being unable to treat their 
conditions more than men did. Cost was cited as a barrier to care, with 
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14 per cent of women and 7 per cent of men saying they had been denied 
medical care at least once in their lives, often because they could not pay. 
Those in the most vulnerable and lowest-paying jobs were the most likely 
to be denied care. This is an especially concerning issue because those most 
likely to report being denied care are also the most likely to report having 
had a health problem in the past year. Although those who have health 
problems may experience more denial of care because they seek care more 
often, these results speak to the fact that those in the least privileged jobs are 
the most likely to have health issues. A quarter of the respondents said they 
had taken loans to pay for medical care. In the USAID study conducted 
in mining towns in South Kivu and Maniema, paying for health care was 
cited as the third-most common reason that people took loans (Kelly et al. 
2014a). 
Against this challenging backdrop, however, the research pointed to 
promising examples of civic organisations with the potential for providing 
inclusivity and social support to miners. According to the DRC Mining Code, 
all artisanal miners are obliged to be part of a cooperative. The experience 
of cooperative formations in ASM in the DRC is, however, extremely 
varied. Members pay a range of entrance fees and taxes. Depending on the 
size and scope of the cooperative, miners may either enjoy profit-sharing 
arrangements and protection, or receive no such benefits (Pact Inc. 2010). 
Although hailed by the government as critical for better organising ASM, 
the perception of cooperatives’ benefits for miners varies. For instance, Kelly 
(2014) reported that certain mining communities perceive cooperatives as 
being embedded within the hierarchy and failing to represent many within 
the community. Geenen (2014) expresses a similar concern, specifically in 
the gold mines of South Kivu. 
Yet, the power of a collective organisation as a means to represent miners’ 
concerns and respond to immediate issues cannot be altogether dismissed. 
The research results from this project suggest that smaller, trade-specific 
groups known as associations may be more beneficial for marginalised 
communities, thereby supporting prior research in specific mining areas. 
For instance, a USAID survey found that less than 20 per cent of workers 
in the lowest-paying trades, such as potters, food venders and sex workers, 
reported belonging to a community group, compared to 50 per cent 
of mining team leaders and 25 per cent of miners (Kelly et al. 2014a). 
Additionally, 25 per cent of men reported belonging to groups, compared 
with 17 per cent of women (ibid.). For instance, in select areas of northern 
Orientale, associations that combine literacy and savings objectives for 
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miners have proven to be effective vehicles for self-organisation (Hayes 
and Wauwe 2009). Meanwhile in South Kivu (Kelly et al. 2014a), there 
is the example of the Association of Free Women, representing women 
involved in sex work. Members of the group expressed the critical role 
it has played in their access to health care, financial stability and social 
support. In Phase 2, women surveyed reported greater access to savings and 
loan programs than men, possibly because non-government organisations 
target women for these programs. Utilisation of these services, however, 
was extremely low (9 per cent for women and 6 per cent for men), despite 
the fact that half of all women and three-quarters of men stated they 
wanted access to these programs, indicating a large unmet need. Such 
forms of self-organisation described earlier could be better expanded. 
Indeed, in the absence of courts and tribunals, as well as capable national 
human rights institutions or ombudspersons, participants in the research 
said they relied on each other and small associations as the most neutral 
and capable parties for bringing some level of justice in their communities. 
Active systems of association were in fact present at every site, speaking of 
an enterprising spirit and a desire for more inclusive political engagement. 
People often self-organised to promote a common profession, cause or 
interest. However, these groups lack the financial means, human capacity 
and political influence to make sustainable change. Organising to create 
more effective unions and associations, while promoting grassroots 
inclusive economic cooperatives, offers a potentially more meaningful 
opportunity for improving life in mining towns.
The implementation of laws and policies is a critical part of the 
formalisation process for artisanal mining in the DRC. Knowledge of and 
adherence to these laws at the local level is the only avenue for successful 
implementation. A minority of men and women surveyed, however, stated 
that they were aware of the existence of the mining code and of related 
laws. Women were far less likely than men to report knowledge of  the 
mining code. Community organisations were described as an effective 
avenue for education for all members of the community. There were, 
however, gendered differences in ways that people gained knowledge. 
Men were most likely to receive information from radio messages, whereas 
women stated they received information more readily from their peers.
Findings from this work bring to light several new pathways for 
understanding the challenges facing both men and women in the mines 
of the eastern DRC. These pathways also emphasise the need for holistic 
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responses to ensure sufficient change in behaviours and practices in the 
mines of the DRC. These programmatic and policy responses will need 
to be fundamentally linked to the long-term project of rebuilding the 
state in the DRC. Most importantly, reforms should be informed by, and 
responsive to, the needs of those working in mining, so that all of those 
seeking fair and equitable work opportunities can find them. 
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Historical trajectory of gold‑
mining in the Nilgiri–Wayanad 
region of India
Amalendu Jyotishi, Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt 
and Sashi Sivramkrishna
This chapter builds on the earlier work of Lahiri-Dutt (2004) to interrogate 
categories of ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ as they are applied to mining, both 
historically and in the contemporary era. This historical perspective 
reveals the many difficulties that come with consistently applying ideas 
of formality to diverse forms and institutions of gold-mining throughout 
time. The difficulties of constructing such a multivariate definition of 
informal mining renders such a project ambiguous at best. We, therefore, 
propose that any suitable uni- or bi-variate definition must be recognised 
as contextual and subjective, dependent on the specific concern that is 
being raised about mining. In particular, this definitional complexity 
has important implications for policy, which suggest the formalisation 
of informal (gold) mining as a solution.
We draw these conclusions from an in-depth study of gold-mining in the 
Nilgiri–Wayanad region of southern India between the early nineteenth 
century and the present. We build a case that challenges the popular 
notion that institutions evolve from informal to formal, and additionally 
suggests the role of external rather than internal factors in precipitating 
any institutional changes. Given the particular evolutionary trajectory 
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of gold-mining in the Nilgiri–Wayanad region, it is pertinent to reflect on 
these changes to suggest implications for the future of these institutions 
and the livelihoods of miners who work within them.
Institutions: Formality, informality 
and property rights
Institutions are ‘the rules, enforcement characteristics of rules, and norms 
of behaviour that structure repeated human interaction’ (North 1990). 
The conventional view on the emergence and evolution of institutions 
tracks a linear path from informal to formal (Zenger et al. 2001). The 
evolution of institutions happens through repeated interactions between 
individuals, groups and organisations. In this process, norms and 
behaviours are established through various processes, such as collective 
action (Ostrom 2005) in responses to uncertainty, risk and other 
transaction costs (Williamson 1981, 2000), or through clearly defined 
property rights (Coase 1937, 1959; Demsetz 1967; Libecap 1978, 1989; 
Barzel 1997). Implicitly, the literature in institutional economics argues 
that internal factors play a more critical role than the external factors 
in the evolution of institutions. The resistance to change, known as 
‘path dependency’,1 is an internal factor to the institutional continuity. 
Another implicit contention of this literature is that institutions become 
more efficient over a period of time through repeated transactions, by 
minimising transaction costs or setting the rules of the game through 
well-defined property rights. The bundle of rights that comprise property 
rights on the goods or resources in question includes the right to use, right 
to earn incomes and the right to transfer. When these set of rights exist 
upon a good or a resource, and are enforceable, the property rights are 
then said to be well defined. Well-defined property rights play important 
roles in the efficient allocation of resources. Whatever may be the origin 
of the institution, it is assumed that the more widely it is recognised, 
the better it will function. Full recognition is achieved when the norm is 
endorsed by the state as legally binding. However, it is important to note 
that not all institutions require the support of governments. The political 
economy of institutional change is therefore important in that they may 
evolve to confer privileges on particular groups (Sikor and Lund 2009).
1  Path dependency can be defined as a decision-making process that is not only dependent on 
present circumstances but also on the past and, hence, acts as a constraint for efficient allocation 
of resources (Liebowitz and Margolis 2000).
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In this chapter, we use the standard classification of economic goods based 
on the property rights attributes of ‘rivalry’ and ‘excludability’. Based on 
the relative strength of these attributes and their combinations, we can 
identify four major types of institutional structures: private, commons, 
club and open access (see Figure 11.1). This simple classification not only 
provides an understanding of the different types of institutions based on 
the combination of these attributes, but also does not separate formal and 
informal institutions explicitly. Yet, of these institutions, those with high 
excludability are often based on formal structures, whereas institutions 
operating with low excludability are guided by informal norms. As one 
moves from a low to a high degree of rivalry and excludability, the 
institutional process also moves towards more formal and structured 
institutions. Thus, low rivalry and excludability often lead to informal 
arrangements for the institutions. The ‘efficiency’ in resource use parameter 
predominates in the degree of excludability, and the ‘equity’ in resource 
distribution parameter predominates in the degree of rivalry. 
Figure 11.1: Excludability and rivalry principles of property rights
Source: The Australian National University CartoGIS.
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Using this framework and understanding, we chronicle gold-mining 
in the Nilgiri–Wayanad region, and evaluate how the institutions have 
evolved and been classified over a long period of time. In the following 
section, we engage more deeply with the debates around nomenclature 
and taxonomy. 
Informal, artisanal or something else: 
Dynamism in gold‑mining
Debates about formality and informality of mining institutions are 
important because of the politics that lie behind these taxonomic 
assumptions (Lahiri-Dutt 2004). Yet, mining that is often small in scale—
bordering on illegal, using artisanal technology along with entrepreneurial 
labour, that itself is often an expansion of a peasantry system—is difficult 
to slot into either category of formal or informal. The widely used term, 
artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM), was popularised by Breaking New 
Ground: Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development (International 
Institute for Environment and Development (IIED)/ World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) 2002); it combines 
two pre-existing terms, ‘artisanal’ (United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP) 1999) and ‘small-scale’, used by the International Labour 
Organisation. ASM, like other attempts to categorise mining as either 
‘formal’ or ‘informal’, loses explanatory potential by focusing on a single 
aspect at the expense of others. By emphasising one aspect of the mining 
activity, such as artisanal technology, small-scale (dis)economies of 
scale or informal rules and norms governing the mining activity, these 
definitions neglect the ways in which these features not only coexist but 
also change their relation to one another over time. When considering 
mining in a single region from a historical perspective, it becomes 
important to consider the flexibility of these definitions to changes in 
mining activities or the institutions governing them. As such, one of the 
major shortcomings of these definitional practices is the assumption of 
‘staticness’ of the form or practice of mining. However, a robust historical 
perspective can illuminate considerable changes in the form and the 
institutions that govern mining activities, even within a single region. 
Table 11.1 offers a broad overview of how, based on these multiple 
characteristics, formal and informal mining is conceived. Strictly speaking, 
perhaps the most critical distinguishing features between formal and 
informal mining are that the latter is non-legal—based on customary law 
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and/or illegal. This highlights the role of governance in the classification 
of formality and informality. Important differences between formal and 
informal mining may occur at the level of governance—the keeping of 
records and the monitoring of informal activities by the state, making 
it (im)possible to collect rent or tax.















































With respect to institutional change, one of the key challenges in studying 
mining historically in a single site is to find an appropriate setting to 
empirically substantiate any resulting hypothesis, not simply quantitatively 
but qualitatively. Gold-mining in the Nilgiri–Wayanad region of southern 
India provides an interesting context for the study of institutional evolution 
for two reasons: first, the fundamental nature and purpose of the activity 
have remained unchanged over generations; second, the technological 
changes have been either manual or mechanical, having no major impact 
on the final product per se. Despite this ‘staticness’ of the operation, the 
institutions involved in such practices and their relationship to structures 
of governance have undergone extensive changes during this period. 
In the context of mining, the establishment (and protection) of property 
rights is perhaps the most basic institution that performs a crucial economic 
function: that of presiding over competing claims of ‘ownership’ over 
both the land from which minerals are extracted and the commodities 
that are extracted from it. Property rights over mines can be accorded 
formally through state agencies and/or informal regulating agencies that 
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include local customs and local political authorities. Historical property 
rights are thus recognisable in a range of forms, varying from written 
documents to oral histories. While property rights can be relatively easily 
identified at specific points of time, it is more difficult to understand how 
and why these institutions evolve and change over time, specifically over 
long periods of time. This particular empirical study of gold-mining in 
the Nilgiri–Wayanad region helps us address several questions that arise 
when considering institutional transitions over the longue durée.
Chronicles of gold-mining in Nilgiri–Wayanad
The Nilgiri–Wayanad region (Figure 11.2) lies at the southern end of the 
Western Ghats—the ranges lining the western coast of peninsular India. 
It is located in the western part of Tamil Nadu, bordering the states of 
Karnataka  and  Kerala. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
this area was governed by a complex network of actors that included the 
East India Company, local princes, zamindars, and the British, and from 
1947 onwards, the state of India. For the larger part of history, the Rajah 
(zamindar) of Neelambur (which was a vassal state of the princely state 
of Calicut) was the ruler. Therefore, all the land transactions in the region 
for agriculture, mining and plantations were conducted by the various 
zamindars of Neelambur (or Nilambur). From the early 1800s to early 
1900s, the Neelambur zamindars leased land for coffee plantation, gold-
mining and tea plantation. 
In view of the dearth of sources on the extent and magnitude of informal 
gold-mining in India, we have collected the material from a combination 
of historical documents (Jennings 1881; Francis 1908), followed by 
a primary survey. Previously, Deb et al. (2008) documented the existence 
and exploration of gold in the region by various companies. Initially, we 
obtained information on the existence of gold-mining from the Pandular 
website.2 We contacted the website owner and formed a strong working 
relationship. In the initial phase, his association and assistance allowed us 
to visit the informal gold-mining sites in the region. Subsequently, our 
research led us to explore the documented history of gold-mining over the 
last two centuries in its continuity, and more extensive socio-economic 
and focus group surveys. 
2  www.pandalur.com.
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Figure 11.2: The study region
Note: Map not to scale.
Source: The Australian National University CartoGIS.
The following analysis is divided into four historical phases, each 
constituted by the predominant institutional structure that governed the 
gold-mining activities in the region at that time. 
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Institutional changes over two centuries 
of gold‑mining 
Phase I: Up to the 1860s
In one of the earliest colonial records on this region, Thomas Barber, an 
official in the East India Company, recorded in his ‘Journal of a Route 
of the Neelghurries from Calicut’ (1830) the low returns on gold-mining 
and payment of a tax by miners in this region (p. 314):
Two persons are employed to each patty [tray], one to dig the earth, 
the other to hold the patty, wash the earth away, and extract and unite, 
by means of quicksilver, the golden particles. Each patty pays a tax to 
government of 3 rupees per month, which my informers added, absorbed 
about two-thirds of the net profits; and from the wretched appearance 
of the person employed in working the patties, it is evident they are 
miserably paid.
The East India Company faced strong resistance to their attempts to assess 
gold mines in Wayanad. An interesting letter published by Bergein (1834: 
124), a correspondent of the Mechanics’ Magazine, states:
The natives, one and all, are very averse to our having anything to do with 
the mines, for obvious reasons: several hundred families are at present 
supported by their produce; the zemindars of the districts obtain from 
them a moderate revenue, which would be lost to them were these mines 
to come into the hands of government …3 
Similarly, Bergein (1834) records how the Rajah of Neelambur and his 
people resisted the British—the Rajah tried to starve a British mining 
contingent by prohibiting the sale of food and even poisoning their 
cattle. Additionally, a number of British shafts were also filled out by the 
Mapillahs,4 and then covered with trees and shrubs (ibid.). These conflicts 
aside, it appears that gold-mining, although artisanal in technology, was 
in this period formal in the sense that reasonably good records were 
being maintained and taxes were being collected. As far as institutional 
framework was concerned, what particularly interested us here was the 
3  ‘Government’ here refers to the East India Company.
4  One of the largest Muslim communities from Kerala. This community is a local source for 
labour in the region.
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presence of a formal tax structure implemented by the Rajah of Neelambur. 
The formal tax structure was built on the ‘excludability’ principle for those 
who did not pay the tax.
An 1843 report titled, ‘Mineral Resources of Southern India, no.  4 
Gold, Tracts’,  by Lieutenant Newbold of the East India Company, 
recorded that, in the South Maratha country (now Gadag District in the 
state of Karnataka), mining was a seasonal occupation and carried out 
predominantly by a caste called Jalgars,5 who had been acquainted with 
the art of gold-mining ‘from time immemorial’ (Newbold 1843: 207).
The report also notes that ‘the rivulets of Hurti and Soltoor … are 
more productive, though I did not see many persons at work at Hurti’ 
(Newbold 1843: 206). Moreover, the overall production of gold from 
the three rivulets, Hurti, Soltoor, and Doni, was not insignificant—some 
200 ounces (5.7 kg) of gold was mined annually after the monsoons. 
These remarks point towards the relative abundance of gold and the 
non-competitive nature of artisanal mining during this phase in history. 
Newbold (1843: 208) also illuminates the governance structure of mining:
A Mussulman, who accompanied me to the spot, informed me that he 
had obtained four rupees’ worth of gold in two days. The hire of the 
three Jalgars, &c., whom he employed amounted to half that sum, leaving 
two rupees clear profits. The ancient lords of the soil, the Dessayes of 
Dummul, formerly levied a toll from the gold-washers, which ceased with 
the authority of the last chief, who was hanged, by the order of the Duke 
of Wellington, over the gate of his own fortress, for firing on a flag of truce 
at the siege of that place.
A careful reading of this statement reveals a lot of information. In earlier 
times, under the Dessayes,6 it seemed that the Jalgars mined for gold 
directly upon paying a toll to the rulers. With the end of their rule, the 
Jalgars worked more as labourers for a Mussulman who bore the risk of 
fluctuating returns, yet retained a relatively significant portion of the 
revenue. It is likely that the Mussulman was a trader or capitalist and was 
an integral part of the supply chain of gold. 
5  The term Jalgar, frequently used in colonial documents related to gold-mining, is possibly 
associated with gold-mining and panning communities. Even today, the community with the 
surname Jalgar exists in the Northern Karnataka region.
6  Also know as Desai, these are the village heads.
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While Newbold (1843) reported on gold-mining in various parts of India, 
of particular interest here are his remarks on gold-mining at the base 
of the Nilgiris, at the frontier with Mysore state. He writes, ‘the mines 
of Wayanad district then worked were those of Cherankode Devala, 
Nelyalam, Ponery and Pulyode’ (Newbold 1843: 208). Some 750 ounces 
(21 kg) of gold was extracted annually in Nilambur, where ‘the golden 
region is rented from Government by a native chief ’7 (ibid.: 209). In the 
report, ‘Preliminary Notes on the Gold Fields of South East Wayanad’, 
King (1875: 45) described the land tenure in Wayanad as follows: 
Hitherto the land in Wayanad has been principally parceled out in coffee 
gardens, either free-hold, or paying an annual rent to the Rajahs who hold 
a great quantity of the ground, or direct to the Government. At the same 
time, after a certain period, a revenue is derived from all the gardens by 
the Government, whether it be Rajah’s land, or not. 
Ball (1869) also lends credence to our hypothesis of ‘excludability’; 
people rarely crossed boundaries in their search for gold. This happened 
elsewhere in India, for example, in Singbhum district (now in the state of 
Jharkhand) he records (ibid.: 12):
On my arrival in Dulmi (which is situated on the faulted boundary of 
these two groups of rocks) when marching northwards from the lower 
part of Pattrum, the gold-washer asked to be allowed to return to his 
own country (Dalbhum), stating that none of his race ever went north 
of Dulmi.
He further reports on the governance structures of gold-mining in 
this region, which he defines as categorised by caste exclusion and low 
standards of living for workers—substantiating our claim that gold-
mining was essentially a ‘club’ good in the pre- and early colonial period 
(ibid.: 13).
The gold-washers belong to the lowest and poorest races in the country, 
Gassees8 according to Colonel Haughton, but some of those which I 
met with were a race of kumars, called Dokras. Their numbers have been 
greatly reduced by the famine; without exception they are all in the power 
7  Here, the government means the East India Company, and the Rajah (zamindar) of Neelambur 
is the native chief. The Neelambur Rajah also leased out land to the East India Company and others 
for mining purposes. 
8  The name gassees or ghasi refers to the occupation of cutting grass, especially for horses. 
In addition to collecting and selling grass, the ghasis are employed in scavenging work. 
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of the Mahajuns,9 for whom they work at a low rate, and are never able 
to free themselves of the claims which the Mahajuns make on account of 
the advances. The daily earnings of the gold-washers are small, but might 
no doubt be increased, if it were not that they are always satisfied when 
enough gold has been found for procuring the day’s subsistence. 
In 1875, Dr W. King of the Geological Survey was appointed by the 
government to survey the ‘country’. He reported that gold-mining in this 
region was carried out by two tribes, the Paniyas10 and the Kurumba11 
(also  referred to as Pannirs and Korumbars), each possessing their own 
specific domain of labour. ‘The Pannirs wash for it in the alluvium, 
surface soils, and river sands. The Korumbars dug down to and excavated 
the quartz leaders’ (King 1875: 30). This description reinforces our 
understanding that caste or tribe provided some excludability to gold-
mining. Apart from a tax payable to the ‘owner’ of the land, there does 
not seem to be any rivalry between the members within the two tribes. 
However, there are indications that one group (Paniyas) were employed as 
labour, rather than working as independent miners; they earned no more 
than a quarter of a rupee per day, thereby engaging in mining only during 
the lean season, when employment was sparse on the coffee gardens. It 
is also mentioned in Ball (1869: 33) that the Paniyas were ‘driven by 
land-owners to search for gold, the land not being so well adapted for 
agricultural work’. On the other hand, it seems that the Kurumbas were 
more independent, although they may have been forced to share their 
profits with the Rajahs. Moreover, the Kurumbas were capital constrained, 
as mentioned in King (1875: 42):
The big reefs were not worked by these men on account of the difficulty 
in breaking up the stones, and because the gold is distributed too finely 
through it to have paid hand labor. With machinery and modern 
appliances, the reefs should pay even if only 3 dwts. of gold are got always 
from the ton of quartz. 
9 Mahajuns are the local moneylenders or usurers. 
10 The Paniya, also known as Paniyar and Paniyan, are an ethnic group primarily inhabiting the 
Wayanad region. The Paniya have historically worked as agricultural labourers and serfs. 
11 Traditionally, the Kurumbas or Kurubas have subsisted as hunters and gatherers. They largely 
reside in the Nilgiri region of Tamil Nadu. There are different groups within this tribe; some among 
them are Alu-Kurumbas, Betta-Kurumbas, Jenu-Kurumbas, Kurubas, Mudugas, Mulla-Kurumbas, 
Palu-Kurumbas, and Urali-Kurumbas.
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It is also mentioned that the Kurumba sometimes found large amounts 
of gold, but probably had given up this work by 1875 because, as King 
records, the pits ‘would be too deep for their style of work, water being the 
great obstacle likely to be met with’ (ibid.: 42).
From these historical sources, we can conclude the existence of gold-
mining in the region prior to 1830. Use of wage labour, as well as the 
presence of independent miners is likewise identifiable during this period. 
The existence of tax structure, payment to the zamindars, and the presence 
of intermediaries and financers (Mahajans) are also reported. The tax on 
panning trays also suggests formal recognition of artisanal forms of mining. 
Most importantly, it has been identified that select castes and tribes were 
engaged in gold-mining activities. Based on this assessment of archival 
records, gold-mining in Phase I may be characterised as formal, although 
the technology was artisanal and caste-based. Entrepreneurial labour and 
rudimentary technology are not by themselves sufficient conditions to 
make an activity informal. ‘In 1879 the government of India employed 
Mr. Brough Smyth (for many years the Secretary for Mines in Victoria and 
held to be the greatest authority on the subject in Australia to examine the 
Wayanad reefs)’ (Francis 1908: 15). It is this report that provided the basis 
for the rapid escalation of British interest and development of the region 
that we discuss next. 
Phase II: From the 1870s to the 1890s
In his study of the relevance of the gold standard to India, Sivramkrishna 
(2015) elaborates that it was at the International Monetary Conference 
of 1867 that a move towards a common international currency was first 
propagated. Gold, which had become relatively abundant by then on 
account of its discoveries (and the gold rushes in America and Australia), 
was to be the basis of this international currency. The danger of a shortage 
in gold, raising its price and leading to deflation, had to be countered 
through an increase in the supply of gold—this led to intensification in 
the search for gold across the world. It was in the context of these changes 
in the global monetary system that India, and more specifically the 
Nilgiri–Wayanad region, was drawn into an international gold rush. The 
desperation of this search for gold proved a sufficient trigger to induce 
the British to explore the possibility of setting up industrial-scale gold-
mining operations in the Wayanad region, in the 1870s. To do so, their 
immediate concern was getting access to the land. The following extract 
from King (1875: 45) clearly exemplifies this major issue:
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Now that gold-mining is likely to become an industry, a new set of land 
interests are being developed. The Rajahs, of course, retain their right to 
all minerals and can sell these as they like. The Government of Madras 
has not yet, I believe, decided as to how they are to act in the matter, 
except that applications for land for gold-mining and for agricultural 
purposes on which quartz reefs are supposed to exist, are being reserved 
for consideration until the question of mining is settled.
In the meantime the Rajah of Nellamborhas (according to their prospectus) 
leased a block of 15 acres of land near Dayvallah to the projectors of 
the Alpha Gold Company for twelve years at an annual rent of Rs.225. 
Since then it is reported that the Rajah in recent applications demands 
10 per cent on the outturn of any gold-mining which may be carried 
on; and it is very probable that he may change this rate. Nearly all the 
land in the Nambalycode Amsham is owned by the Rajah of Nellambor. 
Equally, as with the revenue derived from estates on Rajah’s lands, it may 
be found advisable that the gold from these reefs should pay a royalty to 
Government.
This statement underlines two points: the growing concern of the 
industrialists on the ownership of land by local feudatories, and 
the extraction of high lease rents; and the role played by the British 
Government in Madras in settling these issues. 
During this period, enormous amounts of investment flowed into 
Wayanad.  Some 41 companies with a paid-up capital of more than 
GBP5  million were set up. Domestic companies invested some 
GBP250,000 and began mining operations in Wayanad. Writing in 
the Madras District Gazetteers: The Nilgiri in 1908, Francis reflects on 
this period and suggests that the mood was upbeat and that ‘the whole 
mountain is worth putting through the stamps’ (Francis 1908:  17). 
Most of the capital invested went into procuring land through mining 
leases; land prices varied between GBP70 and GBP2,500 per acre. These 
reflections by Francis provide a vivid picture of the magnitude of corporate 
activities in gold extraction that began in Wayanad in the late nineteenth 
century. The quote given below from Francis (1908: 27–9), suggests the 
magnitude of corporate activities in the Nilgiri–Wayanad gold extraction 
in the late nineteenth century:
In 1879, however, the Government of India employed Mr. Brough Smyth 
(for many years Secretary for Mines in Victoria and held to be the greatest 
authority on the subject in Australia) to examine the Wynaad reefs; and 
his report, written in October 1879, was, to say the least, distinctly 
encouraging. He discussed in detail the value of a great number of the 
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known reefs, most of which crop out in the country traversed by the road 
from Nadgani (same as Nadugani) to Cherambadi; gave the results of 
assays made by himself and others which ranged from nil to no less than 
204 oz. of gold to the ton of ore; considered that low-grade ores, running 
even as low as 3 dwts.12 to the ton, could be worked at a profit. 
The result of this sanguine report was the artificial boom of 1880. 
The  stock markets were ripe for any speculation, however wild. Low 
rates of return on British Government stocks, a paucity of foreign loans, 
flourishing trade and an unusual scarcity of gold all contributed to make 
miscellaneous enterprises more attractive; while coffee-planting’ was 
already on the down-grade and owners of estates containing reefs were 
only too glad to seize a chance of disposing of them at a profit. The mania 
began in December 1879, when a company with a capital of 100,000 
pound was launched; and in the next nineteen months the number of 
companies floated in England amounted to no less than 41 with a capital 
of over five million sterling, while during the same period six companies 
with a total capital of £261, 000 were also started in India itself. Of the 
English companies, 33 went to allotment and the sum obtained by them 
for investment in the industry amounted nominally to £4,050,000. 
Of  this, however £2,375,500 was allotted for payment for the land in 
which the supposed mines were located—the prices of this ranged from 
£70 to no less than £2,600 per acre—so that the sum left for working 
expenses was not more than £1,674,500. Mr. Brough Smyth himself was 
appointed manager of two of the companies, but retired on the ground of 
ill-health in 1882, when the tide had begun to turn.
Phase II was a marked by intense capital investment, employment of 
wage labour and setting up of modern public limited companies listed 
on stock markets, which in turn lead to a high magnitude of speculation. 
However, by the early 1880s, the edifice of gold-mining in the region 
collapsed; the concentration of gold was too low to make large-scale 
mining feasible. Most of the companies had to shut down and investors 
lost large sums of money. Tremors from the bust even rattled the London 
stock market. The short-lived formal corporatisation phase seemed to be 
merely speculation driven. However, the repercussion of this phase had 
significant influence on the subsequent phases of informalisation of gold-
mining in the region. However, it is clear from a study of colonial records 
that although gold-mining remained formal, the technology employed 
had changed from artisanal to modern—the latter including a higher 
degree of capital-intensive mechanisation as well as the use of wage labour. 
12 dwts is also known as penny weight. 20 dwts=1 troy ounce (also written as oz.)= 31.104 g.
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Phase III: From the 1900s to the 1970s
There is little known to us of this post-corporatisation phase, apart from 
the gloomy picture portrayed by Francis (1908). He describes how 
Pandalur and Devala, by the turn of the twentieth century, had turned 
into nothing but ghost towns (ibid.: 31):
At Pandalur three or four houses, the old store, and traces of the race-
course survive; at Devala are a grave or two; topping many of the little hills 
are derelict bungalows and along their contours run grass-grown roads; 
hidden under thick jungle are heaps of spoil, long-forgotten tunnels used 
only by she-bears and panthers expecting an addition to their families, 
and lakhs’ worth of rusting machinery which was never erected; while 
along the great road to Yayitri, which now, except for the two white rats 
worn by the infrequent carts, is often overgrown with grass, lies more 
machinery which never even reached its destination. Moreover, most of 
the numerous coffee- estates which formerly bordered this road all the way 
from Gudalur to Cherambaidi were acquired by the gold companies and 
thenceforth utterly neglected; and now not a single one of them all is kept 
up. They have all gone back to jungle and are covered with such a tangle 
of lantana and forest that it is hardly possible to make out their former 
boundaries. Thus the coffee industry is dead and the mining industry 
which killed it is dead also; and this side of the Wynaad is now perhaps 
the most mournful scene of disappointed hopes in all the Presidency. 
What happened to gold-mining in Nilgiri–Wayanad after that is less 
known. This period also saw major changes taking place in monetary 
systems across the world that would have naturally impacted gold-mining 
in the Nilgiri–Wayanad region, and industrial mining in particular. 
Talking to a few individuals in the region and their recollections of 
their grandparents suggests that the mining activities continued, albeit 
informally, in the ruins and remains of the tunnels abandoned during 
the earlier phase. It would certainly be of interest to find out more about 
who these miners were. In materials gathered by the family members 
of the Neelambur Rajah, we found at least two expressions of interest 
by corporate entities to extract gold and mica, dated 1924 and 1932. 
However, these letters remained at the expression of the interest stage and 
the projects never materialised. As such, we want to suggest that this phase 
of mining was an ‘open-access’ phase without any excludability or rivalry, 
where a range of individuals or groups could freely ride on the already 
excavated tunnels. The end of the gold rush, which left gold-mining in 
the region unattractive for industrial-scale mining, opened up the region 
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for open-access mining. A large tract of the land, known as section 17 or 
Janmam land, mired into litigation in the court of law, leaving no clear 
ownership of land (Menon 2014). Multiple stakes existed, including the 
forest department of the Government of Tamil Nadu, the erstwhile Rajah 
of Neelambur and tea estate and other plantation owners, all of whom 
left the land ungoverned and an open-access space for later entrants. 
Phase IV: From the 1980s onwards
Our several visits to the field between September 2014 and May 2016 
revealed the contemporary narrative of gold-mining in the region. 
We travelled through Nadugani, Pandalur and Devala in Gudalur taluka13 
of Nilgiri district and identified many individuals engaged in gold-mining. 
The current practice of gold-mining is informal and artisanal. The number 
of people engaged in this activity seems to have surged in recent decades, 
possibly due to the increase in global gold prices. Our attempt to identify 
the genesis of persistence and the regrowth of gold-mining in this region 
led us to understand demographic changes that occurred here during the 
early 1970s, when Tamil workers, previously employed on Sri Lankan tea 
plantations, were resettled in this region. This resettlement was the result 
of a pact between the then Indian prime minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, 
and his Sri Lankan counterpart, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, known as the 
Shastri–Bandaranaike Pact (Pillai 2012). This led to a number of Tamil 
migrants working in Sri Lankan plantations being brought back to India 
in the 1970s and settled in various places, including Gudalur taluka. The 
Sri Lankan diplomat K. Godage (n.d.) wrote: 
Indentured labour from South India was brought to work on our tea 
and rubber plantations.14 The issue of Indian immigrants became an 
intractable problem between the two countries in 1953 when India 
resiled from its position that these immigrants were Indian nationals. It 
was only in 1964 that an agreement was reached between Prime Ministers 
Sirimavo Bandaranaike and Shastri. This agreement was supplemented 
by another between Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Bandaranaike in 
1974 with India agreeing to take back 600,000 and Lanka agreeing to 
grant citizenship to 373,000.
13 Taluka is a sub-district.
14  The arrival of labourers from South India to Sri Lanka has a long history. After Ceylone was 
conquered by East India Company, a large-scale temporary migration happened in the 1840s to 
the coffee plantations, especially during harvest season. Permanent migration and settlement gained 
momentum since the 1870s, with the initiation of tea plantations that required regular labour. 
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Our observations during recent field visits show that large numbers of 
informal gold miners belong to this Ceylon15 repatriate community. 
To provide employment to the settlers, the Government of Tamil Nadu 
created TANTEA, a tea plantation company to absorb the repatriates who 
were used to a similar kind of work environment in Sri Lanka. The state 
provided a financial incentive to private estates to absorb repatriates 
(Menon 2014). TANTEA plantations established between 1968 and 
1980 comprised about 2,500 ha, created by clear felling of forests (ibid.). 
However, the time lag between the arrival of repatriates and absorbing 
them into plantations would have been one of the prime causes of a 
spillover into informal mining activities by this community. This also 
suggests that the gold-mining fields were open-access grounds in the early 
twentieth century for the repatriates and others to work in and earn their 
livelihood. Added to the time lag in absorbing the workforce, the downfall 
in the tea market would also have played a critical role in the proliferation 
of ‘informal gold-mining’, where neither formal records were kept nor 
taxes collected. The technology employed in these mines is rudimentary 
while the economic structure is more cooperative and family based.
In Pandalur, we found mines located within private tea estates, whereas in 
Devela, most of these are inside the forest reserve areas, and in Nadugani, 
there was a mix of both. In Pandalur, Nadugani and Devala, with the help 
of local people, we visited several tunnels where mining activity currently 
occurs. These tunnels can be 500–3,000 m in length. Some tunnels are 
horizontal throughout, whereas some are vertical over a considerable 
length before becoming horizontal. In the tunnels are several types of 
quartz stones with tinges of gold, mixed with varieties of other materials 
(especially mica). These stones are collected by these informal miners. 
The collection process involves digging with shovels, hammers, etc. in the 
tunnel, and often blasting with low-intensity explosives. In a day, a miner 
collects about 10 kg of such stones, which may translate into less than 
a gram of gold. One of the miners told the researcher, ‘our target is to 
make 500 rupees in a day’. In today’s context, this translates into a third of 
a gram of gold (excluding other expenses of crushing, etc.). This particular 
miner was young, just about 25 years of age, belonging to one of the 
repatriate communities from Sri Lanka resettled here.
15  Ceylon was renamed Sri Lanka in 1972. We use Ceylon and Sri Lanka alternatively, the first 
representing an historical sentiment and the latter a contemporary thought. 
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The selected quartz ores are taken to a crushing mill, in a few cases called 
‘rice mills’. The reason behind this obviously lies in how statutory law 
perceives informal mining. The crushing mill owners are often different 
from the miners and they charge around INR4–10 per kilogram of stone. 
However, it is likely that some of the crushing mills, apart from crushing 
the stones brought in by miners, would crush their own collected stones. 
Stone-crushing mills are important factors contributing to efficient 
production of gold. After all, a significant portion of investments of the 
colonial industrial-mining operations was in large-scale stone-crushing 
equipment. Once the stones are crushed, it is panned using mercury and 
gold particles are collected. These gold particles are then sold to jewellers 
or local finance companies in the region. With a higher level of awareness 
among the informal miners, the price at which the gold is sold moves 
with the change in market price, although the rates are lower than the 
market price. 
Synthesising the phases
From the available records and documents in the early colonial period, we 
identify that a formal tax structure (in the form of trey tax) was used by 
the local Rajahs and zamindars to provide rights to the gold miners till the 
1860s. The tax structure is a clear form of exclusion for those who do not 
pay the tax. In addition, like most other occupations in India, there were 
specific castes and tribes that engaged in gold-mining. Put together, we 
have interpreted one element in the then existing property rights regime 
as ‘excludability’. The wide dispersion in rather small quantities of gold 
across a region, as well as the lack of capital, meant that several persons 
from the castes and tribes were engaged in the occupation; we therefore 
also impute an element of ‘non-rivalry’ amongst the miners, as long as they 
were able to pay the stipulated fee to the feudatory. The characteristics of 
‘excludability’ and ‘non-rivalry’ are the essence of ‘club’ goods, which was 
considered to be the dominant form of property rights until the 1860s. 
There are also several instances of large tracts of land directly occupied 
by feudatories or Rajahs, who mined gold using ‘slave labour’ at very low 
wage rates. In these cases, it becomes more appropriate to characterise the 
property rights regime as ‘private goods’. Therefore, Phase I has hues of 
both: club goods as well as private goods. More importantly, we are clearly 
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able to establish that gold-mining was not an ‘open access/public good’ 
(non-excludability, non-rivalry) or a ‘common pool’ (non-excludability, 
rivalry) resource in the late medieval or early colonial period.
Gold-mining during the Wayanad gold rush (Phase II) was clearly 
a private good, exhibiting elements of excludability and rivalry amongst 
miners. Not only that, this period was also marked with intensive 
speculation and making short-term gain out of the speculation. 
The elements of speculation were in the geo-political and economic order 
of that time. However, Nilgiri–Wayanad witnessed it in the form of 
intensive deployment of capital and wage labour. 
It would not be wrong to say that Phase III of mining was an ‘open-access’ 
phase, without any excludability, rivalry or free riding on the opened 
tunnels; though it would be worthwhile to determine who the miners 
were during this phase. Very little information is available on this phase. 
In the later phase, the existence and surge of gold-mining by Sri Lankan 
repatriates (who happened to be late entrants to the region, between the 
1970s and 1980s) suggest that the gold-mining areas were open access, 
to be appropriated by anyone interested in this activity.
The fourth phase of informal mining has possibly taken the shape of 
commons, where creating new mining areas is not as easy. A large tract of 
land is under litigation due to multiple claims by the erstwhile zamindars, 
the state and the estate owners, as well as later settlers. This tract of land 
is known as Janmam land or section 17 land (Menon 2014). However, 
in recent times, the forest department is believed to have a de facto claim 
over the land, especially in the region where there is forest cover. In these 
lands, the forest department does not allow any expansion of new mining 
activities. This suggests that the mining activities happen in the defined and 
already opened areas, leading to rivalry in natural resource exploitation. 
The groups of people involved have shifted and changed over time. Paniyas 
remain active and Sri Lankan repatriates are being assimilated; however, 
one does not find as many Korumbas (or Kurumbas) as evident in the first 
two phases. If we identify the informal rules and norms governing access 
to the mining areas, as well as the conflicts between groups in accessing 
the mines for extraction of quartz stones, it would be more evident that 
there is rivalry in appropriation.
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Governance structure over the centuries
The two centuries of the history of gold-mining in the region show the 
changes in its institutional and governance structure. These changes are 
not necessarily due to internal factors. Rather, external circumstances have 
played a critical role in shaping and reshaping the institutions involved 
in gold-mining. 
We attempted to analyse these phases of changes using the concepts of 
property rights. The principle of ‘excludability’ and ‘rivalry’ provided us 
a framework to analyse the institutions and governance structure in the 
four different phases. Table 11.2 summarises the four phases in terms 
of property rights–based institutional structure.
Table 11.2: Institutions of gold-mining over the past two centuries




Phase (up to 
the 1860s)













Privatisation of property 
with corporate mining 
initiatives
Third Phase 




Little is known of this 
phase. But mostly by 
Kurumbas, Paniyas 











are not much involved 
in the activity; Paniyas 
continue, Ceylon 
repatriates are in good 
numbers
Source: Authors’ work.
The property rights–based analysis suggests that gold-mining in the 
region has undergone institutional changes. The first two phases show 
a formal mining setup, whereas the next two phases are informal. Within 
this transition in institutions, external factors (like the gold rush and the 
arrival of repatriate labour) played a critical role.
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In contemporary literature, one finds classifications based on formal and 
informal mining, as well as in terms of artisanal and industrial-scale mining. 
Artisanal mining is often classified with small-scale mining as ASM. 
Based on this classification, approaches to understanding and categorising 
mining activities have been varied. In this chapter, we have added another 
dimension to the debates about classification by not only considering 
property rights, but also the way these shift and change over time, 
influencing the forms institutions can take. Contemporary approaches to 
informal mining emphasise its operation in an ungovernable space, and 
ignore its role as a source of livelihood for local people. Approaches to 
artisanal mining emphasise the scale and forms of technology used in the 
activity—discussions that tend to beget debates about efficiency. Property 
rights–based classifications, on the other hand, combine institutional and 
economic approaches useful for understanding governance, from both the 
perspective of livelihood and efficiency. 
Conclusion
A number of factors worked together to create a situation in which informal 
mining came to prevail in the Pandalur, Nadugani and Devala settlements 
of the Nilgiri–Wayanad region. Mining activities in the region date back 
to the 1830s in the available documented history at which time, as we 
have argued, it was formal–artisanal; however, contemporary mining 
was largely shaped by the unique history of the local context. Currently, 
a large proportion of informal miners belong to the Sri Lankan repatriate 
communities. Additionally, a smaller proportion of the miners belong to 
the native population.
The historical, social, economic, geographical and geological factors 
considered together show the complexity associated with mining that 
transited from a formal to informal process. A long history of the 
profession, position of statutory law and the prevalence of customary 
practice add to this complexity. However, a few important aspects that 
come out clearly from this explorative study are worth taking note of. 
First, existence and prevalence of informal gold-mining in India is a fact. 
Second, people engaged in this mining activity are poor and belong to 
vulnerable social groups, and informal mining contributes substantially 
to their livelihood. Third, the long history of gold-mining shows the 
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transition in the institutions—these are not only internal to the economy, 
but are also impacted by external, global, political and economic factors 
that play a critical role in shaping the institutions.
In the process, this study defies a few theoretical positions. First, a body 
of literature suggests that changes in institutions and the governance 
structure are largely due to the internal dynamics, as suggested in the 
evolutionary strand of institutional economics. However, our study 
shows that external factors like the gold rush, collapse of the gold rush 
and settlement of Sri Lankan repatriates in the region did play a critical 
role in the evolution and changes in the institutions relating to gold-
mining in  the region. Second, institutional economics approaches tend 
to emphasise either property rights or transaction cost economics, which 
suggest that institutions evolve over a period of time, becoming more 
efficient (in  terms of minimising transaction costs) and well defined 
(in  terms of property rights). However, in our study, we identify that 
the institutions have moved from a formal to an informal structure, or 
from a high-excludability to a low-excludability structure. In the pre– and 
post–gold rush phase, the institutions have shown a tendency towards 
greater rivalry in use, over a period of time. 
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Conflicts in marginal locations: 
Small‑scale gold‑mining in 
the Amazon
Marjo de Theije and Ton Salman
Researchers of the GOMIAM consortium1 have worked on conflicts 
surrounding small-scale gold-mining in the Amazon since 2010. 
We understand conflict in a broad sense and have studied many different 
forms of it, ranging from armed conflict and environmental conflict, 
to conflicts of interest between local populations and migrant miners, 
between large-scale mining and small-scale mining, between local, 
regional and national governments on issues of small-scale mining, 
and even between small-scale miners and other small-scale miners, like 
between equipment owners and operators. GOMIAM researchers work 
in Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, French Guiana, Peru and Suriname.
All the various types of conflicts we mentioned have increased dramatically 
because of the tremendous growth of small-scale gold-mining, but are 
also seen in medium- and large-scale gold-mining. Environmental issues 
are among the most prominent causes of conflict. The environmental 
threats connected to gold-mining include deforestation and air and water 
pollution from cyanide and mercury contamination. Polluting effects 
1  GOMIAM is a comprehensive research project on small-scale gold-mining and social conflict in 
the Amazon region, comparing states, environments, local populations and miners in Bolivia, Brazil, 
Colombia, Peru and Suriname. See www.gomiam.org. 
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of small-scale gold-mining often threaten the livelihoods of indigenous 
peoples or peasants in the vicinity of the mining operations. Small-scale 
mining activities are often relatively low-tech, organised with informal 
labour and family networks and, although limited in geographical scale, 
are still very harmful because of the uncontrolled expansion of (albeit 
often small) operation sites, and because of the frequent careless use 
of mercury and other chemicals, with little awareness about the effects 
of inorganic waste. 
Not only does the environment cause conflicts, the land does too. Land 
conflicts between miners and other collective or private concession 
holders or local inhabitants, like indigenous communities, peasants, 
loggers, Amazon nut-collectors or those involved in other forest extraction 
activities, abound. Quite often, due to deficiencies of government 
institutions, overlapping concessions are given out to various local 
players, like miners, agro-business or eco-tourism entrepreneurs, and 
indigenous communities. Conflicts between the various state ministries 
responsible for these contradictory policies are often minor in comparison 
to the conflicts that erupt on the ground because of what was granted 
to such players. 
Such effects obviously bring up critical questions about concessions given 
out by national or local authorities, about the lack of effective control 
and protection for the local population, in case the concessions were not 
officially granted, or if the miners or mining companies do not respect the 
conditions that were attached to it. 
These are only some of the fields of conflict to be found. In our analysis of 
the gold conflicts, we have found many similarities between the countries 
studied. Next to the elements we mentioned above, there are many other 
parallels; for instance, in all countries the state makes efforts to control or 
profit from the gold-mining, usually initiating processes of ‘formalisation’ 
that include licensing, taxation and environmental requirements. 
The success of such efforts varies. In all countries, local people and migrants 
compete and/or collaborate in artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM), 
making a living from it in situations where they often have very few 
alternatives. Also, everywhere, small-scale gold-mining is associated with 
negative qualifications of illegality, criminality, prostitution and violence. 
The reactions researchers get when announcing a visit to the mining areas 
are always full of warnings and calls to be careful. In the imagination of 
many, small-scale gold-mining is full of corruption, vigilantism, an eye for 
an eye and a tooth for a tooth. Finally, and in spite of much heterogeneity 
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in this regard, we found that it is not anarchy or sheer ad hocism that 
rules in the mining areas. Everywhere there is some form of association, 
organisation and rules.
Our analyses of the conflicts have focused on different forms of legal 
systems (Theije et al. 2014), on formalisation and inefficient state capacity 
(Damonte Valencia 2013; Heemskerk et al. 2015), on migration (Theije 
and Heemskerk 2009), on organisation of miners (Carrillo et al. 2013) 
and more. However, the conflicts are complex and multilayered, and we 
need theoretical tools that might help to unpack and analyse the nature, 
layers, time frames and possible ways forward to address these conflicts. 
Elsewhere, (Salman and Theije 2017) we have suggested a multitemporal 
model to understand the structural backgrounds, the actors’ dispositions 
and capacities, and the strategic and tactical manoeuvring of different 
stakeholders in conflicts. Here, we focus on a feature of another nature: 
the spatial characteristics of most gold-mining operations.
In this chapter, we will take a small step in the development of such 
a framework by attempting to shed light on one specific characteristic of 
mining that became apparent in all our case studies—in all countries, the 
mining takes place in remote parts, distant from urban centres, distant 
from regulating state apparatuses, distant from services and legal markets. 
What is the role of this physical distance, this far away situation and this 
isolation from urban centres in the conflicts surrounding mining, and 
how can our attention on this fact lead to insights that might contribute 
to a  more thorough understanding and possibly to a solution for 
the conflicts?
We therefore explore the multilayered nature of conflict using the notion 
of marginal territory, to shed light on some of the most notable features 
of conflict and the processes underlying the conflicts in the small-scale 
gold-mining in the Amazon. The location and marginality of the mining 
regions is part of the structural dimension of the conflicts related to 
small-scale gold-mining. What is the role for the actual interactions and 
encounters, the confrontations between actors in the field and the choices 
people make to join in, be part of the conflict, or stay out? 
We will distinguish four different takes on the remote, isolated, far-
away situation of many of the small-scale gold-mining operations in the 
Amazon, and discuss each of these on the basis of a short case. Based on 
BeTWeeN THe PLOUGH AND THe PICK
264
the results, we come to some general conclusions about the role of 
geographical and political distance as a structural feature in the conflicts 
around gold-mining.
Mining in marginal territory (outside state 
control) 
The mining activities we study usually take place in remote parts of 
nation states, in the dense and often difficult to access remote areas in the 
tropical rainforest. The physical and organisational distance from state 
control affects conflicts between state representatives and groups of the 
population, and miners who have different accesses to state backing and 
authorisation. Remoteness means that activities take place in areas that 
are marginal from the perspective of the political and economic centres 
of that region of the country. For the parties involved, it means exclusion 
from locations of decision-making, as well as a lack of representation and 
presence in public spheres. 
A good case in point is the Peruvian region of Madre de Dios, which 
is the scene of an enduring dispute between small-scale miners and the 
authorities. In part, the dispute can be explained by knowledge hiatuses, 
miscommunication and refusal to understand the other party’s interests. 
Damonte (2016) explains how the Peruvian Government attempted to 
formalise small-scale mining as a measure in a larger plan to counter the 
environmental impact of illegal mining. The formalisation, however, 
included declaring all small-scale mining in the protected non-mining 
zone areas as illegal, thus creating more illegality. From the perspective 
of the miners, this was a threat to their livelihoods and a  violation of 
agreements they had about the use of the land. So far, no workable solution 
has been found to resolve the conflicting understandings of the situation.
The central government in Lima is not really interested in the miners, 
or in the region, and gives no priority to combating illegal small-scale 
mining. But at the same time, the government is whimsical in this respect. 
Pressure to intervene comes from the international community and Peru’s 
own (weak and inefficient) environmental department. The benefits of 
the small-scale mining in economic terms are marginal for the state, as 
it makes no significant contribution to Peru’s gross domestic product. 
What remains is that for the Peruvian state, the formalisation process 
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is a governance instrument for a remote region that it still is unable to 
govern.2 The central government fails to acknowledge the complex social 
dynamics that rule the remote Amazonian region. 
Historically, the Peruvian state followed a ‘conquest’ approach that solely 
focused on extraction of resources from the region. In Madre de Dios, the 
state never developed a program of social and economic development. 
As a consequence, the state can hardly ‘read’ contemporary local society 
(Damonte 2016) and resorts to punitive actions against the miners on 
an ad hoc basis, most often without success. The central government has 
proved incapable of collaborating with regional authorities, for whom 
the small-scale miners represent an economically important factor, and 
a politically dominated area. As a result, the miners refuse to collaborate, 
and instead contest, delay and sabotage the  government’s plans to 
reorganise their mining activities. The authorities are insufficiently 
equipped to enforce the law, because they are unable to grasp the complex 
societal dynamics underlying small-scale mining. Specifically, the failure 
of the state to integrate local people and local agendas in the process of 
formalisation hinders current attempts to intervene with any real effect. 
For the state, operating ‘from Lima’, Madre de Dios continues to be 
a marginal, unknown and unruly area.
Mining in marginal territory (delegated state 
control)
The small-scale miners in Peru worked and organised the territory in the 
absence of the state for a long time. Now that the state wants to interfere, 
they ignore, resist and subvert the actions of the state. This also happens 
in other parts of the Amazon. Others may step into the void to ‘represent’ 
the state or assume the tasks it is unable to fulfil. Who are the actors that 
can do that, and what are the means they apply to do so? 
2  Damonte refers to Foucault’s (2009) discussion of the concepts of sovereignty and governmentality, 
as the different and successive ways states can establish governance. A state achieves territorial 
sovereignty when it is capable of controlling the territory through territorial knowledge (territorial data) 
and administrative power. ‘Governmentality’ refers to the ‘institutions, procedures … that allow the 
exercise of … power that has the population as its target’ (Foucault 2009: 108), and to the government 
apparatuses and related knowledge used to govern the population that lives in its sovereign territory.
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To elucidate this question, Suriname offers a good example. Suriname is 
a small country in the northeastern part of the Amazon, which witnessed 
a substantial increase in small-scale gold-mining activities in the 1990s. 
The gold-bearing lands are located in the sparsely populated interior, 
where only Maroons and Amerindians live. In this part of the country, 
the state has historically been completely absent, and still there are hardly 
any services provided to the people: no schools, no health services and 
no police, to name just some basics. The local inhabitants were totally 
overlooked when mining began to develop. The government issued 
several large concession areas for prospecting to some businessmen and to 
the national mining company. In and around these ‘official’ concessions, 
the local tribal people in whose traditional territory the concessions 
were located also started mining more actively than they had done in 
previous decades. But land rights of the tribal people are not recognised 
in Suriname, and the rights to mine were never assigned to them either. 
This resulted in colliding claims and overlapping operations.
In 1991, two concessions were issued to people from the capital, 
Paramaribo, at the Lawa River—traditional territory of the Aluku 
(or Boni) Maroons and Wayana indigenous peoples. For the indigenous 
people, the new concession holders, with official documents in their 
hands, were complete strangers, even aliens—as if Columbus had landed 
again on the (allegedly uninhabited) territory of the continent and, 
without even blinking, declared, ‘In the name of the King of Spain I take 
possession of this land and everything that belongs to it …’. Now, new 
territorial names and rights were created. The Antino concession came 
into the hands of Nana Resources, a family company of the Naarendorps; 
the Benzdorp concession went to Grassalco, the state business company. 
The  two concessions each comprise about 140,000 hectares. Although, 
strictly speaking, the rights conferred to these outsiders were exploration 
rights and not exploitation rights, the companies soon started to effectively 
mine on the concessions. They did so by inviting others—migrant miners 
and local Maroons. Instead of initiating operations themselves, they gave 
access to migrant small-scale miners, most of them Brazilians, with a lot 
of knowledge and experience as small-scale gold miners (usually called 
garimpeiros), who brought their own equipment and paid 10 per cent of 
the production to the concession holders. 
Subletting is prohibited in the national mining law, but in the miners’ 
culture it is an accepted rule that the ‘owner of the mining land’ has the 
right to collect a percentage of the gold. For the Brazilian garimpeiros, this 
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was a known practice. However, the indigenous Aluku and the Wayana 
felt that this completely ignored and overruled their (customary) rights 
and they resisted complying with these rules, which were now claimed and 
implemented by the new ‘owners of the land’. In this struggle, the state 
remained absent on the ground. In Paramaribo, a minister or another 
official would occasionally explain on television that all mineral resources 
belong to the nation, suggesting that these firms (having their base in the 
city of Paramaribo) were representing the state and operating on the basis 
of its ruling and, therefore, had more right to mine than local inhabitants 
or migrants, who in actual fact were doing all the hard work. This was 
all in the midst of internal frictions between the garimpeiros and the 
Maroons, and with the ‘rights dispute’ remaining a moot point.
The situation became even more complex when the two firms that were 
the concession holders started negotiating with ‘big fish’ from elsewhere: 
Canada- and USA-based junior companies; exploration companies 
looking for gold deposits that have potential for large-scale exploitation; 
and large-scale mining companies. The two firms, Nana Resources and 
Grassalco, acted as gatekeepers and facilitators. They had probably taken 
on the concessions because they hoped to attract foreign investors, who 
would have the knowledge and capital to undertake serious prospecting, 
and would eventually build and exploit large-scale mines on their 
concessions. In the early 1990s, such companies initiated professional 
exploration activities: Golden Star at the Antino concession, and Canarc 
at the Grassalco concession. In both cases, it did not result in large-scale 
exploitation projects. The gold reserves were not big enough to justify the 
scale of investment that would be necessary. It was unlikely that costs and 
yields would bring a beneficial outcome.
Whereas the local gold miners—the Maroons—refused to pay 10 per cent 
of the produce to the concession holders, the migrant miners adapted to 
the rules set by the firms. The small-scale miners were allowed to work 
wherever they wanted on the large concessions. They had to prospect 
for themselves, and could then talk to the ‘security man’ of the firm to 
obtain permission for opening a mine on the location of their choice. 
Doing so in large numbers, the garimpeiros became the prospectors for 
the international firm, while they also paid 10 per cent of their raw 
production to Nana Resources (Theije and Bal 2010). The concession 
owners collected kilograms of gold every week. In the heydays of the 
Antino concession, at the beginning of 2006, more than 60 small-scale 
mining operations were producing gold. Although later, the number of 
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producing miners went down—amongst other reasons, because they were 
sent away when Nana Resources eventually started a mining operation 
on part of the concession—the subletting system continues to be an 
important part of the local organisation of the mining business.
So in the absence of, or under ineffective control by, state representatives, 
gold production is completely managed according to the rules set by the 
concession owners. On the margins of Suriname society, far away from 
the central state, but deriving authority from this same centre, delegated 
through the concession system, the concession owners use this authority 
to guarantee and monopolise for themselves, and subsequently distribute 
to others, the access to profits (Ribot and Peluso 2003) from the gold-
mining activities. Their power, however, has not been effective enough to 
make the Maroons obey.
Marginal territory creates local control
In the absence of central authority, or in the presence of ineffective 
authority, conflict resolution and organisation at the mining sites is 
often self-administered and self-regulated. The self-administration is, of 
course, more flexible than bureaucracies or other institutionalised forces 
imposing the rules. But it often comes at the cost of imbalances in terms 
of abilities to promote one’s interests. Yet, there is a common interest in 
security about the ways to act, to obey and to comply. Even in makeshift 
circumstances, in temporary mining camps, in continuously changing 
working settings, total improvisation or ‘making it up as you go’ will not 
last long; people will get together and arrange a system, no matter how 
precarious, unjust or violent it may be, to channel things. Total anarchy 
and unpredictability is bad news for all players, whatever their working 
and living configurations. We will return to this point later.
Where the state has no control, others take over. Some will often 
monopolise the use of violence and control over people’s moves and 
work. In the Suriname case just described, the ‘security’ employees of 
the concession holders most often assume the role of police, even when 
it concerns persons and issues not related to the firm and mining on the 
concession. So when there is a fight in the neighbouring settlement, 
they are the ones that will go there to settle issues, administer justice and 
restore peace, sometimes even keep perpetrators captive for a short time, 
or some days, before handing them over to the national police officers who 
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are called from town. The miners also appeal to them to settle quarrels 
between spouses, or to ask help with disagreements regarding payments 
between miners. 
In other parts of the Amazon, the hosts to the migrant miners may also 
take on the role of local authority and control the conflict and violence. 
In  Brazil,  this is commonly the ‘owner of the mine’, who usually is 
the person who first found gold in the location and therefore obtained the 
right to ownership in the mining culture. Although the ‘owner of the mine’ 
eventually may have (partly) formalised his access to the gold, usually his 
power extends to other arenas of social life in the mine. ‘Inside’ is a world 
in itself, where gold-mining defines activities, identities and rules (Larreta 
2002: 45). Inside, the negative qualifications of small-scale gold miners that 
are prevalent ‘outside’ are absent. Inside is also where the marginality of 
the territory gives way to the authority of the owner of the mine, who not 
only safeguards his access to the gold, but also decides on other issues in the 
garimpo, the mining site, such as resolving conflicts between workers. 
In quite a similar way, the inhabitants of the Grankriki region in Suriname 
control the Brazilian migrant miners’ access to the mining grounds—not 
only to mine, but also to live there. They are miners themselves, and 
work closely together with the Brazilians. The Brazilians refer to the 
local Maroons as concession owners, although they have never obtained 
mining concessions from the competent state authorities. The situation 
here is that the concession was given to a company that does not use its 
right to explore the area for gold findings and, unlike the firms described 
above, also did not set up any infrastructure to control the exploration and 
exploitation of others. As a result, the Maroons of the area have turned 
their lands meant for planting and hunting into mining ‘concessions’ too. 
The families from the villages each have a specific part of the area as their 
claim, where they mine themselves and give access to migrant miners 
to mine as well. The migrant miners pay a part of the gold production, 
usually 10 per cent, to the family on whose ‘concession’ they work. 
The ‘concessions’ are small and pass from the family elders to the younger 
men, who then take care of the social and economic organisation. They 
collect the contributions from the miners, and keep peace and order—for 
which they are highly respected by the garimpeiros. If there are fights, 
they simply send the troublemakers away. And because access to the gold 
is what brings the people here together in the first place, being sent away 
is a serious punishment. In this situation, the local control of the mining 
area works well.
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Mining ‘claiming’ claims in the margin
Now, we come to the fourth instance where mining-related conflicts 
and marginal territory interact with each other. This time, we see the 
connection the other way around: the marginal territories are also in a way 
created by the mining activity. They are constituted, constructed and built 
in reaction to the mining operations that go on there. In other words, 
we have to look at the way in which mining activities are constitutive 
for territorial organisation and claims, hence the ‘situatedness’ of mining 
regions, which in turn lie at the base of conflicts. 
The goldfields in the south of Suriname continue at the other side of 
the border (which is the Lawa River) into French Guiana. Goldfields 
do not respect national borders. For the Aluku Maroons and Wayana 
Amerindians as well, the region is one continuous territory where they 
have lived for many decades, and even centuries. The local population 
moves, lives and travels in the territory on both sides of the river and 
national border, to plant their gardens, build their houses and search 
for hunting and fishing areas. They also freely use both sides of the 
river to gain direct access to the gold, and to try and control the access 
of others to it. So when it became too difficult to mine on the French 
side, where the state has a stronger presence as compared to Suriname, 
some Aluku moved to the Suriname border of the Lawa River to mine. 
Although they may not have set foot there for years, now that they had 
become miners, the territory turned interesting again and they claimed 
it as tribal territory without further ado. The concession holders would 
obviously not acknowledge or respect any such claim based on traditional 
settlement, but the migrant miners, other Aluku and the members of 
indigenous groups and other Maroons in the region were willing to admit 
such entitlements. The status of a region and one’s right to live, work or 
mine there hence proves to depend on different parameters for different 
local groups or actors. ‘Legitimately mining’ somewhere, or defining an 
area as ‘justifiably accessible’ for someone, depends on whom, and with 
what imposition of power, responds to such claims.
The local inhabitants also found other ways of making a living from the 
gold rush and, here too, they in a way created the nature, ‘identity’ and 
(indirect) accessibility of a disputed mining region. Along the Suriname 
border of the Lawa River, settlements of mechanics and equipment 
maintenance personnel, merchants, bar owners, sex workers, smugglers 
and temporarily unemployed miners and cooks have emerged since 2006. 
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Some have as many as 50 houses, bars and shops, but several other 
smaller places have also emerged on the Suriname bank of the river. 
The Aluku and Wayana collect monthly payments from the migrants 
who have built houses and run their commercial businesses catering for 
the gold miners here. At these locations, the land that was unused and 
untouched before gold-mining became significant. It was ‘community 
forest’ without particular ownership claims or customary destinations for 
these locations. But now, due to the recent gold rush in the region, these 
marginal territories became important and, with that, they also emerged 
as sources for conflicts between local people, migrants and, from time to 
time, the state.
In assessing the importance and ‘constituting force’ of these settlements, 
we need to bring in the fact that French Guiana and Suriname have very 
different politics with respect to small-scale gold-mining. In comparison 
to the Suriname policy of laissez-faire, French Guiana actively tries to 
eradicate illegal small-scale gold-mining with a large police and military 
force. However, the French have little success with their policies because 
ASM is maintained and supplied from Suriname. Additionally, Suriname 
offers ‘sanctuary’ for those miners that need to flee from French law 
enforcement officers, having been caught illegally mining or bringing 
provisions. The newly occupied marginal territory generates opportunities 
for different actors here. Miners cross the borders easily and, most of the 
time, completely unnoticed. Miners find facilities close by and, at the 
same time, out of reach of the French. In turn, the Surinamese shop and 
workshop owners obtain a livelihood. This is only possible due to the 
marginal status of this territory.
Conclusion: Gold conflicts in marginal 
territories
Reflecting upon the role and importance of physical distance—of being 
only difficultly governable and being isolated from the key urban centres—
in the conflicts surrounding mining, we come across various important 
features.
What we can say is that a lack of effective state governance and authority 
characterises the marginal areas where much of the small-scale gold-
mining takes place. In our research in the Amazon, we found different 
effects when it came to the emergence and evolution of conflict.
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To begin with, we found that the idea that mining areas beyond the 
effective range of the state embody a complete mobocracy or ochlocracy, 
a full collapse of any system, mere lawlessness and complete explosion 
of violence seems to be untrue. Although possibly unjust, and partly 
based on physical power, some rule and some routine about how to 
interact, whom to pay and whom to obey exists. Different players, even 
in competition, benefit from some predictability, a certain acceptance 
of power and a  certain acknowledgement of the other’s position and 
legitimacy. We must add, however, that the territorial marginality may 
both contribute to the ineffectiveness of government in the mining areas, 
as well as be the result of local dynamics undermining and altering the 
state’s definition of the region, and the state’s proposal on how it should 
be administered.
Second, the focus on the marginal status of the mining regions shows 
that the lack of state control opens opportunities for other actors to usurp 
authority and embody legal and less-legal power. These actors are often 
from circles close to the state, and borrow the power of the state to impose 
themselves locally. They will, however, often need to make concessions 
because they cannot call in the full force of the state to enforce their will.
In other cases, however, we see that it is not the one closest to the state 
that prevails. The situation of marginality also opens opportunities for 
those who have no such proximity to the power structures of the state. 
These actors will often bring in their creative and innovative vehicles to 
promote their interests and obtain good results through their well-planned 
interactions with the other players. Their power or authority is based on 
other elements, such as geographic or technical knowledge, traditional 
or customary entitlements, or established rules and expectations.
In all cases, the total or partial absence of the state does not result in chaos 
or a blunt measure of physical strength. Violence, or the permanent threat 
of violence, benefits no one. One way or the other, the situation of not 
being governed will lead to some form of creative, albeit often unfair, and 
yet to some degree agreed-upon, self-governance. 
To summarise, we note that in the marginal areas, the access to mining 
grounds is taking place in many different ways: sometimes triggering 
conflicts between actors involved, while in other situations leading to 
the formation of surprising collaborations. Where conflicts occur, they 
are intimately related to the state of marginality of the mining areas. 
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Not rights or judicial force, but an independent dynamic of strengths 
and understanding interdependencies and interest balances seem to be 
the drivers that regulate conflicts. We can recommend that government 
interventions in such constellations always carefully take note of the 
situation on the ground if they do not want to do more harm than good. 
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Opportunities and risks in post-
conflict Colombia
Alexandra Urán
In the last 50 years, the guerrilla group Colombian Revolutionary Armed 
Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC) has made 
progress in furthering its operations, mostly in areas with a relatively 
poor government presence. In these areas, on the margins of the official 
government, this armed group has spread the construction of a political 
setting in order to develop a set of rules that control rural areas. It is not 
a mere coincidence that these areas are the same places where small-scale 
mining (SSM) activities occur in conditions that are out of reach of the 
official legal system (Toro et al. 2012). The strong presence of the FARC 
guerrilla and other illegal armed groups in these rural areas have increased 
procedures for managing and administrating natural resources separately 
from the official legal system and outside of the government’s control, 
and they have also fabricated an extended conflict in response to the 
political competition for power (Álvarez 2015). This chapter focuses on 
the situation of gold-mining to show how the Government of Colombia 
in the last decade has intensified and reproduced a neo-extractivist model 
of an industrial and mechanised paradigm for mining: a strategy that 
has excluded small-scale miners as local agents and decision makers. The 
main objectives of this chapter are twofold: to evaluate how the radical 
left in the political scenario may be included and recognised as a political 
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actor in order to change the rules on mining and the administration of 
mining resources; and to generate a better understanding of the violence 
and analyses of the socio-environmental conflicts associated with the 
large-scale exploitation of mining resources. The purpose is to foster an 
international debate around the post-conflict process in Colombia and, 
perhaps even more importantly, to underline how including the left army 
group in the sphere of politics and recognising them as an actor can create 
opportunities for the SSM in the near future, as well as opportunities for 
the construction of legal pluralism in the exploitation of mining resources 
as a way for democratising one of the most complex fields and disputes 
in Colombia.
Peace process: Background
In 2011, President Santos manifested his intention to the guerrilla group 
to resume talking about the peace process1 with the enactment of the 
Victims and Land Restitution Law (Ley de Víctimas y Restitución de Tierras). 
This law included a list of the issues that the government proposed to 
address, the representatives that they suggested and the possible places in 
which meetings for peace talks could be held. After some discussion, the 
government and the FARC chose Cuba and Norway as the two nations 
that would mediate the talks: Cuba for being the headquarters of their 
first meetings in 2010 with other countries and Norway for its experience 
as a moderator in conflict resolution. The Catholic Church in Colombia 
also offered their assistance as moderators, as they had participated in 
humanitarian efforts with the FARC in the last two decades.
The final outline for the agenda consisted of five items: 
• Integral agricultural development policy: In their agricultural 
proposal, the FARC placed an emphasis on the creation of a ‘designated 
land for farmers’ (Territorios Campesinos), which would be collectively 
owned and managed by individuals chosen by the community. 
• Political participation: The FARC and the government would 
jointly identify regions particularly affected by the conflict, in which 
the national government would commit to creating a total of X 
Special Provisional Peace Districts, in order for a total of X House 
1 The negotiations lasted over two years (Los Tiempos Internacional 2012). 
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Representatives to be elected temporarily and for X electoral periods. 
The topic was also presented that special attention should be given to 
the parties that arise as a result of the peace talks, such as the FARC-EP 
party, both in regard to their access to the media, as well as having their 
programs reach a greater public. 
• Ending the conflict: The surrender of arms by the FARC, which the 
FARC say should be accompanied by a restructuring of the military. 
The surrendering of arms should be done in order for them to return 
or enter into civilian life through a legal framework for peace—an 
effort that is a defining element of the suspension of legal processes for 
subversive agents. 
• Reach a solution to the problem of illegal drugs: The FARC 
proposed to prioritise physical eradication as a method for eliminating 
drugs. In agreement with the cultivators and producers of illegal drugs, 
it was agreed that the cultivation of plants for ancestral use could not 
be eliminated.
• Identify the victims of the armed conflict: While members 
of civil society at large are also to be considered victims, special 
acknowledgement would be given to farming communities—
ethnic victims of the attacks made by FARC-EP. Additionally, 
acknowledgement would be given to the victims of government-
inflicted violence, such as the political organisations of leftist and/or 
trade union groups, which had experienced repression and violence by 
the government.
It is important to recognise that all the items listed in the agenda for 
the peace talks are absolutely necessary in order for an agreement to be 
reached. It is also important to recognise that they may influence the 
development of mining in Colombia. Simultaneously, each of these 
items of negotiation may be changed, resolved or negotiated upon, due 
to decisions made on mining policies. As this is a process of negotiation 
that involves mining, not only will the efficiency of production improve, 
but as a result of the resolution of the extensive conflict in Colombia and 
political polarisation, it will also further develop the democratic process 
and encourage freedom of speech for different players.
The situation in 2015 urgently demanded the signing of a peace 
agreement.  The government has indicated that only through the 
solidification of the peace process can economic stability be established 
in the country. The main question to be asked then is: what principles 
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should the peace agreement secure in order for the mining strategy to 
be implemented successfully? The discussion that follows is focused 
specifically around SSM. It will review the case of gold-mining, as in this 
particular case study different levels of investment resources and players 
are involved, which will enrich the discussion on the opportunities and 
risks that the post-conflict era in Colombia brings to the exploitation, use 
and management of natural resources.
Gold‑mining and social involvement
Gold-mining in Colombia is an activity that involves a diverse group of 
social agents. Unlike in other extraction activities, there is a high demand 
for the participation and inclusion of different agents in order to regulate 
and manage this activity. Gold-mining is performed on different scales, 
from its artisanal form to its most industrial form. On the smallest 
scale, it is performed without machines and by local communities. The 
semi-mechanised mining today involves the use of excavator hoes and 
technology that require high levels of investment by miners. Large-scale 
or industrialised mining requires high levels of investment in capital and 
technology and is performed by large companies, the majority of which 
are international. Each of these scales of mining have different ways of 
standardising and formalising their processes, different economic impacts, 
different levels of social involvement, different forms of operation and 
varying levels of environmental impacts.
SSM is performed mainly in the collective territories, by communities 
of African descent and some indigenous communities. The government 
has acknowledged the right of these communities to perform de facto 
or traditional mining2 as a form of subsistence, provided that it is 
not performed intensively. This form of mining does not require an 
environmental licence. Small-scale mining is also performed as an 
informal activity, particularly in regions where large-scale mining leaves 
scrap material that cannot be used with mechanised mining systems. 
Miners from everywhere in Colombia come to the Chocó region to 
2 ‘Traditional Mining is considered to be that which is performed by individuals, groups of people 
or communities that mine government property without a permit registered in the National Mining 
Registry and that can verify through commercial and technical documentation that their work has 
been continuous over the last five (5) years and that the work they perform has been in existence for 
at least ten (10) years prior to the date in which this law came into effect.’ Mining Code, Law 1382 
of the 2010 Colombian Congress, Paragraph 1/Article 1.
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perform mining manually, which is not very profitable, but becomes 
a form of subsistence for those who do not have other opportunities in 
the formal labour market. As this activity is performed using artisanal 
techniques, in collective territories where de facto mining is performed, 
or in regions where mining companies have environmental licences and 
mining rights, it is not a requirement for the miners who work in SSM 
to have individual mining permits. Recently, however, the use of an 
identification number, RUCOM,3 has been implemented in order to sell 
gold—an implementation that has been met with great resistance.
Following small-scale mining is mid-scale mining, which today is extremely 
complex. Production units that operate on this scale are identified on the 
basis of mining contracts. However, the actual geographical distribution of 
such mining contracts is unknown, and thus, no clear structures exist that 
can regulate their functioning. Mid-scale mining contracts are frequently 
established in areas that receive special environmental protection, such as 
parks and highland areas, and even in the collective territories of ethnic 
communities where environmental authorities are not present. This is 
why the effects of its impact on these ecosystems are yet to be determined. 
While legally, a mineral title and environmental licence is needed (as the 
activity involves mechanised or semi-mechanised mining), local authorities 
are not in a position to closely audit the territories for such permits. It is 
important to note that the process of obtaining a mineral title is a heavy 
burden for a mid-scale mining company. This is one of the reasons why 
the mid sector of gold-mining, at best, becomes a form of outsourcing 
for the mining industry—in regions where a mineral title exists, mid-
scale miners sign agreements allowing them to utilise the large-scale or 
industrial mining areas, provided that the gold is sold exclusively to the 
big company that owns the permit, who then sells and receives the profits 
of the mineral.
3 Commercial Mining Registration Number (Registro Único de Comercio Minero, RUCOM), 
established under Article 112 of Law 1450 of the year 2012 of the National Development Plan. 
Through the RUCOM, the National Mining Agency mandates for controls to be implemented on 
the sale of minerals and that a list of those that hold mineral titles be published, as well as information 
on the agents that are authorised to sell minerals. The purpose of this regulation is to generate greater 
transparency and control around the commercial activity of minerals in Colombia. This regulation 
was implemented in January 2014.
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Such arrangements between large-scale mining companies and mid-scale 
mining contractors do not account for more than 13 per cent of mining 
practices. The remaining 87 per cent of mid-scale mining is performed 
illegally, without the permission of the permit owners or on land where 
no titles exist (Güiza 2014: 100). In other words, the majority of mid-
scale mining operates without any type of monitoring or environmental 
control,4 which also contributes to tax evasion, fosters money laundering 
and the financing of illegal armed groups, guerrillas, paramilitary groups 
and groups that perform ordinary crimes. This phenomenon has become 
evident in many parts of the world, as suggested by Di John’s (2008) 
analysis of the causes of what he calls the ‘failed states’, which, according 
to him, focus their economies on mining processes themselves and not on 
the commodification processes of the raw material that promote national 
industry and generate employment.
Last is large-scale mining, for which legislation, some regulations and 
specific standards exist, such as mineral titles, environmental licences 
and management and deforestation plans. Although regulatory guidelines 
exist, the government’s structure for the monitoring, assessment and control 
of activities related to the management and mitigation of environmental 
impacts is still unstable and not widespread. The Colombian Government 
has few officials in the Ministry of the Environment; and, while the 
government does have regional environmental authorities (CARs),5 in 
the majority of cases where the ethnographies were conducted, these 
officials were found to be influential allies of the mining companies and 
continued to receive large financial benefits from them. Sometimes, they 
are even owners or partners of illegal mining contractor groups, which 
demonstrates the high level of corruption and the resulting lack of 
impartiality when it comes to performing their duty of monitoring as 
environmental authorities. 
4 The estimated average amount of deforestation caused by illegal mining in Colombia between 
1990 and 2019 is 310,349 hectares a year, which amounts to an estimated 6,206,000 hectares of 
destroyed forest land, or 5.4 per cent of Colombia’s surface area (See Güiza 2014: 112).
5 Regional Environmental Corporations (Corporaciones Autónomas Regionales, CAR), part 
of the Ministry of the Environment.
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Colombia: A state of competition for mining 
land rights6
The Right of Preference7 privileges ethnic groups for the use and 
management of the natural resources in their territories. Although this 
right is given to the ethnic communities of the Collective Territories of 
Afro-Colombians (in the case of Afro-Colombians), or to the resguardos 
(a  reservation system of communal landholdings) in the case of 
indigenous groups, evidence shows that in many cases these groups cannot 
compete with large-scale mining. When they apply for mineral titles, 
the majority of times they are denied and instead the titles are directed 
towards the large international mining companies. This is the case of the 
Greater Community Council of Condoto Río Iró in Condoto in the 
Department of Chocó. Since 2010, this council has applied for mineral 
titles for the main gold deposits of the collective territory, for them to 
be mined by the Afro-Colombian community using industrial methods. 
In 2013, concessions for the majority of these deposits were given to the 
international companies—Anglo Gold Ashanti Colombia and Roque 
de Jesús Homez Robayo International Business and Investments LTDA. 
The Greater Community Council of Condoto Río Iró, however, were only 
granted mineral titles that corresponded to less than half of those they 
applied for—the reason for such rejections being that they did not meet 
the requirements established by the government, nor did they have the 
financial or technical resources to perform environmental management. 
The Right of Preference, therefore, is not given to these communities and, 
instead, a different law is employed, which is a result of the Constitution 
6 Concept introduced by Urán (2008) to examine the transformation of the Colombian state, 
seeking its incorporation into the global market using two complementary strategies: competitiveness 
and militarisation. The Colombian case is presented as a key example of the Militarised Competitive 
State, which opens up the path for extended capital accumulation, but also exacerbates the levels of 
social and economic inequality and social conflict. In this article, it is used to talk about the (mining) 
land-right competition on the new model of the Colombian state, where unequal policies have been 
used by the state to protect the interests of the multinational corporations as a strategy to ‘clean’ the 
land, removing the ‘unproductive’ productive sectors—illegal, artisanal and SSM—and to create the 
idyllic productive state, based on the extraction of mining resources.
7  The Right of Preference is the privilege granted by law to ethnic minorities that allows the 
government, by way of the Ministry of Mining and Energy, to issue these groups a special exploration 
and drilling permit in the mining regions of individuals of African descent, in order for them to 
extract the non-renewable natural resources that are traditionally extracted by these communities. 
The Mining Code, Law 685 of 2001/Article 133, states, ‘In the granting of concessions by the mining 
authority, priority will be given to the Afro-Colombian community with regard to the concessions for 
oil field and mineral deposits located in the mining regions of these communities’.
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of 1991. This law establishes the government as the owner of the subsoil,8 
and refutes the pre-existing Right of Preference. The new mining code 
gives privilege and guarantees for multinational companies in terms of 
production and regulation: the concession or allowances for exploitation 
of mineral resources was structured as a privileged form of interaction 
between the state and the private agents, there was an increase on tax 
exceptions, a weakening of environmental regulations and limited need of 
consultation with communities, among others characteristics.
Along with the mining boom, these large international companies receive 
greatly beneficial privileges from the government, which is currently 
focused on attracting foreign investments. These benefits allow them 
to mine large mining reserves even in regions that had previously been 
identified as special-use and environmental management regions, such as 
collective territories, national parks for biological conservation or research, 
or lands that had been considered as land reserves apt for agricultural 
activities. Citing the reason that these lands need to be more productive, 
today these regions are recognised as mining regions. The government 
justifies this by claiming that it is important to create a strategy that allows 
for the promotion of a development model that fosters ‘prosperity for 
all, more employment, less poverty and greater security’ (Departamento 
Nacional de Planeación (DNP) 2011). 
More specifically, the Government of Colombia has insisted upon the 
need to strengthen the industrial mining sector in order to further 
develop the country, which is already included in the ‘National Plan for 
the Development of Mining and Environmental Policy, Vision Colombia 
2019’ (UPME 2013). The surge of large-scale mining in Colombia is 
part of a strategy that seeks to take advantage of the high international 
demand for minerals: mining in developing countries in order to fuel 
industry in influential countries or in emerging large economies that 
produce high value-added products, prioritising the economies of mining 
countries (La Razón Pública Journal 2015). This mode of production 
based on the extractive industry is idealised by formal institutions and 
public entities due to its potential economic outcomes and also due to 
the level of resource mobilisation that it could achieve (Bebbington and 
8 In the 1991 Political Constitution of ‘Title XII of the Economic Framework for Public Finance’, 
Chapter 1, General Provisions, Article 332 states: ‘The government is the owner of the subsoils and of 
non-renewable natural resources, notwithstanding the rights acquired and established in accordance 
with previous laws’. 
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Bury 2013). For many academics, this mode of production consists of the 
‘neo-extraction project’, which has been adapted as a financial strategy in 
Latin America (Acosta 2011).
The mining resources of the country have been conceptualised as 
commodities that need the expertise and technical capital of multinational 
companies to become assets to the state; as such, all the resources of the 
country have become available in legal and political terms for the large-
scale extraction performed by private companies. In consequence, local 
communities and miners are understood as occupiers of those resources, 
instead of their legitimate historical users or marginal subjects in need 
of policy intervention (Bebbington 2012). Historically, public entities 
and official institutions have concentrated their formal efforts to promote 
and create secure conditions for the large-scale extraction of resources 
(Palacios 2006). This dynamic of changing the occupational means of 
production on collective property lands without prior consultation,9 
or without a general agreement from the communities that are directly 
affected, has caused social action to be taken, such as blocking of main 
roads and roads used for commercial distribution, confrontations, the 
closing of highways and even mining sites, and other acts of protest 
that have affected the operations of some of the companies operating 
in Colombia. These companies include Gran Colombia Gold, an 
international company from Canada that has 111 mineral titles in Segovia 
and Remedios in the Department of Antioquia; and Anglo Gold Ashanti, 
which has been in the country for eight years and is the largest investor in 
the gold-mining of La Colosa, located in the highlands of the Department 
of Tolima and in Chocó, in the region where collective permits are used, 
as mentioned earlier.
As an example, Gran Colombian Gold has experienced serious 
confrontations with the public with regard to the validity of the mineral 
title; these confrontations have continued since Gran Colombian Gold 
received the permit from the international company Frontino Gold 
Mines Ltd of the United Kingdom. Gran Colombian Gold received 
the contract for operations in the region that initially had been granted 
to the company from England in the first quarter of the nineteenth 
9  Prior consultation is the fundamental right of the people of ethnic groups when measures 
(legislative and administrative) are taken, or when projects or activities are going to be conducted 
within their territories. The purpose of prior consultation is to protect their cultural, social and 
economic integrity and to ensure their right to participation (Sentencia SU-039 of 1997, cited in 
Rodríguez 2014).
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century, under operational contract number RPP00140. Under these 
companies, however, the property has been in a lawsuit since 1976, when 
the Frontino Gold Mines entered Concordato and when mining rights 
were being demanded by workers who, at the time, were being laid off. 
These mining rights were demanded as part of the negotiation of their 
benefit settlements. In the year 2000, the national government placed 
the mine up for a public bid. Finally, in 2002, in a unilateral decision 
made by the government, the licence belonging to Frontino Gold Mines 
was awarded to Gran Colombia Gold. It wasn’t until the year 2010 that 
Gran Colombia Gold could begin operations, as protests arose rapidly. 
The figures on union-related violence in North of Antioquia during 
these decades are among the highest in Colombia. Historical reference 
can be made to events, such as the Massacre of Segovia and Remedios 
in 1988,10 and other actions against the public and the community of 
union workers, which, due to forces of coercion, had to abandon their 
hopes of obtaining mining concessions. This demonstrates that though 
the company has been granted the concession of the mineral title by legal 
means, several different interests exist that arise in violent protest in order 
to preserve the mining land rights.
In addition to the issue of violence in these mining regions is the problem 
of illegal mining. According to the data from the Colombian Mining 
Association (Asociación Colombiana de Minería, ASM), only 13 per cent 
of the mining activity in the region is legal or formalised. As national 
media outlets purport, this issue of violence is a direct product of the 
illegal aspect of mining and not due to a lack of consensus among the 
different players. This attitude is reflected in the following news remark 
(Semana 2015): 
Gold is part of an illegal empire ruled by criminal organizations that 
inflict serious problems on the environment, to the region and in the 
economy. Of the 55 tons of gold that are produced each year in Colombia, 
only seven belong to large companies, the majority of which are foreign 
investors that follow regulations. Santiago Ángel, President of the ACM, 
affirmed that if everything was formalized, the country would receive 
more than two billion dollars. In other words, this sector would be one of 
the greatest generators of income in the country. 
10  The period between 1982 and 1997 in Segovia and Remedios, Antioquia, was an ongoing 
period of political violence against the public that specifically targeted those who expressed political 
dissidence: social movements—community associations, unions, public boards, human rights 
committees—and the Patriotic Union (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2014: 45).
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Paradoxically, the municipalities11 that report larger productions of gold 
also report experiencing vulnerable conditions and the presence of armed 
conflict, as the investigation made by Ibañez with Laverde (2014: 217) 
revealed:
Mining municipalities, particularly those that mine silver and gold, 
demonstrate a lack of institutional structure and experience vulnerable 
socioeconomic conditions that existed prior to the initiation of mining 
practices. These municipalities do not have a strong institutional presence, 
they experience more armed conflict, are more isolated from main centers 
of production and tend to be more dependent regions. They are also 
municipalities with less potential for agricultural production. 
Although evidence of these vulnerable conditions has been well 
documented by researchers and experts in the main gold-mining regions, 
the national government has refused to admit to the correlation between 
mining and violence. For instance, Rettberg and Ortiz-Riomalo identify 
12 mechanisms whereby mining may be nurturing conflict and criminality, 
which we group in two categories: direct and indirect mechanisms. Direct 
mechanisms refer to activities whereby illegal armed actors seek direct 
access to mining-related rents. This may take the form of actually running 
mining operations or taking part in distribution and trade of mining 
output. Indirect mechanisms are those whereby mining feeds into and 
exacerbates existing social conflict, or contributes to funding illegal actors, 
for example, via protection payments (Rettberg and Ortiz-Riomalo 2014).
In another study conducted between January and December 2011 by 
Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (CINEP 2012), researchers 
registered 274 collective social actions in their database of social struggles 
related to the extraction of oil, coal and gold, which, over time, has shown 
an increase since 2005, and consistent growth between 2008 and 2011.
For the government, violence is not an indicator of the need to question the 
efficiency of mining activities, as the parameters used by the government 
to measure the competence of mining do not specifically measure the 
capacity of mining to make efficient social reproduction possible. In other 
words, the government focuses on showing the positive impacts created by 
mining, such as a strong source of income, but does not show how it also 
creates negative social impacts, such as violence. In terms of its capacity to 
11 Translators note: Municipalities in Colombia are the sub-regions by which departments are 
divided.
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generate financial surpluses and earnings for those that have the privilege 
of owning mineral titles, mining in Colombia is therefore valued for its 
economic efficiency, even though society may not be effectively involved 
in the activity. Additionally, the legitimacy of the mining process and its 
justification as the present development model, based on the exploitation 
of natural resources is specifically associated with economic growth and 
is limited to the meeting of regulations (even though these are flexible 
and manipulated), and not with their ability to produce in a socially 
responsible way. This perspective needs to be debated, given the critiques 
of the efficiency of the neo-extraction model, which have demonstrated 
that the limitations of the model are connected to the limits of nature 
itself, as well as to the strategies of social reproduction (Brand 2014).
Mining activities should therefore be thought of as a way of not only 
creating material reproduction, but also political reproduction. Further, 
the peace process should be perceived not just as a new political agenda, 
but also as related to the reproduction of the economic system.
Parties’ positions on the issue of mining
The participation of illegal groups in mining has been so radical that 
the official sources estimated that the extraction of natural resources has 
become their main source of financing (BBC News 2011). The government 
has argued that in order to bring in investment to the country, national 
security and stability are fundamental. Arguments like these are based on 
figures such as those shown by 2014 Control Risks,12 which registered 
a 60 per cent increase in road and oil well blockades as compared to the 
year before, which caused a decrease of 65 per cent in foreign investment 
during this period (UNCTAD 2014). In the negotiations in Havana, the 
topic of agrarian reform and its relationship to mining and energy policies 
has yet to be properly addressed. The government has argued that there are 
other issues of greater priority to be addressed, such as the establishment 
of a ceasefire as well the guidelines for the end of the conflict, which is 
what negotiations have focused on until now.
12 Control Risks is an independent, global risk consultancy specialising in helping organisations 
manage political, integrity and security risks in complex and hostile environments. They support 
clients by providing strategic consultancy, expert analysis and in-depth investigations, handling 
sensitive political issues and providing practical, on-the-ground protection and support.
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Even though the FARC guerrillas have been accused of participating in 
illegal mining, they have publicly established their interest in reforming 
the mining and energy sectors. They have expressed the need for Farmer 
Reserve Zones (Zonas de Reservas Campesinas, ZRC) to be established, 
which consists of identifying lands with an agricultural priority or under 
agrarian reform, as an initial topic to be included in negotiations. They have 
also called for the establishment of clear regulations for land restitution. 
This includes defining who the victims are and what arrangements are 
needed in order for restitution to occur, as well as defining the processes 
for the productive inclusion of both the victims and the arrangements for 
restitution, which is part of the fifth topic of the suggested negotiation 
agenda.
In order to reach an agreeable compromise that considers both positions—
government and opposition—mining policies must be reformed to take 
land-use regulations into account. These regulations need to be based on 
an environmental plan that ensures the conservation of the environment 
and the implementation of a rural development policy that makes 
agricultural economies viable for farmers. This implies an adequate use of 
the soil, the organised management of agricultural land boundaries and 
the institutionalisation (formalisation or legalisation) of mining activities. 
In this way, under the framework of a rural development policy, mining 
policies may acknowledge the rights of citizens in territories affected by 
the mining of natural resources, as well as the right of the application of 
Mining Code, Law 1448, on the reparation and restitution of land.
It is evident that while the peace talks in Havana have given priority 
to the idea of putting an end to the conflict through practical actions, 
such as a  ceasefire, other issues are still being left by the wayside and 
may have to wait longer for resolution. This suggests that signing a peace 
agreement, which is what is being discussed today and what national and 
international opinion calls for, is not the same as an actual agreement 
for peace. The hasty signing of an agreement may mean that guidelines 
regarding the mining of mineral resources may not be established. While 
it is possible that the signing of a peace agreement may generate a climate 
of financial security, which will surely provide greater incentive for foreign 
investment, it is also very possible for it to bring legal difficulties that may 
negatively affect operations in the mining and energy sectors. Some of 
these risks may include, for example, ambiguity around environmental 
licences, as well as confusion regarding prior consultation in the mining 
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regions of indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities related to the 
topic of victimisation, which is currently happening on a large scale 
throughout the country.
The peace agreement is key
President Juan Manuel Santos believes that the mining industry is the 
key to financing ‘the closing of the peace process—if a final agreement is 
signed in Havana’ (Bermúdez 2015). However, the social cost, which in 
this case is a product of the social and environmental impacts of mining, 
also limits the reproduction of the model based on the exploitation of 
natural resources. This is why these impacts must be accounted for in the 
process of analysing the efficiency of mining in Colombia.
SSM is gaining public attention, but the state through its formal institutions 
is pressuring its actors and using categories such as illegal, criminal or 
mineros de hecho, de facto as synonymous without any precision or empirical 
knowledge (Álvarez 2015). The historical nature of the diverse forms of 
extraction has been abandoned for more simple explanations that reduce 
the activities to legal and illegal ones. Therefore, the intervention of the 
state is also simplified into the options of formalisation or criminalisation 
as the two policies controlling the involvement of the official legal system 
in mining (ibid.).
In light of these issues, the following 10 recommendations should be held in 
consideration in order to put the mining system back on track, or in order 
to reach what we can refer to as the Agreement for Peace. Classification 
of the different types of mining would include: formal (which meets all 
established regulations); artisanal (which includes mining performed by 
indigenous Afro-Colombians and farmers); informal (which does not 
meet some environmental, labour, mining or health regulations, but has 
the intention to formalise); illegal (which does not meet any regulations, 
but mining is not their vocation); and criminal (which finances illegal 
activity). Other possibilities are the establishment of an office for SSM to 
convert formalisation into a gradual process; formation of an agency that 
assists small-scale miners in the formalisation process; hunting down the 
‘big fish’ of criminal mining; and, last but not the least, the development of 
a social map of mining that allows for information on the mining cadastre 
(with all the mineral titles identified) to be cross-identified with ethnic 
group territories and protected environmental areas, which shows where 
miners of all types and races work (from ancestral to informal miners) and 
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locates criminal miners. Other plausible options include the establishment 
of the ‘consolidation’ of mining zones, taking item one from the peace 
agreement negotiations into account; an agency for intercultural dialogues, 
in order for these ongoing dialogues with grassroots communities to have 
an institutional space; or organisation of prior consultation for larger-scale 
formal mining. Two out of every three mining projects considered to be of 
‘national interest’ by the government currently experience difficulties with 
prior consultation, which has created the idea that prior consultation is an 
obstacle for development (Bermúdez 2015).
By carrying out these recommendations, the government will be able to 
consolidate a more participatory mining process, as current assessments 
made by the government on mining in Colombia reveal a high degree 
of improvisation on behalf of the national government, with regard to 
the use and management of its natural resources, and a low degree of 
participation and distribution of its benefits. SSM should not be reduced 
to a premodern set of practices on its way to disappearing, but should 
evolve as a social expression of discontent with official institutions and 
social phenomena, which creates a need to conceptualise alternative legal 
descriptions capable of capturing its complexity and social relevance 
(Álvarez 2015). These aspects make mining a highly political issue, which 
should be open to debate and to seeking solutions among different sectors 
and agents in Colombia.
Signing a peace agreement that is based on an agreement for peace will 
make this process a more open strategy and will serve as a more active 
exercise of democracy, which could fuel the successful reproduction of 
mining companies. Demobilising the guerrillas is not a guarantee of the 
successful process of social progress, as the national government suggests. 
The peace process should combine demobilisation of the guerrillas with the 
active participation of all the political forces in the country, including 
the left and the opposition in general. This would give a new voice to 
rural sectors, including environmental and human rights defenders, and 
would therefore increase the pressure on the government with regard to 
the management of mining and oil exploration and exploitation permits.
The peace talks have already tangibly impacted the mining and energy 
sector and have the potential to substantially influence reforms for 
regulations around investing, which could radically restructure the 
national investment map. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasise that 
the possibility of greater influence from the political left on economic 
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and development policies, as a result of the political participation of the 
FARC-EP guerrillas, may broaden the panorama of decision-making and 
may not negatively affect the interests of a considerable part of Colombia’s 
corporate sector, as suggested by those who oppose such a development. 
After all, no nation may rebuild itself democratically without opposition.
Conclusion
The role of the state as the promoter of mining through the insertion of 
multinational companies into the country has generated a collision of 
interests that had been almost invisible or marginal before (Álvarez 2015). 
The complexity and diversity of actors, mainly the small-scale and local 
mining communities, institutions and rules on the mining ground need 
to be studied more deeply and empirically to achieve an efficient arena of 
participatory post-conflict Colombia.
The effect of post-conflict implications in Colombia on the mining 
sector is indisputable. The participation in the political and formal life of 
a group with ideas of opposition, such as with the FARC, may make for 
a debate that is broader in its vision on the management of the mining 
sector. Demobilisation, as well as the political participation of the FARC, 
may broaden the debate on the mechanisms and strategies that allow 
a political and economic operation to be carried out successfully, with 
regard to the use and benefit of mining resources. Political pluralism is 
a reality that exists in society or, more precisely, in multiple social fields. 
Consequently, the participation of the more radical left, with a discourse 
that will most likely be strongly influenced by the idea of nationalising 
resources, would also be a position that should be heard, as has been 
done in other countries in the region. While the case of Colombia has 
remained far from the other political tendencies in Latin America, where 
governments from the left have reached power (even though it is not as 
likely that a coalition of forces from the left wins a majority in elections 
in Colombia), the possibility of a peace agreement with the guerrillas may 
and should change its governability, based on this first peace agreement 
between Colombian Government and  FARC-EP 2017, which could be 
reproduced with the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación 
Nacional, ELN). 
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Muddy rivers and toxic flows: 
Risks and impacts of artisanal 
gold‑mining in the riverine 
catchments of Bombana, 
Southeast Sulawesi (Indonesia)
Sara Beavis and Andrew McWilliam
In 2008, the Bombana District (Kabupaten) of Southeast Sulawesi in 
eastern Indonesia experienced a dramatic influx of artisanal miners 
following the chance discovery of alluvial gold in the Tahe Ite and, later, 
Wumbubangka rivers (located in the sub-districts of Rarowatu and 
Rarowatu Utara, respectively). As stories of the golden bounty spread, 
a flood of gold prospectors arrived in the area, many of them opportunistic, 
temporary migrants from other regions in Indonesia, and began working 
the alluvial goldfields immediately adjacent to, and within, the river 
systems. Within months, there was said to be a ‘sea of people’ (lautan 
manusia) streaming into the area as thousands of hastily constructed 
prospecting camps sprung up along 15 km of the main channel of the 
Tahe Ite River and then expanded into other areas.
The initial reception of the artisanal mining was positive. The Governor 
of Southeast Sulawesi at the time was a strong promoter of mining 
development in the province, and declared the discovery a sign of 
the grace and blessing of Allah (rahmat dan berkah) (IKAPERMAB-
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Yogyakarta 2009). The local district head (bupati) issued a government 
regulation—Surat Keputusan No. 10, 2008—which decreed that the 
miners would have to pay as much as IDR250,000 (US$24) per person 
in licensing fees to work the prospective sites (Kamil 2009). By mid-2009, 
according to news reports, there were approximately 60,000 gold panning 
licences issued and as much as IDR15 milliar (over US$1.5 million) 
flowing into regional government coffers (IKAPERMAB-Yogyakarta 
2009). At the same time, the local government also issued a series of 
formal exploration and mining licences (called Kuasa Pertambangan, KP; 
and, since 2009, Ijin Usaha Pertambangan, IUP) within their district 
jurisdiction to a growing number of gold exploration companies seeking 
to secure potentially lucrative leases. 
The initial enthusiasm for mining activity, however, was soon tempered 
by a litany of problems and complaints that quickly emerged from the 
inadequate oversight and compliance monitoring of artisanal and small-
scale mining (ASM). Among the impacts from the dramatic influx of 
artisanal miners was visibly increased river channel erosion and sediment 
loads from the finely sifted materials, described as a ‘thick porridge’ 
(bubur kental ), which flowed downstream from the scattered diggings in 
the riverbed. Damage to roads was readily apparent as monsoon rains 
turned dirt tracks into impassable bogs, and conflict with local villagers 
expanded over access and use of customary lands, extensive illegal logging 
and disruption of river flows downstream extending to neighbouring 
settlements. Downstream rice farmers in villages utilising the Langkowala 
River, for example, reported major declines in water supply for irrigation. 
Finally, a growing number of artisanal prospectors had died in their 
attempts to excavate gold ore from the narrow tunnels and deep holes 
(lubang tikus) dug into the river channels (Kamil 2009), and there were 
reports of an increase in a variety of social ills, such as prostitution, 
drunkenness, muggings and violence on the goldfields.
In response to the growing public outcry, the government implemented 
a series of quasi-effective crackdowns (police ‘sweeping’ operations) on 
mining activities, especially in relation to the proliferating unlicensed 
artisanal operations (known as penambang tanpa injin, PETI). Their 
attempts to reduce and regulate the influx of people seeking good 
fortune (rezeki) from gold planning had some initial success. But, in 
the chaotic circumstances, many commentators and reporters of the 
unprecedented developments in Bombana questioned whether the golden 
bounty was really a blessing or a disaster for the general community. 
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Sahrul,  representing the advocacy non-government organisation Sagori, 
which has protested against the destructive impact of mining in the 
region, argued that mining really only benefited a few and was simply 
an ‘ATM’ for the benefit of certain government and security authorities, 
while local people were marginalised in the process (Antara 2012).
Anatomy of a gold rush: Hidden risks
Integral to artisanal gold-mining in the region has been the widespread and 
sustained use of elemental mercury for processing the gold. This practice 
has resulted in extensive, unregulated releases of mercury into the river 
systems that support valuable downstream land and riverine activities, 
including irrigation, tambak fish ponds and estuarine fishing. Seven years 
on since the first discoveries of alluvial gold, the active mining population 
has reduced substantially as a result of declining gold yields and greater 
government control over licensing and access for authorised mining 
companies. But even as the intensity of the gold rush has diminished, 
continuing hydraulic mining of the riverbanks and channels has left 
a  long-lasting deleterious environmental legacy. In previously worked 
areas, there is an extensive accumulation of unprotected mine tailings and 
drainage pits, within and adjacent to streams and waterways. Downstream 
flows in the two affected river catchments still exhibit regular, extreme 
levels of turbidity and sediment loads—a result of the intensive mining of 
riverbanks and beds in the upper catchments, in combination with heavy 
seasonal monsoon rains.
This chapter reflects on the initial results of a targeted sampling program 
of river water and sediments at key points of the Langkowala and 
Kasetahi river systems during the year 2015 (Figure 14.1). The sampling 
was undertaken, in part, as a training exercise with selected staff drawn 
from regional government environmental agencies and university staff, 
and as a demonstration of the value of scientific analysis and monitoring 
to facilitate and support public policy debate and planning. The survey 
was complemented with a social mapping exercise to better understand 
human–water interactions and experiences along the river channels. 
Here, we consider both the immediate impacts and implications of 
the downstream effects of mining, as well as the longer-term risks and 
environmental management challenges of the riverine environments for 
the thousands of residents and artisanal miners who derive livelihoods 
from their flows.
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The research forms part of a three-year Australian Government funded 
project entitled, Artisanal and Small Scale Mining for Development 
(eastern Indonesia) (2014–2017). It brought together Australian and 
Indonesian research partners in a project designed to strengthen social 
and environmental impact assessment methodologies, and to improve 
policy aspects of mining governance in the region.
Figure 14.1: Location of study area and sampling sites
Source: Clive Hilliker ©The Australian National University.
The mercury cycle and its pathways
Mercury is widely used in artisanal gold-mining to facilitate gold 
processing through the chemical bonding of gold and mercury to form an 
amalgam. The mercury is then removed through the application of heat 
(either by direct flame or retorting). However, the process is highly toxic 
and its indiscriminate use is associated with deleterious environmental 
and public health risks. In Bombana, as in most other small-scale gold-
mining sites around the world where the unregulated use of mercury 
is widespread, local ignorance and disregard of mercury’s toxicity and 
potential harm is commonplace.
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By way of overview, mercury is also added to the environment from 
natural sources (for instance, degassing from soil and water, volcanic 
eruptions, fire, weathering of mercury-bearing rock), as well as 
anthropogenic sources (for instance, mining, industry, cremations). It is 
cycled through the atmosphere and lithosphere, and can be converted to 
a more soluble and volatile organic form known as methyl mercury by 
biologically mediated processes within the soil and water, or once ingested 
by organisms (for example, within the rumen of cattle or the muscle of 
fish). Mercury is readily taken up by organisms and it bio-accumulates 
over time; the longer the exposure to mercury, the higher the risk (Lechler 
et al. 2000; Limbong et al. 2003).
Mercury also bio-magnifies as a step-by-step process along the food 
chain (Veiga et al. 1999; Limbong et al. 2003). Top-level predators are 
therefore particularly vulnerable to the accumulated effects of mercury 
contamination within the environment. For people living and working 
in a mercury-contaminated setting, such as artisanal small-scale gold-
mining, the pathways that mercury can take are various. They include 
inhalation of vaporised mercury released during torching of the mercury–
gold amalgam; ingestion of contaminated water and food; and direct 
skin contact with contaminated water, sediment, soil and gold amalgam 
(van Straaten 2000a, 2000b; Cortes-Maramba et al. 2006; Kitula 2006). 
Importantly, mercury not only passes the blood–brain barrier, but also 
through breast milk and the placenta. Unborn foetuses and young babies 
are therefore at significant risk if their mothers have been exposed to 
mercury. The risk to individuals varies according to the form of mercury 
(whether inorganic or organic), the pathway of uptake and the length 
and magnitude of exposure. In the district of Bombana, risks are mainly 
associated with inhaling vaporised mercury through the process of 
unprotected burning of amalgam, drinking contaminated water and 
having direct skin contact with mercury or contaminated water during 
mining operations.
Mercury sampling in Bombana, 2015
In considering the impact of mercury released into the environment, it is 
well attested in global literature that one of the most direct and dangerous 
interactions with mercury is through the burning of amalgam to isolate 
gold (Bank 2012). As part of our collaborative research activities in 
Bombana, the project is working with an non-government organisation 
anti-mercury advocacy group, BaliFokus, to highlight public health risks 
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and effects from direct contact with mercury.1 As part of their activities, 
BaliFokus has undertaken mercury vapour analysis at a range of locations 
in the study area, with some striking results. Levels of airborne mercury 
were recorded in a variety of locations within the active residential mining 
areas of Wumbubangka Village (Langkowala catchment) and Rau Rau 
Village (Kasetahi catchment). These results are shown in Table 14.1. The 
findings reveal a wide range of concentrations across locations with the 
highest values at four specific sites that are well above US-determined 
safe levels of exposure. These sites are mainly local shops (toko) that trade 
in gold and are likely to be places where mercury is volatised through 
burning. When these activities are undertaken in enclosed spaces with 
little ventilation, dense mercury vapour may linger in the air and expose 
the occupants to increased mercury inhalation and ingestion. Occupants 
in these contexts include women of the household, who may combine 
amalgam-processing with nurturing care of infants. Sustained exposure to 
these levels of mercury vapour can lead to severe lung damage, neurological 
problems, tremors, skin rashes, ataxia, insomnia and kidney abnormalities 
(McKelvey and Oken 2012).
Table 14.1: Concentrations of airborne mercury in the Kasetahi and 
Langkowala catchments, Bombana District, South East Sulawesi
Note: Hg = mercury; SP2 = identifier for a specific transmigration settlement.
Source: Field survey data provided by BaliFokus, 2015
1  BaliFokus has also been working with local public health service providers (Depkes) to raise 
awareness of environmental mercury applications and their potential human health risks. To date, 
the Indonesian health system has not developed any effective public health campaigns around 
mercury toxicity and artisanal gold-mining, despite its widespread distribution across Indonesia and 
demonstrated deleterious health impacts for people closely involved in the practice (see, for example, 
Limbong et al. 2003; Global Mercury Project 2006; Serikawa et al. 2011).
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In order to determine the concentration of mercury in the river systems 
affected by mining, samples of water and streambed sediments were 
collected at four sites along the Kasetahi River and eight sites along the 
Langkowala River. A background reference site sample was also taken 
from a stream within the boundaries of the neighbouring Rawa Aopa 
Watumohai National Park to the north where no mining activities occur. 
All samples were analysed for dissolved and total mercury.
Findings for dissolved mercury in the river samples were all below detection 
limits. This indicates that mercury in the river channel is adsorbed into, 
and forms fine coatings on, suspended particulate matter (for example, clay 
particles, organic matter and colloidal material) that subsequently settle out 
as stream velocity slows. Figures 14.2 and 14.3 show the concentrations 
of total mercury at the sampling sites, with reference to international and/
or national water- and sediment-quality guideline values for drinking 
water, aquatic ecosystem health, aquaculture and recreation (WHO 
2011; ANZECC 2000; Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment 
1995). At the time of sampling, it was evident that more active mining was 
taking place within the Kasetahi catchment than the Langkowala, and this is 
reflected in the data; for example, the volumes of suspended sediment being 
transported by stream flow are shown in Figure 14.4. The results reflect the 
level of disturbance and the consequent mobilisation of materials off-site by 
the action of flowing water. Two sites on the Kasetahi River (KT2 and KT3) 
are characterised not only by the highest suspended sediment concentrations, 
but also of total mercury, with water- and sediment-quality guideline values 
for multiple uses being well exceeded. By contrast, the lower concentrations 
of mercury in the Langkowala River (LW1-8) can be attributed to less 
active mining at the time of sampling, and the dilution effects of tributary 
inflows. Nevertheless, water- and sediment-quality guidelines have also been 
exceeded at a number of sites along this river system.
Interestingly, although mercury is being added to the system, there are two 
sites on the Langkowala River (LW4 and LW7) where mercury is depleted, 
relative to the top of the catchment above the mining area. These sites are 
(i) immediately below a small irrigation dam, where heavy material will tend 
to fall out of suspension and be trapped behind the dam wall, depleting 
waters immediately downstream of particulates; and (ii)  the site of river 
dredging, where coarse river sand is being removed from the stream for 
industrial use.
Figure 14.4 illustrates the variable suspended sediment concentrations in 
the two rivers and highlights the different conditions prevailing during 
sampling. As noted earlier, at the time there was significant alluvial 
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and hydraulic mining being undertaken in the upper catchment of the 
Kasetahi, and river flow was visibly turbid. By contrast, in the Langkowala, 
where such activity was not apparent, the water was less turbid and this is 
reflected in the low concentrations of suspended sediment.
Figure 14.2: Concentrations of total mercury in stream waters of the 
Kasetahi and Langkowala rivers
Note: KT = Kasetahi River samples; LW = Langkowala River samples; WHO = World 
Health Organization (2011); ANzeCC = Australian and New zealand environment 
Conservation Council (2000); Hg = mercury. Site LW6 refers to groundwater sampled from 
a village well; site Ref-1 is the reference site outside of the two catchments. 
Figure 14.3: Concentrations of total mercury in the bed sediments of the 
Kasetahi and Langkowala Rivers
Note: KT = Kasetahi River samples; LW = Langkowala River samples; ISQG = 
International Sediment Quality Guideline; Hg = mercury.
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Figure 14.4: Concentrations of suspended sediment in waters of the 
Kasetahi and Langkowala rivers
Note: KT = Kasetahi River samples; LW = Langkowala River samples.
The monitoring results demonstrate that mercury is being added to the 
system and that the location and intensity of mining activity are playing 
key roles in the spatial patterns of contamination. This is consistent 
with findings in the broader literature (Gray et al. 2000; van Straaten 
2000a, 2000b; Fadini and Jardim 2001; Roth et al. 2001). However, the 
concentrations of mercury in the water and sediments are not extremely 
high. This finding is likely to be a function of sampling in the middle of 
the dry season, when surface run-off and stream flow are relatively low. 
Seasonality is recognised as a salient factor in determining stream pollutant 
loads; in this case, sampling took place immediately after the fasting 
month of Ramadhan, when mining had generally ceased for the Idul Fitri/
Lebaran holiday. One of the preliminary results of this study, therefore, 
suggests that the contaminant concentrations observed in the river 
channels represent a current, best-case scenario. Higher concentrations of 
mercury, with associated risks, can be expected during the wet season and 
particularly in the first flushing events, when materials accumulated from 
mining over the dry season are mobilised and transported downstream.
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Social mapping of human–water interactions 
Water and sediment sampling and analysis in the Bombana District 
has provided an initial, objective snapshot of unregulated mercury 
contamination and potential risks to human and environmental health in 
the region. As part of the collaborative research engagement established 
under the auspices of the project collaborative activities with the University 
of Halu Oleo and local government staff, field research extended to 
a  social mapping exercise in the two mining-affected river catchments 
of Bombana. The survey sought to gather information of the nature and 
scope of human–water interactions in the riverine environments of the 
Kasetahi or Poleang and Langkowala rivers that are subject to the mercury 
contamination outlined in the foregoing section. An initial iteration of 
the social mapping was undertaken in July 2015 and involved visiting 
a number of locations along the river channels—from the top of the 
catchments (hulu) to the river mouths (hilir), observing conditions at 
these locations and more or less randomly interviewing local residents 
about their use of the river water, their observations and experiences 
of river flows since the onset of mining upstream.
Large numbers of residents and temporary or recent migrants live along 
the key river channels of the Kasetahi and Langkowala rivers, and have in 
the past drawn on the benefits of the river flows for many daily household 
activities. Water for household consumption and broader productive 
livelihood activities has long attracted farmers to the region. This range 
of interactions includes, for example, fresh water for consumption and 
domestic use (bathing, washing clothes), as well as places where children 
might play in the riverbeds and channels. 
River water is also used widely for irrigation purposes—principally for 
irrigated rice (sawah) on the fertile sloping mid-catchment and plains 
of both river valleys, but also for line and net fishing and harvesting 
freshwater prawns downstream, for stocking fishponds and watering 
wandering livestock (Bali banteng cattle in particular), as well as a resource 
for hand-watering vegetable gardens, establishing fruit trees and for 
washing vehicles. There are established sites for seasonal sand mining from 
deposition of material in the riverbeds and for use in house construction 
and building, as well as water for cement mixing and much else.
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While the implementation of this social mapping exercise remains at 
an early stage, the responses of households living along the rivers were 
highly consistent and generally dissatisfied with the present condition of 
the rivers. Based on initial discussions and brief interviews with a range 
of respondents, there was a consensus view that there had been major 
and long-lasting negative impacts as a direct result of the enthusiastic but 
poorly regulated mining practices in the upper catchments.
Among the issues raised by respondents living and working in villages and 
townships along the main river channels was the widespread complaint 
that the river no longer provided a plentiful supply of potable water. These 
days, and for a number of years, following the advent of mining in the upper 
catchment, river quality has dropped dramatically and the flows are often 
very turbid or muddy (keruh), especially following rains. The situation is 
such that many respondents no longer draw on the river water for their 
household consumption, only using it when alternatives are not available, 
and even in these circumstances they will draw water selectively, when 
flows are visibly clearer. Most rely instead on a combination of nearby 
alternative spring water sources, limited government-provided reticulated 
water supply services and the purchase of potable water from mobile 
traders in the form of large plastic containers known as galon. The latter 
has become a regular feature of daily life in the goldfields area, and one 
that substantially increases living costs for householders and miners alike.
Another significant deleterious impact from hydraulic mining of riverbanks 
and beds, particularly in the Langkowala catchment, has been the 
disruption of river flows to substantial areas. Rice farmers in downstream 
villages of the Langkowala River, for example, reported major declines 
in water supply for irrigation, reducing land under production by nearly 
500 ha, or the equivalent of 2,500 t of harvested rice (based on average 
yields of 4–5 t/ha), and considerably higher in terms of opportunity 
costs over time. Despite protests by farmers and farmer groups about the 
threat to their livelihoods as a result, little corrective action was taken 
by the local government. Consequently, many farmers who formerly 
relied on gravitational river flows have now switched to shallow pump 
well irrigation methods to ensure adequate supplies of water at critical 
times. The availability of groundwater resources has helped cushion 
the damaging impacts of mining, but has resulted in higher investment 
costs for farm inputs. Any impacts on groundwater resources from this 
increased use are not known. 
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A third impact of the dramatic rise in river sediment flows and increased 
deposition of sediments in the river channels over recent years is the 
perceived higher incidence of localised flooding. Inundation of maturing 
cereal crops (especially rice and maize) with mud slurries can result 
in major crop losses for farmers cultivating crops adjacent to the river 
channels. 
In the course of the social mapping exercise, participants visited a series 
of locations throughout the two catchments. The responses recorded were 
remarkably consistent in recognising the much-reduced water quality and 
heavy sediment loads during periods of active mining. At the mouth of 
the Langkowala River, a visit was made to a group of fishing households 
who have for many years fished (ikan bilang) and trapped river prawns 
(balachan). At Tanjung Baropa, a series of stilt and platform houses hug 
the southern bank and provide a staging base for working and managing a 
series of lift net (togo) structures erected in the main river channel.
Discussions with the group revealed a litany of complaints about the 
changing conditions of the river that they have been relying on for their 
livelihoods. They highlighted the heavy sediment loads deposited in 
the river mouth, which they attribute directly to the upstream mining 
activity. This has caused silting in the river mouth, preventing access to 
larger trading boats that used to purchase their catch on a regular basis. 
The traders are now forced to anchor further out and require the fishers 
to use their own boats to make an additional transfer of their catch. 
The  fishing households have also observed declining yields from their 
fishing efforts, which they attribute to the turbidity of sediment loads 
in the river flows, reduced flows at times2 and the frequent flooding after 
rains in the upper catchment, which damages their lift nets and reduces 
their ability to sustain productive yields. In these and other ways, a highly 
sustainable and low-impact fishery that has flourished for years is now 
under threat from the disregard and neglect of environmental standards, 
and the absence of effective artisanal mining procedures.
2 Fishing households also blame the upstream fish pond (tambak) operators who hold back water 
in their retention ponds at low tide.
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Conclusions
Artisanal mining in the Bombana district of Southeast Sulawesi and its 
downstream effects are strikingly evident in the quality of water and 
sediments examined in this study. Through targeted water and sediment 
sampling at different locations in the river systems, we can see what is 
being added to the system over time. We can also see how these impacts 
are modified by their dynamic interaction within the riverine systems. 
Test results reveal how and where mercury-contaminated particulates are 
trapped or removed from a stream. The pattern of mining intensity also 
influences how the contaminant concentration varies over time and space 
within waterways (for instance, during the Ramadhan fasting month), 
as does the seasonal pattern of monsoon rainfall, where the onset of the 
wet season has a flushing effect on river sediments and the mercury load 
that they carry. Identifying hotspots of contamination provides insight 
into the risks of exposure, for both people and aquatic ecosystems.
Preliminary results drawn from this study suggest that the risks of 
mercury suspended in river water downstream of mining activity occur at 
a whole-of-river scale. The transport of mercury within the water column, 
mainly adsorbed into particulate matter, creates risks for biota (especially 
catfish, freshwater shrimp, etc.) to take up mercury along the river course. 
The long-term direct and cascading effects of mercury ingestion within 
these catchments remain unclear without further research. The results of 
the sampling survey thus illustrate the need for active and longer-term 
monitoring of river and sediment quality as an important environmental 
and public health initiative by local government. Continuing efforts of 
the research partners to promote and support policy initiatives directed 
to these ends form an integral part of the action research objectives of the 
present project.
Finally, the complementary social mapping survey into human–water 
interactions along the mining-affected river systems has highlighted 
a series of adverse environmental and ecological impacts from the massively 
increased sediment flows due to unregulated hydraulic mining of riverbeds 
and banks. In particular, damage and destruction to the river amenity and 
its associated high-value, downstream benefits for local communities and 
rural livelihoods is a major and unfortunate legacy of artisanal mining. It 
is by no means evident that the short-term and limited economic benefits 
of the Bombana gold rush offset the long-term environmental costs that 
are borne by the majority of residents.
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Artisanal and small‑scale mining 
governance: The ‘emerging issue’ 
of ‘unregulated mining’ in Lao PDR
Daniele Moretti and Nicholas Garrett
‘Illegality’ and ‘formalisation’ are key topics in the global literature 
on artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) (see, for example, Fisher 
2008; Spiegel and Veiga 2009; Spiegel 2011; Lahiri-Dutt et al. 2014). 
A recent body of research argues that, in many developing countries, 
national governments and donor agencies have deliberately designed and 
implemented mining regulations and policies with the exclusive interests 
of large-scale mining (LSM) in mind, thus accepting the parallel outcome 
of illegality of ASM (see, among others, Baker et al. 2007: 13–14; Spiegel 
2011: 189, 201; Spiegel and Hoeung 2011: 2; Hatcher 2012; Holden 
et al. 2011, cited in Spiegel 2014: 301, 307; Fisher 2008; Hilson 2009; 
Hilson and McQuilken 2014: 112).1 Yet, it has been pointed out that 
1  The term ‘illegal ASM’ indicates ASM activities that are neither licensed nor compliant with 
regulations, taxes and other parts of the formal economy. By contrast, ‘informal ASM’ is a broader 
category that includes situations where ASM activities are ‘unregulated by the institutions of society 
in a legal and social environment in which similar activities are regulated’ (Castells and Portes 1989: 
12). In some cases, this may be because no regulatory frameworks exist. In others, relevant licensing 
agencies, regulatory agents and taxation officials may be non-existent, unreachable or set unreasonable 
barriers to compliance, such as indefinite delays to administrative processes or ambiguous procedures 
that prevent the legal compliance and formalisation of ASM. For example, it may be that authorities 
do not make available the registration documents ASM operators are legally required to have. 
Conventionally, formalised ASM is taken as a necessary prerequisite of legitimacy, but this is not 
always the case. It may be that some ASM operators in a given locality meet all government laws and 
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broader analyses of the many reasons behind the growth of illegal mining 
and its more negative impacts are needed to gain a fuller picture, and 
better guide future policy development and implementation. Among 
others, this includes attention to the wider ‘complexities’ that characterise 
specific ASM governance regimes (Spiegel 2011: 202).
This chapter draws on fieldwork by Nicholas Garrett on the operation of 
the regulatory environment, desktop research and on joint fieldwork by 
the authors in 2014. The research was carried out as part of a consultancy 
for a mining company that sought to develop group standards and an 
engagement strategy for ASM in various countries, including Lao 
PDR. The authors visited Vientiane and current and former ASM sites 
and ASM-impacted areas in Vientiane and Xieng Khouang provinces. 
The visits offered a basis for direct observations supplemented by 
interviews with 40 informants, including local community leaders, gold 
traders, local- and national-level government and technical officials, 
representatives of international donor agencies and staff from two LSM 
companies. A  significant constraining factor in our research is that we 
were unable to directly interview active gold miners as we normally do in 
our research work. Health and safety concerns prevented us from entering 
one site. The seasonal and transient nature of ASM is also a well-known 
impediment to ASM research (Noetstaller et al. 2004: 16; Eftimie et al. 
2012: 32–3, 44), and our fieldwork in Lao PDR coincided with low times 
in the seasonal pattern of local ASM activities. Some of the areas we visited 
had already undergone partial rehabilitation, which limited opportunities 
for direct observations and interactions. The short time we had available in 
the field further constrained our capacity to directly engage and interview 
former and active ASM actors. This is especially significant in a context 
like Lao PDR, where miners are often reluctant to identify themselves as 
such, to take part in research and to disclose information on their activities 
due to illegality and tax issues (Baker et al. 2007: 6–8; see also Noetstaller 
et al. 2004: 16; Eftimie et al. 2012: 32–3). This was compounded by our 
association with an LSM company when undertaking field research on 
ASM in October 2014. We draw more on the viewpoints of government 
agencies, LSM operators and ASM-impacted communities than those 
of still-active miners, but we have ensured that our global experience 
regulations, for example, but that these exclude certain standards deemed critical by the international 
community. Conversely, in circumstances where miners are operating ‘informally’ because they 
cannot reasonably comply with government regulations, or there is no applicable legal framework, 
informal ASM operators are not necessarily illegitimate.
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in interviewing ASM operators has also shaped our analysis. There is 
comparatively little up-to-date research on ASM governance in Lao PDR, 
and we hope to fill this gap with an overview of evolving challenges. This 
chapter also reports recent developments in ASM governance, suggesting 
how these could be made more effective in future. 
The next section offers an overview of the history and present context 
of ASM in Lao PDR, including its key subsectors and their technical 
and organisational characteristics. Central to this is a discussion of some 
key (nationwide) ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors that have driven the sector’s 
expansion and mechanisation over the past 10 years. Following that, we 
consider several ‘complexities’ that so far have limited the effectiveness of 
the country’s ASM governance system, inhibiting attempts to promote 
better practices and ensure accountability. Recent expansion and 
increased mechanisation of artisanal mining have led to greater concerns 
over negative health and safety, environmental and social impacts. 
These concerns are behind recent media reports and perceptions by the 
government that ‘unregulated’ or ‘illegal’ ASM is an ‘emerging issue’ that 
needs to be tackled through new regulations (Vaenkeo 2014a). They have 
also largely motivated recent interventions to improve sectoral policies and 
management systems. The concluding section of the chapter reviews these 
interventions, which have ranged from training and awareness programs 
among miners and local communities, to capacity building in relevant 
government agencies and current efforts to draft ASM regulations. While 
each of these individual interventions has achieved some limited results 
in its own way, ASM governance to date has remained largely ‘ad hoc 
and ineffective’ (Baker et al. 2007: 18; see also BGR 2014). Moving 
forwards, it is argued that the Government of Lao PDR (GoL) should 
consider adopting a more ‘strategic’ approach to ASM. Such an approach 
would draw on international good practice and take into account current 
capacities to implement. It would adopt an integrated suite of interventions 
tailored to the particular characteristics of different ASM subsectors that 
is cognisant of specific national development priorities. While designing 
and implementing such a strategy is fraught with difficulties, several 
guides and toolkits are now available to help governments seeking to 
better manage ASM activities (such as Paget et al. 2015; see also United 
Nations Environment Programme 2015; Eftimie et al. 2012; Hinton and 
Hollestelle 2012). To be effective, such a strategy ought to build on up-
to-date and country-specific sectoral research that also considers ASM’s 
relationship to other economic sectors and the wider regional economy, 
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national industry strategies and rural development plans (Hilson and 
McQuilken 2014; Paget et al. 2015), as  well as a review of existing 
capacity gaps within the government. Further, it must be effectively 
implemented by well-resourced departments with adequate capacity, 
working in coordination with one another (Paget et al. 2015). For this to 
be achieved, the strategy would have to be developed and implemented 
with the support of international donors and in iterative consultation 
with relevant sectoral stakeholders (including artisanal miners, local 
communities, civil society, government, LSM and other supply chain 
actors). Global experience shows that such cooperation is a key factor 
of success in promoting better practices and achieving a better balance 
between positive and negative impacts within the sector (Paget et al. 
2015; see also Aubynn 2009; Spiegel and Hoeung 2011; Spiegel 2014).
ASM in Lao PDR: History, present context 
and main drivers of expansion
ASM is a still-debated term used to describe many different forms of 
extractive activities, from artisanal and unlicensed to more mechanised 
and licensed medium-scale operations (Lahiri-Dutt et al. 2014: 7). In Lao 
PDR, ASM has a long history that predates French colonisation. Presently, 
it involves a long-standing mixture of local kin groups, private and state-
owned domestic enterprises, and partnerships of national and regional 
companies (Larsen 2010: 6–7). In more recent times, however, it has come 
to include a range of independent foreign operators, sometimes operating 
in small groups and sometimes in more organised, commercial forms. 
It has also been increasingly shaped by inputs of financing, technology 
and know-how from neighbouring countries. Lao PDR ASM is therefore 
not a sheltered national sector but one that is increasingly integrated with 
the wider regional artisanal and small-scale mining and economy.
Based on the literature and our own observations, artisanal and small-scale 
mining in the Lao PDR can be divided into two main categories. The first 
involves small-scale mining undertaken without modernised production 
systems. These operations extract a mix of mineral and non-mineral 
resources, including gold, and comprise mines run by the government 
and privately owned mines with investment from local and/or foreign 
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investors from countries including China, Thailand, Vietnam and Korea 
(Shingu 2006: 1, 7; Larsen 2010: 6–7; International Council on Mining 
and Metals (ICMM) 2011). 
The second category includes manual and partly mechanised artisanal 
mining, primarily of gold, though other precious metals and stones, base 
metals like tin and construction materials are also mined and quarried 
(Larsen 2010: 6–7; ICMM 2011: 17; Latsaphao 2014; Vaenkeo 2014a, 
2014b). Our informants referred to this ASM type as ‘handicraft mining’ 
(kun kut hatagam) or, in the case of partly mechanised artisanal mining, 
as ‘semi-handicraft mining’ (kut kun kung hatagam).
There are no precise estimates, but the large numbers of part-time ASM 
miners are thought to be equivalent to between 15,000 and 50,000 full-
time miners, with 35,000–46,000 being the figure used in the most 
recent sectoral projections (Larsen 2010: 7, 16, 20, 23, 30; ICMM 
2011:  17). Non-mechanised artisanal mining is known to take place 
in at least 11  out of 17 provinces, and is estimated to involve around 
11 per cent of all ASM workers, while partly mechanised alluvial and 
hard-rock ASM has been reported in 9 out of 17 provinces, and involves 
around 89 per cent of the ASM workforce. However, both geographical 
distribution and participation levels are systematically underestimated. 
This is due to various reasons, including the fact that not all provinces 
have been covered in recent surveys, the itinerant and subsistence nature 
of ASM, lack of monitoring capacity by GoL and the miners’ reluctance 
to reveal themselves and talk about their activities for reasons considered 
above (Baker et al. 2007: 4–7).
While mining laws allow for and require permits for it (detailed in 
the next section), non-mechanised alluvial and hard-rock mining is 
often carried out informally by whole families, including women (who 
make up between 50 per cent and 80 per cent of the country’s ASM 
operators) and children. At times, individuals or groups of unrelated 
miners also participate in this type of activity, especially in the case of 
non-mechanised hard-rock mining (Earth Systems Lao (ESL) 2003: i, 
3; Shingu 2006: 8; Baker et al. 2007: 2; Larsen 2010: 7; ICMM 2011: 
11, 17; Eftimie et al. 2012: 6–7, 88, 93; Lahiri-Dutt et al. 2014: 16–18). 
For the most part, these miners are not migrants but locals who mine 
nearby areas of alluvial sediments revealed by lower water levels in the dry 
season (between January and June). Alternatively, they mine hard-rock 
BeTWeeN THe PLOUGH AND THe PICK
316
deposits uncovered by past and present larger mining companies or small 
outside operators with greater mining know-how and financing. This type 
of ASM is undertaken mainly during downtimes in the agricultural work 
cycle, as a seasonal subsistence activity to supplement rice and vegetables 
cultivation, rearing of livestock, fishing and gathering from forests, 
which remain the primary sources of livelihood, alongside other cash-
earning activities. Depending on location, such cash-earning activities can 
include limited cash cropping, sale of livestock, tourism and textile and 
other industries (ESL 2003; Shingu 2006: 8–9; Baker et al. 2007: 2, 5). 
Increasingly, however, this type of ASM is also undertaken by small groups 
of outside operators or more organised commercial ventures from other 
parts of the Lao PDR and neighbouring countries. Most alluvial artisanal 
and small-scale gold-mining (ASGM) operators in Lao PDR mine by 
hand, using simple tools like bowls, buckets, chisels, pickaxes, hoes, floats 
and water pumps to move water for sluicing and open sluice boards with 
sack linings to pan and sieve the ore (ESL 2003: i, 19–21; Shingu 2006: 8; 
Baker et al. 2007: 2; Lahiri-Dutt et al. 2014: 16–18). In some areas, such 
as Borikhamxay Province, men reportedly dig deep vertical shafts and 
mine gold gravel to be panned in the river (Shingu 2006: 9). In Vientiane 
Province, Xieng Khouang Province and many other parts of the Lao PDR, 
operators also increasingly mine primary deposits, mainly using simple 
tools adapted from agriculture and construction, such as hoes, shovels and 
bowls to dig pits, and rudimentary, unsupported tunnels to extract and 
wash ores, which are then processed by the miners themselves or by larger 
traders using mechanised crushing, sluices, copper plates, soaking tanks 
and chemicals like mercury and cyanide (Baker et al. 2007: 5; Latsaphao 
2014; Vaenkeo 2014a, 2014b).
Mechanised and semi-mechanised alluvial and hard-rock operations 
require official permits and close reporting and supervision. Yet, they too 
are often undertaken without formal licensing or regulation and with 
little monitoring and environmental or health and safety awareness. In 
some cases, such unlicensed or unregulated operations are directly run 
by foreign companies or small groups of miners from abroad. More 
frequently, they tend to be run by local operators (and, until relatively 
recently, even by the army), but often with the assistance  of foreign 
investors from neighbouring countries, who may provide them with 
financing, know-how or technological inputs, as well as commercialising 
the minerals that they produce (Baker et al. 2007: 5, 9; Larsen 2010: 6–7; 
Lahiri-Dutt et al. 2014: 14). Again, here too increasing numbers of small 
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or more organised groups of foreign operators have also directly entered 
this sector in more recent times, primarily from neighbouring countries 
like Vietnam and China. Processing of ores is minimal and technologies 
simple, often including only barges fitted with excavators, conveyors and 
sluices or old hand drills, compressors and tracks, but often with more 
sophisticated adits, pits and tunnels for hard-rock mining. Where gold 
flakes are coarse, drying and blowing by mouth are commonly used to 
separate them. Where particles are fine, however, or in the case of hard-
rock mining, mercury amalgamation and, more recently, cyanide have also 
been increasingly employed (Larsen 2010: 7; Latsaphao 2014; Vaenkeo 
2014a). The number of employees found in these more mechanised 
artisanal and small-scale operations range from just 10 to 150 each, with 
the majority having around 20 workers. Many of these workers are from 
nearby villages but, by contrast with mostly alluvial, non-mechanised 
operations, a greater number of migrants often participate in this type of 
venture, which therefore tends to be less seasonal, more enduring and not 
as strictly subsistence related (Shingu 2006: 7; Baker et al. 2007: 5). 
If ASM has been a widespread activity in rural communities for some 
time, a combination of familiar push-and-pull factors contributed to the 
considerable expansion of participation in the sector over the past two 
decades, which reportedly reached a peak in around 2008–09, as well 
as its increased mechanisation (Shingu 2006; Baker et al. 2007: 2, 5, 8, 
10–13; Larsen 2010: 7; ICMM 2011: 5; Eftimie et al. 2012: 90; Lahiri-
Dutt et al. 2014: 8–9; Latsaphao 2014; Vaenkeo 2014a, 2014b).2 As is the 
case globally (ICMM 2010: 5; Eftimie et al. 2012: 3), ASM participation 
in Lao PDR tends to be linked to poverty and lack of alternatives that 
could provide better income opportunities. The sector has thus emerged 
as an important source of cash and livelihood diversification, with much 
informal alluvial mining practised by farmers to supplement other 
livelihood strategies (ESL 2003: 19; Shingu 2006: 7; Insouvanh 2015).3 
To appreciate the financial attractiveness of ASM as a complementary 
2  It is important to note, however, that the sector (especially in its fully or partly mechanised 
component) has reportedly shrunk somewhat over the past two years, partly as a result of a 2012 
nationwide GoL moratorium on all new ASM ventures, and inspections and closures of existing 
mines with poor environmental records and likely also partly because of decreased gold prices since 
2012–13.
3  This factor alone may be somewhat weaker in explaining the rise of more mechanised ventures 
and operations that, as discussed above, tend to be more commercial, meaning not strictly subsistence-
related, more often financed by outside operators and more likely to involve migrant labour (Baker et 
al. 2007: 5).
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livelihood strategy, it is sufficient to note that Lao PDR alluvial panners 
can reportedly extract up to 31 grams of gold per annum, which could be 
equivalent to an additional annual income of over US$641.4 Moreover, 
mechanised and semi-mechanised operations, especially of primary 
deposits, are likely to yield even greater returns than this (Larsen 2010: 7). 
For example, our informants suggested that manual hard-rock gold miners 
in Xieng Khouang Province could reportedly earn up to between 6 and 
40 per cent of the average local annual income in a single day of mining 
during the peak phase of two minor, highly localised rushes. 
Over the past two decades, institutions like the Asian Development 
Bank and the World Bank have also encouraged GoL to adopt structural 
reforms and promote foreign investment as part of a transition towards a 
liberal market economy meant to promote national and local economic 
development (Boungnaphalom 2010; Larsen 2010: 4, 13–14; ICMM 
2011: 17; Hatcher 2012: 5–8; Lahiri-Dutt et al. 2014: 2–3). While it has 
brought benefits and opportunities to Lao PDR and its people, this process 
also engendered new forms of poverty and inequality linked to changes 
in demographics, the economy, occupational opportunities and land 
use, and thus also to opportunities for livelihood diversification towards 
a more cash-based economy and sources of cash other than agriculture 
(Rigg 2005; ICMM 2011; Lahiri-Dutt et al. 2014: 3–5). Therefore, the 
recent rise in ASM activities across the country should be understood, 
not only through the lens of poverty and lack of alternative opportunities 
per se, but also in the context of the effects of recent structural reforms 
(Spiegel 2009: 39, 2011: 192; Hilson and McQuilken 2014: 111–13). 
4  This is based on recent estimates that local miners receive no more than half of the international 
price of gold when they sell to local traders at or near the mines (ICMM 2011: 17), and on the average 
annual gold price of US$1,282 in 2014, when our research was conducted (as obtained through 
‘Historical Charts and Data for Gold, 2014’ at www.kitco.com). Not much is known about the 
downstream supply chain of Lao ASGM operators, though a reported pattern involves the miners selling 
gold to itinerant gold buyers who visit their villages every week during the mining season. These buyers 
then further process it for sale in the regional markets or sell it directly to jewellers (ESL 2003: ii, 22; 
Insouvanh 2015). This pattern was confirmed by our gold trading and jewellery industry informants, 
who estimated that around 15–20 per cent of all gold traded in Vientiane may originate from ASM, 
a figure that was said to have declined in the last couple of years, as a result of the 2012 government 
moratorium on alluvial ASGM. According to them, gold is traded through intermediaries, often in 
transactions involving only small quantities of up to 15 grams at a time. The destinations vary, and 
include regional and Vientiane-based markets and jewellers, with some of it also thought to be smuggled 
to neighbouring countries, like China and Thailand. Although some of the ASM gold is then exported 
in the form of jewellery, it is also commonly purchased for savings and marriage-related payments.
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But if participation in ASM offers an alternative source of livelihood 
in the face of wider structural changes, it also causes significant 
environmental degradation, particularly in the case of rush situations 
and more mechanised ASM or medium-scale mining activities. This 
can, in turn, engender further vulnerability, thus promoting further 
participation in ASM to make up for ASM’s own impacts on agricultural 
livelihoods (Insouvanh 2015; Lahiri-Dutt et al. 2014: 3, 9–15, 24–6). In 
line with these facts, our research indicated that in Vientiane and Xieng 
Khouang provinces, participation in ASM (and especially manual and 
semi-mechanised artisanal mining) tended to be linked to situations 
where local communities were experiencing livelihood stresses due to a 
combination of population growth (such as through immigration), land 
shortages, increased food prices, limited employment and alternative cash 
earning opportunities, and liquidity issues in between times when most 
crops become available for consumption and sale. 
Another factor at play in the rise of ASM may relate to issues of 
ownership, state legitimacy and political agency. While Lao PDR mining 
laws place minerals under centralised and unified management by the 
state (Article 3, Mining Law 1997; Article 4, Mining Law 2012), local 
actors can hold alternative understandings of mineral ownership. For 
instance, in Xieng Khouang Province, we interviewed local community 
members about a recent gold rush. The informants were not themselves 
miners, but they belonged to communities located near the ASM sites. 
Contrary to national laws, they believed that minerals belonged to, and 
could therefore be freely worked by, all Lao PDR citizens (and not just 
local residents). It has further been argued that many Lao PDR villagers 
see the state as a distant abstraction of which they are not fully part and 
that they do not necessarily feel wholly included in the benefits generated 
by recent economic changes (Mansfield 2000: 2; Lahiri-Dutt et al. 2014: 
3). In this light, it has been suggested that engaging in illegal ASM and 
reserving the right to sell extracted resources to illegal buyers paying the 
highest price is not just down to an economic logic, but is also a means 
for some villagers to exert political agency by asserting control over their 
livelihoods, and over land, in a rapidly changing context driven by distant 
outside forces (Lahiri-Dutt et al. 2014: 4, 23–6). 
In addition to these drivers, there are a number of pull factors at play in 
the expansion of ASM in Lao PDR. Like any other business, ASM can be 
undertaken only where the costs of extracting a resource are lower than 
the income made by selling it (ICMM 2010: 9). Participation levels will 
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also be influenced by how favourably the rewards obtained through ASM 
compare with those afforded by other economic opportunities available 
to  ASM operators (Spiegel 2014: 301, 307); by  the degree to which 
ASM’s profits are necessary to mitigate the risks and/or the cessation 
of other activities; and by the extent to which ASM can be undertaken 
alongside alternative forms of livelihood. It is therefore unsurprising 
that in Lao PDR, even when undertaken as a means of livelihood 
diversification, participation in ASM is always guided by a combination 
of lack of alternative opportunities and the ‘favourableness’ of mining 
itself (ESL  2003: 19–20; Baker et al. 2007: 4). As such, a commonly 
reported explanation for the recent growth in ASM activities is the rise of 
mineral prices over recent years (Lahiri-Dutt et al. 2014: 11; cf. Spiegel 
2014: 301, 307). This, however, can be contrasted with the 2012–13 gold 
price crash and the fact that the gold price has since remained low have 
(along with the aforementioned 2012 moratorium) reportedly led to an 
overall reduction of activity. 
In many parts of the country, including Vientiane and Xieng Khouang 
provinces, a complementary and partly related push factor has been the 
increased availability of financing, technology, inputs and outside mining 
know-how from nearby countries like China, Vietnam and Thailand in 
recent times (Baker et al. 2007: 4; ICMM 2011: 5). This has facilitated 
the expansion of ASM, particularly in its more mechanised and ‘rush’ 
forms. In many cases, this can take the form of outsiders (mainly from 
neighbouring countries but also from other parts of Lao PDR) coming 
into an area to mine, with locals initially supplying services and mining 
labour (Spiegel 2014: 305; Insouvanh 2015). In so doing, locals acquire 
skills that they later use to mine independently, with outsiders still 
transporting, processing and trading the mined ores. In some areas at 
least, the gold buyers themselves also supply miners with mercury and 
other chemicals (ESL 2003: 22). In the Lao PDR context, the start of 
more mechanised small-scale, medium-scale and large-scale mining 
operations (Baker et al. 2007: 6–7), as well as other forms of large-scale 
resource development, like hydropower, have also sometimes encouraged 
greater involvement in manual and mechanised ASM by both locals and 
outsiders. This is possibly linked to a combination of changes in the 
local socio-economic and environmental contexts (for example, greater 
monetisation of the economy, rising prices, land impacts, easier and 
cheaper exploitation of local deposits, etc.). Greater participation of this 
kind also increases the ‘favourableness’ of mining; for instance, through 
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the transmission of know-how, the creation of infrastructure that reduces 
access and transportation costs, or the unearthing of deposits or disposal 
of tailings that can be more easily and rewardingly worked through ASM 
techniques. In certain cases, the appearance of more mechanised mining 
activities in the given areas can even encourage locals to develop greater 
levels of organisation, including at the village level. It can motivate these 
units to shift away from alluvial mining and towards semi-mechanised 
mining of primary deposits, which typically yields greater returns, but also 
requires more local coordination to raise funds and/or outside investment 
or seed money (ibid.: 8). 
Current ASM governance ‘complexities’ and 
the ‘emerging issue’ of ‘unregulated mining’ 
in Lao PDR 
The aforementioned expansion of artisanal and small-scale mining has 
been mirrored by growing preoccupation in media reports and within the 
government at all levels about the increase of ‘unregulated or illegal ASM’ 
activities and their negative impacts. These concerns are exemplified by 
the issuing of two nationwide moratoria on new ASGM activities and 
consequent rounds of inspections in 2005 (Baker et al. 2007) and 2012, as 
well as ad hoc provincial and district-level moratoria on specific forms of 
ASM at various times. Most recently, they led to the National Assembly’s 
characterisation of ‘unregulated or illegal ASM’ as ‘an emerging issue’ to 
be addressed by GoL through improved regulation (Vaenkeo 2014a). 
The current Lao PDR legislative framework does (primarily through the 
amended Mineral Law 2012) provide for the licensing of ASM, but it also 
poses several restrictions and requirements to operate legally (cf. Spiegel 
2009: 42, 2014: 301–3; Spiegel and Hoeung 2011: 3). For example, ASM 
operators are legal only when: 
• They are Lao PDR citizens, resident in the local community. 
• They acquire appropriate mining licences and mine within the 
boundaries of the licence or permit area, in accordance with the 
techniques and modes of organisation and management appropriate 
to that kind of licence (for example, no machines or machines under 
five horsepower and only up to 10 labourers).
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• They mine only ‘alluvial gold, alluvial tin and tailing’—where alluvial 
gold is defined as ‘mechanical weathered mineral, which have [sic] flown 
and accumulated in some location naturally’—whose exploitation 
‘is not appropriate for industrial mining’ (revised Mining Law 2012). 
• They pay all required taxes.5 
• And/or they are Lao PDR entities with the required permits who follow 
the more stringent requirements for ‘small-scale mining’ and ‘business 
artisanal mining’, such as reporting regularly to the relevant energy and 
mines sector authorities and following strict laws on health and safety, 
environmental and social protection and sustainable development, 
including minimising and compensating for environmental and social 
impacts, and maintaining roads and other infrastructure. 
Equally, small-scale processors and gold traders only process and trade 
legally when: 
• They acquire the appropriate licences. 
• They do not deal in misappropriated or otherwise illegally mined gold.
• They pay all required taxes. 
In practice, this means that many, if not most, ASM operators and 
gold transporters, processors and traders are de facto working illegally 
because, among others, they do not hold the required permits and pay 
required taxes; some are not Lao PDR citizens (or Lao PDR citizens 
who are local residents); they mine primary deposits rather than alluvial 
deposits, as defined by the law; and they lack environmental planning and 
rehabilitation. Moreover, GoL issued two moratoria on all new ASGM 
activities in 2005 and 2012, the second of which was still effective at the 
time of fieldwork, with related inspections of existing operations and their 
closure in case of noncompliance.
Under the current governance framework, inspections and closure 
processes  of non-compliant operations are undertaken by ad hoc 
bodies involving a multitude of agencies, from local representatives of 
the departments of mines, planning, investment, natural resources 
and environment, finance, and public security to local administrative 
authority representatives. Similarly, ASM permits are administered at 
the local rather than central level, with business ASM permits being the 
5  See also the ‘Draft Presidential Decree of Lao PDR President on the Tax Rate of Natural 
Resources/Royalty’.
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competency of provincial-level authorities under the technical supervision 
of provincial-level offices of the Department of Mines (DoM), whereas 
those for non-business (or ‘handicraft’) artisanal mining are issued by 
district-level administrative authorities. While this governance structure 
clearly involves a degree of decentralisation, this is not necessarily 
a  significant devolution of power insomuch as a process intended to 
build decentralised capacity so that the central GoL has a better view 
of the activities, issues and challenges on the ground across the country. 
Nevertheless, it means that Lao PDR law requires that different agencies 
and administrative authorities at different levels should be involved in 
ASM-related issues and also, crucially, that each of them has specific 
powers and competencies. In turn, this ‘complexity’ (Spiegel 2011: 191, 
193) feeds a potential for local variation in ASM strategies and their 
implementation. For example, some provincial and district governments 
have taken a much more favourable attitude to ASM, even asking the 
central government for permission to resume releasing permits after 
national moratoria to regain lost revenue from this source (Baker et al. 
2007: 5). By contrast, others have shown more opposition to ASM, not 
only due to concerns about environmental, health and safety and social 
issues, but also because they regarded it as a threat to key local industries, 
like agriculture or tourism. In some cases, this may have resulted in 
misalignments of interests vis-à-vis ASM between local (provincial and 
district) and central GoL authorities because the former derive a more 
direct potential benefit from fees for issuing ASM permits (ibid.). It can 
also limit the state’s capacity to ensure accountability in the sector and 
open spaces where illegal activities can come to thrive. For example, even 
after the 2012 moratorium, local authorities continued to issue permits 
for ASM operations extracting construction materials, including gravel 
from riverbeds. According to anecdotal evidence, many of these operations 
have then proceeded to illegally mine alluvial gold alongside gravel, at 
times using chemicals in such a way that caused environmental pollution 
and health risks for nearby communities and raised public concern 
(Southivongnorath 2014; Vaenkeo 2014a, 2014b). These challenges are 
compounded by other widely acknowledged regulatory ‘complexities’ 
(Spiegel 2011) that leave Lao PDR with what has been called an ‘ad hoc 
and ineffective system of [ASM] governance’ (Baker et al. 2007: 18). As a 
result, the implementation of national laws and the regulatory framework 
on ASM has long been, and continues to be, ‘weak or wholly lacking’ 
across the country (ibid.; see also BGR 2014). Among others, these issues 
include a lack of communication between different authorities (and 
levels of government) involved in mining activities. There are general 
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capacity issues at all levels in DoM, Department of Geology (DoG) and 
other agencies charged with regulating ASM (such as limited human 
and financial resources and lack of technical expertise in ministries and 
departments), which severely limits capacity to both assist and regulate 
the sector. This is compounded by a lack of detailed ASM regulations 
accompanying mining legislation (Baker et al. 2007; Insouvanh 2015; see 
also Spiegel 2009: 42; 2011: 202; Spiegel and Veiga 2009).
Others have argued that GoL has been reluctant to intervene in artisanal 
and small-scale mining because it views ASM as an activity that requires 
significant (and largely lacking) resources to be properly managed, with 
potential risks (such as creating resentment among miners), and for 
comparatively little benefit in return, particularly from the standpoint of 
central authorities that gain fewer benefits from fees and taxation (Baker 
et al. 2007: 4, 8–9, 19; Spiegel 2011: 193). By and large, governments 
at all levels have tended to accept the presence of micro-level informal 
ASM activities, especially in the case of subsistence-oriented artisanal 
mining by local actors. Indeed, this mining has been allowed in spite of 
the nationwide and local moratoria, as long as it did not cause significant 
social and environmental issues (see also Baker et al. 2007: 7). 
In more recent years, however, the central and local governments’ ‘tolerance 
level’ of ASM has been more frequently and severely tested. Recent 
expansion and increased mechanisation of artisanal and small-scale mining 
mean that significant numbers of new operators have entered the sector, 
often with limited capacity and incentives to respect good practices. This 
has resulted in increasingly significant negative impacts in many parts of 
the country, including land degradation and water pollution that affected 
agricultural livelihoods and the unsafe use of chemicals like mercury and 
cyanide for recovery and processing within or near inhabited areas and 
vulnerable environments, with consequent negative effects like exposure to 
fumes, dispersal in the environment, bioaccumulation in the food chain 
and loss of wildlife, fisheries and even livestock (ESL 2003: i–ii, 20–1, 
24; Shingu 2006: 7–9; Baker et al. 2007: 2, 4–5, 8–13; Larsen 2010: 7; 
ICMM 2011: 5; Eftimie et al. 2012: 90; Lahiri-Dutt et al. 2014: 8–9; 
Latsaphao 2014; Vaenkeo 2014a, 2014b). Many ASM operations do not 
properly plan for, map and reinforce tunnelling or ensure that they are 
properly ventilated; cause land erosions and collapse; make little or no use 
of any personal safety equipment; and make inappropriate and dangerous 
use of chemicals (ESL 2003: 24). As a result, ASM across the country has 
also been associated with health and safety risks for the miners themselves 
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and for non-miners living in the proximity of mining and processing 
areas, including fatalities (for example, 20 known fatalities in one of the 
districts we visited during a  minor, highly localised gold rush). In turn, 
these environmental, health and safety issues have led to concern among 
affected local communities and, at times, conflict between operators and 
surrounding communities—a  pattern that is arguably not reported as 
often as ASM–LSM conflicts but that is found in many contexts globally 
(see, for example, Hinton and Hollestelle 2012: 69; Eslava 2014; Insouvanh 
2015; Soemarwoto 2015). It is largely as a result of these steadily increasing 
impacts, coupled with the aforementioned ‘complexities’ and limitations 
of the current ASM governance system, that ASM has come to be spoken 
of more and more in terms of ‘unregulated or illegal mining’ and as an 
‘emerging issue’ in need of proper regulation and management.6
Looking ahead: Towards a more strategic 
approach to ASM
Over the past few years, GoL has taken some steps with an array of 
partners to improve existing knowledge and management of artisanal and 
small-scale mining. Overall, these have not constituted elements of an 
integrated strategy, but isolated interventions with so far limited impacts.
Between 2003 and 2007, the Global Mercury Project (GMP) worked 
with the government and other stakeholder groups (for example, local 
communities, non-government organisations and United Nations 
agencies) to: 
• Build ASM-related capacity within the then DoG and DoM and local 
government agencies. 
• Introduce technology and training to miners to reduce mercury use 
and loss to the environment.
• Develop new legislation specific to ASM activities, such as a new 
national mercury code. 
• Produce educational materials in Lao.
6  Our interviews suggest that, at least among some central-level authorities, there is also a growing 
recognition that many of the resources found in Lao PDR are of a scale unsuitable for large mining 
companies, which therefore will become commercially viable only if exploited by properly regulated 
artisanal and small-scale mining.
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• Collect data on the extent and magnitude of small-scale and 
intermediate gold-mining activities in Lao PDR and the Mekong 
Basin (ESL 2003; Shingu 2006: 7–9; Baker et al. 2007: 2, 7, 12–19; 
Spiegel and Hoeung 2011: 8). 
More recently, the World Bank undertook a survey of (primarily) river-
based tin ASM, which yielded fresh data on artisanal and small-scale 
mining, particularly in relation to its gender profile and gender-related 
sustainability issues (Eftimie et al. 2012: 87). 
The private sector has also contributed to this process, albeit in a limited 
way. For example, LSM companies have provided some assistance to build 
capacity within the DoM. They have also conducted awareness training 
for ASM-affected communities and assisted government agencies in safely 
disposing of dangerous chemicals and rehabilitating areas impacted by 
ASM activities. However, this has been limited to their specific project 
areas within the country.
In the past couple of years, the DoG, DoM and other GoL authorities 
collaborated with a number of international partners like the World Bank, 
BGR, the Finnish and Thai governments, and Japan Oil, Gas and Metals 
National Corporation to develop new regulatory frameworks and further 
build in-house capacity to more effectively govern the mining sector (see, 
for instance, Korkiakoski et al. 2012; BGR 2014; Insouvanh 2015). As 
part of this, and following pressure from the National Assembly due to 
the aforementioned growing concerns about the negative impacts of some 
unregulated ASM activities, GoL is drafting new ASM regulations with 
technical assistance from international donors. At the time of fieldwork, 
the regulations were still in draft form and undergoing consultation. Many 
of the existing requirements and restrictions appear to be carried over 
in the draft stage of the regulations. However, potential departures from 
previous legislation were being provisionally considered for inclusion in 
the new regulations, which may eventually come to embody a potential 
shift towards greater levels of formalisation of ASM, from alluvial and 
hard-rock mining to individual and collective modes of organisation. 
These included allowing for the exploitation of both placer and hard-
rock deposits by artisanal mining permit holders (though only under 
specific conditions, and where the latter can be extracted and processed 
wholly without the use of machines); enabling artisanal miners to register 
as ‘collectives’; and the eventual creation of a fund that will provide 
training to ASM operators on mine safety, health and environmental 
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protection and rehabilitation. At such an early stage, it is unclear whether 
the regulations will become law any time soon, if they will be redrafted 
prior to that following ongoing consultation, and if they will be effectively 
implemented. Alongside the other interventions outlined above, however, 
they may eventually constitute a significant step towards reforming ASM 
governance in Lao PDR and tackling some of the ‘complexities’ that 
currently limit its effectiveness. 
These individual interventions have all achieved limited results in their 
own right. Overall, however, the existing ASM regulatory framework 
continues to be implemented in a largely ad hoc and reactive fashion, 
remaining on the whole permissive7 while lacking the capacity to provide 
effective assistance, steadily improve practices and enforce standards. In 
its efforts to tackle what is increasingly perceived to be ‘the emerging issue’ 
of the negative impacts of ‘illegal and unregulated mining’ across the 
country, GoL should continue to build on these recent interventions by 
taking a more strategic approach to ASM. This means developing measures 
to ensure accountability while addressing the main drivers behind the 
expansion of ASM and its more negative impacts, and particularly those 
‘push factors’ that are more likely to be modified through the use of 
appropriate instruments. 
An effective ASM management strategy would concern all operations 
throughout their life cycle, including activities as far upstream as 
mining and as far downstream as traders, and secondary processing 
operations that are artisanal or small scale (Paget et al. 2015). It would 
also be integrated with industry strategies and wider national–rural 
development plans (Hilson and McQuilken 2014). While developing 
and implementing such a strategy is certainly no easy task (Spiegel 2011: 
197; 2014: 303, 305, 308), a recent draft guide produced by RCS Global 
for the Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and 
Sustainable Development (IGF) (Paget et al. 2015) provides more details 
for governments on how a strategic approach can be achieved in practice.8 
7  For example, even in the context of an ongoing moratorium, low-level ASM activities are often 
tolerated, especially if undertaken as a local livelihood diversification strategy. For reasons highlighted 
in the paper, such as a lack of monitoring and enforcement resources, even more commercial ASM, 
or ASM activities undertaken by larger numbers of local or migrant actors, do take place despite the 
moratorium. 
8  The IGF is a global forum for dialogue between member-country governments, mining 
companies and industry associations about practical issues related to the sustainable management 
and development of the mining sector. It includes governments from the Asia-Pacific, such as India, 
Mongolia, Papua New Guinea and the Philippines, but not Lao PDR (IGF 2014).
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The starting point of the guide is that there is no ‘best practice’ in ASM 
management, but rather sets of ‘good practices’ that are continually evolving 
and whose effectiveness is context dependent. Instead of recommending 
a cookie-cutter set of reforms to be applied universally, it thus reviews 
a number of instruments that can be employed by governments to better 
manage ASM. Among others, such interventions include ASM zones; 
livelihood diversification schemes; education and training; the provision 
of services; supply chain initiatives; capacity building within relevant 
government agencies; and better interaction between national and local 
level planning and monitoring, including as it applies to different ASM 
types (for instance, alluvial versus hard rock, mechanised versus manual) 
and different minerals and metals (Spiegel 2011: 191–3, 202; Spiegel 
and Hoeung 2011: 3, 5, 7, 10–11; Eslava 2014; Paget et al. 2015: 9, 
12–15, 41, 61–4, 69–70, 78–92, 96–9). For each of these tools, the guide 
highlights advantages and disadvantages, including potential design and 
implementation challenges and the kind of contexts where they may 
prove most or least effective. 
It also suggests how each tool can be incorporated into different overall 
approaches that best suit the existing conditions of particular countries 
or sections of a country’s artisanal and small-scale mining, as well as the 
resources available for their management. For instance, such approaches 
may emphasise the promotion of ‘better ASM practices’ through 
training and incentives rather than forced compliance, particularly 
where governments lack monitoring or enforcement capacity. In other 
contexts, they may instead involve full compulsory licensing, monitoring, 
enforcement and sanctions for non-compliance, as well as effective 
incentives, either in relation to all artisanal and small-scale mining or 
to particular sections of it (such as particular kinds of operations, like 
mechanised or commercial; particular types of metals; or operations within 
specific areas of a country). The guide further suggests how governments 
can switch between different approaches to reflect changing conditions 
and ensure continued improvement in artisanal and small-scale mining’s 
profile. An effective ASM management strategy for the Lao PDR would 
therefore need to be grounded in up-to-date research on the country’s 
artisanal and small-scale mining, including its positive and negative 
impacts, supply chain characteristics and relationship to other economic 
sectors and regional economies. It should also be guided by an analysis 
of existing capacity gaps within government (Paget et al. 2015). As there 
is a current dearth of up-to-date data on both fronts, new ASM research 
should be a priority for the Lao PDR. 
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A strategic approach to ASM should then be guided by a vision about 
clear standards to which GoL wishes ASM to operate, keeping in sight 
what can realistically be achieved given artisanal and small-scale mining’s 
current profile and available resources, as revealed by the aforementioned 
research and gap analysis. The guiding vision and wider strategy should 
be developed by an ASM taskforce or coordination cell, including 
representatives from all government departments relevant to managing 
ASM. It should also be informed by consultations with other relevant 
stakeholders so as to maximise transparency, legitimacy and buy-in, and 
to ensure that it features effective incentives. The vision should, of course, 
already be incorporated in the final ASM regulations that were being 
developed at the time of our research. 
The strategy would then need to be effectively implemented by 
departments working in coordination with one another through the 
ASM taskforce or coordination cell, which could be set up either as a 
separate government organ or hosted by a single department or several 
departments (Paget et al. 2015). Crucially, relevant departments would 
also need to be well resourced and have adequate capacity. In turn, this 
can be achieved only if such a strategy is developed and implemented 
with the support of international donors and in iterative consultation 
with a multitude of relevant stakeholders, including, among others, 
representatives from each of the ASM mining subsectors; representatives 
from each of the connected mineral and metals sectors and the ancillary 
industries that support the ASM mining subsectors; the communities 
that surround ASM mining areas; civil society and LSM operations. As 
past experience has shown, such meaningful, collaborative participation 
is key to mobilising the goodwill and resources, without which it would 
be impossible to develop a governance system capable of enhancing the 
positive contributions of legitimate forms of ASM, whilst also ensuring 
accountability and mitigating the sector’s more negative impacts (Paget et 
al. 2015; see also Aubynn 2009; Spiegel and Hoeung 2011: 8–11; Spiegel 
2014: 303, 307). 
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gold-mining for development 
and sustainability? Opportunities 
and limits to formalisation in 
India, Indonesia and Laos
Keith Barney
In the past two decades, research activity and policy development 
have intensified on the issue of formalising artisanal and small-scale 
mining (ASM), or informal mining. Numerous experts and influential 
institutions, including the World Bank, now view formalisation and 
legal registration as primary policy responses to the socio-economic, 
environmental and human health-related challenges posed by illegal or 
informal mining (see, for instance, Siegel and Veiga 2009; Maconachie 
and Hilson 2011; World Bank 2013). A number of African countries have 
made substantial progress towards the formalisation of artisanal and small-
scale gold-mining (ASGM) through establishing legal rights for miners, 
with Ghana implementing initial provisions as early as 1989 (Maconachie 
and Hilson 2011). In the Asia-Pacific, Mongolia has arguably emerged at 
the forefront of formalisation through the provision of small-scale and 
community mining licences (Purevjav 2011); indeed, the Mongolian 
Government now views ASGM as important for maintaining national 
economic stability in the country’s post–commodity boom era (Financial 
Times 2014). Bougainville Island passed its notable Mining Act  2015, 
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which contains legal provisions for small-scale mining that would involve 
local authorities in regulating this activity (O’Faircheallaigh et al. 2016). 
There has been more partial policy support for community mining 
licences and permits in countries including the Philippines (Verbrugge 
2014a), Indonesia (Spiegel 2012) and Cambodia (Cuddy and Seangly 
2015; Spiegel 2016). Yet, overall across the Global South, progress with 
connecting the insights of applied research and advocacy into national 
policy frameworks and moving formalisation to the forefront of mineral 
governance agendas has been uneven and halting at best (Hilson and 
Gatsinzi 2014). In some country contexts, such as Zimbabwe, established 
policies supporting ASGM have been subject to rollback and renewed 
political contestation (Spiegel 2009). Many other mineral-rich countries, 
such as India and Lao PDR, remain ambivalent towards formalisation 
as a route for addressing the social and environmental externalities and 
promoting rural economic livelihoods (Moretti and Garrett, this volume). 
This chapter draws upon empirical fieldwork conducted in three 
locations in India, Indonesia and Lao PDR between 2013 and 2016, 
as part of a  multicountry research project aimed at understanding the 
role of new technologies in informal mining, and the relationships 
between ASGM, farmers and agrarian transitions in Asia. I examine 
key variations in ASGM practices and governance contexts as a basis for 
better understanding the potential role of legal formalisation. The cases 
illustrate how there is no singular ASM gold economy and, thus, there 
are distinctive potentials and challenges for formalisation initiatives 
across different country contexts and regions. To better understand this 
complexity, I locate the historically mediated process whereby different, 
grounded socio-natural ASGM ‘assemblages’ (as involving combinations 
of gold-bearing tracts; mining–agrarian populations, technologies and 
practices; market arrangements; civil society groups and transnational 
actors; and state institutional governance relations) become organised and 
relationally territorialised in particular places (see Collier and Ong 2005; 
Li 2007; Ouma et al. 2013; Vandergeest et al. 2015). Such assemblages 
of informal mining, the regimes of extraction and the distributions of 
surplus and rents, take form through multi-scaled state–society relations, 
and are mediated through diverging agrarian transitions and distinct 
historical trajectories of resource governance (Peluso 2016).
The complexity and diversity of informal arrangements in the three 
mining sites contribute to the primary arguments put forth in this chapter. 
First, I argue that formalisation interventions would necessarily need to be 
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conceived in relation to the scale and organisation of the informal mining 
assemblage in question—from the micro-artisanal end to the medium-
scale mechanised end of the spectrum. Second, technical templates for 
formalising informal mining, as a way of engaging with the sector’s social 
and environmental challenges, are unlikely to gain traction. ASGM 
initiatives could instead seek to connect with civil society and be responsive 
to local collective actions, thereby developing informed, grounded 
understandings of local livelihood contexts in ongoing mining–agrarian 
transformations, and of the political and class-based struggles occurring in 
ASGM communities. Third, in medium-scale ASGM contexts, there can 
be significant trade-offs between ecosystems and agrarian sustainability 
and local health concerns on the one hand, and income generation 
from ASGM operations on the other. Regularisation and formalisation 
initiatives in Asia would face difficult choices between these priorities; 
such shades of grey could heighten political risks to external intervention. 
Such environmental politics are also reflected within local communities 
themselves, in terms of their debates and contestations on the appropriate 
pace, scale and location of informal mining.
The cases themselves also present novel insights into the political and 
governance arrangements for informal mining in each country context. 
In Jharkhand state in India, I argue that formalisation as basic regularisation 
would represent a necessary first step for supporting miners’ livelihoods, 
lifting the burden of restrictive state control and promoting the basic right 
of the poor to access and extract minerals. In practice, the political ecology 
of informal mining in Jharkhand is framed through distinctive federal, 
state and local–adivasi1 resource politics and contested social struggles 
(Shah 2013). In Central Kalimantan, Indonesia, there is potential to 
progress with ongoing state formalisation reforms, in a  context where 
mechanised ‘medium-scale’ gold dredging, on both land and rivers, can 
represent a profitable rural enterprise. Here, as well, the burden of petty 
exploitation visited by local police upon the poorest and most marginal 
miners relegates some ASGM activity to the suppressed ‘illegal’ sphere, 
with pernicious results for the poor (see also Spiegel 2012). In Central 
Kalimantan, formalisation reforms require careful consideration, as the 
more capitalised end of the informal mining sector involves a distinctive 
1  An umbrella term used to denote a heterogeneous group of tribes and indigenous group of 
people in India.
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extractive assemblage, operating in connection with local authorities, 
which can be associated with clearly negative impacts on common pool 
resources, particularly for fisheries and aquatic habitats. 
In Lao PDR, the last decade of neoliberal-inspired mining reforms has 
focused policy formulation on the large-scale corporate mining sector, 
neglecting the long tradition of local people’s mining (cf. Maconachie and 
Hilson 2011). Agrarian displacement due to state-backed, large-scale land 
acquisitions for resource development has been identified as an important 
‘push’ factor for local farmers to seek cash income though involvement 
in informal gold-mining (Insouvanh 2015). Despite a centrally issued 
moratorium on new mining concessions, in Lao’s southern Xekong 
Province, fieldwork documented medium-scale dredging and sluicing by 
cross-border Vietnamese (and Lao) ‘backhoe’ miners on former streamside 
rice paddy fields. Here, as well, a more mechanised, medium-scale range 
of informal mining and its transnational connections present governance 
challenges with few easy solutions. 
This chapter thus develops a critical interpretation of the formalisation 
literature as related to ASGM, and outlines the significant heterogeneity 
of informal mining practices and governance arrangements across field 
sites in India, Indonesia and Laos. The study concludes with reflections 
on the potential pathways and limits to formalisation beyond a technical 
policy ‘fix’. It explores how applied participatory research programs might 
seek to more rigorously understand ASGM assemblages and to identify 
practical policy options that are responsive to collective actions and social 
mobilisations, involving both informal gold miners as well as broader 
agrarian communities.
Conditions of informality in artisanal and 
small‑scale gold‑mining
The terminology and concept of ‘informal mining’ is useful for moving 
beyond state-centric discourses of illegitimacy and illegality, and for 
recognising the sector’s crucial role in numerous Global South rural 
development contexts. This chapter does not approach formalisation 
through a step-wise template, or an easily replicable ‘formalisation fix’ 
(Dwyer 2015; Spiegel 2016). Instead, we can understand ASGM in 
relation to multi-scaled mineral regulatory regimes, contested political 
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ecologies and situated mining practices and territorialisation, all of 
which are enmeshed in contexts of ongoing struggles for livelihood, rights 
and recognition in agrarian–mining communities (Tschakert 2009a, 
2009b, 2016; Singo and Levin 2016). Following Lahiri-Dutt (2004), 
I view ASGM not as an anachronistic, preindustrial activity, nor as 
primarily a subsector of modern corporate mining. I also avoid locating 
ASGM primarily through the lens of state corruption and uncontrolled 
extraction, or as necessarily tied to negative social outcomes—for example, 
in discourses of informal mining as ‘fast money’ just as quickly spent by 
miners on alcohol, drugs, gambling and prostitution. While there can 
be exploitative social relations in ASGM, such peasant mining can also 
be understood as part of a vibrant, vast, historically significant ‘informal 
economy’ operating largely outside of modern private and public 
institutions. In Hart’s (n.d.) interpretation, the informal sector is that 
segment of the economy that is ‘irregular, unpredictable, unstable, even 
invisible’. As Hilson (2013, 2014) notes, it is also important to understand 
how the informal mining economy can be actively reproduced by state 
and donor policies, and to understand the environmental challenges 
posed by ASGM, not as a technical environmental management issue, 
but rather as a ‘development problem with an environmental dimension’. 
This move places miners and local mining-dependent communities, their 
political and economic concerns and their livelihood struggles as the 
starting points for analysis. 
Critical research on ASGM and informality
The work of Hernando De Soto (2000) serves as the starting point for 
research on ASM formalisation. De Soto’s framework lends support 
to a ‘legal system that transforms assets into capital’ (Hall 2004: 402), 
and builds upon notions of the (potential) entrepreneurialism of the 
poor. Siegel and Veiga (2009) situate their analysis of informal mining 
within this frame, in which the creation of formal, legal property rights 
is conceived as a key (albeit not exclusive) basis for effective poverty 
reduction and improved regulation. Formalisation is viewed as a process 
with three basic elements: a right to land title, a right to minerals and 
a right to mine. A series of supporting reforms would accompany this, 
including legalised trading rights; the clarification of overlapping or 
muddled legal frameworks; and the streamlining of bureaucratic obstacles 
that can limit smallholder formalisation in practice. Siegel and Veiga 
(2009) also note that formalisation is at times avoided by informal miners, 
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as it can create new bureaucratic costs and overheads, and limit flexibility 
in accessing new mining sites. Along these lines, Barreto (2011) advocates 
for establishing clear legal, spatial planning and zoning frameworks for 
ASM, followed by targeted policy packages for legalised miners, including 
support for technological upgradation, new techniques and mining 
methods, improved labour and environmental management standards, 
advice for business development and access to formal credit.
Tempering the neoliberal-inflected views of De Soto, Buxton (2013: 6) 
points to a paradox of informality, in that it can ‘both increase resilience 
by providing an economic livelihood activity and increase vulnerability 
as it removes the protections and opportunities provided by the 
government’. Buxton outlines informality, livelihood vulnerability and 
marginalisation as three core and recursive social processes characteristic 
of ASM. Recognising the numerous barriers that serve to block effective 
reforms in informal mining, Buxton argues for new types of structured 
‘knowledge networks’, as institutional vehicles for participatory research 
and engagement (see also Barreto 2011). Given the huge array of informal 
mining practices across different countries, formalisation could have 
intended or unintended exclusionary consequences—for instance, through 
high licensing fees, and creating new hierarchies between legalised and 
capitalised small-scale operators and more actively criminalised miners. 
Thus, critical ASM observers caution that formalisation does not represent 
a singular solution to the negative manifestations of informal mining 
(see Langston et al. 2015). Formalisation programs could, however, tap 
local knowledge and invite the participation of miner organisations to 
build more pragmatic, responsive and effective regulatory frameworks 
(Barreto 2011; United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 2012).
Hilson (2013) and Hilson and Gatsinzi (2014) further emphasise that the 
informal ASM economy is not a phenomenon that is external to the power 
and territorial authority of the state. They identify how the conditions 
and incentives for informality are continually reproduced, not only due 
to bureaucratic complexity and high transaction costs of legal compliance, 
but other factors as well (De Soto 2000). Also at issue are inappropriate 
or poorly coordinated policy interventions into the informal sector, the 
favouring of corporate mining interests in policy frameworks and persistent 
state underinvestment in sustainable agrarian livelihoods. These authors 
reiterate that the informal sector is not necessarily founded in small-
scale miners’ intentional avoidance of taxes and government regulation, 
as indeed it is very often the selective and exploitative involvement of state 
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actors, such as the police and military, that can reinforce the underground, 
patronage-based ‘shadow state’ (Reno  1999) character of the informal 
mining economy (Peluso 2018). 
Of critical importance is how locally mined gold is transformed into 
a global commodity. Fold et al. (2014) elaborate on the complex 
geographical co-production of formal and informal gold value chains. 
A key implication of their analysis is that any formalisation program 
would need to be based upon a clear understanding of the socio-spatial 
organisation of both formal and informal gold value chains, examining 
how and where these merge into a single marketing chain, and tracing 
through how certain gold commodity markets can lock in exploitative 
labour arrangements and poor environmental practices. Along these lines, 
significant efforts have been made in recent years to connect legalised and 
fair trade artisanal gold production to buyers in the Global North. Here, 
Singo and Levin (2016) argue that a ‘failure to formalise’ stymies efforts 
to restructure how artisanal gold miners are connected with global gold 
markets: 
If miners don’t formalise, they can’t professionalise. Without 
professionalisation, miners are not able to accommodate the due 
diligence requirements of ‘responsible’ buyers. This exacerbates buyer 
disengagement.
Such double (indeed triple) binds with producing and marketing 
‘sustainable’ ASM gold are characteristic of the political economy of 
informal mining. 
In his recent work, Boris Verbrugge has significantly extended our 
understanding of the political economy of informal mining through 
a sophisticated historical–geographical examination of the state and 
capital interests that support ASGM activity in the southern Philippines. 
Verbrugge (2014a, 2014b) argued that potential formalisation policies 
need to be more closely considered in relation to the internal and external 
power relations that structure overall labour–capital dynamics of ASM. 
He characterises complex governance regimes of ASGM in Mindanao as 
comprised of multi-tiered labour structures, linked in various permutations 
to the ‘capital interests’ of local state officials. In the Philippine uplands, 
such politically sanctioned informal mining can take on highly exploitative 
and hazardous forms, including forms of debt bondage. This is occurring 
in a context of elite consolidation and upland state formation, as well as 
a national policy shift away from large-scale mining (Verbrugge 2015a). 
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For Verbrugge (2014a), tracing the connections between informal mining 
and elite interests in Mindanao requires detailed political economic 
analysis, based on a grounded understanding of the context of mineral 
governance, the politics of decentralisation and the dynamics of local 
politics in southern Philippines. 
Verbrugge (2015b) also offers new insights into the political relations 
and forces of capital that structure emergent class hierarchies between 
a poverty-driven labour force and informal ASM entrepreneurs. 
Conceptually, this move focuses attention on ‘the diverse origins 
and implications of informality in ASM … the vested interests in the 
(partial) persistence of informality, in the form of a labour force that is 
bereft of formal legal recognition and vulnerable to exploitation’ (ibid.: 
1042). Verbrugge thus provides a detailed and grounded examination of 
power, marginality and labour exploitation in ASGM in the Philippines, 
examining the reproduction of domination through changing regimes of 
mining governance. In this way, Verbrugge and Besmanos (2016) draw 
attention not just to the rights of mineral resource tenure claimants, but 
also to the labour conditions of highly exploited workers. 
While work from scholars such as Verbrugge identify the complex terrain 
of political–economic power relations in ASGM, critical observers 
such as Labonne (2014) voice a strong pessimism regarding the actual 
potential for formalisation and other pro-poor state policy interventions 
to introduce positive changes. In a blunt challenge, Labonne (ibid.: 123) 
argued that ASM formalisation is more likely to emerge from ‘the 
success of governments in combating poverty in the non-mining rural 
communities’. While caution on the prospects for formalisation is surely 
warranted, agrarian studies scholars have also argued that contemporary 
agricultural labour markets are often insufficient for reducing rural poverty 
(Otsuka et al. 2010). In many contexts, poverty and underdevelopment, 
as well as new livelihood opportunities, are created through rural people’s 
interactive engagement in both agrarian and mineral-based activities, and 
thus Labonne’s analysis risks an undue compartmentalisation between 
these livelihood portfolios. Simply refocusing policy interventions 
upon improving agrarian livelihoods and facilitating urban–industrial 
transitions is unlikely to be an adequate response to the challenges of 
ASGM in many contexts. 
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This review of the core and current debates on ASM and formalisation 
adds significant complexity to governance interventions founded upon 
either top-down regulatory enforcement or a neoliberal, market-friendly 
approach based upon the simple legalisation of property rights as a path 
to a more sustainable and beneficial form of rural people’s mining. I next 
turn to briefly reviewing variations in ASGM practices and organisational 
forms as a basis for discussing the prospects and limits of formalisation in 
the three field cases. 
The diversity of ASGM assemblages and practices
A wide heterogeneity of sites, actors, technologies and practices, 
institutional–capital arrangements and agrarian–environmental relations 
characterise informal and small-scale gold-mining. Veiga (n.d.) usefully 
distinguishes between three broad clusters that are often grouped together 
as ASGM: a) micro-scale, informal, artisanal; b) small-scale, illegal, semi-
mechanised; and c) medium-scale, illegal, mechanised. On the micro-
artisanal side, ASGM can involve relatively independent peasant miners 
working marginally productive alluvial gold tracts, experiencing high levels 
of vulnerability and holding subordinate livelihood positions within the 
local agrarian economy, but who also find support through non-market 
access to gold and other market or subsistence-based ecological resources. 
Towards the more medium-scale end of the spectrum, informal gold-
mining moves into more complex organisational and hierarchical labour 
arrangements, working deeper and more valuable alluvial, hard rock or 
riverine deposits with more significant levels of technology, investment 
and debt relations and operations linked to powerful business interests 
and political patrons (Verbrugge 2014a; Verbrugge and Besmanos 2016). 
This form of mining can even involve transnational capital connections. 
Across this range, informal gold-mining is also characterised by 
changing socio-technological practices, multi-scaled governance systems, 
varying degrees of miners’ geographical and livelihood mobility and 
complex socio-environmental transformations (Verbrugge et al. 2015; 
Ferring et al. 2016). 
This diversity of ASGM actors, practices, institutional arrangements 
and environmental outcomes has significant implications for program 
and policy development on formalisation. Indeed, Ferring et al. (2016) 
question the extent to which this diversity is actually reflected in current 
policy discourses on ASGM in Ghana, a key informal gold-producing 
BeTWeeN THe PLOUGH AND THe PICK
344
country.2 Insufficient recognition of the heterogeneity of informal mining 
could limit the scope for formalisation initiatives to particularly favourable 
sites, rendering policy interventions ineffective on a broader scale. Even 
under optimal conditions, the formalisation of small- and medium-scale 
mining would often involve complex reallocations of resource access and 
property rights, as ASGM typically monopolises and even eliminates 
most future land uses (Putzel et al. 2014). There is also no guarantee of 
improved environmental performance through increased legal regulation 
(MacDonald et al. 2013).
Where does this understanding of the political economy of persistent 
informality, and of highly complex and diverse ASGM governance 
regimes and assemblages, broadly lead us in terms of policy approaches 
to formalisation? Most basically and directly, these factors would 
pose significant challenges to the effectiveness of expert-led, sector-
constrained, technical-based formalisation policy reforms. Insights can 
be drawn from Michael Dwyer’s (2015) perspective on the formalisation 
of land  tenure and ownership in Cambodia through donor-supported 
land titling programs as a ‘formalisation fix’. Dwyer usefully highlights 
a need to extend beyond technical-driven policy interventions, and 
towards a grounding of formalisation policies within distinct, spatialised 
and place-based historical–geographical contexts and socio-political 
struggles (see also Bridge 2002; Peluso et al. 2012; Spiegel 2016). A close 
understanding of the local political ecologies and political economies of 
informal mining might better reveal the democratic possibilities, as well as 
some hard realities of formalisation as a legal policy approach.
I draw upon the above literature to examine local ASGM assemblages in 
three field sites: in India, Indonesia and Laos. I direct analysis into the 
realm of state–capital interests, and hierarchical labour regimes in ASGM 
that reproduce vulnerability and establish the conditions for perpetuated 
(Spiegel 2012) or persistent (Verbrugge 2015b) informality. I locate these 
variations in relation to the material and environmental realities of mining 
activity; to agrarian–ecological class relations (Akram-Lodhi et al. 2010); 
and to local socio-political struggles for rights to livelihood by both local 
miners and resource-dependent communities.
2  Drawing upon Mitchell (2002), Ferring et al. (2016: 3) identify a managerialist impulse in new 
donor and policy frameworks aimed at regulating and formalising small-scale mining, which can be 
based upon unwarranted simplifications: ‘Actually existing complexity is discursively erased in policy 
and other official representations so that a particular type of expert and intervention can rule’. 
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Territorial assemblages of informal 
gold‑mining
Artisanal-peasant gold-mining along the 
Subarnarekha River, Jharkhand state, eastern India 
Indigenous (adivasi) or tribal people have a long history of shallow alluvial 
gold panning and mining along the lower Subarnarekha River (the ‘thread 
of gold’) in India’s eastern Jharkhand state. The local mining taking place 
in the Subarnarekha watershed is typically unregulated, irregular and based 
upon seasonally ephemeral gold resources. Lahiri-Dutt (2004) refers to 
such peasant mining as an ‘elusive, unquantifiable and uncertain section 
of the mineral economy’ (ibid.: 123), while the autonomous and informal 
structure of such activity renders it ‘conceptually, methodologically 
and theoretically difficult to define in terms of its precise nature, size and 
significance’ (ibid.: 126).
Deb et al. (2008: 195) identify the majority of miners and practices in 
these locations in India as informal or ‘non-legal’ (as opposed to illegal), 
as mining is carried out ‘beyond the purview of the law’. Gold is classified 
as a ‘major’ mineral under India’s Mines and Minerals Act 1957, and legally 
any gold-mining occurring more than 6 inches beneath the surface is 
prohibited. Thus, the federal Indian Government allocates gold-mining 
permits to large-scale miners only (Lahiri-Dutt 2004). In practice, as Deb 
et al. (2008: 207) observe, the ‘[l]ack of available official or unofficial data 
related to the practice of artisanal mining in India makes the whole issue 
very nebulous’. In Jharkhand, I suggest that any effort to support artisanal 
miners’ livelihoods and to improve practices would face a number of 
challenges, in terms of the low intensity, spatially dispersed and relatively 
marginal economic value of the resources currently extracted, and the 
rather  poor prospects for Indian state policy reform. Indeed, ASGM 
is the  target for periodic crackdowns by the provincial and district 
constabulary, while the state promotes investments into larger-scale, 
capitalised gold-mining in the Subarnarekha watershed (Bose 2015).3 
3  In Seraikela-Kharsawan district, Geological Survey of India has been drilling since May–June 
2011, where there are potential reserves of gold (Bose 2015).
BeTWeeN THe PLOUGH AND THe PICK
346
Fieldwork in Jharkhand’s Seraikela-Kharsawan District in February 2014 
highlighted two miner communities. The first involved women micro-
scale miners, working in small groups but panning on an individual basis 
or with children assisting. Village women were panning for alluvial gold 
in low-lying agricultural lands along the banks of the Chandil Reservoir, 
using basic hoes and wooden pans (donga), scraping the soil surface 
and panning for minute particles of gold. The local historical context is 
important to their livelihood situation. The Chandil Reservoir was created 
in 1983 through the World Bank–funded Subarnarekha Multipurpose 
Project (SMP), involving a series of barrages and canals targeting 
electricity generation and irrigation. The major Chandil and Icha dam 
components of the SMP involved the flooding of some 30,000 hectares 
of local farms and forest lands; the under-compensated displacement 
and resulting impoverishment of approximately 68,000 adivasi people in 
160 villages (with 38 settlement sites submerged); and the imprisonment 
and violent deaths of a number of protestors and community leaders 
by local security forces in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Probe Alert 
1991). Notably, the Chandil Dam, as well as other reservoir projects, also 
submerged productive sites of traditional gold extraction by local adivasi 
communities (Lahiri-Dutt 2004; Bose 2015). During our fieldwork, 
we also encountered evidence of colonial-era gold-mining infrastructure 
(old elevated roadways, stone-reinforced tunnels) that testifies to this 
history of mineral extraction in the area.
While ethnic Santhal4 men plough agricultural fields or undertake 
evening-time reservoir fishing, women pan for gold along the water’s 
edge, or travel upstream to pan at the Subarnarekha’s confluence. Artisanal 
gold-mining is an important means of supplementing agricultural, wage 
labour and subsistence livelihoods. The ecological impacts from their 
activities would be negligible, as they do not use mechanised digging 
equipment or sluice boxes, or mercury for gold amalgamation. Their low 
capital-intensive gold-extraction activities are not a matter of concern to 
local officials, which is likely why such adivasi women are able to continue 
to access and exploit this local resource. 
One elderly female village informant pithily identified a number of 
intersecting livelihood issues:
4  One of the largest adivasi groups in India, with an estimated population of some 2.4 million in 
Jharkhand state. 
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In one week I can get one lakh rupees, or nothing.5 Our old farming 
land is now the home for fish … [But] we don’t get a fair price [from the 
gold traders], and it’s not enough to keep our stomachs filled. (Interview, 
3 February 2014)
For these women, the painstaking work of daily panning for gold 
represents an important contribution to household livelihoods, following 
their historical displacement due to a major infrastructure project. This 
relationship between population displacement due to large-scale projects 
and subsequent ‘informal’ access to remaining niche common property 
resources has been a recurrent theme in the literature on development-
induced displacement (see, for instance, Kibreab 2000). In Jharkhand, 
women’s engagement with micro-artisanal mining is moreover based upon 
an explicitly gendered access to localised gold resources, which is at a small 
enough scale not to concern local officials, who can act to block miners’ 
access to waterways for mining in other nearby locations (Bose 2015).
Another group of gold miners we interviewed, who were also displaced 
from the original SMP, involved a community of approximately 50 male 
miners. The men were working in two groups, digging pits of up to 
4  m deep along the dry season bed of the Subarnarekha River, about 
8 km downstream of the main barrage, and some 15 km upstream from 
Jamshedpur city. As the agricultural season ends, local ethnic Mundari 
(adivasi) men bicycle daily from villages up to 20 km away to undertake 
gold extraction as an alternative to wage labour in nearby brick kilns, 
or cutting sawn wood for sale from local forests. This form of mining 
involves more specialisation in labour activities and the use of diesel 
hydraulic pumps to increase extractive capacity.6 During our visit, two 
different work teams were subdivided into task groups, removing rocks 
and boulders, scooping water and carrying sand from the streambed for 
panning. Gold is sold to a single trader at the local Chandil market, at a 
reported price of INR2,300 (US$37) per gram (representing a 22 per cent 
discount on the India spot price for gold on that day).7 Miners reported 
that daily profits were shared equally amongst work team members. At an 
upper estimate of group production of approximately 8 grams of gold per 
5  INR10,000, or approximately US$150. The reported value may have been more of a rhetorical 
flourish. Tarun Bose (2015: 10) reports that women from nearby Moisara village could earn INR300–
400 (US$4.80–6.40) per week on average from a similar style of gold-mining. 
6  Purchase price of diesel pumps at INR15,000/US$242 per pump; averaging 20 litres of fuel per 
day, costing INR1,000, or US$16.
7  To compare, India gold spot price on 4 February 2014 was INR2,969/gram: www.goldpriceindia.
com/gold-price-february-2014.php.
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day, the gross yield of a work team of 25 members might represent some 
INR18,400 (US$294). Subtracting daily fuel costs of US$16 provides net 
revenues of US$278, or US$11 per worker, if shared completely evenly 
(purchase and maintenance cost of pumps, compensation for the owner of 
the machinery or investor, and any other fees also need to be subtracted). 
In interviews, individual wages were also reported to lie between INR50 
and 250 per day (US$0.80–4.00), so their average daily income is perhaps 
within these lower and upper bounds, depending on the organisational 
structure of the work teams and rates of gold recovery from the riverbed.8 
Local miners indicated that if they were discovered finding larger gold 
pieces, or if they ventured further into higher horsepower pumping 
machinery, it would attract the attention of local officials (field interviews, 
4 February 2015). While their mining activities are quite visible, these 
miners generally aim to operate outside of the focus of attention of local 
officials as much as possible. 
The broader issue in these adivasi lands in Jharkhand, identified by 
researchers such as Alpa Shah (2013), is that of a stalled agrarian 
transition. Historic Jharkhand witnessed neither an agricultural 
consolidation by a landlord class, nor a capitalist transition to commercial 
agrarian commodity production. To be sure, in Jharkhand, forests have 
been logged and liquidated, major mineral resources are controlled by 
private or state-owned corporations, including Coal India, and large-scale 
state development projects, such as the SMP, have produced significant 
enclosures and dispossessions. Yet, Shah (2013) argues that the majority 
of the region’s rural population has been situated outside of the primary 
circuits of capital, assembling a multifocal livelihood through low-
productivity family-based agriculture, and non–market based access 
to increasingly marginal natural resources, including gold and forest 
products. In response to this rural crisis, there is widespread engagement 
in regional labour migration under highly precarious circumstances, 
while demographic pressures contribute to increasing levels of rural 
landlessness and pauperisation (ibid.). An ongoing Maoist insurgency in 
Jharkhand (including various splinter groups in competition with each 
other) leverages upon conditions of poverty and rural discontent, which 
in turn can invite heavy state and police pressure, including on peasant 
gold extraction activities that extend beyond an acceptable scale.
8  There can be constraints with securing accurate information on daily income from ASGM, 
as miners have a broad interest in not drawing attention to their activities.
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While clearly important for the communities involved, the small and 
micro-scale subsistence-supporting nature of peasant gold extraction 
activity, an ongoing political situation involving disaffected Maoists, and 
the relative degrees of suppression of gold-mining by local state actors, 
would make this a challenging arena for policy intervention. Deb et al. 
(2008: 200) advocate for local governments (Panchayats) to play 
a supporting role in artisanal mining under their jurisdiction, and propose 
a review of state regulatory frameworks to remove ambiguity around the 
legality of ASGM sites. 9 Here, promoting a basic right of the poor to mine 
(rights over land, rights to trade and rights to basic working conditions) 
could potentially assist local gold artisanal panners and miners to secure 
a foothold in the formal economy, and possibly alleviate some of local 
conditions of extreme poverty. This would entail a reorientation of an 
often coercive relationship between local state actors and the rural poor, 
and would require support for the miners to advocate on their own behalf 
through collective organisations. However, in Jharkhand at least, there 
is little indication that state authorities are contemplating such reforms. 
Medium‑scale informal gold‑mining in Central 
Kalimantan, Indonesia
Central Kalimantan has been represented in some of the largest and 
most contentious ASGM mining booms in the post–New Order 
period in Indonesia. Spiegel (2012) and Agrawal (2007) have examined 
a high-profile ‘gold-rush’ site at Galangan in Katingan District, Central 
Kalimantan, in detail. This heavily degraded area of about 50 km2 once 
attracted up to 10,000 miners, using pumps and dredges to work through 
the mineralised rainforest soils. Miners were drawn from local Dayak 
communities, from elsewhere in Kalimantan, as well as from Java and 
Madura. Spiegel (2012: 201) discussed the highly volatile and, at times, 
violent Galangan–Hampalit gold-rush site in relation to the ambiguous 
outcomes of administrative decentralisation, the diversity of participants 
in ASM mining, as well as the ‘political and economic interests in 
perpetuating informality’. International Crisis Group (ICG  2001) 
also documents Galangan–Hampalit as a particularly contested site of 
struggles  over natural resources. Indeed, a violent encounter between 
9  Similar principles of involving local communities in ASM governance have been applied in the 
Bougainville Mining Act 2015 (see O’Faircheallaigh et al. 2016). I thank Matthew Allen for pointing 
me towards this. 
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Dayak and Madurese miners provided the ignition trigger for the 2001 
outbreak of ethnic violence between these two communities in Central 
Kalimantan. 
In the forests and rivers of Katingan Regency and Gunung Mas (gold 
mountain) district, new ‘rush’ sites can still attract thousands of miners. 
Typical in-land mining methods involve the use of dredging pumps, 
sluice boxes and carpets, with a recovery rate for particles of gold reported 
as approximately 30 per cent. In a site visited in Gunung Mas, dredging 
pumps can work through 5–10 m3 of soil per day, eventually yielding 
approximately 5–10 grams of gold per day per team of four to seven 
miners, providing a gross revenue of some US$153–307 per day. Some 
miners, working on an individual basis (using smaller but less costly 
pumps that use less fuel), might mine and sell their ‘pay dirt’ to other 
processors for onward gold recovery. Miners indicate that a primary 
calculus governing their activities is the ratio between diesel consumption 
and grams of gold yielded. Baseline labour costs are discounted, and the 
eventual net earnings of workers depend upon the value of gold their unit 
can extract from the rainforest soils or river bottoms. 
Major rivers in Central Kalimantan, such as the Kahayan and the 
Katingan, and associated freshwater ponds that represent their former 
courses, have also been mined through floating dredging platforms, 
resulting in significant aquatic ecosystem impacts (see United Nations 
Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) 2016). Despite its widely 
acknowledged environmental impacts, ASM is now a primary income-
earning activity in many communities along the major river systems of 
Central Kalimantan. Gold-mining is considered as more attractive than 
working in oil palm concessions (which pays as low as IDR30,000 per 
day for an entry-level worker, or US$2.50), harvesting rattan, cultivating 
bananas or tapping rubber. Indeed, sharp declines in rubber and rattan 
prices in the past years have ushered more rural people into mining 
(fieldwork interviews, November 2014 and September 2016).
During a visit to the Galangan–Hampalit ‘moonscape’ (Spiegel 2012: 
194) in November 2014, we encountered approximately half a dozen 
hardscrabble miners—ethnic Dayak, Javanese and Banjarese—working 
through the tailings long after the end of the main gold rush, in a bleak 
and heavily degraded landscape. For one miner, working autonomously 
without the protection of a ‘boss’, payments of up to IDR100,000 per 
month were still required to the local police. The man used an ‘Alcon’ 
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brand of diesel pump, using 5 litres of fuel per day, and sold 30 kg of pay 
dirt to a local processor. A nearby Banjarese couple living in a rudimentary 
shack was in an even more precarious situation, estranged from their 
children due to their poverty, moving itinerantly around the Hampalit 
landscape in an attempt to avoid payments to the police. For these most 
marginal of miners, working the tailings from a previous gold rush offers 
a residual livelihood foothold. Lifting the burden of petty extortion by 
police forces (see also Spiegel 2012: 195) would seem to offer a first step 
for some improvement to these miners’ desperate predicament.
More capitalised informal mining operations using pump and sluice box 
systems (for in-land mining), which can be placed upon mobile dredging 
platforms (for riverine mining), are the primary modes of informal gold-
mining present in these districts. Some district miner groups have gained 
livelihood security from formalisation systems through the combination 
of Wilayah Pertambangan Rakyat (WPR, Community Mining Areas) 
and the Izin Usaha Pertambangan Rakyat (IPR, Community Mining 
Licences). Formalised miners also require an environmental permit from 
the provincial and district environmental agency (Badan Lingkungan 
Hidup) in the form of an environmental impact assessment document, 
as well as environmental management and monitoring plans. However, 
our local informants indicated that formalised community mining licence 
arrangements required significant paperwork,10 while local authorities 
applied extremely high surcharges for the permits. Limited to 25 hectares, 
community mining licensing also limit mobility and flexibility in 
developing new mine sites, and thus would seem more readily suitable 
to fixed hard-rock deposits, rather than for more mobile and ephemeral 
alluvial gold-mining. For these reasons, the vast majority of alluvial mining 
groups in Central Kalimantan have avoided formalisation; indeed, some 
miners interviewed in September 2016 had never heard of the possibility 
of a formal licence. 
In this legal grey zone, mining ‘bosses’ facilitate protection from police 
harassment for unit owners and their workers, as well as provide 
equipment, financing, (illegal) access to state-subsidised diesel fuel (‘solar’ 
in Bahasa) and gold-trading services in exchange for a share of unit 
profits. Local police also benefit from ASGM through controlling access 
to ‘solar’.11 State-subsidised diesel (retailed at a discount of IDR5,050 per 
10  See also Harvard Kennedy School (2011: 93) on the ‘high cost of formality’ in Indonesia.
11  ‘Solar’ is the Bahasa Indonesian term for ‘diesel’.
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litre, or US$0.39) should be utilised only for personal and not business 
use. District police oversee quite a public and visible system whereby, in 
exchange for a fee, drivers of modified vehicles with expanded fuel tanks 
load up on ‘solar’ from petrol stations for onward delivery to gold miners 
or oil palm plantations, where it can be sold for IDR15,000–20,000 per 
litre (US$1.15–1.54), depending upon the distance.
In Gunung Mas district, in association with a Dayak small-scale mining 
association (ASPERA-KT), we visited informal in-land mining sites 
occurring on individually titled, but formerly customary adat, forest land. 
The unit operations were run by small groups of local ethnic Dayak men, 
involving up to 7–15 workers per large dredging unit, with reported yields 
as high as 100 grams of gold per 200-litre drum of diesel fuel, which lasts 
for five days of dredging.12 From this gross yield, 50 per cent would be 
awarded to the land and unit owner—in this case, who held a land title 
issued by the National Land Agency, under the Ministry of Agrarian and 
Spatial Planning. 
There is a recurring rhetoric that informal miners are engaged in drugs, 
and that their ‘hedonic culture’ contributes to a range of other social ills 
(interviews, Palankaraya, September 2016). However, local discussions in 
Central Kalimantan with both Dayak and migrant miners identified the 
use of mining income to pay for daily living costs, purchasing land or a 
vehicle, building a family house and forming a household, or for their 
children’s schooling. Some miners did report that drugs could be used 
in order to maintain their energy during times when rich gold strikes 
were identified, and work continued through the night. A number of 
parents of young miners also indicated that drugs were an issue in ASGM 
(interviews, Katingan district, September 2016). However, it is not clear 
that gold miners are making a highly disproportionate contribution to 
the province-wide social ills of drugs, alcohol, gambling and prostitution.
12  On 27 November 2014, the reported Palankaraya gold shop purchase price was reported at 
IDR480,000 (US$39.41) per gram, a 6.2 per cent discount on the international spot price for that 
day. Using 200 litres of diesel (worth perhaps US$197), and with 50 per cent of revenues allocated to 
the investor/landowner, a unit team of 7–15 workers might then generate US$125–267 per worker 
for a five-day 100 gram (3.5 ounce) yield of gold. This might then represent US$25–53 per worker 
per day. Food costs need to be deducted; also, for the investor, capital depreciation for diesel pumps 
(US$200/pump), sluices (US$175 in materials) and carpets (US$26/m2). Note that this rate of 
return would represent a better-case scenario. Other interviews indicated estimates of worker’s pay at 
US$11–19 per day. All these calculations depend on the site, yield and recovery of the deposit, which 
are highly variable. Of course, some days can yield no gold at all for the miners.
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What is apparent, as others have noted, is that ‘informal’ mining in 
Indonesia is internally variegated, characterised by unequal power 
relations, connected to particular state institutions and actors, and 
operating through various relationships with formal state agencies (Peluso 
2016, 2018). There is a notable comradely ethic amongst workers, and 
after the share held by the unit owner and landowner, the revenues 
from gold extraction are shared equally amongst a unit team. In Central 
Kalimantan, despite periodic provincial crackdowns and ‘patrols’ (see, for 
instance, Lingga 2016), it is possible to discuss the formalisation of local 
mining with local political figures, signalling a relatively more open and 
permissive political environment for local ASGM activity, as compared to 
Jharkhand or Laos.
The strongly ecological character of the mining–agrarian transition 
(Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2010) in Central Kalimantan is also apparent. 
In Murung Raya and Katingan regencies, the logging boom is long 
past, oil palm has not delivered benefits for wage labourers, while larger 
coal-mining companies have often brought conflicts over land. With 
draining of peat lands and the associated catastrophic El Nino dry season 
fires (McCarthy 2013), local observers point to a downward spiral of 
accelerating resource degradation and livelihood vulnerability. In turn, 
classic dilemmas have emerged between ASGM and common pool 
resources, especially involving waterways and fisheries. Informal mining 
does come at a heavy cost: land is permanently removed from productive 
use, fishing is no longer possible in many heavily degraded waterways 
and ponds due to dredging, and mercury contamination is very likely 
widespread, although the extent of contamination of environments and 
aquatic food chains is poorly documented (Agrawal 2007). Many villagers 
in fact voice opposition to gold-mining activities in their lands and river 
systems, even as mining activities are represented in most rural households 
along the provinces’ major gold-bearing waterways, such as the Katingan 
River (fieldwork interviews, September 2016).
While many villagers have taken part in the successive Central 
Kalimantan resource booms, the majority of profits from large-scale 
resource development have been transferred out of the province. The 
transition has been too rapid and transformative for local communities 
to successfully engage with and adapt to the changes. Some community 
leaders seek a revitalised Dayak customary tradition that could be welded 
to modern economic and technological transformation, including local 
involvement in formalised and regulated gold extraction (fieldnotes, 
BeTWeeN THe PLOUGH AND THe PICK
354
26 November  2014). Yet, the challenges of relying upon a positional 
indigenous Dayak identity and cultural traditions as a bulwark against 
unsustainable extraction are also evident (cf. Li 2000), with the 
widespread involvement and varied motivations and practices of miners; 
at times significant internal tensions within communities over regulating 
mining; accelerating mining-linked ecosystem degradation; and the 
significant numbers of migrants drawn from elsewhere in Indonesia into 
Central Kalimantan’s new gold-mining rushes. Recently, the provincial 
government has promised 1,500 community mining licences as a step 
towards greater formalisation. However, the current permitting process for 
community mining areas and licences in Central Kalimantan is complex, 
costly and poorly organised, the procedures are not adhered to and formal 
permits are only used by a  few dozen miners as a means of providing 
partial protection from police patrols (non-government organisation 
interviews in Palankaraya, 4–5 September 2016). 
Artisanal and transnational‑mechanised informal 
mining in southern Lao PDR
In the previous decade there was significant interest in research on ASGM 
in Lao PDR, and a series of publications were published on informal 
mining through the United Nations–backed Global Mercury Project 
(Boungnaphalom 2003). The last 15 years of World Bank–influenced 
minerals and mining policy reforms in Laos have facilitated the entrance 
of large-scale mining capital into the country (Hatcher 2015). Two 
national flagship gold and copper ventures at Xepon and Phu Bia were 
initially led by Australian mining companies (Oz Minerals and PanAust), 
but have since been purchased by Chinese firms (China MinMetals 
Group and Guangdong Rising Asset Management). Copper, lignite coal, 
potash, gold and tin are key mineral assets for Laos, and together metals 
and minerals accounted for 40 per cent of the country’s export earnings 
by value in 2012 (United States Geological Survey 2014). As with many 
other national contexts, in Laos a focus on large-scale mining capital 
has shifted policy attention away from support for ASM livelihoods. 
The last decade has also witnessed the entrance of medium-scale regional 
investors and mining work teams (Vientiane Times 2014a), undertaking 
unregulated in-land and river mining activities with backhoe excavators, 
pump dredges, sluices and/or floating dredging platforms. This medium-
scale mechanised mining, drawing in workers, operators and investors 
from China and Vietnam, occurs through some level of local government 
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permission, and the operations have often caused a significant amount 
of environmental degradation (International Union for Conservation of 
Nature Laos 2005; Vientiane Times 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2013; Land 
Information Working Group 2012). 
Lao PDR’s updated 2011 Law on Minerals maintains legal protection for 
informal mining; however, these rights are within poorly defined limits 
of mechanisation. In practice, a range of ASM and more mechanised 
informal gold-mining is occurring across the country (with periodic 
booms in other minerals that can be accessed through small-scale 
techniques, such as alabaster). In 2012, the Government of Laos (GoL) 
announced a moratorium on new concessions for mining, as a result 
of the uncoordinated allocations of mining concessions by all levels of 
government and the resultant stream of negative socio-environmental 
impacts, as well as losses in national revenue to the Treasury. The 2012 ban 
on new mining concessions led to uncertainty around how local officials 
should regulate ASM, and has facilitated (selective) enforcement against 
informal mining. Reports from the Vientiane Times (2014a) indicate that 
the Laos National Assembly: 
asked the government to formulate regulations to govern small-scale 
mining and mineral extraction projects, including those carried out 
by locals, after learning that the operations were causing significant 
environmental damage.
The Ministry of Planning and Investment subsequently undertook 
a  nation-wide inspection and survey of mining concession agreements 
and operations (Schoenweger et al. 2012; Vientiane Times 2015). The ban 
on new mining concessions has been extended into late 2016 (Vientiane 
Times 2016); however, the small- to medium-scale mining operations 
have continued to come under policy pressure since then (Vientiane 
Times 2014b; Radio Free Asia 2016). There have been reports of arrests 
of local Lao miners tunnelling for hard-rock gold deposits in central 
Xieng Khouang Province in recent years, in part related to safety concerns 
(Vientiane Times 2014c), and there were reports of a number of deaths 
due to tunnel collapses.
The research of Chansouk Insouvanh (2015) in Xaysoumboun Province, 
central Laos, highlights how one community decided to sell communal 
land to an ersatz ‘ecotourism’ venture, rather than experience what was 
likely to be uncompensated losses of communal land due to a state-backed 
rubber plantation project. Such scenarios are not uncommon in Laos 
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and are part of the creation of new agrarian class relations in the context 
of new global investment into natural resource extraction and ‘resource 
frontier’ state–society relations (Barney 2009). As the ‘ecotourism’ 
venture developed, it morphed into a gold-mining operation, and began 
to displace local peasant traditions of river gold-panning. While villagers 
were historically engaged in low-technology gold-panning, they also 
started to access the gold-bearing soil excavated by the company workers, 
and an orientation towards this informal gold-mining activity turned 
into a new means to earn cash income. As with the other cases described 
above, this example highlights the different social, economic and capital 
structures of ‘informal’ gold-mining, and the different capital interests 
(Verbrugge 2014a) in play, which are often linked in different ways back 
to state actors. 
Fieldwork conducted in 2016 in southern Laos’ Xekong and Attapeu 
provinces highlighted the involvement of joint Lao–Vietnamese mining 
operations in the remote Annamite uplands along the Vietnamese 
border. In the upper Xekaman River watershed near the town of Dak 
Cheung, Lao–Vietnamese mining operations were leasing and digging up 
stream-side paddy fields, using backhoe excavators and thakeng sluices. 
One firm engaged in this activity was known locally as Ong Pheuang, 
reported as a subsidiary of the Vietnamese conglomerate Hoàng Anh Gia 
Lai (HAGL), a major corporate investor in southern Laos with interests 
in plantations, hydropower, infrastructure and mining, and with stated 
mining interests in Xekong Province. A retired district official indicated 
that Ong Pheuang had purchased their mining licence from a previous 
Chinese investor named Jiang Kham company, and then sold it onwards 
to another Vietnamese firm called Hui That. Another Chinese investor 
had been engaged in similar gold-mining operations in the district, which 
were halted after the firm did not pay taxes to the district authorities 
(fieldwork interviews, Dak Cheung, 12 March 2016).
The lack of transparency and public information on these medium-scale 
mining arrangements in remote areas of rural Laos, and their generally 
quasi-legal status, makes this a difficult and nebulous area to research 
and understand. Fieldwork highlighted that villagers are largely left to 
their own devices on negotiations when outsiders arrive and request 
access to community land for mining. Local land brokers might also 
serve as intermediaries between village leaders and gold-mining firms 
in these transactions. Villagers can be faced with unresponsive district 
governors when the mining firms renege on their (verbal) agreements 
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with community leaders. District authorities are in turn constrained in 
controlling mining operations when they are subsidiaries of large and 
politically connected external corporate investors in Laos, such as HAGL. 
There was no indication of any formal regulation of these operations by 
the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment. While recently 
the Lao Government announced a crackdown in provincial Attapeu on 
unregulated mining (Radio Free Asia 2016), there has been little mention 
of enforcement against transborder medium-scale mining in other 
provinces, such as in nearby Xekong. 
Marginalised ethnic Katu villagers in the upper Xekaman watershed 
have little previous experience with such mining operations; indeed, 
we encountered a series of villages where backhoe mining had caused 
extensive and likely irreparable damage to wet rice paddy land, which 
also spilled over to affect nearby landowners who did not lease their 
land. Compensation by the companies to landowners for a mining ‘lease’ 
was reported at a meagre LAK10,000–15,000 (US$1.21–1.82) per 
square metre for productive stream-side wet rice paddy land. These local 
agreements purportedly require the mining firms to retill and prepare the 
soil for a resumption of wet rice paddy cultivation at the end of their 
operations. In reality, the soil structure can be so thoroughly degraded 
after intensive sluice mining that the resumption of agriculture is rendered 
impossible. Villagers reported that staff from mining operations, such as 
Ong Pheuang, also engage in opportunistic illegal logging during their 
periods of work in the village locations. Such intensive mining operations 
also remove any future potential for villagers’ own small-scale panning for 
gold in their local streams and rivers, a livelihood option previously shared 
by men and women (Baird and Shoemaker 2008).
In the deep south of Laos’ Attapeu Province, artisanal (non-mechanised) 
miners are active in upland locations, such as in the Dong Amphan 
National Protected Area. One local miner reported yields for dry season 
stream-side panning for gold at 2–3 ‘houn’ of gold per day (worth 
US$33.20–49.80), or 1 ‘baht’ per 20 days (US$666).13 For this yield, 
his cash income over two days in March 2016 reached LKP170,000 
(US$20.59), which was a much better option compared to working as 
13  According to this Lao measurement system, there are 10 ‘houn’ in 1 ‘saleung’, and 4 ‘saleung’ 
in 1 ‘baht’ of gold. Field interviews in 2016 indicated that 1 Lao ‘baht’ of gold represented a value 
of approximately LKP5.5 million (US$666), representing about 15 grams of gold. Using world gold 
prices as of March 2016, 1 ‘houn’ of gold might then represent approximately US$16.60.
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a labourer in nearby HAGL rubber plantations (at LKP40,000 per day; 
US$4.84). Working as a smallholder gold panner had the added benefit 
of flexibility, and maintaining his independence and autonomy outside of 
the disciplinary surveillance of plantation company supervisors (fieldwork 
interviews, 16 March 2016). 
Similar to the other contexts studied in this chapter, Laos demonstrates 
a highly complex and dynamic landscape, involving both artisanal and 
more mechanised forms of gold extraction. A nuanced understanding of 
the actors, provincial and cross-border capital connections, livelihoods and 
environmental impacts of ASM is required for considering effective policy 
interventions. In Laos, one might imagine strengthening legal rights for 
certain forms of informal mining, in combination with better regulation 
and oversight for other patterns of mining that are producing more 
negative social and environmental outcomes. For example, a politically 
empowered ‘mobile informal mining monitoring unit’, sponsored by the 
GoL and donor partners could quite quickly develop an accurate and 
updated assessment of all the different actors and types of informal mining 
occurring in rural and upland Laos, and their ‘capital interests’, as a basis 
for devising more effective policy interventions that are also responsive to 
local people’s circumstances and resource-based livelihoods. 
Reassembling informal gold‑mining for 
development and sustainability?
In India, Indonesia and Laos, reforms to the regulatory framework for 
small-scale mining have been at best uneven and halting, while the vast 
majority of policy focus has been on large-scale mining. There is currently 
little policy learning on informal mining across Asian countries, although 
much greater sharing of best-practice approaches could be promoted. 
This study has provided insights into the potential pathways and limits to 
formalisation beyond a technical policy ‘fix’. By viewing informal gold-
mining as a rational livelihood opportunity that many different people 
are engaged in, we can move beyond discussions of ‘short-term greed’ 
and allegations of the ASM’s various ‘social ills’. While I do not seek to 
underplay the significance of social and environmental concerns, for the 
most part I have found that informal gold miners are everyday people 
and family members, making a living under less-than-ideal circumstances. 
Quite simply, gold-mining can offer a better livelihood than is available 
from various alternatives, even though there are risks, and the financial 
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benefits are unequally distributed amongst the participants. Much of this 
ASGM activity does indeed come at a direct cost for agricultural lands, 
forests and waterways, and problems such as mercury contamination can 
become very serious public health issues. Yet, small-scale gold miners are 
hardly alone in trading off daily income in exchange for compromises on 
longer-term issues of health and ecological sustainability. 
In Jharkhand, India, promoting the basic right of artisanal operators to 
mine (involving rights over land, rights to extract and trade gold and 
rights to safe working conditions) could assist with alleviating conditions 
of extreme poverty. This would entail a re orientation of an (at times) 
coercive relationship between state actors and the rural poor, and would 
require supporting the ability of miners to advocate on their own behalf 
through collective organisations. In comparison, in Central Kalimantan, 
informal mining occurs on a greater scale, and is far more mechanised and 
capitalised. Here, there is arguably a stronger potential for formalisation, 
although the relationships between informal mining operations, 
financiers, state patronage and power, struggles over territory and natural 
resources and new agrarian class formation needs to be placed within the 
frame of analysis. In Laos, formalising ASM policies and regulations are 
hampered by a non-transparent regime of extraction, where capitalised 
informal mining continues with the apparent backing from state actors. 
Domestic and cross-border medium-scale investors and backhoe miners 
are certainly producing negative impacts for marginalised upland ethnic 
minority communities, even though artisanal gold-mining can offer, for 
some, an alternative from commodified labour relations in Laos’ corporate 
resource economy.
The diversity of sites, actors, practices, capital connections and agrarian–
ecological outcomes encompassed by ‘artisanal and small-scale’ (and 
‘medium-scale’) gold-mining in India, Indonesia and Laos makes 
this a highly complex and indeed challenging area of resource studies. 
Considering ASGM as variegated ‘assemblages’ of informal mining 
can help to understand how different components of ASM and scales 
of mechanisation and extraction are organised, institutionalised and 
territorialised in different places. We need better information on the 
key logics through which informal mining is situated in relation to local 
institutions, labour structures, agrarian relations, systems of enclosure 
and displacements over land and political power and patronage, as well 
as how informal mining production connects into global value chains. 
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Participatory initiatives could start by identifying policy options that are 
responsive to collective political actions and social mobilisations, from 
both miners and broader local communities.
Understanding the material, social and political–economic basis for 
ASGM, miners’ livelihood motivations and the variegated ‘conditions of 
informality’ that characterise local people’s mining is therefore a crucial 
precondition for effective policy intervention. However, I also suggest that 
we should not be overly optimistic for fully formalising and regularising 
the vast and undocumented (perhaps undocumentable) ASGM in Asia, 
thereby ‘solving’ associated social–environmental challenges. Some of the 
ASGM occurring across the region is simply too dispersed, small in scale 
and of marginal economic value to attract significant project or state-based 
support. For this ‘micro’-artisanal gold-mining, limited formalisation 
in the form of lifting the burden of illegality, and rolling back systems 
of petty official rent-seeking, could be the most immediate ‘pro-poor’ 
options available. Moving towards the medium-scale of the informal 
mining spectrum, involving use of machinery and more valuable gold 
deposits, zoning and use rights acceptable to local communities could be 
devolved for local benefit with the support of state governments, while 
also avoiding costly and highly bureaucratic formalisation procedures. 
State or donor support packages could also target more capitalised and 
mechanised (and, often, more environmentally problematic) mining 
activities that fall outside of the artisanal or small-scale range, with a focus 
on dialogue, establishing and enforcing community zoning regulations, 
working towards professionalisation, promoting workplace safety and 
improved environmental standards, and providing access to credit and 
technology, with the aim of shifting this activity into the fully formal 
sector (Maconachie and Hilson 2011). 
Divorced from local politics and a responsiveness to both miners’ and 
local  communities’ collective actions, formalisation will remain on the 
margins of policy development. Given elevated gold prices, in this scenario, 
informal gold-mining is likely to simply continue to churn through South 
and Southeast Asia’s forest lands, rice fields and rivers. As an alternative, 
international and donor projects can engage in ASM in a politically 
informed manner, starting with supporting local collective actions, local 
institutions and social movements, to build a grounded, responsive and 
practical framework. Similar challenges have long been apparent in many 
other resource sectors in Asia (for instance, forests and fisheries), even 
if the environmental and social challenges posed by informal mining 
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can at times be especially stark. Building a formalisation framework that 
takes a broader view of regulation that includes community norms and 
standards, and that links community-based resource management with 
local governance initiatives, has provided innovative alternatives to failed 
top-down coercive legal enforcement in natural resource management in 
Asia (e.g. Tyler 2006). In certain contexts of highly intensive, medium-
scale mechanised gold-mining, such as that occurring in Central 
Kalimantan, this would mean accepting that there will likely be less-than-
ideal trade-offs between local ecologies, resource access and mineral-based 
income streams and livelihoods, and that progress will be challenging 
and incremental. Downwardly accountable and locally responsive state 
institutions and an appreciation of the historical logics that support ASM 
within the vast ‘informal economy’ of many developing Global South 
countries are conditions for these interventions. The challenges of building 
such effective state institutions, for reassembling more locally beneficial 
and sustainable mining practices, are where much of the conundrum 
of ASM lies.
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The contributors to this book have covered wide ground, with many of 
them charting new paths and providing new dimensions through which 
to think about informal mining in the contemporary world. The chapters 
have literally taken the readers from one corner of the globe to another, 
from Southeast Asia and mainland Asia, to the heart of Africa and 
Latin America. They have not only followed the historical trajectory of 
informal, artisanal and small-scale mining at continental scales, but also 
at national and local scales. In the process, contributors have examined 
new dimensions of artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM), the idea of 
informality and the broader political–economic processes within which 
it takes place, and dealt with the difficult questions that such mining 
raises. In the process, the contributors have plotted the future direction of 
research into the broader thematic topic.
Clearly, three important aspects emerge from the chapters as crucial for 
scholarly understanding. The first is to link the growth of informal mining 
with political–economic processes. Hidden within these processes are 
the causes of the sudden mushrooming of informal mining in locations 
and contexts that have no history of such activities. Dealing with this 
question would involve understanding the broader context: rural 
stagnation; structural adjustment programs that leave the rural poor to 
fend for themselves; unhelpful states pursuing self-interest that outweighs 
obligation to their citizens; and the global reach of the market in which 
international commodity prices touch the lives of the poor living in 
the most remote areas of the world. Even though contemporary rushes 
for minerals remind us of those of the past, examining the finer details 
reveals them as somewhat different, precisely because of these factors that 
constitute the background within which contemporary extractions are 
occurring. Again, concealed within these broader political and economic 
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processes driven by global forces lie particularities that are essentially local 
in nature; for example, the specific trigger factor(s) that lead to a sudden 
enhancement of mining activities in an area. 
The second aspect is the need to understand mining organisations and the 
oftentimes complex and exploitative labour processes that define informal, 
artisanal and small-scale mining. The lone entrepreneurial miner is largely 
fictional, and modes of mining production exhibit a  vast range, from 
family units operating solo or in groups, to reasonably capital-intensive 
operations managed by contractors on behalf of owners of land or capital 
equipment. The contractors act as intermediaries, hiring labour locally 
and ensuring that they are paid the lowest wages possible. The precarity 
of labour, rather than legal attributes, is one of the manifestations of 
the informality of ASM. The cheap labour, lying at the bottom of the 
production process, makes this kind of mining possible and productive. 
Of this labour, we now know a large proportion are women, sometimes 
acting as independent wage earners, but most often acting as part of 
the family unit of labour, and producing minerals on piece-rate basis 
for up to 12 hours per day. Whether these meagre incomes add to their 
empowerment—that elusive goal for feminist development planners—
by providing a way out of poverty and exploitation remains a pressing 
concern. The back-breaking work that women and men perform in 
such mining leads to innumerable and serious health issues amongst 
the workers. Again, the question as to how best to deal with them poses 
a challenge that remains intractable.
The third aspect is the management of mineral resources and communities’ 
rights. ‘Governance’ of ASM is a challenge in situations of inadequate 
knowledge, especially since institutions have typically aimed to facilitate 
the extraction of minerals by companies and corporations. There remain 
gaps in knowledge, lacunae in laws and poor recognition of more equitable 
systems of governance in legal frameworks. These appear as primary 
obstacles in helping those toiling away in the mines. More importantly, 
there are undeniably close links between informal mineral extraction 
and political power. In this context, governance needs to be creative and 
innovative, taking into consideration the ‘assemblage’ of factors that create 
the local context.
Several almost intractable difficulties inherent to informal, artisanal 
and  small-scale mining become apparent in a close reading of the 
chapters. I will note only three that are important for consideration of 
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the chapters  in  this book. The first is geographical. Whilst we at once 
become aware of the in situ, place-based, local nature of this kind 
of mining, we also become acutely aware of how some of these local 
transformations are integrally linked to global processes and systems. For 
example, high commodity process in international markets, and the ease 
of communication through which a local place becomes global, allowing 
inhabitants to participate in global market processes and supply chains.
The second inherent contradiction is analytical. In a situation in which 
absolute ownership of mineral resources by the state is accepted, how does 
one envisage the judicious, equitable and sustainable management of these 
resources? Is it even possible to relieve ASM of its perceived illegality? 
Is it possible even to contemplate co-management of resources that have 
so far been treated as open and lootable commodities? In other words, and 
to put it simply, is it possible to integrate contemporary notions of justice 
and equity, and contemporary processes of participation and inclusion 
of the marginalised, into the management of mineral resources? 
The third problematic is linked to the two noted above, and concerns the 
elephant in the room—the sustainability of environmental integrity. This 
concern has somehow taken a backseat in discussions of informal, artisanal 
and small-scale mining in recent years, as researchers have tried to point 
to its historical roots, livelihood concerns and to the important economic 
contributions it makes. The major issue has been mercury pollution, 
with global research tending to focus on the damages caused by mercury 
use by artisanal gold miners. However, one could include deforestation, 
deteriorating water quality, changing river regimes, damages to riverbeds 
and lowering of air quality through dust generation and open-air coking 
of artisanally mined coal. Indeed, the harm is not limited to the local 
area. Whilst such mining provides a crucial livelihood for those who are 
involved in it, the effects are commonly borne by those often living in 
areas beyond the mining tracts, and by those who do not receive any 
benefit whatsoever from it. Therefore, questions of environmental justice 
and equity assume an important dimension. If a political economy lens 
allows us to draw attention to the extractivism inherent in states’ neoliberal 
policies, then the need for the protection of environmental integrity for 
future generations encourages us to consider the political and economic 
questions that rise at the local scale. However, the widespread nature of 
ASM implies that there is a growing need to move beyond the micro scale 
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to the macro, and from the present into the future. No extractivism is 
sustainable, whether practised by states or individuals, irrespective of the 
pressing, compelling factors that they might be subject to. 
The task for future researchers is to broaden the definition of mining, but 
at the same time link ASM with rural development and labour processes. 
We now know that stagnating rural economies and oppressive poverty 
are the primary persuasion pushing many rural folks into mining to ‘try 
their luck’, but what we do not know is how many of them—if any—
can indeed strike it rich. In other words, how do mining individuals, 
families and communities handle and perceive money and wealth, and 
in what ways do they build assets, and of what kind? How do gender 
relations change once families and communities begin to diversify their 
livelihoods? This book has provided more questions than answers, and 
the list could be endless. Indeed, can we ask if it is possible to think of 
such mining within the framework of a moral economy? We know how 
large-scale mineral extraction undermines ordinary people’s livelihoods 
and benefits the companies and corporations besides the states. In this 
context, can one theorise informal mining as an expression of resistance?
These are some questions amongst many for the future generations of 
scholars to answer. I will end this book with these questions, hoping that 
they will be debated by upcoming researchers.
